Ceylon Special Forces. The main enemy is "Tamil tigers
Part 1. War at sea
Since 1983, in Sri Lanka, the armed conflict between the Sinhalese-led government of the country and the Tamil minority demanding independence has been fading, then flaring up. The main struggle is in the northern and eastern provinces, which are predominantly Tamil, although some combat operations held by the rebels in the capital of the country. The geographic status of Sri Lanka as an island nation has left its mark on the conflict, making it stand out sharply among similar ones: rarely does an insurgency war have such a clearly defined maritime component.
One of the biggest problems for anyone partisan movement is the procurement and delivery of weapons and military materials. Lacking legal means to acquire and transport weapons, insurgent groups often have to spend more manpower and resources on this than directly on fighting. This issue has acquired particular urgency for the "Tigers of Liberation of Tamil Eelam", not only deprived of any support from other countries, but also forced to carry out supplies almost exclusively by sea. To carry out these tasks, a wing of the Sea Tigers was created as part of the Tamil armed formations. The basis of their “fleet” is made up of small speedboats, both purchased in other countries and produced in underground handicraft “factories”. Initially, the boats were assigned exclusively transport functions, but gradually the opposition of the Sri Lankan fleet forced the Tamils to start creating combat units. In the late 80s, some of the boats were equipped with small-caliber rapid-fire cannons and machine guns; in the early 90s, improvised explosive boats appeared, driven by suicide bombers from the Black Sea Tigers unit. In the mid-90s, a detachment of combat swimmers-saboteurs (Sea Leopards) was created.
By the beginning of the conflict, the Sri Lankan fleet consisted of two patrol vessels of its own construction, Jayasagara and Sagarawardana, six large Chinese-made patrol boats of the Shanghai-2 type, several dozen small patrol boats and support vessels. The escalation of the conflict forced the government of Sri Lanka to start purchasing ships from abroad. The most useful acquisition was the Israeli small patrol boats of the Dvora and Super Dvora types, which were delivered in several batches starting in 1987. In addition, their licensed production is organized at the shipyard in Colombo. In total, more than two dozen boats of these types were purchased and built under license. The composition of the fleet was replenished by several civilian ships converted into auxiliary reconnaissance and control vessels (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces of Ukraine) or military transports.
The coast of Sri Lanka, inhabited by Tamils, stretches for several hundred kilometers from the Mannara region on the northwest coast to the Pottuvila region in the southeast. During the initial period of the conflict, the Tamils established numerous bases in neighboring India, in the state of Tamilnadu, populated by ethnic relatives. The delivery of goods and fighters was carried out through the narrow Polk Strait, dotted with numerous islands, which greatly hampered the actions of government forces. The almost complete absence of the aviation component of the Sri Lankan armed forces in the first few years of the confrontation also did not contribute to the successful fight against numerous border violators, who, moreover, preferred to carry out their operations at night.
During this period, the Sri Lankan fleet used the following tactics: patrol ships and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, with more or less good radars, were located at a distance of 5-10 miles from each other and combed the strait. In the event that an enemy (or simply a suspected watercraft) was detected, they aimed high-speed patrol boats at the target. This tactic was successful against the slow fishing boats used by the Tamils at first, but proved ineffective against the fast fiberglass boats that soon appeared. Therefore, the acquisition of “Yard”, capable of independently finding, pursuing and destroying targets, has become so important.
In 1988, the situation changed qualitatively. India, which has tens of millions of Tamils, has expressed great concern about the terror carried out by the government of Sri Lanka against the Tamil minority. However, India's intervention in protecting the Tamils turned out to be very “non-standard”: troops sent to Sri Lanka were supposed to defeat the rebels, thus depriving the Sinhalese government of “reasons” for persecuting the Tamils. As part of the operation carried out by India, the Tigers' bases in the state of Tamil Nadu were destroyed, which forced the rebels to relocate to Southeast Asia (in particular, to Burma) and organize supplies by sea through the Bay of Bengal.
At this stage, the Tamils began to acquire, albeit small, but still sea vessels, since the boats clearly could not replace them in “deep” sea operations. Gradually, a fleet of several merchant ships was formed (for obvious reasons, their number is not known exactly, but in all likelihood does not exceed a dozen). Most of the time, such vessels carry out regular charter orders, and crews are recruited from seafarers from different countries peace. However, periodically they deliver military cargo to the coast of Sri Lanka, and the crew in such operations consists exclusively of Sea Tigers. An exemplary scheme of the operation in this case is as follows. The transport vessel approaches the shore for approximately 50 miles, where it meets with the boats to which it transfers its cargo. The boats that have received the cargo are divided into several detachments and proceed to the unloading points. They are covered by detachments consisting of combat and exploding boats. In the event of a meeting with the ships of the government fleet, the cover detachments start a fight with them, regardless of the balance of forces, since the functioning of the entire Tiger organization depends on the delivery of the cargo. The operation is planned in such a way that its most important stage (the transfer of cargo and its delivery to the shore) falls at night. Due to the fact that the government of Sri Lanka has imposed a severe embargo on the supply of goods to Tamil-controlled regions, the cargo often includes not only weapons and ammunition, but also fuel, medicines, medical equipment, and other materials. Such a delivery scheme excludes the transportation of large-sized weapons, so the most "heavy" weapons purchased by the Tamils are mortars and small multiple rocket launchers. All the tanks and artillery pieces that the Tigers possess are captured as trophies from the government forces.
Due to the disparity in the forces of the fleets of the government and the rebels, the latter suffer significant losses in boats, both combat and transport. However, it is not possible to obtain any complete statistics on the losses of the “mosquito” Tamil fleet, so in the future we will focus on describing incidents with larger ships. We only note that, despite the losses incurred, the Tamil "fleet" is still generally coping with the main - transport - task, which is confirmed by maintaining the combat capability of the "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam" at a fairly high level.
In 1991, after the withdrawal of Indian troops, the Sri Lankan fleet, in addition to the usual fight against rebel transportation, was also involved in major operations to support the ground army. So, the Navy boats carried out the supply, and then the evacuation of the troops besieged in Jaffna Fort. The voyages to Jaffna took place under heavy fire from the shore and were nicknamed the "Suicide Express" among the Sri Lankan sailors. Even more important role the fleet played in the defense of Elephant Pass, a strategically important point that closed access to the Jaffna Peninsula. To support the besieged garrison, a major landing operation was carried out, during which more than 7,000 troops were landed on the shore, who managed to “break through” the corridor to Elephant Pass and prevent its fall.
However, the Tamils also did not waste time and increased their combat capabilities. July 10, 1990 recorded the first attack of the "Tigers" using exploding boats, when it was damaged, but the APU "Edithara" remained afloat. And on May 4, 1991, the first completely successful attack of katerniks-kamikaze took place, as a result of which the Abitha APU was destroyed.
The Sri Lankan Navy also suffered losses as a result of accidents. So, in October 1992, as a result of a storm, the large landing craft “Kandula” (one of two Singapore-built ships acquired in 1985) sank. Although in December of the same year it was possible to raise it, however, Kandula never returned to the Navy.
In August 1993, the first Dvora, along with the entire crew of 13, was killed in a battle with Tamil boats. In the same year, when attacking the Punerin garrison (located on the southern shore of the Jaffna lagoon opposite the city of the same name), the Tigers captured 5 small 13-meter patrol boats of government troops.
On August 16, 1994, the debut of Tamil combat swimmers took place: in the harbor of Kankesanthurai (the main port through which government troops are supplied on the Jaffna Peninsula), they sank the A516 APU and the tug "Dheera".
Just a month later, on September 20, the Tigers destroyed the largest warship they have sunk to date: the Sagarawardana patrol ship (tail number P600) attacked by a kamikaze sank with for the most part crew, and his commander was captured.
Losses and an increasing volume of tasks forced the government of Sri Lanka to constantly purchase new ships. Acquisitions were dominated by Chinese-built vessels: three large patrol boats of the “Improved Shanghai-2” type (1991), a patrol ship “Parakramabahu” (a former anti-submarine ship of the “Haiqing” type, 1995), three large patrol boats of the “Haizhu” type (1996) , as well as the Shakthi amphibious assault ship (Wuhu-A class, 1995) and 2 Yunnan-class large landing craft (one in 1991 and the second in 1995). In Singapore, two more large landing craft were purchased, of the same type as those purchased in the 80s (in 1991 and 1992), and in Israel, two small patrol boats of the “Shaldag” type (1996).
The Tigers also suffered losses in ships, and not only from the actions of the Sri Lankan army. So, in December 1990, the Tamil cargo ship "Golden Bird" was arrested by the Malaysian authorities. In January 1993, the Indian Navy intercepted the Ahat, on board of which the Tamils, led by the founder of the Sea Tigers wing, did not give up and blew themselves up along with the ship. It should be noted that in the future, the crews of the intercepted insurgent ships preferred to die rather than be captured.
A brief truce concluded at the end of 1994 ended in the spring of the following year. The beginning of a new phase of the conflict was marked by an attack by Tamil combat swimmers on ships in the harbor - the main base of the Sri Lankan Navy on the east coast of the island. The saboteurs who entered the harbor sank two large patrol boats: “Sooraya” (tail number P310, type “Shanghai-2”) and “Ranasuru” (tail number P320, type “Improved Shanghai-2”).
On July 16, 1995, in the harbor of Kankesanthurai, saboteurs sank the Edithara APU. This vessel has repulsed Tamil attacks several times in the past and even survived being hit by an exploding boat. Now the patrol ship “Edithara”, named after its honored predecessor, operates in the Sri Lankan fleet.
On August 28, 1995, off the coast of Jaffna, the Tamils seized the passenger ferry Irish Mona. Arrived at the scene of the incident, two patrol "Yards" inadvertently approached the ferry and were sunk from anti-tank grenade launchers, the crews were missing. The ferry itself was subsequently abandoned by the Tigers off the coast of the peninsula.
In February 1996, the Kfirs of the Sri Lankan Air Force sank the Tamil transport ship Sea Bird, which was carrying weapons and ammunition, near Mullaitivu.
In July 1996, the rebels launched a large-scale operation to capture Mullaitiwa. The Sri Lankan Navy tried to help the dying garrison with both artillery fire and landings. At the same time, a large patrol boat "Ranaviru" (tail number P321, type "Improved Shanghai-2") was sunk by an exploding boat, the crew of 40 people died.
In 1997, the Tigers carried out a series of anti-truck operations along the island's east coast. In early July, the passenger ferry “Misen” was sunk. At the same time, the Tamils seized the North Korean ship "Mo Rang Bong", released after several weeks of negotiations. On September 9, in the Pulmoddai region (between Mullaitivu and Trincomalee), the Gordeliti ship was attacked, sailing with a cargo of ilmenite ore (the processing plant in the Pulmoddai region is not working because the Tamils control the main sources of water supply, but the government is gradually developing this deposit, which provides valuable raw materials for the production of titanium). Having sunk several motor boats guarding the ship, the Tigers landed saboteurs on board, who sent the Gordeliti to the bottom.
In mid-1997, an unusual, almost Detective story worthy of a Hollywood action movie. The Sri Lankan government ordered a batch of 30,000 mortar rounds. The order was placed in Zimbabwe, although Croatia and Bulgaria offered almost half the price. It was the purchase at clearly inflated prices that attracted the attention of the parliamentary opposition, which organized an investigation into the transaction. The investigation revealed much more interesting fact than a simple embezzlement of public funds: the ammunition was loaded on a chartered vessel "Stillus Lymasul", but it did not arrive at the port of destination. And after a while, information appeared that the mines were unloaded ... on the coast occupied by the rebels. According to existing versions, the Tamils either simply “bought” information about the time and route of the cargo, or even “substituted” one of their ships for freight. Indirect confirmation that the cargo fell into the hands of the Tigers was a barrage of mortar fire that fell over the next few months on government troops carrying out an operation with the loud code name “Guaranteed Victory” (at that time it seemed to the Sri Lankan military that victory was really close, although, as showed subsequent events, it was an overly optimistic view).
A few months later, in November of the same year, an unmanned reconnaissance drone discovered a ship standing off the coast in the Tamil-occupied Mullaitivu area. The Kfirs sent by the Sri Lankan Air Force sank the ship, from which, according to government sources, they did not have time to unload most of the cargo. In turn, the Tigers stated that the destroyed ship was in fact the previously captured Stillus Lymasul, exposed as bait for the Sri Lankan Navy (similar to the Irish Mona operation). Who was right will not be known soon (if it ever becomes clear at all). Perhaps it really turned out to be “Stillus Lymasul”, but it had already come to the Tamils with a new batch of weapons.
On October 19, 1997, another Dvora was sunk in a battle with Tamil boats. And in February 1998, off the coast of Jaffna, the Tigers attacked a large government convoy. With the help of exploding boats, the large landing craft "Pabbatha" (Singapore-built) and the cargo ship "Valampuri" were sunk. More than 40 sailors and soldiers of government forces died on board both ships.
In August 1998, the Tamils hijacked the cargo ship Princess Kash, which was carrying general cargo. Placed for unloading in the harbor of Mullaitivu, it was sunk on the same day by the Kfirs.
Soon the Sri Lankan Navy lost two more "Yards": on October 30, 1998 as a result of a kamikaze attack and on January 1, 1999 as a result of an internal explosion on board a boat that was in the port of Talaimannar.
March 1999 brought losses to the Tigris: in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Navy intercepted the ship "Mariamma". When the Indian ships approached, the Tamils left it on a speedboat, having previously laid explosive charges that destroyed the ship. Interestingly, instead of gratitude, the Sri Lankan government demanded that the Indians hand over the ship and cargo to them, since they assumed that they could be captured by the neighbors' navies.
In early 2000, the Tamils launched a large-scale operation to seize Elephant Pass. In this case, the landing force in the amount of 1,500 people, landed by the Tigers on the flank of the defenders, played a crucial role. Elephant Pass fell. During these battles, on one of the April days, the Sri Lankan Navy lost two Yard at once: one was sunk in battle with Tamil boats, and the other - by the fire of a captured tank from the shore. A similar story repeated itself in June of the same year: one "Dvora" sank from the damage received in battle with the Tigers' boats, the second was sunk by mistake by its Mi-24 helicopter.
Meanwhile, the government fleet was constantly replenished with new ships and boats. Based on the design of the Shaldag boats, at least 10 Colombo-type boats were built at the local shipyard. In 1997, 6 small patrol boats of the “Trinity Marine” type arrived from the USA, in 1998 - 3 boats of the “Killer” type from South Korea. In 2000, the Sri Lankan Navy added two large Chinese-built Lushun-class patrol boats (a further development of the Haizhu class) and two ex-Israeli Saar 4.5-class missile boats. The latest acquisition caused particularly sharp criticism from the parliamentary opposition, since it was not clear against which enemy the missile weapons of these boats could be used: Tamil fiberglass boats are too small a target, and shooting from afar at a large ship in the Bay of Bengal with its intensive shipping, without first making sure that that this is really the ship of the Tigers, no one, of course, will dare. Finally, the former Indian frigate “Saryu” was acquired, which became the largest ship of the Sri Lankan fleet today and received the new name “Sayura”.
On June 26, 2000, the Tamils attacked the tanker "Merces Uhana", which was hit by an exploding boat and sank after several hours of fire. It is assumed that the actual target of the operation was the ship "Lanka Muditha", sailing seaward with 1,500 government troops on board.
In October of the same year, the Tigers made an attempt to attack the enemy right in the harbor of Trincomalee. Two exploding boats entered the port, but this time they failed to cause significant damage to the government fleet. The attack resulted only in severe damage to the high-speed transport "Lihiniya" (tail number A541) and damage to one of the large patrol boats.
But the "Yards" continued to suffer losses during normal operations: one was killed in battle with the Tamils in the same October 2000, another one - in March of the following year.
On September 14, 2001, Tiger boats attacked the Pride of south, which was carrying over 1,300 government soldiers. The ship was closely escorted by two small French-built patrol boats, which managed to hold out until help arrived, although one of these boats was sunk by a Tamil kamikaze. In the ensuing battle, one of the "Dvor" received heavy damage, 6 members of its crew were killed, the rest were injured. However, with the support of combat helicopters, the attack on the main target - with troops - was thwarted, and the damaged Dvora was towed to the base.
In 2002, the warring parties entered into a truce that has lasted to the present day. However, clashes occur from time to time at sea as the Tamils continue their transport operations. The strengthening of the government fleet allowed him to achieve a number of successes. Thus, on March 10, 2003, the Tamil tanker Koimar was intercepted and sunk.
On June 10 of the same year, the Sri Lankan Navy ship Nandimithra (a former Israeli Saar 4.5-class missile boat) discovered a suspicious vessel. However, during the rendezvous on Nandimithra, the propulsion system failed and contact was lost. The Sri Lankan fleet organized a large-scale search operation, and on June 16 they discovered the same (or possibly another) vessel. This time the operation was successful and as a result the tanker “Shoshin” was destroyed.
However, according to information coming from Sri Lanka (which, of course, cannot be considered completely reliable), the Tigers managed to make a number of large deliveries in the subsequent period. By the end of 2004, the situation was on the verge of resuming large-scale hostilities. However, nature unexpectedly intervened in the plans of the parties. The recent tsunami took a heavy toll on the entire east and south coast of Sri Lanka. The harbor was engulfed in war and sank the patrol ship "Parakramabahu" and the landing craft L820 (apparently soon raised with the help of the Indian Navy). In the harbor of Trincomalee, three-quarters of the ships of the Sri Lankan Navy concentrated there were damaged, but none sank. According to government sources, the military has developed a plan for the urgent withdrawal of damaged ships from Trincomalee in case the city is stormed by the rebels. However, these preparations were clearly superfluous. The Tamils also suffered heavy losses from the tsunami, more severe than the Sri Lankan Navy, since their "mosquito" ships were much less likely to withstand the elements.
At the moment, it is unlikely that any of the parties will decide to start hostilities after devastating tsunami. However...
In accordance with the classification adopted by the Tamils, the period of the war from its beginning to the invasion of Indian troops is called Eelam War I (“eelam” in Tamil “state”), from the withdrawal of Indian troops to the truce concluded at the end of 1994 - Eelam War II, since 1995 to 2002 - Eelam War III. Today, the term Eelam War IV is increasingly common in the Sri Lankan press. There is no war yet, but it already has a name.
Part 2. Aviation
By the beginning of the conflict, the Sri Lankan Air Force was in a state of disrepair and in fact could only use 7 Bell 206 helicopters and a few DC-3 transport aircraft. To perform combat missions, these helicopters were urgently armed with 70-mm NURS installations and 12.7-mm machine guns. In addition, 2 more helicopters of the same type and 2 Bell 212s were purchased in 1984.
In order to assist the fleet in interdicting Tamil traffic, the 3rd Marine Reconnaissance Squadron was formed, equipped with mobilized civilian aircraft (3 deHavilland Doves, 1 deHavilland Heron, 2 Riley Skyliner Heron), located in China Bay (near Trincomalee). These aircraft could patrol the airspace over the sea for a long time and direct combat boats at suspicious watercraft, but the lack of the necessary equipment did not allow them to operate at night, when the Tigers carried out the bulk of their transport operations. In the second half of the 80s, the squadron was replenished with six Cessna 337 Super Skymasters.
The escalation of the conflict forced the acquisition of aircraft capable of providing direct support to troops on the battlefield. The choice fell on the Siai Marchetti SF-260 - a light training and combat training aircraft. The first 3 SF-260s arrived in 1985, and two of them crashed that same year. The following year, the Air Force replenished with 5 machines of this type, and in 1988 - three more. In 1990-1991, 12 used SF-260s were purchased from Myanmar (Burma). Capable of carrying up to 300 kg of bombs (with a maximum caliber of 114 kg), 70 mm NURS and machine guns on suspensions, the SF-260 was very popular in Sri Lanka and was the main strike aircraft until the mid-90s.
The helicopter component has also significantly increased - in order to carry out combat and transport tasks in 1985, 9 Bell 212s were purchased, armed with 12.7-mm machine guns in the side openings and two NURS units or machine guns on suspensions. These helicopters were often used by special forces. 4 Bell 412s (in 1985) and 3 Bell 212s (in 1986) were purchased for the transportation of command personnel and transportation of goods.
Given the particular importance of supplying the garrisons besieged by the rebels, the Air Force's transport capabilities were reinforced by three Avro HS748, two Y-8 and nine Y-12. The latter turned out to be the most valuable acquisition and became the “workhorse” of the war, being engaged not only in the transfer of troops and cargo, but also in reconnaissance over the sea. Moreover, Y-12s were actively used as improvised bombers.
From October 1987 to March 1990, Indian aviation conducted combat work against the Tamils. As a result of the almost complete lack of air defense systems among the rebels, the Indian Air Force, despite 70,000 sorties, did not lose a single aircraft.
Since 1987, rarely any operation of government forces has been without air support: planes and helicopters have attacked the enemy, landed troops, evacuated the wounded, delivered ammunition, fuel, and food. The Tigers, in turn, made attempts to strengthen air defense. On September 13, 1990, during a flight to support the troops besieged in Fort Jaffna, an SF-260 was shot down, the pilot of which became the first Sri Lankan pilot to die from enemy fire in this conflict.
In the summer of 1992, a Y-12 crashed during Operation Balavegaya II, killing all 18 on board. Presumably, the cause of the death of the impromptu "bomber" was the explosion of his own bomb.
In 1991, Chinese jet fighters entered service with the Sri Lankan Air Force: 4 single-seat F-7BS, and "sparks" - 1 FT-7 and 2 FT-5. These machines turned out to be not the best choice for solving the existing range of tasks: too fast and not having a good aiming system, they could neither effectively support ground troops nor fight Tamil boats. Therefore, already in 1992, 4 IA 58 Pukara attack aircraft were purchased in Argentina. However, the “Argentines” did not live up to their expectations, mainly due to frequent breakdowns and problems with spare parts. By the end of 1997, the remaining Pukars were laid up, and a few years later they were finally written off.
Finally, in 1995, the first 6 Kfirs purchased from Israel entered service with the government Air Force. This jet fighter-bomber showed itself very well in Sri Lanka when attacking Tiger formations on the line of contact, their rear bases and ships, thus becoming a worthy “successor” to the SF-260, now transferred from combat training to just training.
The helicopter wing was also strengthened: in 1992, 12 Mi-17s were purchased in Russia, and Ukraine delivered 3 more aircraft of this type in 1996. The significantly larger carrying capacity of the Mi-17 compared to the Bell 212 made it possible to entrust it with the bulk of the tasks of supplying troops on the front line, while the Bell 212 began to be used mainly in the interests of special forces. However, Mi-17s were sometimes involved in landing, for example, during the battles for the Mullaitivu base in July 1996.
The next logical step towards increasing the capabilities of the Air Force was the acquisition of the first truly combat helicopter - in 1995-1996, 6 Mi-24s arrived from Ukraine, which immediately went into “work”. Among their goals were not only land, but also sea ones - thanks to their low speed and powerful weapons, the "crocodile" became a serious opponent of the Tigers' boats. In the same place and at the same time, 7 An-32s were purchased, which, together with the Y-12, formed the basis of transport aviation.
The Tamils did not sit idly by. On the "black market" they purchased the Strela MANPADS (presumably from the stocks of the Cambodian army). On April 28, 1995, an HS748 was shot down by a missile near Palali Air Base (on the Jaffna Peninsula), killing 54 passengers and crew members. The next day, the Tamils destroyed another HS748 in the same place, killing 51 people.
On September 13, an An-32 crashed into the sea in the area (75 dead). According to one version, the cause of the disaster was an explosive device planted on board. The same fate befell the An-32 in the Palali region on November 28 (63 dead).
On November 18, while approaching Palali, a Y-8 was shot down by ground fire, all 5 people on board became victims of the incident.
On January 22, 1996, an Mi-17 with 39 servicemen on board disappeared without a trace off the northeast coast. Another loss occurred at the end of the year: on December 7, a Bell 212 carrying a number of top commanders from the Jaffna Peninsula, for technical reasons, made an emergency landing in Tiger-controlled territory. As a result of an urgently organized rescue operation, people were taken out, but the helicopter itself had to be blown up.
1997 brought a lot of trouble to the Sri Lankan Air Force. On January 20, a Y-12 patrol flight went missing in the Jaffna area. The next day, in the Negombo region, the Kfir fell into the sea.
On February 21, an An-32 crashed while taking off from the Ratmalana airfield. The plane crashed in a nearby swampy area, killing 3 of the 62 people on board. And exactly two months later, on April 21, there was a flight accident with another An-32: in conditions of poor visibility, the plane made a hard landing, the landing gear broke, the propellers and fuselage were damaged. Although the damage was severe (specialists estimated the cost of restoration at half the purchase price), none of those on the plane died.
On March 6, during an attack on China Bay Air Base, the Tamils destroyed another Y-12 on the ground. On March 16, the Pukara exploded during a training flight. On March 19, an Mi-24 disappeared near the Jaffna Peninsula (along with 8 servicemen on board).
On November 10, an Mi-24 was shot down off the northeast coast and fell into the water, both pilots died, but the shooters managed to escape. November 25 crashed Bell 212. In addition to all of the above, was lost trainer SF-260.
Since 1997, the Sri Lankan army has actively begun to use UAVs acquired in Israel. With their help, it was possible to detect a number of important targets, for example, a small test runway built by the Tamils or supply vessels. Of course, intensive use also entailed losses: in 1997-1999, at least 6 UAVs crashed.
On January 4, 1998, a Mi-17, which had just landed, was hit by an RPG in the Olumadu area, delivering supplies to the troops involved in Operation Jayasikuruy.
On June 26, a Mi-24 crashed in the area. The Tamils claimed their involvement in the incident, however, given that it is located deep in the rear of government troops in the territory inhabited by the Sinhalese, an ordinary disaster seems more likely.
In September of the same year, a tragic incident occurred with an An-24 civilian aircraft flying from Jaffna to Colombo. Apparently, he was mistaken for a transporter of government troops and shot down by a MANPADS missile in the area of Mannar Island, the crew and passengers were killed.
In 1999, the Sri Lankan Air Force acquired 4 Bell 212s and 3 Mi-35s. It should be noted that although the first "crocodiles" were purchased in Ukraine for a very small amount, but the constant problems with maintaining them in working condition contributed to the decision in favor of the supply of Mi-35 from Russia - although 3 times more expensive, but with obligatory technical support " Rostvertol".
However, a real “boom” in aircraft purchases followed in 2000. On the one hand, it was caused by a series of heavy defeats suffered by government forces since November 1999. On the other hand, the successfully growing economy has finally allowed the government of Sri Lanka to start implementing extensive plans for the technical re-equipment of aviation, army and navy. 8 Kfirovs were received from Israel, 6 MiG-27s and 3 An-32s from Ukraine, 2 S-130s from Great Britain. From 2000 to 2004, Russia delivered at least 20 more Mi-35s, resulting in a 4-fold increase in the number of attack helicopters.
The “oldies” SF-260W were replaced by the training RT-6 and K-8 purchased in China. Light transport aviation has been replenished with several Beech King Air 200s. One of the Beech 200s was delivered in a reconnaissance version and is equipped with equipment for intercepting and direction finding radio communications, as well as infrared scanners. At the same time, plans to resuscitate the 3rd Naval Reconnaissance Squadron, which had been left without equipment by that moment, were not realized due to lack of funds.
Naturally, the Sri Lankan Air Force not only replenished, but also suffered losses. In December 1999, during fierce fighting in the Parantana area, it was hit and fell into the Jaffna Mi-24 lagoon. Another Mi-24 was shot down near Chavakacherri on May 24, 2000, both shooters were killed, the pilots were injured, but managed to make an emergency landing. In October of the same year, during an attack by Tamil “kamikazes” on the harbor of Trincomalee, a cover group shot down another Mi-24 with a missile. Half of the crew survived, and the helicopter itself with the bodies of the dead pilots was raised a few days later.
At the height of the fighting, there were not enough own forces for transportation, so the government rented several aircraft. One of them, an An-26 with a Ukrainian crew, was shot down on March 30, 2000 in the Vavuniya region by a MANPADS missile. The crew and more than 30 wounded on board were killed.
They contributed to losses and flight accidents not directly related to hostilities. So, on July 24, an F-7 crashed near Colombo, and on September 15, an Mi-17 carrying several high-ranking government officials crashed on the east coast. In August 2001, a MiG-27 crashed.
The Tamil attack on the Katanaike air base in July 2001 gained great notoriety. The sabotage group, having penetrated the airfield, destroyed two Kfirs, one MiG-27, two Mi-17s and three K-8s. Since the military airfield of Katanaike is actually single complex with Colombo International Airport, the saboteurs were not limited to the military aircraft, “adding” to them 4 more burned-out airbuses (2 A-330, 1 A-320 and 1 A-340) of the Lion Air company, which is jointly owned by Sri Lanka and the United Arab Emirates.
In early 2002, the government and the rebels signed a truce, but after that the composition of the Air Force decreased by several aircraft due to accidents: in August 2002, a Y-8 crashed, in September of the same year, a Kfir, and on June 9, 2004 another MiG-27.
In conclusion, let us say a few words about the structure and basing of Sri Lankan aviation today. There are 5 main air bases: Katanaike, Ratmalana (south of Colombo), Vavuniya, Anuradhapura and Minneriya (east of Anuradhapura). Auxiliary air bases in Palali, China Bay, Amparai and are also important. The 5th Fighter Squadron (Mig-27, F-7, FT-7, FT-5), the 10th Fighter Squadron (Kfirs), the 4th Helicopter Squadron are based in Katanaik, whose task is to transport VIPs (Bell 206 and Bell 412), as well as the 14th training squadron equipped with K-8. The 2nd Heavy Transport Squadron (An-32, S-130) and the 8th Light Transport Squadron (Y-12 and Beech 200) are located in Ratmalan. The 7th (Bell 206 and Bell 212) and 9th (Mi-24 and Mi-35) squadrons are based in Minneriya. The 6th Helicopter Squadron on the Mi-17 and the 11th Aviation Unit operating UAVs are located in Vavuniya. Finally, the 1st training air wing is based in Anuradhapura on RT-6, Cessna-150 and SF260TP.
Part 3. Fighting on land
The population of Sri Lanka is ethnically heterogeneous: about 70% are Sinhalese who arrived on the island in the 5th century BC, 20% are Tamils, whose active penetration into the northern and eastern regions of the country is associated with the 5th century AD, up to 7 % falls on Muslims - descendants of Tamils and Sinhalese who profess Islam. The Tamil settlement area covers the districts (districts) of Mannar, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara. The most densely populated peninsula is Jaffna, on which the eponymous is located - the historical capital of the Tamils. The peninsula is separated from the main part of the island by the Jaffna lagoon, and in turn consists of three sectors, practically separated by small winding bays: Valikamam (in which the city of Jaffna is located), Tenmarachchi ( main city- Kodikamam) and Vadamarachchi (a narrow strip of land in the northeast of the peninsula from Point Pedro to Kaddaikadu). A vast area with an underdeveloped road network, often covered with jungle, south of the Jaffna peninsula to the Vavuniya region is called Vani. The settlements mentioned in the future when describing the hostilities are highlighted in bold on the attached maps of the Northern Front and the Vavuniya-Mankulam region.
Relations between the main ethnic groups have always been marked by tension, often resulting in interethnic clashes. In the early 1980s, the Tamil militant organization "Tigers for the Liberation of Tamil Eelam" began to operate in the northern regions of the country, headed by V. Pirapaharan. The start date of the “hot” phase of the conflict is considered to be July 23, 1983, when 13 Sri Lankan soldiers died as a result of an attack by Tamils near Palali (near Jaffna). In response, Tamil pogroms broke out in the country's capital, Colombo, and a number of other areas, killing up to 3,000 people. Under these conditions, not only radical, but also many "moderate" Tamils supported the armed struggle. Within a few months, the uprising swept through vast areas of the north and east of Sri Lanka.
By the beginning of the conflict, the armed forces of Sri Lanka were in a state of decline. The absence of external enemies and a weak economy did not contribute to the creation of a well-equipped and trained army. Therefore, the Sri Lankan government immediately took up the acquisition of military equipment, mostly outdated and used, but quite suitable for fighting the rebels. Without going into a detailed chronological list, we will describe the main range of weapons purchased by Sri Lanka so far. T-59 tanks, T-86 infantry fighting vehicles (a copy of the Soviet BMP-1) and wheeled T-92 infantry fighting vehicles, T-63 and T-85 tracked armored personnel carriers, 122-mm and 130-mm artillery pieces, 152-mm howitzers. The Czech Republic supplied T-55 tanks and 122-mm MLRS. BMP-1, BMP-3 and BTR-80 were purchased in Russia. Armored vehicles “Saladin” and armored personnel carrier “Saracen” arrived from Great Britain, armored personnel carrier “Buffel” from South Africa. The lack of qualified personnel forced at first to hire military specialists from the UK, Pakistan and Israel.
Improved not only technical equipment army - it grew quantitatively: in a few years from the moment the uprising began, the armed forces increased from 15 to more than 100 thousand military personnel. Numerous police units also joined the fight against the Tamils. At the same time, the number of "tiger" formations (including various auxiliary units, including women's and youth) usually did not exceed 10-15 thousand people, which is primarily due to difficulties in providing more fighters with weapons and ammunition. Like the government, the Tamils had to go through long haul to the formation of truly combat-ready units. We also note that the rebels do not enjoy the support of any country in the world, and the financial base of the uprising is primarily provided by numerous Tamil communities in developed countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Canada (for example, Tamils make up about 30% of the population of Singapore).
At the first stage of the conflict, in addition to conducting actual hostilities, both sides widely practiced terror against the civilian population, which claimed the lives of thousands of Tamils and Sinhalese. There were also cases of "cleansing" by government troops of some areas from the Tamil population with their subsequent colonization by "trustworthy" citizens. So, as a result of such an action, the Tamil region of Manal Aru (to the northeast of Vavuniya) was inhabited by Sinhalese and was named Veli Oya. As a result, the Sri Lankan authorities have driven a wedge between the northern and eastern Tamil regions.
In 1985, the Tigers took control of virtually the entire Jaffna peninsula, including their capital. Government troops were blocked in the garrisons of Palali and Point Pedro.
In May 1987, the greatly strengthened Sri Lankan army launched its first major offensive, codenamed "Liberation". During heavy fighting, the Tigers were driven out of most of the Vadamarachchi sector, thus establishing a ground line between Palali and Point Pedro. In these battles, artillery and improvised Avro and Y-12 bombers were widely used, striking not so much at the enemy as at the settlements controlled by the Tamils.
Worried about the numerous civilian casualties and the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees, neighboring India in July 1987 forced the government of Sri Lanka to agree to a cessation of hostilities and the provision of limited autonomy to the Tamil regions. In exchange, the Indians pledged to disarm the Tamils, i.e. actually carry out a military operation to defeat them, since the Tigers categorically refused to lay down their arms.
The Indian offensive on Jaffna began on October 11, 1987. On the night of October 12, troops were landed in the Jaffna University area from 4 Mi-8s to capture the leadership of the Tigers, but this special operation failed. Several helicopters were damaged by small arms fire, only 120 paratroopers were able to land (they were tasked with guarding the stadium where the helicopters landed) and 30 Sikh commandos, who were supposed to capture the Tamil leaders. In the ensuing battle, 29 commandos and 6 paratroopers were killed. The remnants of the landing force were saved the next day by three T-72s that made their way to the rescue.
The fierce battle for Jaffna, which claimed the lives of over 400 Indian soldiers, went on for 17 days. Strong air and artillery strikes were inflicted on the city, which caused great casualties among the civilian population. By the end of the defense, the Tigers, whose losses were comparable to the Indian ones, managed to evacuate the main forces in the Vanni.
The capture of Jaffna, contrary to the hopes of the Indian command, did not lead to the defeat of the Tamil detachments, which switched to guerrilla warfare. The Indian "peacekeeping" contingent was gradually brought up to 100,000 people, but this did not give the expected effect. Constant partisan attacks embittered the "peacekeepers", who began to act in the same way as the Sri Lankan army had previously. The participation of Indians in the massacres, the high cost of the operation and the growing losses caused discontent in India itself. As a result, by March 1990, the Indian army left Sri Lanka, having lost by this time only about 1,150 soldiers killed. Already after the withdrawal of troops, in 1992, the Tamils executed the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, who organized the invasion: during an election rally, a kamikaze woman approached him, blowing herself up along with those around her. Two and a half years of struggle with a strong enemy hardened the formations of the Tigers, whose forces were not only not undermined, but even strengthened.
The fragile peace that had been preserved after the withdrawal of the “peacekeepers” collapsed on June 11, 1990. On that day, in the districts of Batticaloa, Ampara and Trincomalee, the Tamils attacked numerous police stations and captured over 1,000 Sinhalese and Muslim police officers, at least 630 of whom were executed.
By the 20th of June, fighting began in Jaffna. A small garrison of government troops was besieged in the ancient Fort. The Tamils, who did not have heavy weapons, made several unsuccessful attempts to capture the enemy's stronghold, including a very exotic one: one night the Tigers tried to enter the Fort using a crane. However, the crane boom could not stand it and collapsed with 40 fighters on it.
On July 12, government troops launched the “Thrivida Balaya” operation to capture the islands of Vellanai and Mandaitivu, located opposite Jaffna, and after stubborn fighting captured them by mid-August. On September 13, an landing attempt was made from these islands to deblockade Jaffna, but it failed with significant losses. As the supply of the besieged by sea faced increasingly strong fire resistance from the coast, on September 26, the Fort garrison was evacuated.
In June 1990, the Tamils also blocked the garrisons in Vanni along the Vavuniya-Elephant Pass road (Mankulam, Kokavil, Kilinochchi). The commander of the garrison, who refused to leave the wounded and evacuate, was posthumously awarded the highest order of the Sri Lankan army. Shortly thereafter, government troops left Kilinochchi.
On November 22, the assault on Mankulam began. First, a kamikaze-driven explosive truck entered the base and exploded, then an attack followed from different sides. On November 24, the camp was evacuated, killing more than 100 servicemen.
Despite the capture of a number of important points, the Tamils experienced certain difficulties in supplying their formations in Jaffna, since government garrisons at Elephant Pass and Punerin blocked unhindered access to the peninsula. On July 10, 1991, the Tigers attacked Elephant Pass. The government fleet and army urgently organized landing operation for his rescue under the code name "Balavegaya". The landing in the Vettilaikerni area (east of Elephant Pass) began on July 15, but it was not possible to break through the corridor to the besieged until 18 days later. During the siege of Elephant Pass, according to official figures, the Sri Lankan army lost 202 soldiers killed, the Tamils - about 600 people.
The long siege of Jaffna and the failure of the assault on Elephant Pass showed the Tamils that without a serious reform of their detachments and the acquisition of heavy weapons, one cannot count on a successful fight against the government army. And although to resolve the issue of the delivery of artillery to the Tigers by objective reasons failed so far, the Tamil infantry units soon turned into well-trained and combat-ready forces, including a large number of special forces units.
Starting from August 28, 1991, for four weeks, government forces carried out operations "Ashakasena" and "Akunarahara" northeast of the Manal Aru region (colonized by Sinhalese settlers). The purpose of the operations was to permanently cut off communications between the eastern and northern provinces. However, in the conditions of the jungle, it was very difficult to achieve decisive success, and at the end of the operations, the Tamils again occupied the area.
On August 8, 1992, during a reconnaissance on Vellanay Island, a mine explosion killed the commander of government forces in the north of the country, General D. Kobbekaduva, and 9 officers accompanying him.
After the withdrawal of Indian troops, mutual terror against the civilian population significantly weakened. Now the Tamils tried to attack mainly military targets, including the top leaders of the army and the state. So, on November 10, 1992, the commander of the Navy, Admiral K. Fernando, was killed by a kamikaze, and on May 1, 1993, President of Sri Lanka R. Premadas was killed during an election rally. On November 24, 1994, as a result of an assassination attempt, the main candidate for the post of President, G. Dissanayake, died.
In June-July 1992, the Sri Lankan army carried out Operation Balavegaya II, as a result of which the zone of control was expanded north of Elephant Pass. The next operation in this direction was “Yal Devi”, launched on September 28, 1993. The main goal was to capture Kilali - the main base of the Tamil boats in the Jaffna lagoon. On the second day, a convoy of government troops fell into a well-prepared ambush. With heavy fire, the Tamils cut off the infantry from the armored vehicles and destroyed 2 Czechoslovak-made T-55 tanks, about 70 soldiers died. By October 6, when the operation was terminated, the total losses amounted to 110 troops.
The fact that the Tamils are not sitting idly by, but intensively training fighters and developing new tactics, became clear after a month. As a result of a surprise attack on Punerin, the Tigers managed to break through the outer perimeter of the defense and penetrate the territory of the base. Thanks to reinforcements urgently deployed by sea, the garrison, after three days of fierce fighting, managed to repulse the assault. However, the losses were heavy - only according to official figures, 613 servicemen died. The Tamils captured a large amount of weapons, including two T-55 tanks.
At the end of 1994, the government of the new President of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga, concluded a truce with the Tigers. However, the positions of the parties on the main issue - granting independence to the Tamils - remained diametrically opposed, and in April of the following year hostilities resumed.
In June 1995, the Tamils attacked the garrison of Mandaitivu Island. The attack was again repulsed, but at least 120 servicemen were killed. In response, the Sri Lankan army on July 9, 1995 launched an offensive called “Leap Forward” from the Palali region. Without encountering serious resistance, government troops advanced 10 kilometers and expanded the security zone around the Palali airfield and the port of Kankesanthurai, objects critical to supplying the entire group on the peninsula.
By this point, the Sri Lankan armed forces had finally received a large number of new weapons. Acquired tanks and artillery significantly increased offensive capabilities ground forces, and "Kfira" and Mi-24 - strike power of aviation.
On October 17, 1995, the Sri Lankan army launched an offensive to capture Jaffna - Operation Riviresa. Artillery and aviation dealt heavy blows to the positions of the Tamils, who had neither the means of counter-battery combat, nor any serious air defense. Despite the fierce resistance of the Tigers, the troops slowly moved forward. On November 22, the last road linking Jaffna's defenders with the Tenmarachchi sector was cut. Heavy fighting for the city continued for another 2 weeks, the attackers suffered especially heavy losses from mortar fire. However, on 2 December the Sri Lankan flag was hoisted over the magistrate of Jaffna. The remnants of the defenders, as during the assault on the city by Indian troops, managed to evacuate to Vanni. According to official data, 450 servicemen died during the month and a half of the operation, although there is reason to believe that in fact the losses were much higher. The losses of the Tamils, according to the Sri Lankan military, exceeded 2,000 people - it is natural that the Tigers, in turn, argue that this figure is significantly overestimated.
During this period, the Tigers carried out two highly famous operations in the capital of the country. On October 20, 1995, Colombo's main oil storage facility was destroyed, killing about 20 guards. On 31 January of the following year, a car bomb caused serious damage to the building of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
The concentration of the main forces of the army in the north of the country allowed the Tamils to significantly increase their activity in the east - around Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara. In this area, the clashes were in the nature of classic guerrilla warfare: ambushes on the roads, shelling of police stations, garrisons and outposts. The largest operations of the rebels were the defeat of the column in the Batticaloa region in March 1996 (54 dead military personnel) and the attack in the same area on the Vavunaitivu camp in March of the following year (75 dead). In the latter case, the Tigers also suffered heavy losses. Minor collisions numbered in the hundreds.
Meanwhile, the government army continued to fight to defeat the Tamils on the Jaffna Peninsula. At the end of March 1996, an operation was carried out to destroy small Tamil detachments that had penetrated into previously occupied areas. On April 19, 1996, Operation Riviresa II began to capture the Tenmarachchi sector. By April 21, government troops captured Chavakacherri, and on April 26 they occupied Kilali. The Tigers offered no serious resistance and evacuated to Vanni. Finally, in May, the Vadamaracci sector was occupied without resistance during Operation Riviresa III.
Undoubted successes in the fight against the Tigers gave grounds to the government to assert that the day of the final defeat of the rebels was approaching. However, it soon became clear that not everything was as well as the Sinhalese politicians would like. On the night of July 18, 1996, the Tamils launched a surprise assault on the Mullaitivu base - Operation Unceasing Waves (Unstoppable Wave). Despite its name, the operation did not at all mean a banal attack by large masses of infantry. On the contrary, in this case (as in subsequent offensives), the main stake was placed on the actions of special forces that penetrated the front lines of the enemy and attacked key defense installations. The Mullaitivu garrison, according to various sources, numbered from 1200 to 1600 military personnel, but was located in isolation from the main forces of the Sri Lankan army, which played a deplorable role in its fate. After an eight-hour battle, the Tigers broke through the defensive perimeter and captured the base's armory. Arms and ammunition from the arsenal were immediately used against their former owners. By the end of the first day of the assault, the position of the defenders became critical.
The Sri Lankan army immediately made an attempt to help the garrison. Not far from Mullaitiwu, commandos were landed from helicopters, but they immediately came under fire from the rebels and were forced to fight hard to hold the captured bridgehead. Over the next few days, the paratroopers landed continued to receive reinforcements by air and from the sea, but due to strong opposition, they were unable to begin the main task. Meanwhile, already on July 20, the Tamils destroyed the last centers of resistance of the Mullaitiv garrison. Having lost hope of saving the remnants of the garrison, the Sri Lankan army evacuated the landing force on July 25.
The result of Operation Unceasing Waves was a severe defeat for government troops: the Mullaitivu garrison was completely destroyed, and about 100 soldiers who tried to help him also died. The Tigers captured a large amount of weapons and ammunition, including two 122 mm guns.
The fall of Mullaitivu led the command of the armed forces of Sri Lanka to the idea of the need to abandon the holding of isolated bases, which are very difficult to assist in the event of an assault. Therefore, the Punerin garrison was soon evacuated, which greatly complicated the control of the movement of Tamil boats in the Jaffna lagoon.
Despite the defeat suffered, the Sri Lankan army did not postpone the already prepared offensive in the north and on July 26 launched the Sath Jaya operation, the purpose of which was to capture Kilinochchi. The offensive was carried out from the Elephant Pass area. At the first stage, the Tamils, whose main forces were concentrated in the Mullaitivu region, offered practically no resistance. Already on the first day, government troops occupied Parantan. However, the further advance to the south resumed on August 4 met with serious difficulties. In two days of fighting, government forces failed to break through the Tamil defenses, about 150 soldiers were killed, 3 tanks were destroyed and several more were damaged. On September 22, the third phase of the operation began. This time, instead of a frontal attack, the Sri Lankan army made a detour and went to Kilinochchi from the east. Having stretched the Tamil defense in this way, the attackers again changed the direction of the main attack - on the night of September 24, an advance began to the west of Kilinochchi. On September 26, the Tamils organized a powerful counterattack. During the many hours of battle, about 200 Sri Lankan soldiers died, and the Tigers also suffered heavy losses. Already weakened by previous battles, the defenders could not offer serious resistance in the future, and on September 30, government troops finally captured Kilinochchi. As in the attack on Jaffna, the overwhelming superiority of the Sri Lankan army in aviation and artillery played an important role. At the same time, it should be noted that in this conflict the words “powerful air and artillery strikes” refer to events that are incomparable in their intensity with the actions of really strong armies: for example, during the described operation to capture Kilinochchi, 7-8 air strikes were carried out per day on the positions of the Tigers. According to official figures, for September 22-30, the army’s losses amounted to 269 people killed, although twice the figure was announced in the Sri Lankan parliament.
In January 1997, the Tamils launched a powerful attack on Parantan. In the event of the capture of this important point, the Tigris would be able to cut off the troops in the Kilinochchi region from the garrison of Elephant Pass. As a result of a surprise attack, the front line of defense was broken through. The Tamil special forces managed to penetrate the artillery positions, where 11 guns were destroyed: some by female kamikazes from among the attackers, some by their own servants in order to prevent their capture by the enemy. However, with the help of reinforcements, the Parentan garrison still managed to repulse the attack. At the same time, according to official figures, more than 250 servicemen were killed.
The following month, government forces carried out Operation Edibala, which resulted in the control of the Vavuniya-Mannar road. The Tigers offered little to no resistance.
On May 13, 1997, the Sri Lankan army launched a “decisive” offensive under the loud code name “Jaya Sikuruy” (“Guaranteed Victory”). The main task The operation was to regain control of the only land road leading to the Jaffna Peninsula, the section of which between Vavuniya and Kilinochchi was under the control of the rebels. The target of the first stage of the offensive was Puliyankulam, which was attacked in two converging directions: from the Vavuniya region to the north and from the Veli Oya region through Nedunkeni to the west. Government troops actively used artillery and armored vehicles. The Tigers, in turn, relied on mortar fire and surprise counterattacks. During the fighting on May 13-18, the attackers captured the Omantai and Nedunkeni regions, while losing about 120 military personnel. Having entrenched themselves in their positions, on May 24, the troops continued to advance and by June 3 they occupied Panikkaniravi, a village just 3 kilometers from Puliyankulam. Already in these first battles, the army lost up to a dozen tanks and armored personnel carriers knocked out and destroyed, which was the result of the active use of RPGs by the Tigers.
On June 9, the Tamils penetrated into the areas recently captured by the Sri Lankan army and attacked the village of Tandikulam, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich artillery depots were concentrated. During the fierce fighting that lasted all day, up to three hundred government soldiers died, the Tigers managed to knock out several armored vehicles and, more importantly, destroy large stocks of ammunition and ammunition.
On June 22, having brought up reinforcements and replenished supplies, the army resumed its advance towards Puliyankulam. However, already on the night of June 24-25, the Tamils launched a new powerful counterattack. This time, artillery positions in the Omantai region were attacked. The rebels managed to capture one gun and 4 artillery tractors, 3 more guns were destroyed. As a result of fierce fighting, at least 180 Sri Lankan military personnel were killed.
The Sri Lankan command was forced to take a month and a half break in the operation, during which 130 military personnel were killed as a result of another Tigers counterattack in the Rambaikulam area. Finally, on August 19, as a result of a new offensive, the army managed to capture Puliyankulam. During fierce fighting in the village itself, the Tamils knocked out 6 tanks, of which two were beyond repair, and captured one BMP.
Initially planned for 3 months, the operation “Jaya Sikuruy” clearly stalled. Until the end of the year, the Sri Lankan army made no new attempts at a large-scale offensive. At the same time, the Tigers launched two more major counterattacks. During the first of these, carried out in early October in the Kanakarayankulam region, the Tamils captured two Buffel armored personnel carriers and a large amount of light weapons and ammunition, killing at least 200 military personnel. And in December, the base of a special forces brigade was destroyed in the same area and more than 150 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed.
On February 1, 1998, the Tamils attacked Kilinochchi, but this time the operation was unsuccessful. The Tigers suffered heavy losses (up to 300 killed), while about 50 soldiers died from the Kilinochchi garrison. During this operation, Tamil saboteurs who penetrated the Jaffna peninsula attacked an artillery base in the Iyakacchi area, from which the heavy artillery of the Sri Lankan army fired supporting the garrisons of Kilinochchi and Parantana, and inflicted significant damage on it.
Between February and May of the same year, government troops undertook a series of operations, main goal which was the capture of Mankulam - the next major settlement on the Vavuniya-Kilinochchi road. The Sri Lankan army managed to get close to Mankulam, but the attempt to capture the city itself failed in early June.
On September 26, 1998, the Tigers launched a massive attack on Kilinochchi (Operation Unceasing Waves II). After fierce three days of fighting, Kilinochchi passed into the hands of the attackers. The losses of the Sri Lankan army alone exceeded 1000 people killed. 4 artillery pieces, 2 T-55 tanks and 8 Buffel armored personnel carriers, a large number of light weapons and ammunition were lost. The Tamils captured part of the lost weapons as trophies (including 2 or 3 130-mm guns).
The capture of Mankulam was a weak compensation for the defeat: taking advantage of the distraction of the main forces of the Tigers to the northern sector of the front, the Sri Lankan army finally captured this settlement, losing only 90 people killed.
With the fall of Kilinochchi, it became clear that "Guaranteed Victory" had little chance of success in the near future. Soon the end of "Jaya Sikuruy" was announced, instead of which a number of private offensive operations. So, as a result of the operation “Rivibala”, which began in December 1998, the Sri Lankan army captured Oddusuddan, located on the road from Mankulam to Mullaitiva (which housed the “headquarters” of the Tigers after its capture in 1996). And in March-September 1999, during the Ranagosa operation, a number of areas north of the Vavuniya-Mannar road were cleared of Tamil formations. At the same time, in June 1999, not far from Mannar, the Sri Lankan Air Force managed to destroy one of the 122-mm guns captured by the Tamils in Mullaitivu.
Despite the lack of rapid impressive successes, the operations of the Sri Lankan army put the rebels in a difficult position. Already with the loss of the Jaffna peninsula in 1995-1996, the Tamils began to feel difficulties in replenishing their troops: the small population of Vanni and a number of areas of the east coast that remained under the control of the Tigers could not compensate for considerable losses. And if there were no particular problems with the recruitment of personnel in auxiliary units (often women's or "children's"), then special forces and "conventional" infantry units could not be content with the same fighters. The loss of many districts of the Vanni further exacerbated the situation.
Under these conditions, the events of November 1999 were completely unexpected. By this point, the government troops were stretched out over a long distance in a rather difficult terrain. Numerous Tiger attacks on rear units during the operation "Jaya Sikuruy" they were forced to divert large forces to protect the previously occupied areas. Therefore, with a sufficiently large total number of troops on the front line, there was a very limited contingent.
On the night of November 2, the Tamils launched a major offensive in Vani, codenamed "Unceasing Waves III". The offensive was carried out from two directions: from the north across the Mankulam-Oddusudan road (here the blow fell at the junction of the army and marines) and from the east between Oddusuddan and Nedunkeni. The attackers were assisted by special forces units that had infiltrated into the rear. Within a few hours, the “tigers” managed to break through the defenses and capture Oddusuddan, and by the evening of the same day, take Nedunkeni. Government troops, leaving a large amount of military materials, retreated south to the Veli Oya region and west to the Vavuniya-Jafna highway. Pursuing the retreating, by the evening of November 5, the Tamils started fighting on the outskirts of Mankulam and Kanakarayankulam. Threatened with encirclement, the Sri Lankan troops offered no serious resistance and hastily retreated to the south. There were even cases of armed clashes between demoralized units and the military police, who were trying to detain the fugitives. Only by transferring significant reinforcements, the government army was able to stop the advance of the "tigers" in the area of Puliyankulam. According to official data, the losses of the Sri Lankan army amounted to only about 200 people killed and missing, but the scale of the defeat suggests much greater casualties. The Tamils seized a significant amount of light weapons, ammunition and ammunition, the removal of which took more than 60 car trips.
Taking advantage of the favorable situation (the attention of the Sri Lankan command was focused primarily on strengthening new positions north of Vavuniya), the Tamils on December 11 began active operations on the northern front, trying to break into the Jaffna Peninsula. The blow was delivered along the coast to the Vettilaikerni-Kaddaikadu area (east of Elephant Pass). Already on December 12, these settlements came under the control of the Tamils, which threatened the eastern front of the Elephant Pass base. On December 17, as a result of a powerful attack, the Tigers captured Parantan, which defended the southern front of the base. However, they failed to advance further, although heavy fighting continued in the area until the end of winter.
On the night of March 26-27, 2000, the “tigers” presented another surprise to the Sri Lankan army: instead of a frontal attack on Elephant Pass (whose garrison exceeded 10 thousand people), an amphibious assault was landed from more than 1,500 fighters north of the base, in the Chempiyanpattu area. At the same time, spetsnaz detachments infiltrated into the rear of the Sri Lankans attacked artillery positions in the Pallay region (according to the Tamils, 11 guns were destroyed). After three days of heavy fighting, the Champyanpattu area came under the complete control of the “tigers”. Even more important was the fact that on March 28, units of the landing force, in cooperation with special forces detachments, blocked main road from Elephant Pass to Jaffna between Pallay and Eluthumadduwal. Elephant Pass was only able to be supplied by a single low-capacity dirt road running south of the main road along the coast of Jaffna Lagoon. Government troops made numerous attempts to regain control of the main road. In fierce battles, the parties suffered heavy losses, including the Tamils destroyed, captured and knocked out more than 10 armored vehicles. By April 10, the Sri Lankan army managed to clear the road directly from the enemy, but the Tamils held their positions only 500 meters to the north, so to restore transport connection on the road was not possible.
Meanwhile, having redeployed reinforcements to the landing force, on April 18, the "Tigers" delivered another blow from the Champyanpattu region and blocked the strategically important road in yet another place - between Pallay and Iyakacchi. In the following days, fierce fighting unfolded for locality Iyakacchi, who fell on April 22. The garrison of Elefan Pass, under the threat of complete encirclement and destruction, hastily left the base, abandoning most of the weapons. The retreat took place under Tamil fire, both along the coastal road and through the shallow waters of the Jaffna lagoon. The losses of the retreating were heavy - according to various sources, from several hundred to more than a thousand, while the commander of the garrison also died. According to the "tigers", they got 3 152-mm and 2 122-mm guns, 12 120-mm mortars and a large amount of other weapons and ammunition.
On April 30, after a fierce battle, the Sri Lankan troops left Pallay, who was in a semi-encirclement, and withdrew to the Kilali-Eluthumadduwal-Nagar-Kovil area, where they equipped a new defense line.
Having suffered a heavy defeat and being threatened by a further offensive by the Tamils in order to capture Jaffna, the Sri Lankan army hastily strengthened its forces on the Northern Front. By May 2000, two of the three divisions previously involved in operations in the Vavuniya region were deployed to the Jaffna Peninsula - thus, five of the nine divisions of the government army - more than 40 thousand military personnel - were concentrated on the peninsula.
Considering that the rebels could hardly provide more than 5 thousand fighters for the operation against Jaffna, the prospect of such an offensive seemed simply utopian. However, the “tigers” still started it, and the direction of the blow in again changed: this time the attack was directed from the Punerina area to Navatkuli through the Jaffna lagoon (the depths here are such that they allow fording the lagoon during the dry season). The offensive began on May 10 and within a day the Tamils managed to capture not only the positions of the Sri Lankan troops on the coastal beaches, but also the strategically important Navatkuli bridge connecting the Valikamam and Tenmarachchi sectors. Subsequently, the offensive developed in two directions: west to the city of Jaffna and east to Chavakacherri. In fierce battles, both sides suffered heavy losses. Government troops actively used aviation, the rebels, as usual, relied on the fire defeat of the enemy with artillery and mortar fire. On May 17, the Tamils captured the fortified point of Kaitadi (halfway between Navatkuli and Jaffna), and by May 20 captured the second largest city of the Chavakacherry peninsula and the important village of Sarasalai. The situation for the Sri Lankan army became more and more threatening, however, the forces of the attackers were running out. In fact, with the occupation of Chavakacherri, the offensive of the “Tigers” ran out of steam. Despite the battles that continued until the end of May, the positions of the parties in this area did not change. The Tamil attempt, following the capture of Elephant Pass, to completely master the Jaffna Peninsula failed.
Having put the troops, battered in previous battles, in order over the summer, the Sri Lankan army from the beginning of September switched to active operations against the Tamils. On September 3, an offensive began on the Navatkuli region, code-named “Rivikirana”, the main blow was delivered from Jaffna. However, the very next day, having lost at least 170 soldiers killed, the Sri Lankan army stopped the operation. On September 17, the offensive aimed at Chavakacherri resumed (Operation Kinihira I). For a day of fierce fighting, the Sri Lankans captured the city, repelling a number of counterattacks by the “tigers”.
Until the end of the year, government troops carried out a whole series of successive offensive operations, united by the common name "Kinihira". The Tamils, weakened by previous battles, could not hold their positions and gradually retreated: in October, the Sri Lankan army occupied Sarasalai, on December 21, Kaitadi, and on December 30, Navatkuli. By the new year 2001, the Tigers had evacuated their last units from the area.
Having removed the direct threat to Jaffna, on April 25, 2001, the Sri Lankan army attacked the positions of the Tamils in the Eluthumadduwal-Nagar-Kovil area (Operation Agnie Khiela). The "Tigers" put up fierce resistance in well-equipped positions during the year, making extensive use of mortars and artillery. Heavy three-day battles did not lead to any changes in the front line, the losses of the Sri Lankan army exceeded 300 people killed. After that, there were no serious hostilities until the end of the year, both sides were actively engaged in training troops, stockpiling weapons and ammunition. In January 2002, a truce was signed, which is still in force today. However, the prospects for concluding a peace treaty remain extremely vague - since none of the parties, agreeing to various concessions, is willing to give in on the main issue - the creation of an independent Tamil state.
Let us now turn to the losses of the parties during the entire period of armed confrontation. According to official Sri Lankan data, the army and police lost 5,250 people from 1983 to 1994; 4,760 people from April 1995 to January 1997; The losses of the rebels are estimated by the Sri Lankan army at 30 thousand, the "tigers" claim that this figure is actually half as much - in any case, the ratio of losses (given the quantitative and technical superiority of government forces) looks very "flattering" for the rebels.
In conclusion, let's say a few words about the structure of the Sri Lankan army. It consists of 8 infantry divisions and one special forces division. By the time of the ceasefire, they were stationed as follows: 21st division - Mannar, 22nd - Trincomalee, 23rd - Batticaloa, 51st, 52nd, 54th and 55th - Jaffna, 56th - Vanni. Each infantry division usually consists of 4 brigades, whose numbers are formed by adding the number from 1 to 4 to the division number (for example, 561st, 562nd, 563rd and 564th brigades of the 56th division). The 53rd elite special forces division, which participated in almost all major operations, consists of a commando brigade, a special forces brigade and an airmobile brigade. There are also several separate tank, artillery and engineer regiments, which are attached to divisions as part of reinforcement if necessary.
The police units involved in operations against the insurgents are divided into brigades, each of which has its own area of responsibility. Two police brigades deployed in Batticaloa and Ampara special purpose.
The population of Sri Lanka is ethnically heterogeneous: about 70% are Sinhalese who arrived on the island in the 5th century BC, 20% are Tamils, whose active penetration into the northern and eastern regions of the country is associated with the 5th century AD, up to 7 % falls on Muslims - descendants of Tamils and Sinhalese who profess Islam. The Tamil settlement area covers the districts (districts) of Mannar, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara. The most densely populated peninsula is Jaffna, on which the city of the same name is located - the historical capital of the Tamils. The peninsula is separated from the main part of the island by the Jaffna lagoon, and in turn consists of three sectors, practically separated by small winding bays: Valikamam (in which the city of Jaffna is located), Tenmarachchi (the main city is Kodikamam) and Wadamarachchi (a narrow strip of land in the north east of the peninsula from Point Pedro to Kaddaikadu). A vast area with an underdeveloped road network, often covered with jungle, south of the Jaffna peninsula to the Vavuniya region is called Vani. The settlements mentioned later in the description of hostilities are highlighted in bold on the attached maps of the Northern Front and the Vavuniya-Mankulam region.
Relations between the main ethnic groups have always been marked by tension, often resulting in interethnic clashes. In the early 1980s, the Tamil militant organization "Tigers for the Liberation of Tamil Eelam", headed by V. Pirapaharan, began to operate in the northern regions of the country. The start date of the "hot" phase of the conflict is considered to be July 23, 1983, when 13 Sri Lankan soldiers died as a result of an attack by Tamils near Palali (near Jaffna). In response, Tamil pogroms broke out in the country's capital, Colombo, and a number of other areas, killing up to 3,000 people. Under these conditions, not only radical, but also many "moderate" Tamils supported the armed struggle. Within a few months, the uprising swept through vast areas of the north and east of Sri Lanka.
By the beginning of the conflict, the armed forces of Sri Lanka were in a state of decline. The absence of external enemies and a weak economy did not contribute to the creation of a well-equipped and trained army. Therefore, the Sri Lankan government immediately took up the acquisition of military equipment, mostly outdated and used, but quite suitable for fighting the rebels. Without going into a detailed chronological list, we will describe the main range of weapons purchased by Sri Lanka so far. T-59 tanks, T-86 infantry fighting vehicles (a copy of the Soviet BMP-1) and wheeled T-92 infantry fighting vehicles, T-63 and T-85 tracked armored personnel carriers, 122-mm and 130-mm artillery pieces, 152-mm howitzers. The Czech Republic supplied T-55 tanks and 122-mm MLRS. BMP-1, BMP-3 and BTR-80 were purchased in Russia. Armored vehicles "Saladin" and armored personnel carriers "Saracen" arrived from Great Britain, armored personnel carriers "Buffel" from South Africa. The lack of qualified personnel forced at first to hire military specialists from the UK, Pakistan and Israel.
Not only did the technical equipment of the army improve - it also grew in number: in a few years from the start of the uprising, the armed forces increased from 15 to more than 100 thousand military personnel. Numerous police units also joined the fight against the Tamils. At the same time, the number of "tiger" formations (including various auxiliary units, including women's and youth) usually did not exceed 10-15 thousand people, which is primarily due to difficulties in providing more fighters with weapons and ammunition. Like the government, the Tamils had a long way to go to form truly combat-ready units. We also note that the rebels do not enjoy the support of any country in the world, and the financial base of the uprising is primarily provided by numerous Tamil communities in developed countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Canada (for example, Tamils make up about 30% of the population of Singapore).
At the first stage of the conflict, in addition to conducting actual hostilities, both sides widely practiced terror against the civilian population, which claimed the lives of thousands of Tamils and Sinhalese. There were also cases of "cleansing" by government troops of some areas from the Tamil population with their subsequent colonization by "trustworthy" citizens. So, as a result of such an action, the Tamil region of Manal Aru (to the northeast of Vavuniya) was inhabited by Sinhalese and was named Veli Oya. As a result, the Sri Lankan authorities have "driven a wedge" between northern and eastern Tamil regions.
In 1985, the Tigers took control of virtually the entire Jaffna peninsula, including their capital. Government troops were blocked in the garrisons of Palali and Point Pedro.
In May 1987, the greatly strengthened Sri Lankan army launched its first major offensive, codenamed "Liberation". During heavy fighting, the Tigers were driven out of most of the Vadamarachchi sector, thus establishing a ground link between Palali and Point Pedro. In these battles, artillery and improvised Avro and Y-12 bombers were widely used, striking not so much at the enemy as at the settlements controlled by the Tamils.
Worried about the numerous civilian casualties and the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees, neighboring India in July 1987 forced the government of Sri Lanka to agree to a cessation of hostilities and the provision of limited autonomy to the Tamil regions. In exchange, the Indians pledged to disarm the Tamils, i.e. actually carry out a military operation to defeat them, since the Tigers categorically refused to lay down their arms.
The Indian offensive on Jaffna began on October 11, 1987. On the night of October 12, troops were landed in the Jaffna University area from 4 Mi-8s to capture the leadership of the Tigers, but this special operation failed. Several helicopters were damaged by small arms fire, only 120 paratroopers were able to land (they were tasked with guarding the stadium where the helicopters landed) and 30 Sikh commandos, who were supposed to capture the Tamil leaders. In the ensuing battle, 29 commandos and 6 paratroopers were killed. The remnants of the landing force were saved the next day by three T-72s that made their way to the rescue.
The fierce battle for Jaffna, which claimed the lives of over 400 Indian soldiers, went on for 17 days. Strong air and artillery strikes were inflicted on the city, which caused great casualties among the civilian population. By the end of the defense, the Tigers, whose losses were comparable to the Indian ones, managed to evacuate the main forces in the Vanni.
The capture of Jaffna, contrary to the hopes of the Indian command, did not lead to the defeat of the Tamil detachments, which switched to guerrilla warfare. The Indian "peacekeeping" contingent was gradually brought up to 100,000 people, but this did not give the expected effect. The constant attacks of the partisans embittered the "peacekeepers", who began to act in the same way as the Sri Lankan army had previously. The participation of Indians in the massacres, the high cost of the operation and the growing losses caused discontent in India itself. As a result, by March 1990, the Indian army left Sri Lanka, having lost by this time only about 1,150 soldiers killed. Already after the withdrawal of troops, in 1992, the Tamils executed the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, who organized the invasion: during an election rally, a kamikaze woman approached him, blowing herself up along with those around her. Two and a half years of struggle with a strong enemy hardened the formations of the Tigers, whose forces were not only not undermined, but even strengthened.
The fragile peace that had been preserved after the withdrawal of the "peacekeepers" collapsed on June 11, 1990. On that day, in the districts of Batticaloa, Ampara and Trincomalee, the Tamils attacked numerous police stations and captured over 1,000 Sinhalese and Muslim police officers, at least 630 of whom were executed.
By the 20th of June, fighting began in Jaffna. A small garrison of government troops was besieged in the ancient Fort. The Tamils, who did not have heavy weapons, made several unsuccessful attempts to capture the enemy's stronghold, including a very exotic one: one night the Tigers tried to enter the Fort using a crane. However, the crane boom could not stand it and collapsed with 40 fighters on it.
On July 12, government troops launched Operation Thrivida Balaya to capture the islands of Vellanai and Mandaytivu located opposite Jaffna, and after stubborn fighting, they captured them by mid-August. On September 13, an landing attempt was made from these islands to deblockade Jaffna, but it failed with significant losses. As the supply of the besieged by sea faced increasingly strong fire resistance from the coast, on September 26, the Fort garrison was evacuated.
In June 1990, the Tamils also blocked the garrisons in Vanni along the Vavuniya-Elephant Pass road (Mankulam, Kokavil, Kilinochchi). The commander of the garrison, who refused to leave the wounded and evacuate, was posthumously awarded the highest order of the Sri Lankan army. Shortly thereafter, government troops left Kilinochchi.
On November 22, the assault on Mankulam began. First, a kamikaze-driven explosive truck entered the base and exploded, then an attack followed from different sides. On November 24, the camp was evacuated, killing more than 100 servicemen.
Despite the capture of a number of important points, the Tamils experienced certain difficulties in supplying their formations in Jaffna, since government garrisons at Elephant Pass and Punerin blocked unhindered access to the peninsula. On July 10, 1991, the Tigers attacked Elephant Pass. The government fleet and army urgently organized an amphibious operation to rescue him, codenamed "Balavegaya". The landing in the Vettilaikerni area (east of Elephant Pass) began on July 15, but it was not possible to break through the corridor to the besieged until 18 days later. During the siege of Elephant Pass, according to official figures, the Sri Lankan army lost 202 soldiers killed, the Tamils - about 600 people.
The long siege of Jaffna and the failure of the assault on Elephant Pass showed the Tamils that without a serious reform of their detachments and the acquisition of heavy weapons, one cannot count on a successful fight against the government army. And although it has not been possible to solve the issue of delivering artillery to the Tigers for objective reasons, the Tamil infantry units soon turned into well-trained and combat-ready forces, including a large number of special forces units.
Starting from August 28, 1991, for four weeks, government forces carried out operations "Ashakasena" and "Akunarahara" northeast of the Manal Aru region (colonized by Sinhalese settlers). The purpose of the operations was to permanently cut off communications between the eastern and northern provinces. However, in the conditions of the jungle, it was very difficult to achieve decisive success, and at the end of the operations, the Tamils again occupied the area.
On August 8, 1992, during a reconnaissance on Vellanay Island, a mine explosion killed the commander of government forces in the north of the country, General D. Kobbekaduva, and 9 officers accompanying him.
After the withdrawal of Indian troops, mutual terror against the civilian population significantly weakened. Now the Tamils tried to attack mainly military targets, including the top leaders of the army and the state. So, on November 10, 1992, the commander of the Navy, Admiral K. Fernando, was killed by a kamikaze, and on May 1, 1993, President of Sri Lanka R. Premadas was killed during an election rally. On November 24, 1994, as a result of an assassination attempt, the main candidate for the post of President, G. Dissanayake, died.
In June-July 1992, the Sri Lankan army carried out Operation Balavegaya II, as a result of which the zone of control was expanded north of Elephant Pass. The next operation in this direction was "Yal Devi", launched on September 28, 1993. The main goal was to capture Kilali - the main base of the Tamil boats in the Jaffna lagoon. On the second day, a convoy of government troops fell into a well-prepared ambush. With heavy fire, the Tamils cut off the infantry from the armored vehicles and destroyed 2 Czechoslovak-made T-55 tanks, about 70 soldiers died. By October 6, when the operation was terminated, the total losses amounted to 110 troops.
The fact that the Tamils are not sitting idly by, but intensively training fighters and developing new tactics, became clear after a month. As a result of a surprise attack on Punerin, the Tigers managed to break through the outer perimeter of the defense and penetrate the territory of the base. Thanks to reinforcements urgently deployed by sea, the garrison, after three days of fierce fighting, managed to repulse the assault. However, the losses were heavy - only according to official figures, 613 servicemen died. The Tamils captured a large amount of weapons, including two T-55 tanks.
At the end of 1994, the government of the new President of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga, concluded a truce with the Tigers. However, the positions of the parties on the main issue - granting independence to the Tamils - remained diametrically opposed, and in April of the following year hostilities resumed.
In June 1995, the Tamils attacked the garrison of Mandaitivu Island. The attack was again repulsed, but at least 120 servicemen were killed. In response, the Sri Lankan army on July 9, 1995 launched an offensive from the Palali region called "Leap Forward". Without encountering serious resistance, government troops advanced 10 kilometers and expanded the security zone around the Palali airfield and the port of Kankesanthurai, objects critical to supplying the entire group on the peninsula.
By this point, the Sri Lankan armed forces had finally received a large number of new weapons. The acquired tanks and artillery significantly increased the offensive capabilities of the ground forces, and the Kfirs and Mi-24s - the striking power of aviation.
On October 17, 1995, the Sri Lankan army launched an offensive to capture Jaffna - Operation Riviresa. Artillery and aviation dealt heavy blows to the positions of the Tamils, who had neither the means of counter-battery combat, nor any serious air defense. Despite the fierce resistance of the Tigers, the troops slowly moved forward. On November 22, the last road linking Jaffna's defenders with the Tenmarachchi sector was cut. Heavy fighting for the city continued for another 2 weeks, the attackers suffered especially heavy losses from mortar fire. However, on 2 December the Sri Lankan flag was hoisted over the magistrate of Jaffna. The remnants of the defenders, as during the assault on the city by Indian troops, managed to evacuate to Vanni. According to official data, 450 servicemen died during the month and a half of the operation, although there is reason to believe that in fact the losses were much higher. The losses of the Tamils, according to the Sri Lankan military, exceeded 2,000 people - it is natural that the Tigers, in turn, argue that this figure is significantly overestimated.
During this period, the Tigers carried out two highly famous operations in the capital of the country. On October 20, 1995, Colombo's main oil storage facility was destroyed, killing about 20 guards. On 31 January of the following year, a car bomb caused serious damage to the building of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
The concentration of the main forces of the army in the north of the country allowed the Tamils to significantly increase their activity in the east - around Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara. In this area, the clashes were in the nature of classic guerrilla warfare: ambushes on the roads, shelling of police stations, garrisons and outposts. The largest operations of the rebels were the defeat of the column in the Batticaloa region in March 1996 (54 dead military personnel) and the attack in the same area on the Vavunaitivu camp in March of the following year (75 dead). In the latter case, the Tigers also suffered heavy losses. Minor collisions numbered in the hundreds.
Meanwhile, the government army continued to fight to defeat the Tamils on the Jaffna Peninsula. At the end of March 1996, an operation was carried out to destroy small Tamil detachments that had penetrated into previously occupied areas. On April 19, 1996, Operation Riviresa II began to capture the Tenmarachchi sector. By April 21, government troops captured Chavakacherri, and on April 26 they occupied Kilali. The Tigers offered no serious resistance and evacuated to Vanni. Finally, in May, the Vadamaracci sector was occupied without resistance during Operation Riviresa III.
Undoubted successes in the fight against the Tigers gave grounds to the government to assert that the day of the final defeat of the rebels was approaching. However, it soon became clear that not everything was as well as the Sinhalese politicians would like. On the night of July 18, 1996, the Tamils launched a surprise assault on the Mullaitivu base - Operation Unceasing Waves (Unstoppable Wave). Despite its name, the operation did not at all mean a banal attack by large masses of infantry. On the contrary, in this case (as in subsequent offensives), the main stake was placed on the actions of special forces that penetrated the front lines of the enemy and attacked key defense installations. The Mullaitivu garrison, according to various sources, numbered from 1200 to 1600 military personnel, but was located in isolation from the main forces of the Sri Lankan army, which played a deplorable role in its fate. After an eight-hour battle, the Tigers broke through the defensive perimeter and captured the base's armory. Arms and ammunition from the arsenal were immediately used against their former owners. By the end of the first day of the assault, the position of the defenders became critical.
The Sri Lankan army immediately made an attempt to help the garrison. Not far from Mullaitiwu, commandos were landed from helicopters, but they immediately came under fire from the rebels and were forced to fight hard to hold the captured bridgehead. Over the next few days, the paratroopers landed continued to receive reinforcements by air and from the sea, but due to strong opposition, they were unable to begin the main task. Meanwhile, already on July 20, the Tamils destroyed the last centers of resistance of the Mullaitiv garrison. Having lost hope of saving the remnants of the garrison, the Sri Lankan army evacuated the landing force on July 25.
The result of Operation Unceasing Waves was a severe defeat for the government troops: the Mullaitivu garrison was completely destroyed, and about 100 soldiers who tried to come to his aid also died. The Tigers captured a large amount of weapons and ammunition, including two 122 mm guns.
The fall of Mullaitivu led the command of the armed forces of Sri Lanka to the idea of the need to abandon the holding of isolated bases, which are very difficult to assist in the event of an assault. Therefore, the Punerin garrison was soon evacuated, which greatly complicated the control of the movement of Tamil boats in the Jaffna lagoon.
Despite the defeat suffered, the Sri Lankan army did not postpone the already prepared offensive in the north and on July 26 launched Operation Sath Jaya, the purpose of which was to capture Kilinochchi. The offensive was carried out from the Elephant Pass area. At the first stage, the Tamils, whose main forces were concentrated in the Mullaitivu region, offered practically no resistance. Already on the first day, government troops occupied Parantan. However, the further advance to the south resumed on August 4 met with serious difficulties. In two days of fighting, government forces failed to break through the Tamil defenses, about 150 soldiers were killed, 3 tanks were destroyed and several more were damaged. On September 22, the third phase of the operation began. This time, instead of a frontal attack, the Sri Lankan army made a detour and went to Kilinochchi from the east. Having stretched the Tamil defense in this way, the attackers again changed the direction of the main attack - on the night of September 24, an advance began to the west of Kilinochchi. On September 26, the Tamils organized a powerful counterattack. During the many hours of battle, about 200 Sri Lankan soldiers died, and the Tigers also suffered heavy losses. Already weakened by previous battles, the defenders could not offer serious resistance in the future, and on September 30, government troops finally captured Kilinochchi. As in the attack on Jaffna, the overwhelming superiority of the Sri Lankan army in aviation and artillery played an important role. At the same time, it should be noted that in this conflict the words "powerful air and artillery strikes" denote events that are incomparable in intensity with the actions of really strong armies: for example, during the described operation to capture Kilinochchi, 7-8 air strikes were carried out per day on positions Tigers. According to official figures, for September 22-30, the army’s losses amounted to 269 people killed, although twice the figure was announced in the Sri Lankan parliament.
In January 1997, the Tamils launched a powerful attack on Parantan. In the event of the capture of this important point, the Tigris would be able to cut off the troops in the Kilinochchi region from the garrison of Elephant Pass. As a result of a surprise attack, the front line of defense was broken through. The Tamil special forces managed to penetrate the artillery positions, where 11 guns were destroyed: some by female kamikazes from among the attackers, some by their own servants in order to prevent their capture by the enemy. However, with the help of reinforcements, the Parentan garrison still managed to repulse the attack. At the same time, according to official figures, more than 250 servicemen were killed.
The following month, government forces carried out Operation Edibala, which resulted in the control of the Vavuniya-Mannar road. The Tigers offered little to no resistance.
On May 13, 1997, the Sri Lankan army launched a "decisive" offensive under the loud code name "Jaya Sikuruy" ("Guaranteed Victory"). The main objective of the operation was to regain control of the only land road leading to the Jaffna Peninsula, the section of which between Vavuniya and Kilinochchi was under the control of the rebels. The target of the first stage of the offensive was Puliyankulam, which was attacked in two converging directions: from the Vavuniya region to the north and from the Veli Oya region through Nedunkeni to the west. Government troops actively used artillery and armored vehicles. The Tigers, in turn, relied on mortar fire and surprise counterattacks. During the fighting on May 13-18, the attackers captured the Omantai and Nedunkeni regions, while losing about 120 military personnel. Having entrenched themselves in their positions, on May 24, the troops continued to advance and by June 3 they occupied Panikkaniravi, a village just 3 kilometers from Puliyankulam. Already in these first battles, the army lost up to a dozen tanks and armored personnel carriers knocked out and destroyed, which was the result of the active use of RPGs by the Tigers.
On June 9, the Tamils penetrated into the areas recently captured by the Sri Lankan army and attacked the village of Tandikulam, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich artillery depots were concentrated. During the fierce fighting that lasted all day, up to three hundred government soldiers died, the Tigers managed to knock out several armored vehicles and, more importantly, destroy large stocks of ammunition and ammunition.
On June 22, having brought up reinforcements and replenished supplies, the army resumed its advance towards Puliyankulam. However, already on the night of June 24-25, the Tamils launched a new powerful counterattack. This time, artillery positions in the Omantai region were attacked. The rebels managed to capture one gun and 4 artillery tractors, 3 more guns were destroyed. As a result of fierce fighting, at least 180 Sri Lankan military personnel were killed.
The Sri Lankan command was forced to take a month and a half break in the operation, during which 130 military personnel were killed as a result of another Tigers counterattack in the Rambaikulam area. Finally, on August 19, as a result of a new offensive, the army managed to capture Puliyankulam. During fierce fighting in the village itself, the Tamils knocked out 6 tanks, of which two were beyond repair, and captured one BMP.
Initially planned for 3 months, the operation "Jaya Sikuruy" clearly stalled. Until the end of the year, the Sri Lankan army made no new attempts at a large-scale offensive. At the same time, the Tigers launched two more major counterattacks. During the first of these, carried out in early October in the Kanakarayankulam region, the Tamils captured two Buffel armored personnel carriers and a large amount of light weapons and ammunition, at least 200 soldiers were killed. And in December, the base of a special forces brigade was destroyed in the same area and more than 150 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed.
On February 1, 1998, the Tamils attacked Kilinochchi, but this time the operation was unsuccessful. The Tigers suffered heavy losses (up to 300 killed), while about 50 soldiers died from the Kilinochchi garrison. During this operation, Tamil saboteurs who penetrated the Jaffna peninsula attacked an artillery base in the Iyakacchi area, from which the heavy artillery of the Sri Lankan army fired supporting the garrisons of Kilinochchi and Parantana, and inflicted significant damage on it.
Between February and May of the same year, government troops launched a series of operations, the main goal of which was the capture of Mankulam, the next major settlement on the Vavuniya-Kilinochchi road. The Sri Lankan army managed to get close to Mankulam, but the attempt to capture the city itself failed in early June.
On September 26, 1998, the Tigers launched a massive attack on Kilinochchi (Operation Unceasing Waves II). After fierce three days of fighting, Kilinochchi passed into the hands of the attackers. The losses of the Sri Lankan army alone exceeded 1000 people killed. 4 artillery pieces, 2 T-55 tanks and 8 Buffel armored personnel carriers, a large number of light weapons and ammunition were lost. The Tamils captured part of the lost weapons as trophies (including 2 or 3 130-mm guns).
The capture of Mankulam was a weak compensation for the defeat: taking advantage of the distraction of the main forces of the Tigers to the northern sector of the front, the Sri Lankan army finally captured this settlement, losing only 90 people killed.
With the fall of Kilinochchi, it became clear that "Guaranteed Victory" had little chance of success in the near future. The end of "Jaya Sikuruy" was soon announced, instead of which a number of private offensive operations were undertaken. So, as a result of the operation "Rivibala", which began in December 1998, the Sri Lankan army captured Oddusuddan, located on the road from Mankulam to Mullaitiva (which housed the "headquarters" of the Tigers after its capture in 1996). And in March-September 1999, during the Ranagosa operation, a number of areas north of the Vavuniya-Mannar road were cleared of Tamil formations. At the same time, in June 1999, not far from Mannar, the Sri Lankan Air Force managed to destroy one of the 122-mm guns captured by the Tamils in Mullaitivu.
Despite the lack of rapid impressive successes, the operations of the Sri Lankan army put the rebels in a difficult position. Already with the loss of the Jaffna peninsula in 1995-1996, the Tamils began to feel difficulties in replenishing their troops: the small population of Vanni and a number of areas of the east coast that remained under the control of the Tigers could not compensate for considerable losses. And if there were no particular problems with the recruitment of personnel for auxiliary units (often women's or "children's"), then special forces and "conventional" infantry units could not be content with the same fighters. The loss of many districts of the Vanni further exacerbated the situation.
Under these conditions, the events of November 1999 were completely unexpected. By this point, the government troops were stretched out over a long distance in a rather difficult terrain. Numerous attacks by the Tigers on the rear units during the operation "Jaya Sikuruy" forced the diversion of large forces to protect previously occupied areas. Therefore, with a sufficiently large total number of troops on the front line, there was a very limited contingent.
On the night of 2 November, the Tamils launched a major offensive in Vani, codenamed "Unceasing Waves III". The offensive was carried out from two directions: from the north across the Mankulam-Oddusudan road (here the blow fell at the junction of the army and marines) and from the east between Oddusuddan and Nedunkeni. The attackers were assisted by special forces units that had infiltrated into the rear. Within a few hours, the "tigers" managed to break through the defenses and capture Oddusuddan, and by the evening of the same day, take Nedunkeni. Government troops, leaving a large amount of military materials, retreated south to the Veli Oya region and west to the Vavuniya-Jafna highway. Pursuing the retreating, by the evening of November 5, the Tamils started fighting on the outskirts of Mankulam and Kanakarayankulam. Threatened with encirclement, the Sri Lankan troops offered no serious resistance and hastily retreated to the south. There were even cases of armed clashes between demoralized units and the military police, who were trying to detain the fugitives. Only by transferring significant reinforcements, the government army was able to stop the advance of the "tigers" in the area of Puliyankulam. According to official data, the losses of the Sri Lankan army amounted to only about 200 people killed and missing, but the scale of the defeat suggests much greater casualties. The Tamils seized a significant amount of light weapons, ammunition and ammunition, the removal of which took more than 60 car trips.
Taking advantage of the favorable situation (the attention of the Sri Lankan command was focused primarily on strengthening new positions north of Vavuniya), the Tamils on December 11 began active operations on the northern front, trying to break into the Jaffna Peninsula. The blow was delivered along the coast to the Vettilaikerni-Kaddaikadu area (east of Elephant Pass). Already on December 12, these settlements came under the control of the Tamils, which threatened the eastern front of the Elephant Pass base. On December 17, as a result of a powerful attack, the "tigers" captured Parantan, which defended the southern front of the base. However, they failed to advance further, although heavy fighting continued in the area until the end of winter.
On the night of March 26-27, 2000, the "tigers" presented another surprise to the Sri Lankan army: instead of a frontal attack on Elephant Pass (whose garrison exceeded 10 thousand people), an amphibious assault was landed from more than 1,500 fighters north of the base, in the Champyanpattu area. At the same time, spetsnaz detachments infiltrated into the rear of the Sri Lankans attacked artillery positions in the Pallay region (according to the Tamils, 11 guns were destroyed). After three days of heavy fighting, the Champyanpattu area came under the complete control of the Tigers. Even more important was the fact that on March 28, landing units, in cooperation with special forces, blocked the main road from Elephant Pass to Jaffna between the settlements of Pallay and Eluthumadduwal. Elephant Pass was only able to be supplied by a single low-capacity dirt road running south of the main road along the coast of Jaffna Lagoon. Government troops made numerous attempts to regain control of the main road. In fierce battles, the parties suffered heavy losses, including the Tamils destroyed, captured and knocked out more than 10 armored vehicles. By April 10, the Sri Lankan army managed to clear the road directly from the enemy, but the Tamils held their positions only 500 meters to the north, so it was not possible to restore transport links along the highway.
Meanwhile, having transferred reinforcements to the landing force, on April 18, the "Tigers" delivered another blow from the Chempiyanpattu region and blocked the strategically important road in yet another place - between Pallay and Iyakacchi. In the following days, fierce battles unfolded for the settlement of Iyacacchi, which fell on April 22. The garrison of Elefan Pass, under the threat of complete encirclement and destruction, hastily left the base, abandoning most of the weapons. The retreat took place under Tamil fire, both along the coastal road and through the shallow waters of the Jaffna lagoon. The losses of the retreating were heavy - according to various sources, from several hundred to more than a thousand, while the commander of the garrison also died. According to the "tigers", they got 3 152-mm and 2 122-mm guns, 12 120-mm mortars and a large amount of other weapons and ammunition.
On April 30, after a fierce battle, the Sri Lankan troops left Pallay, who was in a semi-encirclement, and withdrew to the Kilali-Eluthumadduwal-Nagar-Kovil area, where they equipped a new defense line.
Having suffered a heavy defeat and being threatened by a further offensive by the Tamils in order to capture Jaffna, the Sri Lankan army hastily strengthened its forces on the Northern Front. By May 2000, two of the three divisions previously involved in operations in the Vavuniya region were deployed to the Jaffna Peninsula - thus, five of the nine divisions of the government army - more than 40 thousand military personnel - were concentrated on the peninsula.
Considering that the rebels could hardly provide more than 5 thousand fighters for the operation against Jaffna, the prospect of such an offensive seemed simply utopian. However, the “tigers” nevertheless launched it, and the direction of the strike changed once again: this time the attack was directed from the Punerina area to Navatkuli through the Jaffna lagoon (the depths here are such that they allow fording the lagoon in the dry season). The offensive began on May 10 and within a day the Tamils managed to capture not only the positions of the Sri Lankan troops on the coastal beaches, but also the strategically important Navatkuli bridge connecting the Valikamam and Tenmarachchi sectors. Subsequently, the offensive developed in two directions: west to the city of Jaffna and east to Chavakacherri. In fierce battles, both sides suffered heavy losses. Government troops actively used aviation, the rebels, as usual, relied on the fire defeat of the enemy with artillery and mortar fire. On May 17, the Tamils captured the fortified point of Kaitadi (halfway between Navatkuli and Jaffna), and by May 20 captured the second largest city of the Chavakacherry peninsula and the important village of Sarasalai. The situation for the Sri Lankan army became more and more threatening, however, the forces of the attackers were running out. In fact, with the occupation of Chavakacherri, the offensive of the "tigers" ran out of steam. Despite the battles that continued until the end of May, the positions of the parties in this area did not change. The Tamil attempt, following the capture of Elephant Pass, to completely master the Jaffna Peninsula failed.
Having put the troops, battered in previous battles, in order over the summer, the Sri Lankan army from the beginning of September switched to active operations against the Tamils. On September 3, an offensive began on the Navatkuli region, code-named "Rivikirana", the main blow was delivered from Jaffna. However, the very next day, having lost at least 170 soldiers killed, the Sri Lankan army stopped the operation. On September 17, the offensive aimed at Chavakacherri resumed (Operation Kinihira I). During the day of fierce fighting, the Sri Lankans captured the city, repelling a number of counterattacks by the "tigers".
Until the end of the year, the government troops carried out a whole series of successive offensive operations, united by the common name "Kinihira". The Tamils, weakened by previous battles, could not hold their positions and gradually retreated: in October, the Sri Lankan army occupied Sarasalai, on December 21, Kaitadi, and on December 30, Navatkuli. By the new year 2001, the Tigers had evacuated their last units from the area.
Having removed the direct threat to Jaffna, the Sri Lankan army on April 25, 2001 attacked the positions of the Tamils in the Eluthumadduwal-Nagar-Kovil area (Operation "Agnie Khiela"). The "Tigers" put up fierce resistance in positions well-equipped during the year, making extensive use of mortars and artillery. Heavy three-day battles did not lead to any changes in the front line, the losses of the Sri Lankan army exceeded 300 people killed. After that, there were no serious hostilities until the end of the year, both sides were actively engaged in training troops, stockpiling weapons and ammunition. In January 2002, a truce was signed, which is still in force today. However, the prospects for concluding a peace treaty remain extremely vague - since none of the parties, agreeing to various concessions, is willing to give in on the main issue - the creation of an independent Tamil state.
Let us now turn to the losses of the parties during the entire period of armed confrontation. According to official Sri Lankan data, the army and police lost 5,250 people from 1983 to 1994; 4,760 people from April 1995 to January 1997; The losses of the rebels are estimated by the Sri Lankan army at 30 thousand, the "tigers" claim that this figure is actually half as much - in any case, the ratio of losses (given the quantitative and technical superiority of government forces) looks very "flattering" for the rebels.
In conclusion, let us say a few words about the structure of the Sri Lankan army. It consists of 8 infantry divisions and one special forces division. By the time of the ceasefire, they were stationed as follows: 21st division - Mannar, 22nd - Trincomalee, 23rd - Batticaloa, 51st, 52nd, 54th and 55th - Jaffna, 56th - Vanni. Each infantry division usually consists of 4 brigades, whose numbers are formed by adding the number from 1 to 4 to the division number (for example, 561st, 562nd, 563rd and 564th brigades of the 56th division). The 53rd elite special forces division, which participated in almost all major operations, consists of a commando brigade, a special forces brigade and an airmobile brigade. There are also several separate tank, artillery and engineer regiments, which are attached to divisions as part of reinforcement if necessary.
The police units involved in operations against the insurgents are divided into brigades, each of which has its own area of responsibility. There are two special forces police brigades deployed in the Batticaloa and Ampara areas.
The fleet also contributes to the struggle on the land front: about three thousand sailors act together with the army in the Vanni.
As a result of a massive and well-prepared offensive launched in 2008, the Sri Lankan army managed to almost completely break the resistance of the Tamil rebels from the Tamil Eelam Liberation Tigers, who have been fighting for almost a quarter of a century to create an independent Tamil state in the northeast of the island. The "Tigers" lost all their fortified points, strong bases and were forced to retreat into the jungle. Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa announced that the rebels would be eliminated as early as 2009. However, winning does not mean securing a stable peace. The contradictions remain the same as they were at the very beginning of the conflict.
The armed confrontation between the Tamil Tigers and the authorities of Sri Lanka has been going on for so long that sometimes it seems that it has always been like this. It is hard to believe that the civil war, which began in 1983 with the massacre of Tamils by the Sinhalese, can ever end. And yet, recent events speak for themselves. Sri Lankan army, which purchased modern weapons in India, Pakistan and the Russian Federation, apparently, managed to turn the tide of history. In 2008, it consistently advanced to the north of Sri Lanka, recapturing more and more territories from the separatists. The cities of Kokavil and Mankulam fell. In September, one of the most important strongholds of the "tigers" Parantan, a former fort, which was the key to the capital of the informal Tamil state - the city of Kilinochchi, was taken.
After that, the offensive slowed down a bit. Probably, during the autumn and early winter there were stubborn battles for the capital of the "tigers". It is still impossible to say how the hostilities unfolded and what were the losses on both sides: the Sri Lankan authorities completely closed the combat zone from journalists and observers, declaring that they were acting in the interests of their own security. One way or another, but on January 2, the capital of the Tamil Tigers, Killinochchi, was taken. After that, government troops moved further north and captured the fort city of Elephant Pass, or Elephant Pass, which is located on a narrow isthmus connecting the Jaffna peninsula to the north with Sri Lanka. On January 15, the army announced that the entire peninsula was under its control.
Finally, on January 25, the last stronghold of the Tamil separatists, the city of Mullaittivu, located on the northwestern coast, was taken. It was the main sea gate of the self-proclaimed Tamil state. The Sri Lankan Navy blocked it from the sea, in order not only to cut off the main supply channel for the Tamil Tigers, but also to prevent them from breaking out of the ring and leaving the island. As a result, the rebels were pushed back into the jungle and locked in a small area of about 300 square kilometers. The situation is complicated by the fact that about 250,000 civilians live in this territory, who find themselves between two fires. The Sri Lankan government issued an ultimatum to the "tigers", demanding that the civilian population be released along the security corridor. However, this was done, rather, to calm the international public opinion: the entire history of the conflict shows that both warring parties, without much hesitation, let civilians go to waste if circumstances so required.
However, the question that worries observers no less, and perhaps even more, is how strong the victory of the Sri Lankan government over the Tamil Tigers is. Is current Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran ready to continue the fight, or is he busy looking for ways to leave the island as soon as possible? He had previously stated that he would not give up. By the way, the successful attacks of the Sri Lankan army on the "tigers", similar to the one that took place in 2008, happened before, and every time the Tamil separatists found the opportunity and strength to launch a counterattack that brought all the efforts of the government to naught.
This was the case, for example, in 1995-96, when the Sri Lankan army, as a result of military operations under the code names Riviresa I, II and III, also managed to take control of the Jaffna peninsula. As today, the Sri Lankan government claimed that the defeat of the rebels was close. However, on July 18, 1996, the Tamils unexpectedly launched an operation called "Unstoppable Waves" and captured the city of Mullaitiwa. At the same time, the superiority of government troops in numbers and weapons did not help. The constant shortage of heavy weapons forced the "tigers" to develop a special tactics of warfare: their main force is small, but well-trained commandos, as well as kamikazes, who capture key positions in the rear and break into defenses from the inside. During the attack on Mullaitiwa, strike groups broke through and captured the weapons cache, which was immediately directed against the defenders. The garrison of about 1600 people was completely destroyed.
"Tamil Tigers". Photo (c)AFP
Of course, the Sri Lankan army took into account the mistakes of the past. In addition, now the “tigers” have suffered really serious damage. In addition to the debacle in Sri Lanka, over the past few years, law enforcement agencies of a number of foreign countries disrupted several international networks that collected and sent funds for the Tamil rebels. The arrests have taken place in the US, Canada, France and the UK, where the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are considered a terrorist organization. But even if the "tigers" no longer have the strength and means to conduct a large-scale operation, they can switch to guerrilla warfare, that is, return to what they actually started with in the 70s and early 80s. And in order to fight the guerrillas and keep the jungle-covered areas recaptured from the "tigers" under control, the Sri Lankan army will need much more human and material resources than to conduct open hostilities.
It is also clear that if the Tamil rebels switch to guerrilla warfare in Sri Lanka, the number of terrorist attacks will increase many times over, especially with the use of suicide bombers. AT last years When the attention of the world community was riveted to the countries of the Near and Middle East, the words "suicide bomber" were mainly associated with the so-called "martyrs". In fact, the Tamil Tigers account for most of the terrorist attacks involving kamikaze terrorists. This is their kind business card. Created in the group special unit suicide bombers, which was called the "Black Tigers". The Black Tigers' most notorious terrorist attack was the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, who paid the price for India's intervention in the civil war in Sri Lanka in 1987-1990. The premier was blown up by a Tamil suicide bomber, handing him a bouquet of flowers in which the bomb was hidden.
Other successful attacks by the Tamil Tigers include the explosion of an oil storage facility in the country's capital Colombo in 1995, the assassination of the Sri Lankan President Premadas in 1993, the commander of the Navy Admiral Fernando in 1992, not to mention the numerous bloody terrorist attacks against ordinary residents of Sri Lanka. Lanks who are blown up in buses and markets. The risk of a repetition of these attacks cannot be ruled out because, despite the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers, none of the causes underlying the armed conflict has been eliminated. Meanwhile, these contradictions are so deeply rooted in the history of Sri Lankan society and the state that it is most likely impossible to do without a political solution.
Sri Lanka is home to many ethnic groups. Four-fifths of the population are Sinhalese, who live mainly in the south of the country. Tamils living in the north and east, according to some sources, make up one tenth of the population. The rest falls on smaller ethnic groups, including the so-called Indian Tamils, who were brought from India by the British colonialists to work on tea plantations. They live in the central regions and do not take part in the war. Contradictions between Tamils and Sinhalese date back to the colonial era. Before colonization, there were three states in Sri Lanka - two Sinhalese and one Tamil. Having established control over the island in the 19th century, the British united them into one. At the same time, guided by the principle of "divide and rule", the colonizers were relying on the Tamil minority, whose representatives were entrusted with many important administrative functions.
The leader of the Tamil Tigers, Veluppilai Prabhakaran. Photo (c)AFP
Despite this, after the island gained independence in 1948, there were no ethnic clashes among its inhabitants for a long time. The United National Party (UNP) came to power, bringing together representatives of various groups belonging to the stratum of the European-educated elite. Ethnic and confessional contradictions - between Sinhalese Buddhists and Hindu Tamils - escalated later, when the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) entered the political scene, which used patriotic and sometimes nationalistic Sinhala rhetoric, intending to take revenge on colonial times and restore "justice" in relations between Sinhalese and Tamils. Sinhalese became the only state language, Buddhism was actively promoted, quotas were introduced at universities according to national and regional affiliation. This caused dissatisfaction with the Tamil minority, which in turn led to the formation of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), which demanded the creation of an independent Tamil state - Tamil Eelam.
Further escalation of political confrontation led to inter-ethnic clashes and war. In 1987, India intervened in the conflict, through the mediation of which the parties managed to reach a compromise. The authorities of Sri Lanka agreed to recognize the official status of the Tamil language, to grant broad autonomy to the northern and eastern regions inhabited by Tamils. However, in the end, nothing came of it. Several truces that were concluded during civil war, also failed to give rise to a political settlement.
But in any case, the armed confrontation lasting 25 years, the victims of which were about 70 thousand people, indicates that it will not be possible to resolve the conflict by military means. You can defeat the "tigers", drive them into the jungle, but the question of the political rights of the Tamil minority will remain open, which means that the possibility of a new confrontation is not ruled out. It is noteworthy that the current President Rajapaksa is also a representative of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, he is not inclined to compromise with the Tamils, which means he risks stepping on the same rake.
Perhaps, in terms of the number of various special forces and their percentage of the total army, Sri Lanka occupies one of the first places in the world. The reason for this lies in the fact that over the past decades, the main (and in fact the only - apart from UN peacekeeping operations) conflict in which the Sri Lankan army has been involved has been the war with the Tamil rebels of the LTTE.
In total, during the civil war that ended in 2009, 685 Sri Lankan special forces were killed. 10 of them were posthumously awarded the highest award of Sri Lanka - Parama Vira Vibhushana.
At present, the Sri Lankan special forces have about 5,000 servicemen.
The Sri Lankan Army Commando Regiment was the first to be created. The decision to form it was made in 1977 by the then commander of the army, Lieutenant General Janaka Pereira. About a dozen officers and sergeants were trained by Indian para-commandos.
And on March 15, 1980, the first commando squadron was formed, after 6 years it was deployed into a full-fledged regiment, and in April 1988 - and in separate brigade.
In total, during the years of the civil war, 4 commando regiments were formed. During the war, they played the role of air assault units, specializing in combat operations in urban areas, air and sea assaults, assaults on fortified LTTE bases in the jungle, as well as counter-terrorist operations and the protection of top officials of the state.
Since 1993, the main commando base and school has been at Velioi in the Northern Province, which had the status of a "border village" on the border of LTTE-controlled territories.
In June-July 2007, it was 1,200 commandos who stormed the main LTTE base in the Eastern Province on Mount Thoppigala, nicknamed the "Sri Lankan Tora Bora", the capture of which led to the establishment of full government control over the Eastern Province.
After the end of the war, the regiments were reduced to the size of battalions. Today, the commando regiment consists of 4 battalions, as well as separate groups for the protection of the country's leaders, counter-terror and service dog breeding.
Each battalion has 140 operatives, divided into teams of 20 people.
The second special unit of the Sri Lankan army - the regiment special forces- began its history in 1985, with a squadron trained by advisers from the Pakistani special forces SSG. She was deployed to the regiment in December 1988, in March 1997 - to a separate brigade.
During the civil years, it numbered up to five regiments. The first commander of the 1st Regiment of Special Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Fazli Lafir, died in action in July 1996, commanding the operation to deblockade the besieged LTTE garrison of government troops in Mullaitivu, and was posthumously awarded Parama Vira Vibhushana.
Unlike commandos, special forces regiments specialized in raids behind enemy lines with deep reconnaissance, sabotage and acts of sabotage.
Now the regiment of special forces has 3 battalions, trained on operations in the jungle with patrols of 4-8 fighters.
Also in the regiment there is a team of combat divers and one of the most famous parts of the Sri Lankan army - a squadron of combat raiders, regularly entertaining spectators at army events with firing from AK-47s and grenade launchers from the saddle of motorcycles at full speed.
The third special unit of the army was created in 1996, but the authorities officially recognized its existence only in 2013. The deep reconnaissance detachment, now numbering about 200 fighters, is the elite of the Sri Lankan special forces.
In addition to the commandos and fighters of the regiments of special forces, it also includes former LTTE militants who defected to the side of the government. During the war years, they specialized in operations in small groups in the depths of enemy territory, staged sabotage and assassination of high-ranking LTTE figures.
The deep reconnaissance squad killed at least 8 separatist commanders ranging from major to colonel, and unsuccessfully attempted several times on the leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran. They were also accused of killing a number of human rights activists and lawyers who acted as defenders of the captured militants.
The training of the squad members takes place in the Maduro Oya National Park. The final exam is a 100 km march through the national park with 18 checkpoints in 72 hours, with a full load, no food, no water, with one compass.
The park is known for the largest population of wild elephants in the country, which you have to wade past. Of course, for the sake of saving lives, you can shoot at elephants, but this means failing the exam.
This special unit does not have any special uniform or insignia.
The Air Force also has a separate regiment of special forces, it was created in July 2003.
It is entrusted with the task of protecting air bases, as well as rescuing the crews of downed helicopters and aircraft on enemy territory.
As part of the fleet in January 1993, with the help of British SBS instructors, its own Special Boat Squadron (SBS) was created under the command of Lieutenant Commander Ravindra Vijigunaratne. Already in November 1993, he conducted the first operation to recapture the Fleet camp in Punerin, captured by the LTTE.
During the war years, SBS operatives intercepted ships delivering weapons to the LTTE, reconnoitered the coast for amphibious landings, and confronted Sea Tigers that attacked Sri Lankan ships in their motor boats, often in kamikaze attacks.
Especially for the SBS, Arrow high-speed boats were designed and built, armed with a 23-mm automatic cannon and a PKM machine gun.
By the way, after the end of the civil, Australians became interested in this development of the Sri Lankans - to fight illegal migrants.