Soviet army in the Helmand province of Afghanistan. Herat operations
By nature, all women are individual. Under the influence of stereotypes, some anatomical features are considered to be shortcomings. A long neck is a sign of aristocratic origin, a short one can […]
Our life is a picture of white and black spots. Sometimes it seems that the hands would have been torn off by the artist who spilled black paint. And if you look under […]
Among the signs of the Zodiac, one can single out the five most impatient, loving to command others. Relationships with them are not so easy to build, because you have to either fight them […]
Oriental medicine experts are sure that our feet can be good helpers in diagnosing certain diseases. Permanent corns become a signal of interruptions in the work of the body. Coarseness […]
All girls, without exception, dream of becoming the owner of lush, long and jet-black eyelashes. To get the desired result today, painstaking, daily care and such fairly simple […]
Many people consider dark chocolate, blueberries, cinnamon, and red wine to be healthy foods. But it's not. They have their contraindications and can harm the body. […]
No one doubts the fact that our well-being directly depends on what we eat daily. A balanced diet affects our health [...]
Healthy sleep is one of the recipes for beauty and youth. If you do not systematically get enough sleep, this is reflected primarily on the skin of the face. Hide traces of fatigue, […]
Mascara helps to quickly achieve an expressive and attractive look. In addition to the obvious advantages, the cosmetic product contains dangerous components. We will tell you more about them in this article. […]
Despite the fact that there is a lot of information in the public domain about the relationship between a man and a woman, we continue to ask ourselves difficult questions. One of them: […]
If you began to see objects not as clearly and clearly as before, feel pain or burning in your eyes, it's time to reconsider your […]
During the winter, girls often experience dry lips. Only a balm can save lips from peeling and cracking. But remember, the wrong remedy can bring […]
Sooner or later, any woman notices the first age-related changes: small wrinkles and gray hair, sagging skin and dull complexion. Some of these shortcomings can […]
Not every woman reads the composition of the shadows before buying. It would seem that they can be harmful? However, harmful substances can penetrate even through the pores […]
Jewelry, in particular, rings that women like to wear on different fingers, can tell a lot about the female character and its features. Wherein we are talking […]
Relationships with a narcissistic woman, whether she is a mother, sister, friend or lover, rarely lead to anything good. At best, the price of such a relationship is the time spent […]
The main criterion when choosing shoes is comfort. But if we dress old-fashioned, then we look older than our years. There are signs that will indicate that your […]
In order to become truly happy now, it's time to take on yourself and start changing. It's much easier than it actually seems. And if you don't […]
It is not customary to argue about tastes, but psychologists say that the whole point is not only in the things in favor of which we make a choice. Due to the nature of its […]
With the help of various styling tools - tongs and irons - we are trying to create our own unique image. But it is not always possible to achieve […]
Unfortunately, few people know that lettuce leaves are very healthy, and the rest simply do not include them in their diet. But the benefits of fresh herbs for the body are really invaluable. Korn This is one of the […]
American psychologists have proven that every second man lies on the first date. It comes from self-doubt. In the article we will tell you about what most often lie […]
Second trip to Afghanistan
By the end of 1987, it was finally decided to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan. At a meeting of the Military Council of the Army, the commander set the main task for commanders of all levels: combat losses, and even more so non-combat losses, in the troops of the 40th Army should be sharply reduced. He demanded that the officers do everything to prevent the death of soldiers and sergeants. For every person killed in battle, during the shelling of airfields, garrisons, outposts, or under any other circumstances, the commander must bear serious responsibility.
In accordance with the instructions of the army commander, the combat activity of units and subunits of the 40th Army, as well as the number of operations in the interests of government troops, were gradually to be reduced to a minimum. Retaliatory or, depending on the situation, pre-emptive combat actions, the commanders of formations and units were obliged to carry out only in order to prevent the mass death of their people, moreover, to exclude such a threat. Only in the case when the situation dictated the need to deliver a powerful blow to the enemy did the commander have the right to make such a decision.
The management of combat and transport aviation was no less rigidly organized. The 40th Army had a powerful air force. We almost completely abandoned the reckless assistance to the Afghans - representatives of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the leadership of the districts and the government of the country.
Experience has shown that the results achieved in the course of our military operations are not used by the Afghans. One and a half to two months after the completion of the operation, everything returned to normal: the enemy again occupied those areas from which the Soviet troops had ousted him some time ago. In addition, the enemy promptly restored the former bases with weapons and ammunition and again found himself in close proximity to our facilities, resuming shelling, attacks on our columns and committing terrorist acts.
This position of the command of the 40th Army did not satisfy everyone. We immediately felt powerful pressure, primarily from the leadership of Afghanistan.
The situation in the country on the eve of the withdrawal of troops
The military-political situation in Afghanistan became more and more complicated. The weaker and more vulnerable the positions of state power became, the stronger the pressure on the Soviet military command was. With each week, the demands of official Kabul increased. The Afghan government has failed to consolidate its power in many provinces. Among them are Kunar, Paktia, Badakhshan, Kapisa. In 1987, more than 85% of the country's territory, administratively divided into 31 provinces and one Khost district, was under the control of the Mujahideen. The government lost county after county, province after province.
Of particular concern to the Afghan leadership and the Soviet military command was the situation in the province of Paktia, namely in the Khost district. This was due to the fact that the armed opposition groups had practically completed the blockade of the city. In Khost there was a critical situation with food - the population of the city was starving. Food was delivered there mainly by planes. Transport aircraft went to Khost, as a rule, at night.
After the withdrawal of the garrison of Soviet troops from Khost, there was a real threat of losing the city, and indeed the entire district. The situation was complicated by the fact that Khost County itself was in double isolation. The first ring consisted of the armed formations of the opposition, and the second passed along the mountain range of the Satykandav pass, the height of which reached three thousand meters.
The loss of Khost by the Kabul government would be an important gain for the opposition. Therefore, the Mujahideen prepared thoroughly for the decisive blow. Taking advantage of the absence of Soviet troops in the area, the Dushmans restored one of their largest transshipment bases, "Javara", which means "Wolf Pit", which our troops defeated in the spring of 1986.
Operation "Highway"
After repeated persistent requests from the Afghan leadership, the command of the 40th Army began to plan a major joint military operation of the Afghan and Soviet troops. Here is how Colonel-General Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich describes in his book "Limited Contingent" the preparation and conduct of the operation "Magistral": "The main goal of the operation was to break the blockade to provide the population of Khost, primarily with food, as well as other types of material resources - fuel, medicines etc. Previously, we carried out a deep and detailed analysis the situation around Khost. Officers and generals of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the 40th Army visited there.
The opposition grouping in the area consisted mainly of the paramilitary part of the Jadran tribe. These are very proud people who in their history did not submit to any government at all and acted as they saw fit. The general leadership of the formations of the Mujahideen was carried out by Jalaluddin, a native of this tribe.
It was decided to start the operation in November 1987. Simultaneously with the planning and preparation of hostilities, the command of the 40th Army made one attempt after another in order to achieve the release of Khost by peaceful means. Negotiations had to be conducted, including by me, as the commander of the army and the leader of the upcoming hostilities. Despite the fact that, together with several officers, I personally climbed the pass, which served as a dividing line between the possessions of the Jadran tribe and the rest of Afghanistan, in order to meet with Jalaluldin and negotiate with him, but all our efforts were in vain. He avoided direct contact with us in every possible way. Our communication with him was limited to a few letters. However, we did not stop trying to achieve a peaceful solution to the problem.
by the most important issue in the course of preparing the operation, I considered minimizing possible losses on the part of the 40th Army. A lot of time was devoted to a thorough study of the terrain on which the troops were to operate. We organized the interaction of Soviet and Afghan troops, artillery and aviation. The areas and terms for the concentration of the involved forces and means were determined.
The 40th Army participated in the operation with the forces of the 108th and 201st motorized rifle divisions, the 103rd airborne division, the 56th separate airborne assault brigade, the 345th separate airborne regiment, as well as other units and subunits . From the side of the armed forces of Afghanistan, the forces and means of the 8th, 11th, 12th, 14th and 25th infantry divisions, the 15th tank brigade and several units were involved special purpose. In addition, more than ten battalions of Tsarandoy and state security participated in the operation.
Even at the final stage of preparations for hostilities, we still hoped that as a result of negotiations with both Jalaluldin and the elders of the tribe, we would be able to come to an agreement on the unhindered passage of columns with peaceful cargo to the besieged Khost.
The plan of the operation included: in the event of an inconclusive completion of negotiations with the Jadran tribe, air strikes would block the caravan routes along which the opposition carried weapons and ammunition, and thereby isolate the area of upcoming hostilities from the approach of reserves.
By capturing the Satykandav pass, which was located at an altitude of three thousand meters, we planned to ensure the unhindered advance of our troops and block the Gardez-Khost road.
At the next stage of the operation, keeping the highway under its control, combat units they were supposed to cover the passage of columns with a supply of materiel to Khost and ensure their return in the opposite direction.
Later, after the necessary supplies of food, medicine and fuel were created in the Khost garrison, the troops that were located along the road were supposed to be withdrawn from the district to the Gardez region.
By the end of November 22, units and subunits were fully prepared for the operation, which received the code name "Magistral". Operational groupings of Soviet and Afghan troops were created in the area of Gardez and Khost. Artillery took up the main firing positions. I chose the place for the command post in such a way as to see everything that happens in the combat area and influence the development of the situation.
Since we failed to agree with the opposition on the unhindered passage of the columns, on November 23, as planned, we began hostilities. Unfortunately for the Jadran tribe, the very first air strikes succeeded, as we expected, in blocking the area of the operation.
Of course, the dushmans understood that our actions were dictated by the need to eliminate the threat of starvation to several thousand inhabitants of Khost. However, they offered serious resistance to Soviet and government troops.
During the first week, the troops of the 40th Army methodically acted on the enemy, slowly but surely moving towards the Satykandav pass, trying to capture it. At the same time, every day we sent through special security officers our proposals for a peaceful solution to the issue. Even at the height of hostilities, having met fierce resistance, we did not seek to inflict heavy losses on the opposition. The army command had reliable data from aerial and undercover intelligence about the locations of enemy groupings. Nevertheless, we, strange as it may sound, tried to inflict minimal losses on the enemy; at the same time, they made the necessary efforts to simply push him out of the pass.
By the end of November 29, after six days of hostilities, the advanced units captured the Satykandav pass. The main merit in this belongs to the personnel of the 103rd Airborne Division, which at that time was commanded by Major General Pavel Sergeevich Grachev. He personally directed the actions of his subordinates and managed to capture the pass, while suffering minimal losses.
After that, the command of the 40th Army made another attempt to release Khost without bloodshed. On November 30, regular negotiations with Jalaluddin and other leaders of the warring tribe began through the Afghan security officials. Understanding the importance of the ongoing events, the representative of the President of the country, the Minister for Tribal and National Affairs, Suleiman Laek, flew from Kabul from the Afghan government. On behalf of the president and the loya jirga that was taking place at that time in Kabul, he once again addressed the leaders of the Jadran tribe with a proposal not to impede the progress of columns with peaceful cargo.
In order to negotiate, we had to suspend hostilities for almost two weeks. This time was quite enough to hold the necessary meetings, negotiations, as well as mutual recriminations, accusations, ultimatums and other measures that, in our opinion, should have led to a positive result.
The command of the 40th Army these days was also not inactive. Realizing that the hopes for a peaceful solution to the problem are very illusory, we prepared an operation using special capabilities. In an effort to have the maximum impact on the situation around the leaders of the Jadran tribe, the army command decided to mislead the enemy about the real state of affairs in the combat area.
Through agents military intelligence we through proxies transmitted to Pakistan information that Jalaluddin was increasingly inclined to agree to the proposals of the Soviet military command and lay down their arms. The leadership of the "alliance of seven" as if by chance found out that Jalaluddin was discussing with his assistants the routes for the withdrawal of formations subordinate to him from the combat area. In the hope that Jalaluddin will be liquidated by his leadership, we even indicated the timing of the withdrawal of the opposition detachments.
A week and a half after the start of this operation, Jalaluddin disappeared from the combat area. He reappeared in Khost only at the end of January, when the operation "Magistral" was completely completed by us. Later we learned that in Pakistan this information was treated with doubt. Nevertheless, they decided to check Jalaluddin after all. He was recalled to Pakistan and went there, leaving the armed formations that were in the war zone to his deputy. According to our information, Jalaluddin was interrogated for a long time, checking and rechecking his every word for loyalty.
Thanks to a successful operational combination, we managed to remove the irreconcilable field commander from the leadership of the opposing enemy grouping. The fierce resistance of the rebels continued after that for no more than two weeks. However, we were unable to achieve the most important thing - the release of Khost by peaceful means. Under increased pressure from the leaders of the "alliance of seven", whose headquarters was in Peshawar, the leadership of the Jadran tribe refused to let our columns into Khost.
To save the population of the city and Khost district from starvation, the Loya Jirga authorized President Najibullah to order units of the Afghan armed forces to continue the operation.
I specifically emphasize that the order was given to the Afghan troops, because it was on their shoulders and on their weapons that the main burden of this operation lay. Parts of the 40th Army, as a rule, acted in the interests of ensuring the operation.
On December 16, the troops were forced to continue fighting. By this time, the road from Gardez to the Satykandav pass was completely in our hands. I moved the command post closer to the area of the operation and deployed it directly on the pass, which was also under our control. I think not many people had to lead the fighting from a height of three thousand meters above sea level.
In the area of Khosta, we landed troops consisting of one Soviet battalion and a brigade of Afghan commandos. This made it possible to create very favorable conditions for a rapid advance towards each other.
The units operating in the direction of Gardez-Khost successively captured the dominant heights along the road and took the highway under guard.
The paramilitary part of the Jadran tribe continued to resist. Dushmans conducted aimed fire at the artillery positions of the Soviet troops and at the command post.
During the fighting, we first blocked and then destroyed the base area called Srana, which was located just south of the Satykandav pass and closer to Khost.
The elimination of this large base area played a decisive role in final defeat resisting detachments of the armed opposition and the capture by Soviet troops of the Gardez-Khost highway under their guard. After the field commanders realized that the outcome of the hostilities was a foregone conclusion, they changed their plans. Instead of concentrating forces and means and additional delivery of weapons, ammunition and equipment, they began to take active measures to preserve those stocks that were already in Khost district.
The command of the 40th army was clearly aware that in the course of the operation "Magistral" the key tasks for us were the capture of the Satykandav pass and the destruction of the Srana base area. With the implementation of these tasks, we have practically overcome all the obstacles that were in our way, and have come close to the ultimate goal of this operation.
On December 30, a day before the start of the new year, 1988, we, having completely cleared the road of mines, land mines and rubble, launched the first trucks with food along it.
Beginning of second tour as First Deputy Commander of the Army
In December 1987, I was appointed First Deputy Commander of the 40th Army. Arriving in Kabul, he equipped himself and the next day flew to the army command post.
Arriving at the army command post, he introduced himself to the commander and leadership, including the Afghan one. Among the Afghan generals and officers there were many acquaintances from the first trip. Boss General Staff of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Asef Delaware, during my advisory work, was a division commander; my former sub-councilmen Nabi Azimi was already an army general, first deputy minister of defense; Faruk - lieutenant general, chief of artillery of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan.
The chief of the operational department of the army headquarters introduced me to the situation. The active phase of the operation was completed, and the convoy of columns with stocks of materiel began. Every day, two or three columns left Gardez for Khost, and by January 19, 1988, the last column had already returned empty from Khost.
All this time, units and subunits of the army stood guard along the highway, successfully repelling regular attempts by the Mujahideen to break through the outposts, go to the highway and disrupt transportation.
On January 10, a Diploma of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on conferring the title of Hero was delivered to the army command post Soviet Union to the commander of the 345th separate airborne regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Vostrotin Valery Alexandrovich, whose soldiers and officers brilliantly showed themselves in the destruction of the Srana base area. The three of us - the commander of the army, Lieutenant General Gromov B.V., a member of the Military Council of the Army, Major General Zakharov A.I. and I - went to the command post of the regiment, where they presented the Diploma to Valery Alexandrovich and congratulated him on a high state award. Lieutenant Colonel Vostrotin V.A. during the first trip he was seriously wounded, but, thanks to the efforts of doctors, he not only got to his feet, but also returned to combat formation again.
As a result of the operation "Magistral", many generals, officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and Army General Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov, Lieutenant General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, Junior Sergeant Yury Verikovich Islamov (posthumously) and Private Igolchenko Sergey Viktorovich were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
During the operation, units of the 40th Army seized more than a hundred warehouses, destroyed over 40 caravans with weapons, ammunition and other materiel, captured four tanks and nine armored personnel carriers. Drivers of autobattalions of the army transported about 30 thousand tons of various cargoes to the city of Khost.
Performing tasks in the provinces of Kandahar, Loshkargah, Helmand
With the announcement of a policy of national reconciliation, the rebels made vigorous efforts to "erode" the existing regime in the country, categorically rejecting the conditions he offered for reconciliation. In addition, they stepped up their activities, including shelling, attacks on convoys and settlements, actively carried out terrorist and sabotage acts.
With the help of the Soviet Union, two powerful textile factories of woolen and cotton fabrics with modern equipment were built in Kandahar. They needed electricity to run. The commissioning of factories was a huge contribution to the development of the Afghan economy. But the opposition could not come to terms with the fact that with the help of the Soviet Union there could be a revival of the economy, and as a result, an improvement in the life of the population. this region countries. They did everything to disrupt these works. At night, in different places, attackers undermined the huge reinforced concrete foundations of the metal pylons of the power line, which stretched from the Kajaki hydroelectric power station.
Reference: the length of the hydroelectric dam was 270 meters, the height was 100 meters, the dam's capacity was 50 megawatts. The hydroelectric plant supplied electricity to Kandahar and Loshkargah. It was built in the upper reaches of the Helmand River, a few kilometers from the large volost village of Musakala.
This parish and the whole province of Helmand was one of the most famous for growing poppies for the production of opium. The planting area of opium poppy was over 100,000 hectares. The king of drugs was Muhammad Nasim, one of the leaders of the rebel gang, which controlled the entire parish. Its armed formation consisted of about 1,400 people, 19 detachments and groups, 4 MANPADS, 30 DShKs, 11 RPGs and other weapons. In addition to him, a bandit formation led by Abdurakhman operated in this area: 960 people, 18 detachments and groups, 3 ZGU, 5 BO, 31 DShK, 57 RPG.
In order to organize the safe work of Soviet and Afghan specialists in restoring power lines and providing power to Kandahar and Loshkargah, defeating the main forces of gangs and preventing the export of narcotic substances, joint military operations were planned and organized in the province of Helmand with the involvement of forces and means of the 5th MRD, 22nd arr. , Air Force of the 40th Army, 7 Infantry Division, Tsarandoy battalions and the Ministry of State Security of the Republic of Afghanistan. The first deputy commander of the army, Major General Pishchev Nikolai Pavlovich, was appointed the head.
Due to the fact that at the very beginning of hostilities, General Pishchev suddenly fell ill, the commander sent me to lead the operation. At night, in two helicopters, I flew from Kabul to the Musakala region. The helicopter landing area was illuminated with improvised means, using shells from 122 mm howitzer shells filled with rags and diesel fuel. Within ten minutes, Nikolai Pavlovich brought me up to date and flew to Kabul. Thus began my first independent fighting.
We did not conduct active combat operations, but, blocking the main exit and entry routes to the area, we inflicted fire damage on the enemy with artillery fire and air strikes. Active operations were carried out by units of the 22nd SN Brigade, which, using the full range of reconnaissance and search activities in cooperation with aviation, local structures of Tsarandoy and the Ministry of State Security, obtained accurate data on the whereabouts of detachments and groups of rebels, by ambushes and raids, they defeated caravans exporting drugs and drugs outside the region. importing weapons, ammunition and other materiel.
The work with the local population was of great benefit in solving the problems facing us.
To restore the power line, Il-76 transport aircraft delivered metal poles and copper wire to Kandahar from Alma-Ata.
We took the necessary measures in order to avoid losses not only on our part, but also to cause as little damage as possible to the enemy. After all, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan was coming, and we had to take care in advance not to provoke the enemy into shelling and terrorist acts against our marching columns, which were the most vulnerable in marching formations. Mullah Naseem's gang was especially rampant in this area, and the rebels avoided any negotiations with us. All our efforts to get in touch with them and persuade them to a peaceful dialogue have not been crowned with success.
At the same time, the method of warfare chosen by us yielded results. The entire area along the power line was cleared of insurgents and blocked off, ensuring the safe operation of power line restoration specialists. A large-scale work was carried out by our soldiers, who worked together with Afghan specialists. In the end, soon, the rebels threw out the white flag and we entered the Musakala volost center with Army General Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov.
Preparations for the withdrawal of troops from the country
On April 14, 1988, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States signed five documents in Geneva on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. According to the Geneva Accords, which came into force a month after its signing, a limited contingent of Soviet troops was to leave Afghanistan in nine months.
On April 7, 1988, the USSR Minister of Defense issued a directive that determined the procedure for the withdrawal of troops and ensuring their safety on the march. This directive was fully prepared on the basis of proposals from the command of the 40th Army and provided for the start of the withdrawal of formations and units of the army on May 15, 1988. It was planned to complete the withdrawal of troops by crossing the State Border of the USSR on February 15, 1989.
For the withdrawal of troops, the same routes were used that the formations and units of the 40th Army entered Afghanistan in 1979. In the west: Kandahar - Shindand - Kushka. In the east: the routes from Ghazni, Gardez and Jalalabad that united in Kabul. Further, the troops in this direction had to overcome the Salang pass, go to the Puli-Khumri region and complete the march in Termez.
By the time the Geneva Accords were signed, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 102.3 thousand people. At the first stage, formations and units were to be withdrawn from the garrisons of Jalalabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Kandahar, Lashkargah, Herat, Faizabad, Shindand, and some units - support and maintenance - from Kabul. Soviet troops were withdrawn to the territory of the USSR in the west through the settlement. Kushka, in the east - n.p. Termez. At the same time, the phasing and sequence of the withdrawal of compounds and parts was strictly observed. At the same time, for a number of reasons, the schedule for the order of withdrawal of troops sometimes had to be slightly adjusted.
To manage the withdrawal of troops, two operational groups were created: in the west - led by the first deputy commander of the army, Major General Nikolai Pavlovich Pishchev, and in the east, I, the first deputy commander of the army, Major General Sheenkov A.G., was entrusted to head the task force.
We left the territory of Afghanistan in the conditions of a serious aggravation of the internal political situation. The opposition was actively preparing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The leaders of the armed opposition predicted that as soon as the last Soviet soldier left the country, the Kabul government would hold out for a few weeks.
The army command clearly understood the gravity and complexity of the withdrawal of troops, especially in the last stages. A lot of work has been done to prepare for this event. To ensure maximum security of the troops, unprecedented measures were taken to organize the outposts of columns on the march. The foreseen measures practically ruled out a surprise attack by the enemy on the columns of our troops. In case of individual attempts to prevent the advance of our columns towards the border, powerful air and fire strikes were planned.
Operational measures on the part of the army were predominantly pre-emptive in nature. We actively carried out reconnaissance, constantly monitored the movements of the enemy armed formations and were sufficiently aware of the plans to counter the withdrawal of Soviet troops by individual opposition detachments. Possible areas of concentration of rebels and probable places of their exit to the main routes of movement were taken under strict control. military units.
Road security has been significantly increased. All communications used by the troops, in addition to stationary outposts and combat security forces detached from these outposts, were thoroughly blocked by the forces and means of the 108th motorized rifle and 103rd airborne divisions.
If necessary, the air and fire assets of the 40th Army were ready to deliver a preemptive or retaliatory strike in any area of Afghanistan.
We carefully planned the actions of aviation and artillery in high-risk areas. The places of night rest of the units and the territory adjacent to them were constantly illuminated by aircraft. This ruled out the possibility of a surprise attack by the enemy.
World-famous news agencies showed great interest in the withdrawal of troops.
In the eighties, the situation in Afghanistan worried a lot of people. The public was primarily interested in the practical actions of the Soviet military command in Afghanistan.
The withdrawal of troops was covered by more than two hundred correspondents from Australia, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, Canada, the USA, Sweden, Japan, Germany and other countries. A small group of Soviet journalists from Gosteleradio, APN and TASS worked with them, a little over ten people. They accompanied our troops during the movement to Kabul and further north. By the way, many reporters tried to be part of the columns and march along with our servicemen. As a rule, we refused this, because at any moment the regiment or battalion could be subjected to a surprise attack by the enemy. An exception was made only for a few of our compatriots. The rest we transferred by plane to the region of Hairatan and Termez, where they covered the troops crossing the state border. For the first time, we gave journalists complete freedom of action. They repeatedly noted this in their publications, emphasizing that they were given exceptional opportunities for a truthful presentation of the events taking place at that time in Afghanistan.
On May 14, 1988, in Kabul, the commander held a press conference for the first time for Soviet and foreign journalists. It aroused, in my opinion, considerable interest. And first of all, because journalists finally have the opportunity to ask all their questions directly to the command of the 40th Army. Many topics were touched upon - ranging from the number of our losses in Afghanistan to the prospects for a political settlement of the situation in that country. Of course, there were also "uncomfortable" questions. After the press conference, it became clear that the commander's answers satisfied the journalists. Neither then, nor, moreover, now, we do not need to hide what the Soviet troops were doing in Afghanistan.
The initial stage of the withdrawal of troops. Jalalabad.
Before the withdrawal of the first formations and units, the decision of the army commander determined the preparatory period April - the first half of May. Preparations began from the Jalalabad garrison, where the 15th Special Purpose Brigade (15 SN Brigade), the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (66th Motorized Rifle Brigade), a helicopter regiment and an airfield security battalion were deployed.
Upon arrival in Jalalabad, work began with planning and preparation for the withdrawal of troops from Asadabad of the battalion of the 66th brigade, and the battalion of the 15th brigade of the SN, as well as the 9th infantry division of the DRA Armed Forces. To manage the withdrawal, a joint command was created, which included the task force 40a, the commander of the 1st AK with advisers and the control group of the 66th brigade.
A day before the withdrawal of units of the 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the route from Jalalabad was blocked. The command post, equipped in engineering terms, was placed in the area of the settlement of Tsoukan.
The next day, the blocking of the road was suspended. About twelve kilometers short of Asadabad, the battalion setting up blocks was fired upon. This place was the closest to the border with Pakistan. Simultaneously with the shelling, the bridge across the Kunar River was blown up. For the purpose of engineering reconnaissance of the destroyed bridge and making a decision on its restoration, the deputy chief of the army engineering troops, Colonel Nikolai Nikolayevich Elovik, left. Based on the results, it was decided to build a new bridge with two sets of heavy mechanized bridge (HMM) with demolition work to equip the exit and exit.
On the same day, work was organized to restore the bridge. The next day, the second set of TMP was delivered to the place of work. At the same time, in places of permanent deployment, 66 motorized brigade were being prepared for withdrawal, and 9 infantry divisions were being prepared for redeployment.
An air bridge was organized to evacuate the families of the Afghan army with the involvement of two links of transport helicopters.
By the time the bridge over the Kunar River was restored, I, with the corps commander and his adviser in an Afghan armored personnel carrier, decided to advance to the bridge. The three of us - on top of the armor. Inside the armored personnel carrier were the driver and radio operator - Afghans. Suddenly it dawned on me that the radio operator was negotiating with some distant object. It is good that during the first business trip we studied Farsi.
I hit the radio operator on the headset, and transmitted the information to the corps commander through an interpreter. From what I heard, I understood that the radio operator was transmitting data to someone about who was on the armored personnel carrier and our destination. Some time after arriving at the bridge, we were covered in rocket fire. Local residents dragged us into an underground shelter, where we waited out the fire raid. The shelling was carried out from the territory of Pakistan because of the pass. Despite all the intrigues of the armed opposition, two days later the withdrawal of troops from Asadabad was completed.
In preparation for the withdrawal of troops from the Jalalabad region, a buried reinforced concrete command post for advisers had to be equipped at the local airfield. I called it "burial". The fact is that the decision to withdraw the advisory apparatus was not adopted. They were left in the places of their permanent activity. The buried control point was equipped by employees of the army's communal and operational department and military builders. The corresponding services of the army were engaged in equipping with means of communication and everything necessary for life support.
In addition, at that time, three-month stocks of materiel were being created in key areas of Afghanistan, including in Jalalabad.
To do this, a specially created task force of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces arrived to us, headed by Lieutenant General A.G. Gaponenko and Major General V.A. Bologov. I personally knew them well, and the matter was arguing. The three-month reserves included tens of thousands of tons of various property, food, ammunition and fuel.
We went out, and our places were occupied by the Afghan army, Tsarandoy (police), security units (MGB). Everything was calculated. Colonel Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Vasenin, deputy army commander for logistics, dealt with logistics issues. The military camps were handed over fully landscaped. Even the beds were covered with new linen. Air conditioners, clocks, televisions, refrigerators - everything was handed over in working condition. The whole situation in the offices and rest rooms was preserved, the plumbing and the sewage system worked without interruptions.
In excellent condition, equipment and weapons were handed over to representatives of the Afghan army. A few days before the start of the withdrawal of the brigades, together with the officers of the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, the combat vehicles were checked by firing and mileage. Only after such a procedure, the joint commission signed acts on the acceptance and transfer of property.
During the withdrawal, we not only transferred materiel, but also trained specialists from among the Afghan army capable of keeping the received objects in working condition. In the Jalalabad garrison, 65 of them were trained (35 for the army, 11 for Tsarandoy, 19 for the MGB).
We carried out the withdrawal of troops from Jalalabad in six columns from May 15 to May 27, 1988 (May 15, 17, 20, 22, 25 and 27). In total, more than five thousand people were withdrawn. About fifteen thousand Afghans came out to see off the first column from Jalalabad. The entire route through the city passed along the human corridor. Well-known foreign news agencies showed great interest in this event.
I went out with the task force with the last column on May 27, 1988. Even then, the so-called "tradition of return" was born. During a halt at the Surobi Dam, I received orders to return and collect our military advisers and interpreters. I had to wait until night. Advisor to the commander of the 1st Army Corps, Colonel Chernyshov, as well as one of the officers of headquarters 40a with an air assault company of the 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade, returned to the airfield and evacuated the advisers. Subsequently, I once again had to visit Jalalabad to resolve the issue related to the restoration of disabled equipment, which we handed over to the Afghan side.
United Nations Good Offices Mission
In 1988, the need arose to verify the implementation of the bilateral Afghan-Pakistani agreement on non-intervention. This task was entrusted to the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The number of military observers was set at 25 in each country, but in October 1988 it was reduced to 10 people. In Afghanistan, the activities of the Good Offices Mission extended, in fact, to monitoring the withdrawal of Soviet troops. I, in particular, also happened to take part in the work of this Mission.
During the withdrawal, observers in the eastern part of Afghanistan were at the post at the border checkpoint of Hairatan, visited garrisons during the withdrawal of units from Jalalabad, Faizabad, and were periodically present at the Kunduz airfield. We tried to fulfill the obligations of the USSR with strict punctuality, rendering every possible assistance to the representatives of the UN. They personally confirmed the strict and precise fulfillment of our obligations by us and informed the UN leadership about this. Representatives of the UN control bodies testified to this. I will cite as an example the statement of General R. Helminen.
The Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations is authorized to state the following:
1. The United Nations Commission of Observers in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), in accordance with its mandate under the Geneva Accords, has been monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan since May 15, 1988, when the Geneva Accords entered into force.
2. On May 14, 1988 UNGOMAP was informed by the Military Representatives of the Government of the USSR in Afghanistan that the number of foreign troops stationed in Afghanistan at that moment was 100,300.
3. On May 15, 1988, foreign troops were in 18 main garrisons located in 17 of the 30 provinces (currently 31 provinces) of Afghanistan: Badakhshan, Baghlan, Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar , Kunar, Kunduz, Logar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Parvan, Samangan, Tokhar, Zabol.
4. From May 15 to August 7, 1988, the following 10 main garrisons, which were under the control of foreign troops, were evacuated and transferred to the Afghan Armed Forces: Baraki, Daulatabad, Faizabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Kunduz, Lashkargah and Rukh.
5. After August 15, 1988, 8 main garrisons remained under the control of foreign troops. They are located in the following 5 provinces: Baghlan, Herat, Kabul, Parwan and Samangan. Further, in the province of Balkh, a small number of foreign troops will remain in the Hairatan region, which will be used as a border point for the withdrawal of troops.
6. Groups of UNGOMAP military officers observed the withdrawal of foreign troops in Bagram, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz and Shindand, as well as in the border cities of Hairatan and Turagundi, where UNGOMAP established permanent posts. The UNGOMAP group also visited Gardez after the completion of the evacuation of the garrison.
7. The Secretary General and his representative are satisfied that the withdrawal of foreign troops is proceeding in accordance with the Geneva Accords. In this regard, they would like to express their sincere gratitude to the government of the Republic of Armenia, the government of the USSR and their civilian and military representatives for their help and assistance.
Withdrawal of troops from the Gardez and Ghazni regions
In connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the DRA government decided to concentrate units and subunits of Tsaranda and KhAD, concentrated in various garrisons and deployment points.
This decision also affected the border brigade, which was stationed in the settlement. Urgun. The withdrawal of this brigade was planned and carried out by the commander of the army corps together with the advisory apparatus. There were no military operations. The command post of the corps commander was bombarded with mortars and rockets. During the shelling, our colonel was wounded - adviser to the deputy commander of the corps on the technical side. The adviser to the corps commander decided to send the wounded man in an armored personnel carrier, accompanied by two lieutenant colonels, one of whom was a medical worker. The calculation of the armored personnel carrier consisted of a driver and a gunner. The armored personnel carrier advanced to its destination as part of a common column.
In the area of the village of Dila, the convoy fell into a large, pre-prepared ambush with the participation of foreign mercenaries and correspondents. According to eyewitnesses, panic arose and the control of the column was disrupted. A shot from a grenade launcher intended for an armored personnel carrier hit a ZIL-130 with a gun, which at that moment was overtaking an armored personnel carrier. ZIL caught fire and crashed into an armored personnel carrier, which also caught fire. The presence of correspondents in ambush is confirmed by the fact that after 2-3 hours the whole world knew about it from the radio broadcasts of the Voice of America and the BBC.
The corps commander informed the DRA Ministry of Defense about combat losses. Immediately, this information was received by the Chief Military Adviser and Commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Gromov B.V.
At that time, I was in Gardez in the air assault brigade, which we were withdrawing after the withdrawal of the regiment from Ghazni. Already more than half of the brigade was sent to Kabul in three columns.
At that time, the 4th party conference was taking place in Moscow. The Minister of Defense of the USSR reported to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.S. Gorbachev, who immediately shared hot information with Soviet and foreign journalists. The news spread all over the world, the resonance was the strongest for the following reasons:
Firstly, the tragedy occurred after the Soviet Union announced its readiness for the complete withdrawal of troops from the DRA. Secondly, the decision of the Soviet Union was enshrined in the Geneva Agreement. And thirdly, the bulk of the troops have already been withdrawn from the country.
An important role in all this tragic history played by the simultaneous loss of three senior officers. A command came from Moscow to find out the true situation and, if possible, save the living, help the wounded, and evacuate the bodies of the dead.
There were two options for entering the area, barely cooled down from the battle - ground and air. The first option had to be immediately abandoned, since there were not enough forces and means to block the exit route, and there was practically no time left to solve this problem. It was decided to use the second option. Groups from the remaining units of the brigade were urgently prepared for landing. It was decided to land the landing method in the Dila area with two waves of a helicopter regiment. To communicate with the army headquarters, helicopter pilots delivered signalmen, who were equipped with shortwave radio stations. Communication was carried out in clear text.
The next day, upon the arrival of helicopters, they loaded troops with a supply of ammunition and food, designed for three days. The first helicopter I took off with the control group. We landed at the command post of the Afghan army corps, which moved to the Deela area. We established communication, outlined the landing sites and began to receive the landing.
At the command post of the army corps, we heard a report on the situation in the area and began planning military operations. Elders and representatives of authorities were invited to the CP.
In a tough form, in an ultimatum, we demanded that the Soviet servicemen, the living and the bodies of the dead, be handed over. They warned that in case of refusal, we would raze the village to the ground. According to the plan, the outer ring surrounding the village and the surrounding area where the battle took place was formed from units and subunits of the Afghan army, the second inner ring was created by the forces of the Soviet landing force. The start of hostilities was scheduled for five o'clock in the morning. By 07:00, the outer ring was closed and our paratroopers went inside. At 7.30 in the morning a helicopter landed, which delivered General of the Army Varennikov with a photographer and a correspondent to the command post. After the paratroopers closed the second ring of encirclement, the air assault company on an armored personnel carrier began advancing directly to the place where the enemy had organized an ambush. Accompanying and supporting the actions of the paratroopers was carried out by a pair of helicopters by loitering over the combat area.
With the exit to the goal, they discovered a terrible picture. The skeleton of a burnt armored personnel carrier and two almost completely burned corpses of a wounded colonel and driver. Next to the armored personnel carrier, the burnt bodies of two lieutenant colonels and a machine gunner lay on their backs. The heads of all three were nailed to the ground with sharp wooden stakes driven through their mouths. This terrible picture was recorded and recorded on film by correspondents.
During the cleansing of the village, which was carried out with the assistance of local residents, 12 dushmans were taken prisoner, four of them were Pakistanis.
By 12.00 the task was completed. The prisoners and the bodies of the dead were sent in the first wave to Gardez. I took the second flight. By 4 pm the operation was completed, and I reported the results of the operation to the army commander. For the successful completion of the task assigned to me, I was subsequently awarded the order"Red Banner".
Ahmad Shah Massoud is a worthy warrior of his country
With the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Ahmad Shah stepped up his actions to strengthen his influence, expand the controlled zone, mainly at the expense of the northern provinces of Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhshan, Kunduz, Samangan, winning over the leaders of detachments of other Islamic parties. As a result, the armed struggle for the control zones between the rebel detachments escalated. Combat clashes between them, covering the green areas of Charikar and Kapisa, spread to the Gorband Gorge. Using the growing flow of refugees returning to Panjshir from Kabul, the rebels unleashed open terror against the Panjshirs on the Kabul-Jabal-Ussaraj communication line. In particular, on August 7, in the Laghmani region, they burned two cars, shot 9 people returning to the settlement. Hinj.
Ahmad Shah Massoud was born in 1953 in the village of Jangalak in the Panjshir Gorge into the family of an Afghan armed forces officer. Fate was given to endow this outstanding man with serious masculine and human virtues. After graduating high school in the Kabul Lyceum "Istekall", entered the Kabul Polytechnic Institute, which he left without completing the second year. After the Daoud coup, which Massoud called "communist", he joined the ranks of the fighters for the faith and began to fight against the Daoud regime. By appointing communists to high positions in his government, Daoud began to persecute Muslims. At that time, the Muslim Youth organization drew up a plan to overthrow the regime, but the plan became known to the country's top leadership, which led to the detention of some activists. Massoud was forced to go into hiding.
In 1974, another coup attempt was made. Masud then won only in Panjshir, but was soon defeated again. From 1974 to 1978 while in Pakistan, Massoud continued to fight against the Daoud regime. In 1978, after the communist coup, Massoud's fears were justified: the communists really came to power, and Massoud led an armed anti-communist uprising. In 1979, the 40th army was introduced into Afghanistan, which served as the beginning of anti-Soviet resistance. Fighting against the Soviet troops, Massoud chose Pajshir as his base. During the anti-Soviet resistance, Masud gained worldwide fame, he was recognized as a brave and competent commander. Massoud, during the period of struggle, founded the theory guerrilla war. After the fall of the Najibullah regime, with the creation of the first Islamic state of Afghanistan in 1992, Massoud became Minister of Defense and remained in this position for almost ten years.
As a political figure, he always strived for good neighborly and mutually beneficial relations with all the neighbors of Afghanistan, he was a staunch supporter of a peaceful solution to differences and problems with Pakistan.
By religion Masud was a Muslim, a preacher of the Hanifi religion. He had good relations with friends, however, he could not forget any disrespect for himself. With people in communication he was simple and open, but in public he preferred to appear rarely; he treated the enemy with respect, he did not kill prisoners, but he never spared traitors and spies. He was patient and patient. He often repeated Eastern wisdom, which says that if, they say, something happens that makes you angry, then try to calm down and demand from yourself: "I can endure and I must endure." Thus, he believed that endurance and patience could be trained, and he developed these qualities in himself.
In difficult times, he was patient and calm. He was brave and respected brave, talented and enterprising people. Illiteracy considered a disadvantage, he advised everyone to study; he was curious, liked to listen to erudite people, never tired, asked questions of interest to people who were more literate than him. He was a thinking person, he never took anything on faith, until he was personally convinced of the justice of a particular issue. Massoud was an attentive and sympathetic person, did not miss the little things, did not like superstitions and was wary of people who exaggerated their role and the role of the events that took place around them. In the course of conversations with them, such people were often put in an awkward position.
He had an interlocutor to himself, in any society his presence was immediately felt, while it was easy to communicate with him without any discomfort. He did not like protocol events, when communicating, he valued good manners in any society, be it urban or provincial, and strictly observed the rules of conduct. He loved to read, always had a book with him, often forgot his watch and other things, but never his book. He loved physical education and was a good athlete himself, doing boxing, taekwondo, football, volleyball and swimming. Although he was very fond of swimming, he was embarrassed to undress in the presence of strangers. When he was shy, he smiled involuntarily and the horizontal lines on his forehead became noticeable. He was fluent in Dari, Pashto and French.
He adored good food, but ate in moderation. From food he loved shurpa and kebabs, from fruits he ate everything, but he especially liked apples and pears. He preferred green tea, he called it men's tea. He preferred to dress in light colors, especially cream and light blue; was always clean and tidy, wherever he was. Outwardly, he was handsome: medium height, with thick and slightly long hair, an aquiline nose, a bony face, white skin, and a muscular body.
In 1988, Ahmad Shah Massoud married the daughter of his closest assistant, Tajoddin. Masood's married life was crowned with the birth of six children - a son and five daughters.
On September 9, 2001, an assassination attempt was made on Massoud: during interviews, suicide bombers posed as journalists by hiding explosives in a video camera. Ahmad Shah Massoud died of his wounds the next morning.
Features of the withdrawal of troops from Faizabad and Kunduz
At the final first stage of the withdrawal of troops, it was necessary to carry out the redeployment and withdrawal of army units and formations from the northern provinces, the so-called "Pamir" group of troops. At the request of President Najibullah, some changes were made to the withdrawal schedule. Instead of Shindant and Herat, troops were withdrawn from Faizabad and Kunduz.
Fayzabad is the capital and large city of the province of Badakhshan, located on the right bank of the Kokcha River at an altitude of 1000 m. The majority of the population were Tajiks and Uzbeks.
In this mountainous province, government authority extended only to the administrative center - the city of Fayzabad. The rest of the territory was under the control of the opposition. Since the beginning of the withdrawal of our troops, the armed formations of the enemy have intensified their actions. The most dangerous areas were considered to be Karamugul, Baharak, Karakorama, Kishim, where large groups of rebels were operating. The opposition was headed by Assadulo Basir (at one time he studied at our military academy named after Frunze). In his submission were about 1.5-2 thousand people. He controlled the territory from Faizabad to the Pakistani border, which was almost a third of the province of Badakhshan.
In the area of the fortress of Baharak, a detachment of rebels, led by Dostum, operated.
Along the withdrawal route of our troops, which passed through the settlements of Karakoram, Ishkoshim, Farkhor, the largest detachments of the rebels operated. Smaller groups of dushmans, the so-called self-defense units, performed the tasks of protecting villages and farmlands.
The 860th separate motorized rifle regiment (860 OMSP) was stationed in Faizabad. One battalion with reinforcements was located 40 km away in the settlement-fortress of Baharak and at the Sarikul bridge outpost.
The plan provided for the withdrawal of 860 OMSP in three stages. The first stage from June 5 to 8 - reconnaissance and demining of the route, setting up blocks in the area from Faizabad to Kashim by the forces of a motorized rifle battalion and reconnaissance company 860 omsp; on the Kishim-Tulukan sector - by the forces of the 345th separate parachute regiment; in the Tulukan-Khanabad-Kunduz sector - by the forces of 149 infantry regiments and a separate reconnaissance battalion (orb) of 201 infantry divisions.
The second stage from June 9 to June 28 is the restoration of destroyed sections of the road and the passage of convoys from Kunduz to Faizabad with fuel for 860 OMS, with various property and food for 24 points of the Afghan army, based on the creation of three-month reserves.
The third stage from June 29 to July 5 is the withdrawal of 860 OMS to the city of Kunduz. Transfer of heavy equipment 108 and 201 MRD. The transfer of personnel by aircraft to the Union.
Upon arrival with the operational group to the regiment, he heard reports on the state of affairs, the decision of the regiment commander on the withdrawal of units to Kunduz. During the preparatory period, the battalion with reinforcements was redeployed by two helicopter squadrons to Faizabad. The battalion's deployment point and heavy equipment with ammunition were transferred to the 24th point of the Afghan army.
On June 5, units and subunits left simultaneously from two directions from Faizabad and Kunduz to reconnoiter and demining the route, and placing blocks.
The road along which the units of the regiment were to withdraw was the main segment of the Great Silk Road. The most difficult section of the route was Faizabad-Kishim, a little better from Kishim to Tulukan, but from Tulukan to Kunduz, the road section, although broken, was paved. The road on the passes was narrow with oncoming traffic not to disperse. One unit of equipment will stall, and the column becomes easy prey even for a small armed formation of the enemy.
More than half of the way the route ran along the banks of the Kokcha River. The river is stormy, obstinate, carries its waters from the glaciers and mountain peaks of the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush. The most difficult and dangerous were three flooded sections eight hundred meters long in the area of Karakoram and Kishima.
The summer of 1988 was very hot. You can't hide from the heat, you can't hide. The armor is hot, the water in the flasks is almost boiling. On the road there are minefields in the form of land mines. The sappers do their job brilliantly, despite the heat. All hope for the probe, your experience and intuition. Even dogs with their natural stamina lose their senses after just a couple of hours of work.
It was in such conditions that we had to withdraw 860 OMRs from Faizabad over the mountains and gorges, along a mined road rich in surprises, at gunpoint of dushmans.
This is an important name "sapper"
I especially wanted to stay in the service of sappers. The well-known truth says: without sappers in Afghanistan it was impossible to walk or drive, moreover, it was possible to drive only rut to rut. The mine situation in the country even changed the behavior of nomads. If earlier the owner walked in front, and behind him all his "brood" - wives, children, pack animals, then during the war everything became the other way around - wives walked in front, if one blows up, they say, it's okay. And there is only one owner, he must be protected, so he began to walk behind.
Engineering troops, which include sappers, are combat support troops. They face a wide range of tasks. One of the main tasks is demining and repairing roads, keeping them in working order. Ensuring the safe movement of columns, the sappers were always ahead and were the first to take on not only the dangerous work of identifying and neutralizing mine-explosive obstacles, but also the impact of enemy fire weapons.
Demining and clearing passages in minefields, the installation of minefields is a headache for engineering troops.
Water purification is also their responsibility. In Afghanistan, it was extremely dangerous to drink raw water. It was possible to use only specially treated, disinfected water. The sappers have at their disposal special equipment for water purification, which they install in the immediate vicinity of the water supply sources and serve it.
Fortification equipment of outposts, trenches, walls, dugouts and camouflage - all this is included in the list of tasks of the engineering troops.
The supply of troops with engineering ammunition, entrenching tools (shovels, picks, crowbars) and other means, without which it is impossible to do in a war, is under the responsibility of sappers. And this is just a small list of tasks facing the engineering troops. I would like to stop at demining. The main means for the sapper were a mine detector and a probe, which became more advanced by the end of the war. At the same time, dogs remained the main means of searching for explosive devices. In Afghanistan, it seemed that all the countries of the world were working against us: we removed all kinds of mines. A real mine war was waged against us. Our sappers passed their mine academy right on the battlefield. All new samples of mines that were removed were emasculated and sent to the Union for study.
The most troublesome were the plastic-bodied Italian mines, in which only the striker's sting was metal; even the trigger spring was plastic.
These mines were tuned so cunningly that one had to have a delicate ear for music in order to distinguish the subtlest sound changes in the mine detector's headphones. These mines did not work even under a tank trawl. The trawl rolled through the mine without consequences, and when the tank itself ran over, the mine exploded under the second or third roller. The mine had a mechanical fuse, and for the impact mechanism to work, several mechanical conditions were required simultaneously to activate the explosion.
The sappers had to deal with a huge number of surprise mines and booby traps. Especially vile, I think, was the manufacture of mines in the form of children's toys. They were scattered near schools and in other places of mass congestion of children. They very cleverly disguised mines as cigarette packs, flasks of water and much more. Dushmans fought not only against the Soviet troops. They destroyed even those among their compatriots who did not support the regime existing in the country, but also did not want to cooperate with the opposition.
Modern laboratories have developed various methods for disguising mines as various household items, as well as new methods for setting mines for non-removability. Even against the probe, special mines were invented: when the probe touched the body of the mine, the mechanism closed, after which an explosion immediately followed.
Americans and Europeans, who are proud of their humanity, supplied these deadly products to Afghanistan, which for many years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops killed and maimed all life on the territory of the country.
After a short excursion into the engineering troops, let me take you back, my dear readers, again to the withdrawal of 860 OMS from Faizabad. So, due to the fact that the enemy took unprecedented measures in order to maximally prevent our withdrawal from the indicated area, the speed of the advance of the columns averaged no more than one kilometer per hour. In order to make it clear how difficult and dangerous the work of sappers was in these conditions, it should be noted that from one kilometer of the route they removed up to thirty-five land mines.
Dangerous kilometers of Faizabad-Kunduz route
As I already mentioned, to ensure the passage of columns along the Faizabad-Kunduz route, sentry blocks were set up from both directions. Unfortunately, it was not possible to place blocks without clashes. The first happened already at the twelfth kilometer from Faizabad in the direction of Batash village. Then the reconnaissance company of the regiment in the area of the village of Jata was ambushed. There were wounded. When leaving the encirclement near the village of Artyndzhilats, 70 km from Faizabad, the commander of the reconnaissance platoon was killed. Not far from Kishim, in the area of the village of Shaesta, motorized rifles again entered the battle. Explosions of technology have also begun. A 45 oipp obstacle combat vehicle was blown up, the driver died. An infantry fighting vehicle was blown up in the 149th MRR near the village of Farhad - two people were killed: a lieutenant colonel, assistant chief of the army's engineering troops, and a driver. When overcoming a flooded area in the Kishima region, an infantry fighting vehicle fell into the abyss. The driver-mechanic managed to jump out. In another flooded area, the platoon commander sat down at the levers of a tank with a trawl instead of a driver, but lost control and a multi-ton tank fell off an underwater cliff and in a matter of seconds went into the depths of a raging river, burying a young officer alive in his womb.
In the Kishima area, an MTLB (small light armored transporter) was blown up, as a result, a lieutenant colonel, the head of artillery intelligence, and a communications officer were killed. By the end of June 8, the route for the withdrawal of troops from Faizabad was completely under the control of the guard blocks. 45 OISP (separate engineer-sapper regiment) eliminated flooded sections of the road. In less than two weeks, the regiment's sappers destroyed separate sections of rocky rock and built almost a kilometer of road in the mountains, "moving" the raging Kokcha from the road. And the columns of motor battalions, bulk carriers and tankers (tankers) with various materiel went to Fayzabad.
On June 29, the withdrawal of 860 OMSR from Faizabad began. With the last column, sentry blocks began to be removed, which had been on patrol for more than three weeks. By July 4, the last units of the regiment arrived in Kunduz.
For three weeks the regiment was in Kunduz, handing over heavy equipment to 108th and 201st Motor Rifle Divisions, and the personnel, detained with transfer to the reserve and handing over military equipment, were sent to the Union on An-12 aircraft under the control of UN observers.
On July 23, the remnants of 860 OMSR marched to the village of Hairatan and on July 24, having passed customs inspection, crossed the state border of the USSR.
Withdrawal of troops from Kunduz and re-entry of troops
From August 2 to August 7, 1988, they completed the withdrawal of units of the 201st Motor Rifle Division, which were stationed in Kunduz.
The dust from the last outgoing column of Soviet troops did not have time to settle, as a result of betrayal, refusal to fight the rebels, surrender of security posts by the government regime, the rebels captured the city of Kunduz on August 10, 1988. The night before, about a hundred rebels entered the city and prepared the conditions for the approach of another thousand people by morning. The mayor of the city, representatives of the security agencies, Tsarandoy and other authorities went over to the side of the rebels and worked on their instructions. The personnel of government forces, about 4.5 thousand people, evaded armed resistance to the rebels. The posts and outposts of the security belts created to protect the city, and consisting of units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security, did not offer any resistance, but, leaving their weapons and equipment, fled. An eloquent fact confirming this is that among the defenders of the city there were neither killed nor wounded. With a fourfold superiority in people, military equipment and weapons, government troops surrendered the city without a fight.
By order of Army General Varennikov V.I. 149 MRR and Orb 201 MRD, 345 OPDP made a march to the area of the Kunduz airfield. In addition, measures were taken for the additional redeployment of the Afghan army. A combat plan was developed for the liberation of the city of Kunduz. The coordination of the actions of the troops was entrusted to the adviser to the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, Major General Chaus P.G. After powerful fire and air raids on the places where the rebels gathered in the city and in the areas adjacent to Kunduz, government troops, 18th Infantry Division under the command of General Said Azam, with the support of our military units, captured the city. During the six days of occupation, the city was destroyed and plundered and was a pitiful sight.
Thus ended the first stage of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. From May 15 to August 15, 1988, formations and units of the army were withdrawn from nine garrisons. More than fifty thousand soldiers and officers left Jalalabad, Ghazni and Gordez in the east; in the west - Kandahar and Lashkargah, as well as Faizabad and Kunduz in northeastern Afghanistan.
Five happy days in Tashkent
After completing the first stage of the withdrawal of troops and summing up the results, I turned to the army commander for a five-day vacation with a flight to the city of Tashkent to meet with my wife. The commander gave the go-ahead, and on August 21, on the next Il-76 transport plane, I flew to Tashkent.
The city of Tashkent is the capital of Uzbekistan. The first mention of it refers to the 7th century AD. Tashkent consists of two parts - Old city and new town, built by the Russians after the conquest of Uzbekistan by Russia in 1865.
In 1966, Tashkent was badly damaged by an earthquake. Through the efforts of all the union republics of the Soviet Union, it was rebuilt and became one of the most beautiful cities in Central Asia. Ultra-modern buildings harmoniously coexist with medieval buildings, while at the same time, the city has a large number of parks and squares rich in greenery and fountains.
The next day I met my wife at the airport. After a short rest we made a tour of the city. We got an unforgettable impression of architectural monuments and ancient Uzbek culture such as Friendship Square, Zangi-ata mausoleum and Barn-bibi (14th century), Independence Square or Amir Timur, Alisher Navoi Opera and Ballet Theater, Independence Square and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier , Ensemble Shaykhantur, Monument to the Victims of the Earthquake and others.
The old city is very different from the new one. Narrow dusty streets. Clay walls. Almost an analogy of the Afghan villages. And at the same time, the architectural complex "Khazrati Imam" is truly unique in all respects. The elements of this complex were erected in different periods of the city's history, but surprisingly, they look like a single whole, since they were built in a single oriental style.
When our day trip around the city was over, Rustam, who accompanied us, arranged a real dastarkhan (Uzbek table) with his relatives in the old city. To fully enjoy the Uzbek feast is an impossible task. The long line of dishes is amazing. As the owner of the house said - up to ten dishes per meal - the usual hospitality in Uzbek.
The next day, taking advantage of the courtesy of the chief of staff of the TurkVO, Lieutenant General Yu.A. Gusev, we went to the dacha village of the district, where we were given a separate house on the shore of the reservoir. We spent three happy days there. Unfortunately, all good things come to an end quickly. After seeing my wife to the airport three hours later, I flew to Kabul two hours later.
At the end of this meeting, a poetic gift unexpectedly “cut through” in me, as a result of which I dedicated several quatrains to my beloved wife Raisa Ivanovna SHEENKOVA and called them “To You!”:
You are on the other side of the planet
To get to you that fly to Mars.
Fate is a villain and this one
With you we were separated once.
I missed you then in Kabul,
And I was young and quick in decisions,
But even now, love for you will not wane,
Although there are many years and a gray-haired tuft.
I'll come to you, as before, remember, it was?
Sometimes in the evening I will knock on the door.
That's just we will finish this V U O D,
And I will come, hope, wait and believe!
I am grateful to the fate that rewarded me with a devoted and faithful woman who kept and strengthened our family hearth for more than fifty years. During the most difficult periods of my service, she was next to me, even if she was far from me. Therefore, all my military awards are her awards. I bow my head before her, before her love and loyalty!
Salang
In August 1988, the situation in Yuzhny Salang sharply escalated. The reasons for the aggravation are shelling by government troops of villages located near the highway, where, according to the Afghan command, rebel formations were located. As a result, there were casualties among the local population. The elders appealed to the President of the country with a request to cease fire. Instead of a ceasefire, the 2nd infantry division of government troops was additionally advanced to the area. She began to systematically shell the villages controlled by the rebels. There is reason to believe that these actions were intended to provoke retaliatory actions on their part, making it difficult, and possibly disrupting the withdrawal of our troops, provoking the deployment of hostilities in order to draw the OKSV (Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops) into them.
At a meeting with representatives of the 40th Army on August 6, the rebels turned to us with a request to stop shelling, warned us to carry out retaliatory actions, but the 2nd Infantry Division not only did not stop, but, on the contrary, intensified the fire, especially at night.
On August 11, a column of Soviet troops, being withdrawn to the Soviet Union, passed through Salang, the rebels let it pass unhindered. But on August 15, they carried out an action against government convoys, which they had previously warned about. 30 vehicles, 2 BRDMs were destroyed, 40 were killed, 20 soldiers were wounded. PGI captured, about 100 units small arms. 50 soldiers were taken prisoner. At the same time, they first fired at the column of the Afghan army, missed the Soviet column following it without a shot, and then attacked the column of Tsorandoy.
Further aggravation of the situation on Salanga was provoked by the actions of the 2nd Infantry Division, which, after the completion of the first stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, began to take up positions on the pass in the immediate vicinity of our outposts. In response, the rebels practically blocked the pass, setting up armed groups of 15 to 50 people at every turn in the road. Only Soviet columns passed through without hindrance.
The military command, using the secret connection he had with Massoud, sent Ahmad Shah a number of questions in writing for discussion and approval, which were certified by the appropriate signatures and sealed by the Soviet embassy in Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah expressed his readiness to meet to discuss these issues, said that he had his own proposals, and he was ready to bring them to the attention of the Soviet command. In addition, he reacted positively to the proposal of the Soviet command to further maintain business contacts. For our part, we expressed our readiness to meet at a predetermined place with the authorized representative of A. Shah, without guards and weapons, and to negotiate with him.
A Soviet-Afghan commission was created to negotiate with A. Shah's representative. It included: I am Major General Sheenkov A.G., First Deputy Commander of the 40th Army, Deputy Chief of Army Intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Kharlamov S.F., Colonel Goncharuk N.A., Deputy Chief of the General Headquarters of the RA Armed Forces, Major General Amin, Captain D.Kh. Rajanov, translator.
Ahmad Shah was asked to sign a protocol on the basics of relations between the leadership of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the armed opposition of Panjshir (IOAP), which stated:
"Guided by good will and the desire to consolidate peace in Afghanistan, the contracting parties have signed this protocol, in accordance with which they assume the following obligations:
1. Completely cease hostilities in Yuzhny Salanga and in other areas adjacent to the Kabul-Khairatan highway, including shelling of the locations of IRA detachments and groups, villages, outposts and posts of Soviet and Afghan troops, the Ministry of State Security and Tsarandoy from any type weapons.
2. In order to prevent shelling, looting, and other actions against Soviet and Afghan columns, single vehicles, the Panjshir armed detachments assume responsibility for protecting communications in the area from Tajikan to Chaugani.
3. In order to provide for the population of Panjshir in the districts adjacent to the specified section of the highway, the Soviet side undertakes to supply, by mutual agreement, the necessary amount of food, essential goods, and other material resources - within the time limits agreed between the parties.
4. Not to allow detachments, groups of other parties to enter the contractual area for the purpose of shelling Soviet and Afghan columns, carrying out terrorist acts, sabotage on the pipeline. When armed persons of other parties attempt to carry out these actions, the Soviet side expresses its readiness to provide artillery and aviation support to the Panjshir armed detachments at their request.
5. Exchange information and make joint efforts to search for Soviet and Afghan citizens who disappeared in the contract area.
6. In the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation, hold meetings for the purpose of mutual consultations on preventing the resumption of hostilities in the interests of maintaining peace in the treaty zone.
7. This Protocol applies to the territory adjacent to the Tajikan - Chaugani communication (30 km on both sides).
Outside this region, Soviet troops and armed detachments of Panjshir have the right to carry out operations to eliminate armed detachments and groups of any party affiliation that have not ceased armed struggle against the contracting parties.
8. This Protocol shall enter into force upon its signing."
This document was signed by the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General B. V. Gromov and the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia Sh. N. Tanai.
We hoped that this protocol would suit Ahmad Shah Massoud. However, all our proposals by Ahmad Shah were rejected. Then we told him in an ultimatum form: the protection of the highway would still be posted, but now only from the government forces, and he was recommended not to interfere with this. At the same time, we orientated him about the time of the "event".
The results of the activities of the troops at the first stage of the withdrawal of the OKSV from Afghanistan
Colonel-General Gromov B.V., summing up the activities of the 40th Army for 1988, in his book "Limited Contingent" stated: "As a result of the combat activities of the 40th Army during 1988, the opposition detachments were significantly weakened. Together with the units armed forces of Afghanistan, we did a lot of work to clear areas along the highways.After failed negotiations with the opposition during military operations, we inflicted impressive damage on the Mujahideen.Soviet troops captured more than 1,000 anti-aircraft mountain installations, more than 30,000 rockets, over 700 mortars and approximately 25,000 mines, as well as a significant amount of small arms and more than 12 million rounds of ammunition.In the second half of 1988, the forces of the 40th army captured 417 opposition caravans coming from Pakistan and Iran.Nevertheless, the Mujahideen still posed a danger to the government of Afghanistan ".
Tasks for the second stage of the withdrawal of troops
After the completion of the first stage of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the commander made a decision on the second stage of the withdrawal of troops and determined the procedure for its implementation.
In accordance with the directive, the withdrawal of formations and units of the army from the RA should have been completed before February 15, 1989 in accordance with the approved schedule.
The withdrawal of formations, units and institutions of the army from the Republic of Afghanistan should be carried out in two directions sequentially, garrison by garrison, starting from the most distant from the Soviet-Afghan border.
East direction:
In the period from January 2 to January 10, 89, in order to exclude the influence of the rebels on the columns, block the withdrawal route by occupying platoon strongholds.
Create artillery groups, which were ordered to take up firing positions along the troop advance route. Bring parts of the technical support to the SPPM ( collection point damaged vehicles), to equip and maintain night rest areas in Puli-Khumri and Hairaton with the help of 201 motor rifle divisions at the rate of 1,500 people and 300 pieces of equipment. ZKP, OG army and KP 108 MRD to withdraw to pre-planned areas.
In the period from 10 to 28.01.89, withdraw to the territory of the USSR formations and units of logistics, rear divisions, regiments and garrison establishments.
The transfer of personnel (about 30 thousand people), not involved in the hostilities for the withdrawal of troops, to be carried out by air from the airfields of Kabul, Puli-Khumri, Shindand in the period from 3.01 to 31.01.89.
In the period from January 28 to February 15, 1989, complete the withdrawal of combat units and subunits to the territory of the USSR.
Fire defeat of the enemy to carry out 10-15 minutes. fire raids from the moment the columns enter the zone of responsibility and accompany them with harassing fire on planned targets and fire on the call of artillery spotters in the columns.
Air cover for marching columns on the march is carried out by Air Force 40a and aviation of the TurkVO from the airfields of Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kokaydy.
Manage the withdrawal of troops from the command post of Kabul, ZKP Naybabad, as well as the allocation of OG (operational groups) to the areas: Jabal-Ussaraj, per. Salang, Chaugani, Puli-Khumri, Hairaton, Termez, Tashkent.
To ensure the safety of the withdrawal of troops and exclude the influence of the rebels, block the withdrawal route by occupying platoon strongholds on commanding heights and in areas where the rebels are most likely to advance in the areas:
Kabul-Kalakan - two battalions of 181 SMEs; Kalakan-Charikar - two battalions of 180 SMEs; Charikar-Jabal-Ussaraj - with two battalions of 682 SMEs; Jabal-Ussaraj-Chaugani - 345 opdp; Chaugani-Doshi - 668 about "SN"; Doshi-SZ No. 15 - 350 pdp 103 vdd; SZ No. 15-Naybabad - 1, 2/122 MRR, 873 Orb 201 MSD.
III. The withdrawal of army troops will be controlled from the command post in Kabul, ZKP - Naibabad, VPU - Shindand, as well as army operational groups led by:
Jabal-Ussaraj - Colonel Yakubovsky V.F.
per. Salang - Major General Sheenkov A.G.
Chaugani - Major General Profatilov V. G.
Puli-Khumri - Major General Vasenin V.A.
Hairatan - Colonel Dybsky V.A.
Termez - Colonel Shcherbiy V.P.
Tashkent - Colonel Kitsak S. F.
The exit of the operational groups to the places of work - 01/03/89 The exit of the operational group to Tashkent - 01/09/89 The exit of the Army's ZKP - 01/07/89 The army commander and the operational group of the commander until 01/14/89 manages the withdrawal from the Darul-Amane; from 01/14/89 to 02/02/89, control will be carried out from the army command post deployed on the basis of 103 airborne division; from 02/02/89 - the army command post is stationed in Naibabad.
Upon completion of the withdrawal, the task force of the army commander moves to Tashkent and manages the disbandment of the army from a command post located at the transit point in Tashkent.
IV. Withdrawal of rear formations and units of the army, rear of divisions, regiments and garrison establishments.
01/13/89 - 59 brmo, rear of 108 motor rifle divisions are withdrawn from Bagram.
Border crossing: 59 BrMO - 01/14/89; rear 108 motor rifle divisions - 01/16/89;
01/15/89 - 47 orders are issued with 668 about "SN". 668 about "CH" blocks the Chaugani-Doshi section, and 47 orders from Puli-Khumri, under the protection of 783 orb 201 motorized rifle divisions, continue to move to Hairatan.
The border is crossed on 01/18/89;
01/17/89 - Army signal units are withdrawn from Kabul to Hairatan.
The border is crossed on 20.01.89;
01/19/89 - army support units march from Kabul.
The border is crossed on 22.01.89;
01/21/89 - the rear of the 103rd airborne division is advanced.
The border is crossed on 24.01.89;
01/23/89 - 45 oipp (without idb) starts moving from Charikar.
Crosses the border on January 26, 1989;
01/26/89 - withdrawn from Chaugani on December 278.
Crosses the border on 27.01.89;
01/28/89 - 276 Tiber is withdrawn from Puli-Khumri.
Crosses the border on January 29, 1989;
01/29/89 - the rear of 180, 181 MSPs from Kabul begin to move.
The border is crossed on 01/31/89;
01/30/89 - the rear of the 201st Motor Rifle Division begins to move, on the same day they cross the border.
V. Withdrawal of combat formations and units
Bagram garrison: 01/28/89 - the garrison is being withdrawn in one column consisting of: the ground echelon of the Air Force and 177 about "SN", which, with access to Hairatan, guards and strengthens the regime zone.
The ground echelon of the Air Force crosses the border on January 30, 1989;
01/28/89 - 2/180 MRR, 2/682 MRR, after being removed from the outposts, are put forward to strengthen the route in the areas of responsibility of the regiments;
01/29/89 - 781 orb 108 motorized rifle divisions, after being removed from the blocks, are concentrated in the area of the Bagram intersection as a reserve.
The Kabul garrison: It is withdrawn from 1 to 02/04/89 in three columns:
the ground echelon of the Air Force advances in the first column. Start of movement 1.02.89. Crosses the border on 4.02.89;
371 PDPs are moving forward in a second column after the rally in Kabul. Start of movement 02/02/89. Crosses the border on 02/05/89. The security of the rally is carried out by the forces of 357 traffic police.
the third column advances 357 pdp. The movement began on February 4, 1989. The border was crossed on February 7, 1989. Thus, the withdrawal of the troops of the Kabul garrison was completed on February 4, 1989.
4.02.89:
after the withdrawal of troops from Kabul and the transfer of outposts, units of 181 SMEs are removed from the blocks and march to Jabal-Ussaraj;
units of 180 SMEs are removed from the blocks at the Kalakan-Bagram crossroads and concentrated in the area of the crossroads.
5.02.89:
181 SMEs from Jabal-Ussaraj march to Hairatan. Crosses the border on February 7, 1989.
180 SMEs are being removed from blocks at the Bagramsi crossroads-Charikar section and concentrated in Jabal-Ussaraj.
6.02.89:
180 MRR makes a march to Hairatan. Crosses the border on February 8, 1989.
7.02.89:
KP 108 MRD, 682 MRR from Jabal-Ussaraj are moving to Hairatan. The border was crossed on February 9, 1989;
2/177 MRR after the transfer of outposts in the Jabal-Ussaraj-Kalavulang sector is concentrated in Chaugani;
1/345 OPDP is being deblocked in the Jabal-Ussaraj-Kalavulang section and concentrated in Kalawulang.
02/8/89:
177 SMEs, after the transfer of outposts in the Kalawulang-Doshi section, are concentrated in Puli-Khumri;
345 opdp after being removed from the blocks in the Kalawulang-Chaugani section is concentrated in Chaugani.
9.02.89:
345 opdp marches to Puli Khumri;
688 about "SN" is removed from the blocks in the Chaugani-Doshi section and concentrated in Puli-Khumri;
2/350 PDP is being removed from blocks in the Doshi-Puli-Khumri section and concentrated in Puli-Khumri.
02/10/89:
345 opdp, 668 about "SN" make a march to Hairatan. The border is crossed on 11.02.89;
395 MRR after the transfer of outposts in the regime zone and in the section of Puli-Khumri-per. Mirza is concentrated in the area of the pass (outpost No. 15).
02/11/89:
395 SMEs march from NW 15 to Hairatan. Crosses the border on February 12, 1989;
350 traffic police are removed from the blocks and concentrated in the Aibak area.
02/12/89:
350 pdp makes a march to Hairatan. Crosses the border on February 13, 1989;
After the transfer of outposts, 122 SMEs are removed from blocks in the area of the Tashkurgan Gorge and concentrated in Naibabad.
02/13/89:
1/149 MRR with the ground echelon of the Air Force makes a march from Mazar-i-Sharif to Hairatan. Crosses the border on February 14, 1989;
122 SMEs (without 3 SMEs) make a march from Naibabad to Hairatan. Crosses the border on February 13, 1989.
02/14/89:
Army CP, 201st Motor Rifle Division, 783rd Orb are marching to Hairatan. The border was crossed on February 14, 1989.
02/15/89:
3/122 MRR, optadn 108 MRD, transshipment base are brought to Termez before 12:00;
783 orb crosses the border before 15:00. The army commander crosses the border at 15:00 on 02/15/89.
Western direction.
The withdrawal of troops in the western direction is carried out from February 1 to February 15, 1989 in ten columns.
Major General N. P. Pishchev, leader of the military operations for the withdrawal of troops from the western direction.
Lieutenant General B. Gromov.
Operation Typhoon
We constantly kept under control the territory adjacent to the roads along which the troops moved. The rebels, having received a warning from us, did not interfere with the withdrawal of the army.
The command of the 40th army had every reason to believe that Ahmad Shah Massoud would prevent government troops from setting up their outposts along the road. Through intermediaries, we warned him that if the detachments subordinate to him offered armed resistance to the deployment of such outposts, the Soviet troops would be forced to use force. We placed the responsibility for possible casualties on Massoud.
Despite the warning, on January 23, 1989, government troops, while moving along the highway in the South Salang area, were subjected to intense shelling. This forced us to deliver a powerful blow to the formations of Ahmad Shah Massoud
The last military operations of the Soviet troops on the territory of Afghanistan were carried out under the code name "Typhoon". The purpose of the operation was to cause maximum damage to the opposition in the central and northern provinces of the country, as well as to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to conduct an active armed struggle in last step withdrawal of Soviet troops. Significant forces of Soviet troops, a large number of fire weapons, including multiple rocket launchers "Hurricane", "Grad" and heavy flamethrowers "Pinocchio" were pulled into the area of the Salang Pass. I will dwell on this system in more detail.
Flamethrowers "Pinocchio"
This new weapon is the brainchild of the winner of the State Prize of the USSR, Honored Inventor of the country, candidate of technical sciences, Colonel Yury Mikhailovich Korneevsky (as he introduced himself).
The decision was based on the idea of delivering a large amount of incendiary ammunition to the target and creating a high-temperature field in the target area. Incendiary munitions were delivered to the target by means of an original launcher, the equal of which at that time did not exist in the world. The power of the incendiary projectile was not comparable to traditional TNT explosives.
Such a weapon was designed under the code name MLRS (multiple launch rocket system) "Pinocchio" based on the chassis of the T-72 tank and entered service with the chemical troops. MLRS "Pinocchio" was armed with a 30-barrel launcher for unguided rockets of 220 mm caliber with fire mixture. The mass of fire mixture in one projectile was 45-50 kg. The firing range was 600-4500 m; a laser rangefinder was used to measure the distance to the target. The time of the descent of rockets when firing in one salvo did not exceed 15 seconds. The mass of the combat vehicle was 46 tons. Armor protection corresponded to the T-72 tank. Crew of 3 people. The heavy flamethrower system consisted of a combat vehicle and two transport-loading vehicles with a special crane.
With one volley, the Pinocchio MLRS is capable of incapacitating lightly armored and automotive equipment, setting fire to and destroying structures and buildings, destroying enemy manpower located in open areas and in fortifications; shrapnel, shock wave created by the massive use of unguided rockets in thermobaric and smoke incendiary equipment over an area of more than one hectare.
The tactics of using the MLRS consisted of a sudden fire engagement of the enemy, the rapid withdrawal of combat vehicles and guards from possible return fire and withdrawal to the point of deployment of troops. In the area of the Charikar valley and in the South Salang, two firing positions were selected each. A blow from each firing position was delivered only once, and the time spent by the combat vehicle in the firing position was reduced to a minimum. Also, in order to reduce vulnerability, the guide package was loaded with 24 missiles (3 guides from each side remained empty). As the test showed, the effectiveness of the application was very high. The action of thermobaric ammunition on targets in the mountains caused great damage to the enemy due to the mutual superposition of air shock waves and their multiple reflections from the surrounding rocks. The high accuracy of the hit and the density of fire were noted.
The march of the detachment through the Salang Pass was planned for the night. At 3 o'clock in the morning I was informed that the detachment had passed the tunnel and concentrated in the designated place on North Salang.
In September 1997, the designer answered the questions of Sergei Ivanov, correspondent of the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper. The material was published on September 2, 1997 under the title "Papa Carlo and his deadly Pinocchio":
"The designer thought for a long time:" Well, let's call me - Korneevsky.
- And yet, Yuri Mikhailovich, why don't you want to publish your real name? Is this because of 7 million Afghans?
At one time, the Americans really offered that kind of money for my head. In December 1982, for the first time, we introduced test samples of the Bumblebee rocket-propelled infantry flamethrower into Afghanistan. The power of the ammunition was equal to a 122-152-mm howitzer projectile. The effectiveness of the flamethrower in the first battles turned out to be so high that American intelligence began a real hunt for this weapon. At that time, US military experts wrote: "The Russians have fulfilled their dream - they put a 122-mm howitzer on the soldier's shoulder."
I don't know how they found out, but leaflets with my description and the price for my head - as much as 7 million afghans - were thrown at our locations. For that money it was equal to seven "Mercedes". They were looking for the author and developer of the idea of creating a flamethrower "Bumblebee" and tried to get samples of new Russian weapons.
They did not succeed in physically capturing me. When the bandits saw my detachment, they said: "The shaitan-pipe is coming, death is coming." And they left.
I'm sure the Americans don't have anything like that now. Our projectile has 10 times more power and hit accuracy: from 200 meters - into the window. One shot of ammunition can disable an aircraft at the start, a helicopter, any car, an armored personnel carrier. This technique is no longer being repaired.
FROM THE DOSSIER "KP": Reactive infantry flamethrower "Bumblebee" 93 mm caliber, 920 mm long, weighing 11 kg, has a firing range of 600 m. It is used, among other things, to destroy enemy firing points.
- How did you get this nickname - Papa Carlo?
This is thanks to Gromov's deputy, General Sheenkov, I consider both of them to be very talented military leaders with a crystal clear military reputation. So, when Sheenkov found out that a detachment under the code name "Pinocchio" had come to him, the first thing he asked was: "Where is Papa Carlo?" That's how we met. And then the nickname firmly stuck to me. Well, I didn't take offense.
- I know that "Bumblebee" has already proven itself well at arms exhibitions in the United Arab Emirates, the Chinese are asking to sell a license for its production. "Bumblebee" is adopted in many countries of the world. Is Pinocchio for sale?
The British tried to buy "Pinocchio" through a third country at a time when everything in Russia was sold, as they say, under the hammer. But even at that time, our military leadership had the good sense to refuse the sale. I can say with absolute certainty that there are no analogues to our "Pinocchio" in the world and, I think, there won't be any soon.
- So why not sell this weapon, for which, apparently, there is a good demand today? As far as I know, Russia's portfolio of military export orders for this year is approximately $7 billion. This is compared with 3.4 billion profits received by the Russian Federation from the sale of weapons in 1996. Pinocchio could become a bestseller on the world market.
Americans do not sell their latest developments. What they have on the market has long been released into series, or a trading competitor has something similar. And we must not make the mistakes that Oleg Soskovets made in his time. Do you remember how he sold to the Chinese not only modern fighters, but also the technology for their production? It is not difficult to assume that after some time China will flood the market with inferior quality, but cheaper aircraft, as it has already happened with our Kalashnikovs.
- You did not participate in the last roles in the creation of highly effective weapons. Only in Afghanistan, let's say, from your "Bumblebee" and "Pinocchio" killed hundreds, if not thousands of people. Among them were civilians, old people, women, children. Don't you get scared? Don't suffer from nightmares?
Maybe the answer will seem too pretentious to you, but I am still convinced that when you invent weapons for your country, in which you believe, you do not experience such psychological problems.
I had hundreds of combat episodes, when a machine gun fired from a village, a grenade launcher fired. There may have been women there, there must have been children, old people. I didn't want to kill them. But the logic of the war is this: I simply have to return the mother of a Russian soldier alive. Therefore, my conscience does not torment me - not a single soldier from my Pinocchio squadron died during the entire war in Afghanistan. There were wounded.
Now I'm just painfully offended to hear that we have bad officers, our equipment is backward, our tanks are on fire. Tanks will burn if they are locked up on the streets of the city. I had a chance to fight in Afghanistan with such wonderful people that I just cannot believe that in just ten years you can change them. All of them deserve the highest respect. Real Russian officers. You can change the state approach to the army, regularly change military leadership in the country, not to pay people salaries. But the essence of the Russian officer will remain unchanged. This is how he was taught, this is how he was brought up. Believe me. I am not afraid to seem banal in these reasonings of mine.
Not so long ago, Korneevsky returned to the drawing board. He does not talk about what he is working on today. It is clear that he is making another weapon to protect the country.
Sergey Ivanov".
Seven Mercedes cars - such was the reward announced by the Afghan Mujahideen for a living or dead designer of a secret Soviet superweapon.
Again pass "Salang"
So, let's get back to the fighting in the area of the Salang Pass under the code name "Typhoon".
Starting from January 24, 1989, bombing and assault air strikes were carried out, artillery fire raids were carried out on the base areas of the rebels, and mining was carried out on possible approaches for enemy reserves.
More than 600 sorties were made and 46 air strikes were carried out. Artillery carried out more than 400 fire missions.
The combing and cleaning of the area and the deployment of guard units with Afghan personnel on the highway began. The main efforts were focused on the protection of bridges, galleries and tunnels. The area was constantly shot through, and at night it was illuminated by aircraft and artillery. Engineering units cleared stone and snow blockages on the road. In order to properly put communications in order, the army command decided to close it for a while.
As a result of the strikes, the rebels were demoralized. During the following days, there was little opposition from them. The control of the armed formations was clearly violated. Constantly inflicted by aircraft and artillery strikes made it difficult to restore their combat capability. The approach of enemy reserves was prohibited by long-range fire raids.
In just two days of hostilities, more than 600 rebels, 32 mortars, 15 recoilless rifles, 46 heavy machine guns, 490 units were destroyed. small arms, 10 warehouses, 36 strongholds and 15 vehicles. 17 grenade launchers and 190 small arms were captured.
Our losses for two days amounted to 3 people killed, 5 people wounded.
fighting on the South Salang lasted about three days, as a result, the rebel detachments suffered serious damage. In order to minimize the losses of their troops, they decided to inflict fire and air strikes on the areas adjacent to the highway, where there was an accumulation of rebels.
Unfortunately, there were some casualties among the inhabitants of the villages adjacent to the road: some of them did not leave their homes and found themselves under the influence of our fire weapons.
The most fierce fighting took place eight hundred meters from the 42nd outpost near the village of Kolatak. There, according to our information, a detachment of the field commander Karim equipped his base. Karim's detachment numbered over a hundred people, armed with machine guns, DShK machine guns and recoilless rifles. A sniper worked from the rubble. Conducted an artillery fire raid. The chief of staff of the parachute battalion, Major Yurasov, surrounded the village with part of the battalion's forces. It contained many civilians. Major Yurasov knew about this and invited Karim to surrender. But he began to leave for the mountains with his militants, hiding behind civilians. Major Yurasov tried to cut off the militants from civilians, but then a machine gun fired from an ambush. An oblique machine-gun stream pierced him, fifteen minutes later Major Yurasov died. For courage and heroism shown in the performance of international duty, Major Yurasov Oleg Aleksandrovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously).
After the end of hostilities, Ahmad Shah sent a letter to the Soviet embassy in Kabul, in which he blamed the Soviet troops for the consequences of the hostilities in South Salang: "The bombing and the crimes that your people committed on Salang and Jabal Ussaraj will not change anything , they destroyed all the optimism that has recently appeared.On the contrary, it makes us believe that you want to impose on our Muslim people dying regime. It's impossible and illogical."
Of course, one can understand the despair and disappointment of Ahmad Shah Massoud - the Soviet command repeatedly violated the agreements concluded with him. At the same time, we counted on the fact that A. Shah should have been sympathetic to the fact that we could not leave, leaving to the mercy of fate, without protection, the highway through which Kabul was supplied with food and other means necessary for the city. After all, we had our obligations to the regime of Najibullah, so we provided him with all kinds of help and support. After all, it was to the government troops that we handed over outposts on the southern and northern slopes of the Salang Pass so that the communication linking the central and northern parts of the country could function normally.
The final stage of the withdrawal of troops
On January 27, 1989, the withdrawal of troops was resumed. The operation took only 20 days to complete. Such deadlines forced us to carry out the movement of columns in a continuous stream. The following mode of operation of the tunnel was established: the convoys were escorted in the direction of the state border every other day, since on other days columns with military equipment, food, fuel and essentials for Kabul came from the Union. It should be noted that the schedule for the withdrawal of troops was at the limit.
We closely observed the actions of the Mujahideen. It should be noted that after the operation "Typhoon" the armed detachments of the opposition as a whole did not prevent the withdrawal of our troops, as well as the occupation of sensitive zones, outposts and security posts by units of the 2nd Frontier Division, units of Tsarandoy and the Ministry of State Security.
Over 25,000 people were still in Afghanistan Soviet soldiers and officers. Ensuring the withdrawal of troops, formations and units of the army continued to carry out the tasks of protecting communications, sensitive zones and facilities. In particular, only in my eastern direction, 26 battalions were involved in protecting roads, more than four and a half thousand military personnel served at 193 outposts and posts, more than seven thousand military personnel performed tasks to protect airfields.
The winter of 1989 was snowy and frosty. Salang's "wolf fangs" grinned into the sky. Extremely difficult weather conditions were observed at the pass - fogs, icing of the road, drifts, snow avalanches that formed many kilometers of blockages on the road. It was necessary to carry out a huge amount of work on engineering, road and logistic support. It took a lot of effort and resources. Five rotary auger machines based on the "Ural" car, sent at my request, were rescued. Sometimes it was necessary to push long cars into the gorge to clear the way. I had to trample the southern slopes of the Salang pass several times in order to eliminate the congestion. In these difficult days, the commandant's service proved itself well, passing the columns through the galleries and the tunnel. There is only one method - during the day military columns go, at night - cleaning and ventilation of the tunnel and galleries.
Since January 30, aviation was allowed to pass over Salang at night, especially helicopters, which were relocated to the territory of the Soviet Union, for which powerful searchlights were used, illuminating the flight corridor over the peaks of the Hindu Kush. The redeployment of aviation ended on 8 February. During the relocation of the helicopter regiment, which was previously stationed in Jalalabad, one of the helicopters crashed into a rock: the regiment commander died.
On February 4, the command and headquarters of 40a left Kabul and moved to the area of the settlement. Tashkurgan, Naibabad township.
Artem Borovik
A young journalist, a correspondent for Ogonyok magazine Artem Borovik, arrived at the outpost of the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ushakov, with another column. We met. He stated the purpose of the trip as follows: "I want to convey to the readers the truth about the war in Afghanistan, about soldiers' everyday life through the eyes of an eyewitness, with a story without admixture of propaganda." To which I told him that it was necessary, at least for a while, to become a soldier. He agreed. We changed his clothes, and the next day, as part of the squad, he went high into the mountains to the sentry block to change personnel. Five days later he was replaced. We talked with him all night. Artem shared that in american army he served as a soldier for ten days, but these five days in Salang are equivalent to a whole month there. He was convinced that a journalist, even the most courageous, even one who goes on a feat, knows that he will return to his editorial office, where he will calmly describe what he saw. And a soldier who has not even accomplished a noticeable feat, in fact, performs it daily from morning to night and from night to the next morning, and again and again. Exhausting, tiring, daily, hourly, every minute and completely imperceptible feat.
As a result of the trip, a series of his essays "The Hidden War" was published. Artem Borovik was only 39 years old when he died on March 9, 2000 (at Sheremetyevo Airport, a Yak-40 plane fell and crashed during takeoff).
Last days on the soil of Afghanistan
On February 10, I arrived at the army command post, reported to the commander on the completion of the withdrawal of our units from the Salang pass section and the transfer of the entire route under the protection of government troops, and received a task for further actions.
On February 12, I arrived in Hairatan, went through customs and went to the bridge across the Amu Darya. Having approached a wide white strip, which marked the state border on the bridge, he ordered the adjutant to lay a white sheet, went on it, wiped his feet, threw the trophy "things" into the river, crossed the state border and arrived in Termez, in the military town of the motorized rifle division, where he was army command post deployed.
According to the order of the army commander, he took control, clarified the situation in the western direction and reported to the Minister of Defense. February 13 and 14 went to the preparation of ceremonial events related to the end of the withdrawal of 40a. The Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Southern direction, General of the Army Popov Nikolai Ivanovich, arrived in Termez to meet and greet.
On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet battalion ( reconnaissance battalion 201st Motor Rifle Division) headed by the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Gromov B.V.
General Gromov reported to General of the Army Popov that the troops of the 40th Army had been safely withdrawn from the territory of Afghanistan.
After the solemn rally, units and divisions of the 201st Motor Rifle Division were sent on a march to Dushanbe, to the place of permanent deployment. It was on this day that a message came that the division commander, Colonel Ruzlyaev V.V. promoted to the rank of Major General.
Afterword
The 40th Army was an unusual formation. It consisted of four divisions - three motorized rifle and one airborne, as well as several separate brigades, regiments and battalions. In the entire history of our Armed Forces, there has never been an army that had its own air force. A serious force was made up of special-purpose battalions, of which there were eight in the army.
In addition, this association had an impressive numerical strength, which reached 120 thousand soldiers and officers.
March 29, 1989 at 6.00 Moscow time, the liquidation act on the disbandment of the 40th Army was signed by the Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General Sokolov Vladimir Sergeevich.
Thus ended for the Soviet Union and the 40th Army this difficult, exhausting and for many years secret war for the Soviet people in Afghanistan, which lasted 2238 days and nights (from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989).
On February 19, the commander of the army, I, Major General Pishchev N.P., Major General Vasenin V.A. on a Tu-134 flew to Moscow for a conversation at the Main Personnel Directorate and the Central Committee of the CPSU, followed by appointment to command positions in the USSR Armed Forces. Three of us returned to Tashkent. Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov left for Kyiv, as back in January he was appointed commander of the Kyiv military district.
Soon I was appointed commander of the 13th combined-arms army of the Carpathian military district with headquarters in the city of Rivne and left for a new duty station.
Instead of an epilogue
Against the backdrop of current events in the country, the memory of the Afghan war, which claimed about fourteen thousand lives of our soldiers and made more than six and a half thousand disabled, began to gradually blur. The power that started this war and found the courage to withdraw its troops is gone, but those who honorably fulfilled their military and international duty in a foreign and distant country are gone.
The memory of the past is not just a property of human consciousness to keep traces of the past. Memory is the link between the past and the future. Memory is not neutral, not passive. She teaches, encourages, convinces, gives strength, inspires faith.
The war left a deep imprint in the souls of its participants, negatively affected their health, and some made them disabled. She taught them to truly appreciate life, friendship, made them strong-willed people: serious, responsible.
More than six hundred thousand soldiers and officers passed through the crucible of the Afghan war.
The war helped to see, including me, many things in a different way, to decide in terms of friendship and humanity, the choice of a position in life.
The war taught attention and care for their neighbors. Apparently, this trait of my character was noticed by the leaders of the top military leadership of the USSR and subsequently chose to appoint me as the head of the department in the Main Directorate of Personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense. It was this trait of my character that helped me work in the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation as the head of the department for the protection of the rights of military personnel and members of their families.
The war gave many reasons to become a cynic or a convinced mystic, but most of us were able to cope with these shortcomings because we carried kindness in our hearts. After the introduction of troops, and even then during the hostilities, we repeatedly observed how stray cats and dogs walked towards our soldiers at the facilities where the units of our troops were stationed. The soldiers caressed and fed them. Even wounded animals went to our soldiers to get help. After all, animals, like no other, feel the kindness of a person.
It is gratifying that in the hearts of most of our soldiers, officers and generals who fought in Afghanistan, there was no feeling of hatred for the Afghan people, and he became close and dear to them, despite the losses we suffered there.
Each of the hundreds of thousands who went through this war became part of Afghanistan, and Afghanistan became part of everyone who fought there.
Having gone through the "school" of Afghanistan, I now know firsthand what war is, and the combat experience that I have gained will remain with me until the end of my days.
It can be frankly, without pathos, to note that Afghanistan has become for me the most important and defining stage in my life. The experience gained there was useful to me in subsequent years of service. This experience helps me to work well in civilian life. It is useful and effective at all times.
I am proud that there is my contribution to minimizing losses and saving many lives of servicemen of the 40th Army, as well as to the release of several people from captivity who returned alive and healthy to their families.
But youth remains beautiful at all times.
The continuity of generations is natural. The younger generation is faced with the need to refer to the experience of previous generations. The transfer of patriotic experience is also natural. For almost ten years of the war in the 40th Army, six personnel changes took place in a two-year cycle, but this did not affect the combat activities of the army.
During various years of the war in Afghanistan, its participants were: General of the Army Sokolov S.L. Born in 1911, army generals Akhromeev S.F., Gareev M.A., Varenikov V.I. Born in 1923, army commanders Lieutenant General Yermakov V.F., Tkach B.I. Born in 1935, Rodionov I.N. Born in 1936, Generalov L.E. Born in 1937, Gromov B.V. and Dubynin V.P. 1943 year of birth. Members of the Great Patriotic War and other wars, experience and wisdom stood in the same ranks with the unexposed youth.
Of the 86 Heroes of the Soviet Union and 8 Heroes of the Russian Federation who accomplished feats and received this title in various years of the Afghan war, there were:
18-20-year-olds - 19 people;
- 22-30-year-olds - 27 people;
- 32-35-year-olds - 13 people;
- 36-40-year-olds - 20 people;
- over 40 years old - 15 people.
Patriotism, which came from the very bottom, was close and understandable to both the private and the general, and encouraged courage and heroism. It was associated not only with love for the Motherland, but also met the inner needs of a citizen of our country who could not imagine himself without the land on which he was born and raised, and the family that raised him and gave him a start in life. Patriotism as a phenomenon of a nationwide character is relevant at all times, and this nationwide quality is aggravated to the maximum in the most critical periods of the country's history, such as, for example, the Great Patriotic War.
Selflessness and courage, combat skill and humanism, valor and self-sacrifice were characteristic of our soldiers. All these qualities had to be confirmed by Western military experts.
There were a lot of heroic deeds in the Afghan war. This is a grenade explosion, and a shot at oneself in order to avoid captivity, and calling fire on oneself in order to complete the task, and deliberately sacrificing oneself in the name of saving one's subordinates or colleagues.
A person must go through life with dignity, so as not to dishonor his family and, first of all, his parents, causing a sense of pride and a desire to be like their valiant parents in children.
For us, who have gone through the crucible of the war in Afghanistan, lies a special responsibility. Knowing the price of war and peace, life and death, we are obliged to do everything in our power to prevent this from happening again.
Numerous organizations of Afghan soldiers still operate in Russia to this day. They are proud of the awards received during their stay in Afghanistan and continue the traditions of the older generations in the patriotic education of the younger generation.
Far from everything has been said about the Afghan war. Not only wounds, but Afghanistan itself hurts in the soul of every "Afghan". As long as the memory of these years spent "across the river" will be alive, as long as we are participants in these events, our relatives and friends, our children and the children of our children will keep in memory those unforgettable years, as long as the path leading to the monuments and obelisks to the Afghan soldiers, will be trampled by subsequent generations of our fellow citizens, this war will not be forgotten and will continue to live in the hearts of the generations coming to replace us.
TO ALL WHO WITH HONOR AND Dignity PERFORMED THEIR DUTY IN AFGHANISTAN - GLORY!
ETERNAL MEMORY TO ALL WHO SACRIFIED THEIR LIFE FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TASKS FACING THEM - ETERNAL MEMORY!
THE TAJ BEK PALACE WHERE THE 40A HEADQUARTERS HAD BEEN LOCATED. MY OFFICE IS ON THE THIRD FLOOR, EXTREME WINDOW TO THE LEFT.
STATEMENT OF TASKS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 201 MSD FROM KUNDUZ BY COMMANDER 40a LIEUTENANT GENERAL GROMOV B.V. AT THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE ARMY (KUNDUZ, 06/21/1988)
ORGANIZATION OF INTERACTION ON THE LAYOUT OF THE TERRAIN IN PREPARATION FOR COMBAT ACTIONS. REPORTS THE 1st DEPUTY ARMY COMMANDER, MAJOR GENERAL PISCHEV N.P.
MEETING THE COMMANDER AT THE AIRFIELD IN KABUL AFTER THE GOLD STAR OF THE HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION IS PRESENTED TO HIM IN MOSCOW. TO THE RIGHT OF THE COMMANDER: MAJOR GENERAL SEREBROV L.B., MAJOR GENERAL SHEENKOV A.G., MAJOR GENERAL KUDLAY V.I., MAYOR GENERAL L.I. LEVCHENKO
LEFT TO RIGHT: GENERAL - MAJOR SHEENKOV A.G.; HEAD OF THE OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS COLONEL CHURKIN N.P.; GENERAL - MAJOR PISCHEV N.P.
MEETING AT THE ARMY COMMAND POST WITH AKSAKALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE AREA OF ACTION NEAR THE SETTLEMENT OF MUSAKALA IN THE PROVINCE OF LOSHKARGAH (FEBRUARY 1988)
PREPARATION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM JALALABAD AND THE CREATION OF 3 MONTHS RESERVES FOR THE ARMY OF AFGHANISTAN. LEFT TO RIGHT: DEPUTY CHIEF OF ARMY LOGISTICS COLONEL AS SIVAKOV; ADVISER TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 1st AK COLONEL CHERNYSHEV A.N.; FIRST DEPUTY COMMANDER 40A, MAJOR GENERAL SHEENKOV A.G.; HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOMU OF THE GS AF OF THE USSR, MAJOR GENERAL V. A. Bologov; COMMANDER OF 1 AK VS DRA MAJOR GENERAL ZEYALUTDDIN.
AT THE LOCATION OF THE PIPELINE TEAM. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AREA OF MASS REFUELING OF EQUIPMENT AND DAILY REST OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE WITHDRAWAL UNITS.
BEFORE DEPARTURE FROM JALALABAD WITH BRIGADE COMMANDERS: THIRD FROM THE LEFT - COMMANDER OF THE 1st BRIGADE "SN" COLONEL STAROV YU.T. FIFTH LEFT - COLONEL AVLASENKO A.V. THIRD FROM THE RIGHT - CHIEF OF ARMY LOGISTICS MAJOR GENERAL V.A. VASENIN
RALLY ON THE OCCASION OF THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN. ON THE OUTSIDE OF KABULA, MAY 1988.
THE FIRST COLUMN OF THE 15th SPECIAL FORCE BRIGADE DURING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS AT THE RALLY.
MEETING WITH THE HEAD OF THE TSARANDOY OF THE BAGLAN PROVINCE IN PULI-KHUMRI AND HIS ADVISER DURING THE RELEASE OF OUR PRISONERS.
PLANNING AND ORGANIZING THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM FAYZABAD AND KUNDUZ.
UN BLUE BERETS IN KUNDUZ. 5TH LEFT - LIEUTENANT COLONEL LIPSKY, HEAD OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENT 201 MSD.
UN BLUE BERETS IN FAYZABAD.
AT ARMY CP, KUNDUZ AIR DROME.
From 1979-1989 |
|
Republic of Afghanistan, Herat province, districts: Goryan, Gulran, Guzara, Zinda-Jan, Injil, Karukh, Kohsan, Kushki-Kuhna, Pashtun-Zargun, Farsi, Chishti-Sharif |
|
Liquidation of base areas, transshipment bases, weapons and ammunition depots |
|
Opponents |
|
Afghan Mujahideen |
|
Commanders |
|
Commanders of the 5th Zimovnikovskaya motorized rifle division |
Ismail Khan |
Side forces |
|
Parts and formations of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan: 5th Guards Zimovnikovskaya Motorized Rifle Division - 12th, 371st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiments, 101st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 650th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, Tahta-Bazarsky Border Detachment of the KSAPO KGB of the USSR |
Formations of the Afghan Mujahideen of the "Western United Group" field commander Ismail Khan (Turan Ismail); Military-Political Union of Islamic Parties "Shiite Eight" (commanders: Karim Ahmad "Yak Daste", Sheikh Nasrullah Mansour, etc.) |
unknown |
unknown |
Military operations in Herat province (1979-1989)- Military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
A series of various in scale, goals, composition of participants in joint and independent (private), ground and air-ground planned combined arms operations - units and subunits of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovskaya Order of Kutuzov II degree motorized rifle division named after the 60th anniversary of the USSR, other parts of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (OKSVA), parts of the border troops (KSAPO) of the KGB of the USSR and government forces of the DRA against the formations of the Afghan Mujahideen of the "Western United Group" under the command of Ismail Khan (Turan Ismail, Amir Ismail) during the Afghan war (1979-1989) with the aim of stabilization of the military-political situation, strengthening of state power in the western part of the Republic of Afghanistan.
(term), was formed among the military personnel of the SA units and formations as part of OKSVA to designate (clarify) the geography of hostilities on the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan in the period (1979-1989).
Combined-arms operations of OKSVA units, government forces: Ministry of Defense, State Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs - DRA against the formations of the armed Afghan opposition, parties: Islamic Society of Afghanistan (IOA) (leaders: Burkhanuddin Rabbani, Ismail Khan) - military-political union (UPU) " Peshawar Seven"; "Hezbe Allah", "Movement of the Islamic Revolution" (DIR) - "pro-Iranian" Islamic parties of the UPU "Shiite Eight" (leaders: Karim Ahmad "Yak Daste", Sheikh Nasrullah Mansur and others); various international Shiite groups, also included in the "Western United Group" under the overall command of the field commander Ismail Khan.
Goals, tasks, results
“There was a continuous struggle for the right to control Herat: shelling, operations to clean up the area were combined with attempts at negotiations, up to mutual bargaining. A weighty word in this struggle remained with aviation. At times, raids western part Herat followed uninterruptedly, “the bombardments produced a very impressive effect on the rebels ...” V. Markovsky “The Scorched Sky of Afghanistan. Combat Aviation in the Afghan War.
The purpose of the military operations was:
- mastering strongholds and transshipment bases
- the defeat of numerous opposition groups
- the appeal of a number of its members to the side of the government forces of the DRA
- the capture of a wide arsenal: weapons and ammunition.
On the plain, it was necessary to ensure the safety of the movement of columns of armored vehicles along the reverse route: "Kushka - Herat - Kandahar", transporting military, civilian and humanitarian cargo to the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.
In mountainous areas: landing of tactical airborne troops of the OKSVA troops to eliminate the rear services: mastering the fortified areas of the Mujahideen, capturing transshipment bases with weapons and ammunition depots, neutralizing members of armed formations.
History of military operations
In the province of Herat, located in the zone of the Afghan-Iranian border, large-scale military operations of various scales, goals, composition of participants were systematically carried out. The proximity of the border of the neighboring state, where the cities of Qom and Mashhad housed the headquarters of eight major pro-Iranian Islamic parties, the Shiite Eight, which financed the activities of the armed formations of the Shiite and Ismaili Mujahideen, training camps for the training of military specialists provided special conditions for organizing and waging a total guerrilla war throughout the west of the territory of the DRA.
The 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, whose units and subunits were stationed in the province of Herat, took part in numerous combat operations and raids of various scale and goals, carried out intelligence and ambush operations, completing their efforts with the defeat of numerous detachments of the armed opposition, the conversion of many its members on the side of the government forces of the DRA army, by seizing a large arsenal of weapons and ammunition in the warehouses of transshipment bases and strongholds of the Mujahideen. The course of military operations was accompanied by:
- implementation of intelligence data, ambush actions
- escorting columns - military, civilian and humanitarian cargo in the direction of the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, stationed at a considerable distance from other parts of OKSVA
- repelling numerous armed ambushes and fire raids by armed formations
- the systematic mining by the rebels of the main routes and the roads adjacent to them, where - in order to inflict maximum damage on columns of armored vehicles with OKSVA personnel, the enemy manpower, a large amount of weapons and ammunition were pulled together.
- the landing of tactical airborne troops from Mi-8 helicopters in the areas bordering Iran on the dominant heights of the Kuhe-Senge-Surakh mountain range, in order to further eliminate strongholds and transshipment bases.
- high voltage and massive fire strikes from all types of weapons from both sides
- the death of OKSVA personnel and members of anti-government armed groups
- damage and destruction of transport, military equipment, weapons OKSVA
The forces of the personnel of the sapper units of the 5th motorized rifle division neutralized a large number of land mines, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.
Operations in the province of Herat 1980, 1983, 1984, 1985
On the fighting in the province of Herat from the report of the 40th Army for 1980. The results of the actions of the army for March, September 1980. The style of the document of the headquarters of the 40th Army is fully preserved in the material:
YEAR 1980
MARCH 1980 MSD with an infantry battalion of the 17th infantry division of the Afghan Armed Forces and subversive groups went to the initial area to Chakhi-Galgal (8 km north-east of Karezi-Ilyas), blew up the road 2 km north to Chakhi-Galgal (point No. 35) and is preparing to undermine two other passages in the areas 6 km to the west and 17 km south-west of Karezi-Ilyas (points No. 33, 34).
"Units 2/101 and 3/101 MSP 5 Guards. MSD with 70 divisions infantry regiment 17 AP of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, police and a detachment of local activists on 20.3 were carried out in preparation for 21.3. search for rebels in Sivaushan (15 km southeast of Herat). 20 rebels-agitators were detained, including 10 people. with weapon".
APRIL 1980. In Herat, units 101, 371 SMEs of the 5th Guards. MSD and 17 RD completed combing settlements in the valley of the Harirud River east of the city to a depth of 55 km. In three days, 50 were destroyed and three rebels were captured. All units returned to their permanent deployment points, except for 3/371 MSRP, which is fighting with three enemy groups with a total of 150-200 people. in winter regions. Bedan, Khoja-Muhammed, Bouran (50–60 km southeast of HERAT).
APRIL, MAY 1980. In the city of Herat, 49 party activists and civil servants were killed. Terrorist acts are committed day and night. There are arson and explosions at state-owned enterprises. Anti-Soviet and anti-government radio and television broadcasts are systematically conducted from Iran to Herat leading to an armed uprising. The security agencies and Tsaranda in the city are numerous, and the effectiveness of their work is ineffective. We are taking measures to curb the actions of the counter-revolution. The work is carried out together with the representation of the nearest neighbors. Our and Afghan forces and military intelligence facilities are additionally deployed in the city.
Second half of April 1980 - correspondence between two marshals
JUNE (2-3) 1980. Report of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. / 371 SME 5 Guards. The MSD, together with units of 28 PP 17 PD, blocked several rebel groups in settlements and combed them for two days. Over 60 rebels were destroyed, 5 prisoners were captured.
JUNE 1980. The liquidation of the counter-revolutionary forces in the city of Herat continued. 92 people were detained, of which 26 terrorists and members of armed rebel groups were arrested by the security forces.
JUNE 1980. In the province of Herat 1/101 MSP 5 Guards. Motor Rifle Division with PB 70 PP 17 RD blocked and defeated a detachment of rebels in Karukh (38 km north-east of Herat). 10 people were killed and 30 people were arrested, including an assistant to the leader of the detachment. On suspicion of belonging to counter-revolutionary organizations, 80 people were detained, with whom the state security agencies are working.
JUNE (18-19) 1980. In the province of Herat 3/101 SMEs of the 5th Guards. MSD with PB 70 paragraph 17 PD searches for and destroys rebels in the valley of the Harirud River - east of the city of Herat. In the areas of Siavushan and Khoja-Muhammedi-Sabz (7892), two detachments of rebels numbering 30-50 people are scattered. Destroyed up to 20 and captured 4 rebels.
In the vicinity of the city of Herat and the valley of the river. Harirud is currently concentrated armed detachments of 20-50 rebels. Their total number is up to one thousand two hundred people. Numerous terrorist and sabotage groups penetrated the city, and their activities intensified.
JUNE 1980. KHAD workers and 120 people from Tsarandoy are sent to the city of Herat from the city of KABUL. Soviet military units were trained to isolate the city from the influx of counter-revolutionaries, and Afghan troops were trained to assist Tsarandoy and KhAD inside the city to protect important facilities, check the population, identify and detain (destroy) the rebels. From June 3 to 8, reconnaissance of counter-revolutionary centers and organizations will be carried out, after which the city will be declared under martial law, blocked and cleared of rebellious elements.
JUNE 1980 At the same time, the destruction of the rebel detachments around the city of Herat began. Organized from 6–7 June this year. anti-government radio broadcasts from Iran to HERAT will be constantly suppressed.
JUNE (2.3) 1980 Report of the Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. Report on the course of hostilities for June 2.3, 1980. In the SAURISTAN area (10 km southwest of HERAT) 1.3 / 101 SMEs, 3/371 SMEs of the 5th Guards. The MSD, together with units of 28 paragraph 17 PD, blocked several rebel groups in settlements and combed them for two days. Destroyed over 60 rebels, captured 5 prisoners. (Afghan campaign: unclaimed experience. June 18, 1980 - correspondence between two marshals)
SEPTEMBER 1980. “A new method of warfare, which we first used this month, is the mining of penetration and supply routes for rebel groups from Iran, with ambush operations along these routes. This method has been carried out by us since September 3 in the provinces of Herat and Farah by the forces of two SMEs of the 371st SME of the 5th Guards MSD, reinforced by companies of engineering barriers. As a result of such actions, the penetration of rebel groups and military cargo from Iran into the DRA was significantly reduced. In total, during the specified period, the following were destroyed: rebels - 124 people, cars - 6, motorcycles - 37. Captured: captured - 36, small arms - 41 units, ammunition - 500 pieces.
“Operational groups did some work in September, which helped to increase the flow of intelligence data and improve their quality and reliability. In September, the company "Spetsnaz" in full strength was relocated to the Herat region, and then to Shindand with the task of reconnaissance of the rebels' routes from Iran to Afghanistan, as well as with the aim of setting up ambushes to destroy the rebels. So, at 18.00 on September 24, a group of Lieutenant Mikhalkov captured a prisoner who testified about the whereabouts of two groups of rebels and the route of their movement from Afghanistan to Iran and back. On the night of September 24-25, an ambush was organized, during which two cars were captured, 62 rebels were killed, and 11 small arms were captured.
Effective conduct of radio reconnaissance is hampered by the fact that the rebels use electronic means to a limited extent, and if they use it, then, as a rule, in the VHF band, therefore the main objects of reconnaissance are: border. Pakistan Corps, Iranian Gendarmerie and Iranian Intelligence Groups in Kabul and Herat. The inclusion of an encryption group in the 1863 ORADB "ON" made it possible to process intercepted cipher transmissions more quickly and thereby reduce the time for bringing information to the command.
SEPTEMBER 1980. In the province of Herat, 2/371 SMEs of the 5th Guards. The MSD with a company of obstacles continued to ambush and mine the penetration routes of the rebels from Iran at the same line. On September 21, the outer encirclement of the Herat area was removed. 3/371 SMEs returned to the point of deployment. More:
SEPTEMBER 1980. During the military operation in the province of Herat, ambush actions by 2/371 SMEs of the 5th Guards were effective. MSD with a company of obstacles, which from 3 to 21.9 p. 80 rebels, 15 vehicles with weapons and ammunition, 9 motorcycles were destroyed.
SEPTEMBER 1980. In the province of Herat on September 23, 3/101 SMEs of the 5th guards were withdrawn to the county centers of Gurian (60 km west of Herat) and Zindajan (40 km west of Herat). MSD and 3/350 RAP 103 VDD, as well as in TURAN (32 km east of Herat) 1/357 RAP 103 VDD, where they, together with the KGB "Kaskad" units, the forces of Tsarandoy, Khad and local party activists, began to establish state power . 2/371 SME 5 Guards. The MSD with a company of obstacles continues to ambush and mine the penetration routes of the rebels from IRAN at the former lines.
SEPTEMBER (26-27) 1980. In the province of Herat, 3/350th infantry regiment and 1/357th infantry regiment of the 103rd Airborne Division carried out reconnaissance and destruction of rebels in the areas of Gurian (60 km west of Herat), Zindajan (40 km west of Herat) and Murgchayi-Payi (80 km east of Herat) respectively, assisting in the establishment of state power in these areas.
YEAR 1983
SEPTEMBER, OCTOBER 1983. The concept of the operation carried out by units of the 5th Guards. The MSD in the Shindand region in the period from September 20 to 24, under the leadership of the head of the operational department, Lieutenant Colonel I. M. SMIRNOV, provided for blocking sections of the "green zone" region of Shindand, followed by combing to destroy identified rebel bands, Islamic committees, warehouses with weapons and other property, as well as to help strengthen the people's power in the area. Operation features:
According to the plan of camouflage and disinformation, the blocking areas changed 1-2 hours before the subunits set out to blockade, which prevented the actions of the rebel agents and gave good results during combing. The rebels put up stubborn resistance, especially in the area of the fortress on the southern outskirts of the city of Shindand, undertook a breakthrough of the blockaded area with forces of 200-250 people in a 200-meter section at the junction between units of 371 SMEs. A night blockade of the city of Shindand was carried out by motorized rifle units reinforced with tanks.
As a result of the operation, 314 rebels were killed, 92 were detained, and 1,171 people were filtered. Captured: small arms - 93, ammunition - 6.2 thousand pieces, RPG - 2, RPG grenades - 56, hand grenades - 36, mines and land mines - 64, various warehouses - 3. Destroyed: small arms - 100, DShK - 7, RPG - 15, firing points - 5. Our losses were: wounded - 2.
In accordance with the plan for organizing ambush actions, units and subunits of the army widely used them on the likely routes of movement of caravans with weapons and bands of rebels from abroad, and also in order to prevent the rebels from attacking military columns. In total, 268 ambushes were set up during the reporting period, 40 were successful, which is 15% of the effectiveness (15% in August this year). As a result of ambush actions, 234 rebels were killed, 17 people were detained and transferred to KhAD. Captured: small arms - 58, ammunition for SO - 59.5 thousand pieces, DShK - 2, mortar - 1, recoilless rifle - 1, RPG - 5, hand grenades - 15, mines and land mines - 27.
The sabotage actions of the rebels on communications are not weakening, but, on the contrary, are becoming more and more fierce and daring. During the reporting period, 27 attacks on convoys, 15 explosions on mines and land mines, 8 attacks on posts and deployment points were carried out (in August, 15 attacks on columns, 2 explosions on mines and land mines, 26 attacks on posts and deployment points).
As a result of sabotage, our losses amounted to: killed - 22 (of which 1 officer), wounded - 59 (of which 6 officers), cars - 5, armored personnel carriers - 1. The losses of the rebels were: rebels were destroyed - 9, small arms were captured - 6, RPG - 1, small arms destroyed - 21, RPG - 9.
Captured: small arms - 926, various ammunition - 145.4 thousand, DShK - 12, ammunition for DShK - 37.7 thousand, mortars - 4, mines for mortar - 246, recoilless rifle - 1, bp for BO - 95 , RPG - 11, RPG grenades - 169, hand grenades - 741, mines and land mines - 1742, explosives - 743 kg, radio stations - 5, various warehouses - 44. Destroyed: small arms - 949, ammunition for CO - 48.3 thousand units, DShK - 80, mortars - 24, mines for mortars - 61, RPGs - 46, recoilless guns - 1, bp to BO - 150, ZGU - 1, mines and land mines - 84, pillboxes - 55, strong points - 11, firing points - 90, caves - 199, fortresses - 29, warehouses of various - 23, Islamic committees - 20. Our losses were: killed - 109 (of which 13 officers), wounded - 201 (of which 31 officers).
AUGUST 1983. The plan of the operation carried out by the 5th Motor Rifle Division with the DRA Armed Forces in the period from August 8 to 19 in the "green zone" of the province of Herat, provided for air and artillery strikes to defeat the identified detachments and groups of rebels in the "green zone" west and southwest of .Herat. By blocking the area of hostilities, block the main ways out of the rebels from this area. By sequentially combing the blockaded area, identify Islamic committees, warehouses with weapons and ammunition, filter the population of the area in order to identify the rebels and their accomplices. Further assist in strengthening the people's power in the "green zone" of the province of Herat. Operation features:
The enemy tried to assist the blocked grouping with weapons and ammunition, to break through the blocking ring from the outside, exposing the blocking subunits to mortar fire and fire from small arms. To prevent the advance of our troops by the rebels, minefields, ambushes and blockages were widely used. The dense vegetation of the "green zone" fettered the actions of our troops, hampered reconnaissance, and helped the rebels to covertly regroup their forces and means. The wide network of channels of the "green zone" limited the use of armored groups to support our units in the course of blocking and combing the area.
As a result of the operation, 1,261 rebels were killed, 48 were captured, 393 were detained and transferred to KhAD, and 5,644 people were filtered. Captured: SO - 404, b / c to SO - 178.9 thousand pieces, mortars - 8, mines to mortars - 675, DShK - 7, b / c to DShK - 18 thousand pieces, BO - 2, ZPU - 2, RPG - 13, WG - 375, various warehouses - 22, cars - 27, motorcycles - 16, documents - 4 ICs. Destroyed: SO - 19, DShK - 37, mortars - 21, RPGs - 18, mines and land mines - 155, various warehouses - 7, bunkers - 3. Our losses: killed - 2 (1 officer), wounded - 9.
DECEMBER 1983 The MSD with the DRA Armed Forces in the period from December 22 to 29, under the leadership of the division commander G. N. Anoshin, provided for blocking and combing the green zone area along the western outskirts of the city of Herat to identify bands of rebels, their IK, warehouses with weapons and ammunition. Assist local residents in strengthening people's power in the green zone of Herat. The features of the operation were:
The enemy from the outside repeatedly tried to help the blockaded grouping to break through the blocking ring, exposing our units to mortar fire and small arms fire. To prevent the advance of our units during combing, the rebels widely used mine-explosive barriers, blockages, flooding of the area, and acted from ambushes. The features of the terrain and the development of the green zone fettered the actions of the armored groups.
As a result of the operation, the following were destroyed: rebels - 393. Captured: small arms - 116, RPG - 3, RG - 109, mines and land mines - 135. Destroyed: DShK - 10, mortars - 7, mines and land mines - 269, firing points - 48 , warehouses of various - 5. Our losses amounted to: wounded - 15 (of which 3 officers).
YEAR 1984
JANUARY, FEBRUARY 1984. In total, in February, one planned operation was carried out in the province of Herat (began on January 24, 1984), in accordance with the combat plan, from January 24 to February 1, under the leadership of the commander of the 5th MSD, Major General G. Ya. a planned operation was carried out to destroy the gangs and stabilize the situation in the province of Herat.
5 MSDs were involved in the fighting - 3 SMEs 101 SMEs, 3 SMEs 371 SMEs, 1 TB 24 TP, 1 RR, RDR 650 ORB with reinforcements, 8 battalions of the DRA Armed Forces, friendly gangs of Shir Ogi, Aref, Juma Khan, engineer Abduraim . By the beginning of the operation, Turan Ismail's gangs intensified their activities in order to maintain the spirit of the rebels: they launched an attack on the villages of the friendly gang of Juma Khan, as a result of which the latter lost five villages, fired at columns in the green zone of Herat.
The plan of the operation provided for: air strikes, artillery fire to defeat the identified detachments and groups of rebels, destroy warehouses and air defense systems; the forces of the division's units, in cooperation with the DRA Armed Forces, to defeat the rebel formations, capture, and if it is impossible to capture, destroy their bases, warehouses, and help strengthen the people's power in the province of Herat. The features of the operation were:
In the blockaded areas, the rebels offered stubborn resistance, repeatedly tried to break through the encirclement at night, which forced them to conduct combat operations around the clock. At night, the units remained in the occupied combat formations, the Afghan units left the combing areas, refused to stay overnight. When units entered the blockade, the areas of approaches were heavily mined by the rebels. To comb a number of villages, friendly gangs were involved, who know the terrain in the combat area better.
As a result of the operation, 372 rebels were destroyed, 15 were detained, 8652 were filtered. ., shots for RPGs - 4, hand grenades - 21, explosives - 18 kg, mines and land mines - 122, documents IK - 6, radio station - 1. Destroyed: small arms - 29, DShK - 12, mortars - 7, recoilless guns - 2, mines and land mines - 202, warehouses - 5, firing points - 11, IR - 5, RPG - 9.
Year 1985
Turan Ismail had 199 detachments numbering 4655 rebels. In addition to the formations of Turan Ismail, “In October-November 1984, for example, in the province of Herat, six battalions of the “Hazrat Hamza Division” (“Holy Hamza”) and 11 fronts belonging to the ILA fought. In other months, the composition of battalions and fronts partially changed: new ones appeared and the old ones disappeared.
MARCH 1985. 9 battalions of the "division" and 13 fronts were named as leading combat operations. “In 1985, in a number of operations, new methods of combat operations were used, inherent only in these operations and only for a certain area of combat operations, a specific formation or unit .... The use of such a method as reconnaissance, search and destruction of rebel caravans, gave great results, especially with the close interaction of aviation and general military units».
On the effectiveness of interaction in military operations in the province of Herat of ground forces and aviation: “the following example speaks. Aerial reconnaissance in the area of the gorge between the mountains of Rangi and Gulistan discovered a convoy of 27 vehicles. An air strike by the forces of the 665th IAP, 302nd OVE, the actions of the reconnaissance and airborne company of the 650th reconnaissance battalion (ORB), the reconnaissance company of the 25th TP, 6, 7 MSR of the 101st SME, 4th batr 1060- th AP the column was defeated.
As a result of the battle, 62 rebels, 11 vehicles, and a large amount of ammunition were destroyed. In the same battle, 16 vehicles, 13 grenade launchers, 6 machine guns, 237 AKM, 12 mortars, 10 bags of documents, 10 bags of medicines, 50 boxes of food, a large amount of equipment and military equipment were captured.
YEAR 1987
“A large-scale military operation to clean the “anthill” of the green zone of Herat in the fall of 1987 was carried out with the participation of fighters of the 168th IAP from Shindand. Detachments of the Mujahideen of Turan Ismail were forced out of the valley into the mountains and gorges, where they tried to bomb them from the air. In addition to the usual ammunition, the MiG-23 used concrete-piercing BetAB-500, suspended two per aircraft. The targets were underground tunnels, caves and burrows in the mountains.
war zone
“The entire combat zone on the territory of Afghanistan was conditionally divided into four regions, which were controlled by army aviation units and partly by troops. In the west - the regions: Farah, Shindand and Herat.
“... There was enough work in the vicinity of Herat - an endless green zone and the Herirud valley adjoining it. The detachments operating in the provinces of Herat and Farah were supported by numerous villages that supplied the Mujahideen with food and replenishment. Here they found rest and lodging for the night, receiving weapons from nearby bases in Iran. Under the cover of "greenery" - vast thickets of shrubs, gardens and vineyards - the Mujahideen approached the location of military units, robbed and burned convoys, and after the attacks instantly dissolved in the surrounding villages, and it was not easier to find them in these places, especially from the air, than in the mountains .... "- Viktor Markovsky "The hot sky of Afghanistan"
The Mujahideen grouping, concentrated along the Kushka-Herat-Shindand-Kandahar highway, inflicted significant damage on the moving columns of the Soviet troops .... The interaction of local field commanders with the influential Ismail Khan, his significant formation, provided for the transfer from other nearby regions of Afghanistan, reinforcements: fresh manpower , weapons and ammunition.
Territory, Counties
Herat Province is one of the largest provinces in Afghanistan and ranks second in area. It is located in the west of the country, has a long border with Iran. In the northeast it borders with the province of Badghis, in the south with Farah. The province is occupied by mountain ranges and deserts, most of which are occupied by sagebrush semi-deserts. In the valley of the river Harirud - an oasis.
The capital of the province of the same name - the city of Herat, is the second largest city in Afghanistan. The traditional religions of the region include: Shiism and Sunism. A significant part of the population professes Shiism. The main languages are: Iranian languages: (Dari - Farsi Kabuli), Pashto.
The province of Herat is divided into counties: Adraskan, Herat, Goryan, Gulran, Guzara, Zinda-Jan, Injil, Karukh, Kohsan, Kushk, Kushki-Kuhna, Obe, Pashtun-Zargun, Farsi, Chishti-Sharif, Shindand.
Population
Population: Farsivans; Tajiks; charaymaks; Pashtuns; Uzbeks; Turkmens (tribes: Ersarys, Tekins, Ali-Elys, Saryks and Salyrs); the Kyzylbash; Kurds, etc.
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the local population of the province of Herat, as well as the provinces of Panjshir and Badakhshan, fiercely resisted the establishment of the power of the "Taliban".
Operations Commanders
Commanders of the 40th Army - OKSVA
- Lieutenant General Tukharinov Yuri Vladimirovich. Entering OKSV into the DRA - September 23, 1980.
- Lieutenant General Tkach Boris Ivanovich September 23, 1980 - May 7, 1982
- Lieutenant General Ermakov Viktor Fedorovich May 7, 1982 - November 4, 1983
- Lieutenant General Generalov Leonid Evstafievich 11/4/1983 - 04/19/1985
- Lieutenant General Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich 04/19/1985 - 04/30/1986
- Lieutenant General Dubynin Viktor Petrovich 04/30/1986 - 06/1/1987
- Lieutenant General Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich 06/1/1987 - 02/15/1989
Ismail Khan and formation
Armed formations of the Mujahideen, concentrated along the route "Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar" caused significant damage to the moving columns of Soviet troops.
The management of the armed formations of the Mujahideen in the period (1979-1989) in the west of the Republic of Afghanistan was carried out by the well-known and most influential field commander in the region Ismail Khan, better known as Turan Ismail, (translated from "Dari" - Captain Ismail). This appeal was strengthened by him due to military service in the 17th infantry division of the DRA army.
Ethnic Tajik, a native of the Shindand district of Herat province, a former military man, an officer in the Afghan army. Graduated from the Harbi Puhantun Military School. Until 1979 in military rank"Captain" ("Turan") commanded a battalion of the 17th Infantry Division. With the arrival of Soviet troops, after the "Herat rebellion" (March 1979), he deserted from the military unit and led the armed formation "IOA" in the province of Herat.
“... Having won the well-deserved authority of the Mujahideen in the insurgent struggle (in a short time), he managed to subjugate the scattered detachments of the armed opposition and lead a large-scale armed resistance. Having become the chief coordinator of the armed group throughout the west of Afghanistan, he received a respectful nickname from subordinate Mujahideen - “The Lion of Herat ...” A.A. Lyakhovsky “The Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan”
Member of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan - (IOA), was a member of its supreme council. Third in influence, after Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud. Simultaneously with the financial assistance of the CIA as part of Operation Cyclone, where Burhanuddin Rabbani was one of the distributors of foreign financial assistance, Ismail Khan also had his own channels of financial and military support, being the distributor of funds for Shiite circles - the Alliance of Eight, the Shiite Eight - Mujahideen parties based in Iran, the cities of Mashhad and Qom.
From the dossier on Turan Ismail: “... Married. The family lives in Tayabad (Iran). Secretive and cautious, often changes the location of his headquarters. Extremely cruel. He personally dealt with the prisoners. He is the general leader of the armed formations "IOA" in the province of Herat. Over 20 thousand rebels acted under his leadership. It enjoys authority among the local population, as it prohibits robberies ... "A.A. Lyakhovsky" The tragedy and valor of Afghanistan "
“The most prominent of the local field commanders was Turan Ismail, a former army captain who went over to the Mujahideen after the April revolution. Military experience, literacy and exactingness quickly allowed him to become a local emir, who ruled over seven provinces and an army of five thousand militants - V. Markovsky "The Hot Sky of Afghanistan"
Training camps in Iran
Excerpt from the book of retired lieutenant general Neshumov Yu.A. “Afghan borders. Tragedies and Lessons" :
“... The scale of training of the Afghan Mujahideen in Iran also increased - also mainly with the involvement of Afghan refugees. Their training was carried out in camps located in the regions of Tehran, Mashhad, Tayabad, Zahedan and some others. The militants were trained by Iranian instructors from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) under the supervision of Imam Khomeini's personal representative. From here (from the IRGC) the rebels were provided with weapons and ammunition. A permanent connection was established between the headquarters of the rebels in Peshawar and Mashhad in order to coordinate their actions on the territory of the DRA ...
Operation Trap
Operation "Trap" August 18-26, 1986 - a military operation of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. A large-scale planned combined-arms operation of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan to defeat the "Western United Group" of the Afghan Mujahideen formations of the influential field commander Ismail Khan (Turan Ismail), the capture and liquidation of the strategic fortified area "Kokari-Sharshari", located in the zone of the Afghan-Iranian border, mountain range "Kuhe - Senge - Surah" (White Mountains) of the system "Sefid-Kuh" (Safed-Koh) - province of Herat.
The result of the military operation "Trap" consisted in the defeat of the Mujahideen formations of the "Western United Group", the capture of an important base area (fortification) - a stronghold and a border with Iran, a large transshipment base with a wide arsenal: weapons, ammunition and intelligence documentation.
Forces and means
The province of Herat was a "point of permanent deployment" and was part of the area of responsibility of the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division ("PPD" of the city: Herat and Shindand) OKSVA.
Ground forces and facilities
5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, units and subunits:
- 101st Motor Rifle Regiment (Herat)
- 12th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment (Herat)
- 371st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment (Shindand)
- 1060th Artillery Regiment (Shindand)
- 650th Separate Prague Order of Alexander Nevsky Reconnaissance Battalion (Shindand)
- 68th Guards Separate Engineer Battalion (Shindand), etc.
In the period from 1980 (July) to 1984 (April) in the province of Herat, the counties of Herat and Shindand, special tasks were carried out by the "Cascade Detachment" - (special forces) of the KGB of the USSR: "Karpaty", "Karpaty-1".
The course of conducting large-scale (army) combined-arms operations to capture the Kokari-Sharshari fortified area covered a wide front of a hard-to-reach mountainous area in the Afghan-Iranian border zone where, in case of strategic expediency, the command reinforced the OKSVA group. For the landing method of tactical airborne assault in the mountainous areas of the province of Herat, additional units and formations of OKSVA were involved. In particular, the following were involved in the combined-arms operation "Trap" in the province of Herat on August 19-25, 1986:
- 149th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, 201st Motorized Rifle Division (Kunduz),
- 345th Separate parachute regiment(Bagram)
- 28th Rocket Artillery Regiment (40th Army) (Shindand)
- Tahta-Bazarsky border detachment KSAPO
Forces and means of the Air Force
For transport needs, interaction in the course of hostilities with the OKSVA ground forces, the following were involved in military operations: assault, bomber-fighter and reconnaissance aircraft. The tasks set by the command of the Air Force of the 40th Army included, among other things, the application of bombing and assault strikes (BSHU).
In the province of Herat, the command of the 40th Army used the aviation of the following air units:
- 17th Separate Aviation Regiment of KSAPO - Mary Air Base - Turkmen SSR, regiment commander Colonel N. Romanyuk
- 302nd Separate Helicopter Squadron - Shindand Air Base, Herat Province
- 303rd Separate Helicopter Squadron - Herat Air Base, Herat Province
- 335th Separate Helicopter Regiment - Jalalabad Air Base, Nangarhar Province
- 378th Separate Assault Aviation Regiment - Bagram-Kandahar Air Base, Parvan-Kandahar Province
- 50th Separate Mixed Aviation Regiment, Kabul airfield
- 200th Separate Assault Aviation Squadron - Shindand Air Base
- 154th Separate Bomber Fighter Regiment - Kandahar Air Base
- 378th Separate Assault Aviation Regiment - Shindand Air Base
For the interaction of the Air Force with ground forces, helicopters were used: MI-8 and MI-24, attack aircraft SU-25 - "Rooks", the connection of which was provided by "VHF radio stations" - "Eucalyptus" - "R-828", air command posts IL -22.
Memoirs of V. Markovsky in the book "The Hot Sky of Afghanistan"“In the course of major operations, when special coherence and preparedness were required for the actions of large groups of aviation in a vast area (as was the case in the summer of 1986 during the defeat of the arsenal base near Herat), Il-22 flying command posts equipped with a powerful airborne complex appeared over Afghanistan control and communications, capable of ensuring the work of an entire air army. The Su-25s themselves were equipped with a special VHF radio set R-828 Eucalyptus for communication with ground forces within line of sight. - Victor Markovsky "The hot sky of Afghanistan"
“The attack aircraft of the 200th OSHAE also participated in the struggle for Herat, which was located 120 km north of Shindand and became the center of the opposition in the west of the country. The local gangs acted right in the city, dividing it into spheres of influence and fighting not only with government troops, but also among themselves. There were also strongholds, stocks of weapons and ammunition. The Su-25 had to strike right in the city on the quarters controlled by spooks and the houses indicated by intelligence.
Forces and means of the DRA
Parts and connections armed forces Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: 17th Infantry Division, 4th tank brigade and other military units of the Afghan army with (PPD Herat province).
Memoirs of Army General V.I. Varennikov
Excerpt from the memoirs of General of the Army V.I. Varennikov about the large-scale combined-arms operation "TAP" in August 1986 in the book "UNIQUE":
“During my stay in Afghanistan, a number of interesting and complex operations were carried out. Of course, the operation of the operation is different. Some left no memories. Others will never fade. I especially remember the operations in the Kunar Gorge, during the assault on the Javara base, on the Parachinar ledge, in the Kunduz region, west of HERAT to the KOKARI-SHARSHARI base on the Iranian border ... ”- General of the Army Varennikov V.I. "Unique" (book 5th chapter 4th)
The future commander of the 40th Army - "Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan" and the governor of the Moscow region - General Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich served in the province of Herat in the period from 1982-1984 as commander of the 5th Guards Zimovnikovskaya motorized rifle division.
Also in the 101st motorized rifle regiment of the same 5th guards motorized rifle division in the period from 1983-1985 military service the famous Russian actor Yevgeny Sidikhin took place.
Songs about Herat in soldier songwriting
The song "Herat Waltz", music and lyrics by V.M. Koshelev:
“Again, the hard worker“ Antey ”carries the boys to someone else’s war:
Time has chosen these guys, time has chosen this country
Herirud will flash with a blue ribbon, mountains are everywhere - not a Russian landscape:
I drew a dangerous route here, red-colored, staff pencil
Herat, Herat - Dushman's capital, Afghanistan - no glory to me, no shame
Herat, Herat, I dream again at night: Afghanistan hurts in my soul .... "
“.... A high-explosive gap will rear up the earth, decorating a foothill sketch
The commanders will check who is alive, and the soldiers will be led into the attack
Again the hard worker "Antey" carries the beardless veterans home,
And the rangers remaining here are waiting for an unfinished battle .... "
Heroes of the USSR of the Russian Federation for participation in military operations in the province of Herat
"For courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty (providing international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan), by the Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation", the highest rank of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the medal " Golden Star» awarded soldiers-internationalists:
Kuchkin, Gennady Pavlovich, captain, political officer of the 3rd SME of the 101st SME of the 5th Guards MSD - Hero of the Soviet Union
Neverov, Vladimir Lavrentievich, colonel, commander of the 101st SME of the 5th Guards MSD - Hero of the Soviet Union
Pugachev, Fedor Ivanovich, captain, commander of the reconnaissance company of the 101st SME of the 5th Guards MSD - Hero of the Soviet Union
Daudi, Ilyas Dilshatovi, senior sergeant, platoon lock of the 149th Guards SME, 201st MSD - Hero of the Russian Federation
Kandahar and Helmand
Kandahar and Helmand operations
Combined-arms operations of the 70th separate guards motorized rifle brigade
Military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. A series of joint and independent (private), "ground" and "air-ground" planned combined arms operations of the 70th Separate Guards twice Red Banner Orders of Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky motorized rifle brigade, different in scale, goals, composition of participants, other units and formations of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (OKSVA) and government forces of the DRA against numerous armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen of the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (field commanders: Mullah Malang, Mullah Nakib, Mullah Naseem, etc.), based in the southern provinces: Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan , Nimroz of the Republic of Afghanistan during the Afghan war (1979-1989) with the involvement of significant forces and means.
Combined-arms operations of the 70th separate guards motorized rifle brigade "PPD" - Kandahar, units of the 5th guards Zimovnikovskaya motorized rifle division PPD - Shindand, other units and formations of OKSVA, as well as the forces of the Ministry of Defense, State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - DRA on a wide front in order to stabilize the military -political situation, strengthening state power in the southern Afghan provinces - Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz.
One of the largest planned combined-arms "Kandahar operations" was carried out in 1987 under the code name "South-87"
Geography and population of the region
Main article - Kandahar Province, Main article - Helmand Province
The provinces of Kandahar and Helmand are one of the largest provinces in Afghanistan, located in the south of the country - the border with Pakistan and are included in the "Southern Territorial Zone" (STZ). YuTZ also includes Afghan provinces bordering Kandahar: Nimroz, Uruzgan, Zabul. YuTZ is occupied by mountain ranges, sagebrush semi-deserts and deserts of Dashti-Margo and Registan and is located in the river valleys: Farahrud, Helmand, Kandahar. The provinces are inhabited by Pashtuns of various tribes belonging to large tribal unions - Durrani and Ghilzai, as well as Balochs, Hazaras and other Afghan peoples.
The "southern territorial zone" includes the provinces: Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan - (it also includes the southwestern part of Afghanistan)
Kandahar: Kandahar, Nagahan, Sinjaray, Santaray, Shinarai, Torshikot, Mahajiri, Spinehun-Tana, Payi Mulu, Islamdara, Khusravi-Sufla, Gundshan, Kishkinahud, Nagahan, Mahajiri, Spinehun-Tana, Spinbuldak, Spinahula, Anizani, Anizamal, Arghandab , Haji-Razmukhammed, Pasab, Palmukhamed, Zakiri-Sharif, Kara, Gulyamuddinkhan and others.
Nimroz: Dilaram, Bagar, Karyati-Chara, Kotalak, Chakhansur, Khushkhadir, etc.
Helmand (aka Helmand): Girishk, Lashkargah, Kajaki-Sufla, Shinkarai, Nikazi, Sangin, Musa-Kala and others. (Abdali). It consists of two branches - "Zirak", tribes: Popalzai, Sadozai, Alikozai, Barakzai, Muhammadzai, Achakzai; and also - the branch "Panjpay": Nurzai, Alizai, Iskhakzai, it includes: Mohamedzai, Yuzufzai, Nurzai and others ...... The second major tribal union is Gilzai. It consists of branches - "Turan", it includes the tribes: Hotaki, Tokhi (Toki), Haroti (Haruti), Nasir (Nasyr); ..... And "Burkhan", it consists of tribes: Ibrahimkheil, Suleimanheil, Aliheil, Sahak, Andarheil, Nasar, Tarakheil and others; also a branch of "Musa", consists of tribes: Ahmadzai, Andar, Taraki, Sahak, etc. The south of Afghanistan is inhabited, also: Balochs, Braguis, Kyzylbashs, Tajiks, Afshars, Hazaras, etc. This territory has always been a zone of absolute influence of the Pashtun tribes Durrani and Ghilzai - historically using their geographical position for military and economic purposes from the days of "Western India" to the present.
The main religion of the region is Sunnism. The main languages are: Pashto, Dari. The province is divided into counties. The provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan are the main areas with a strong influence of the Taliban movement.
Goals, tasks, results
The purpose of the "Kandahar and Helmand" military operations was to ensure the safety of the movement of columns of armored vehicles following the reverse route: "Shindand - Lashkargah - Kandahar", transporting military, civilian and humanitarian cargo to the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, landing tactical airborne troops with the aim of:
liquidation of infrastructure: mastering the strongholds of the Mujahideen
capturing transshipment bases with weapons and ammunition depots
neutralization of members of armed formations
appeals of members of the armed opposition to the side of government forcesGeography of the "Kandahar and Helmand operations"
War zone - on a wide front of the counties:
Arghandab, Arghistan, Daman, Gorak, Kandahar, Khakrez, Maruf, Maivand, Miyannasheen, Naish, Panjwai, Reg, Shan-Vali-Kot, Shorabak, Spin-Boldak - Kandahar province
Baghran, Vashir, Garmsir, Dishu, Kajaki, Lashkargah, Musa-Kala, Nad-Ali, Navai-Barakzayi, Navzad, Nakhri-Saraj, Sangin, Khanashin - Helmand Province for mastering strongholds and transshipment bases in the counties:
Forces and means
Main article - Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan
Ground forces in the region:
The southern provinces of "Kandahar and Helmand" were the "point of permanent deployment" - "PPD" of units, units of the ground forces and the Air Force and were part of the area of responsibility of one of the OKSVA formations - the 70th separate guards motorized rifle brigade. Among them are the Kandahar Airborne Assault Battalion - PPD Kandahar (1980-1981) - 2nd Airborne Assault Brigade as part of the 56th Guards Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, then (1981-1988) as part of the "70th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade" ( PPD Kandahar)
In the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand (1980-1985), in addition to units of the 70th separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, units and units not included in this OKSVA unit were deployed:
"3rd Battalion of the 317th Guards. parachute regiment "of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division - (RPD Kandahar in the period from 80-82, later from 82-85 (RPD Lashkargah, Helmand province)
"3rd Battalion of the 350th Guards. Parachute Regiment "of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division - (PPD Girishk, Helmand Province) in the period from 80-85.
"173rd Separate Special Purpose Detachment" (3rd Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion - PPD Kandahar) from the 22nd Separate guards brigade special purpose GRU GSH
"370th Separate Special Purpose Detachment" (6th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion - PPD Lashkargah) from the 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, where the headquarters of this brigade itself was directly stationed in (PPD Lashkargah) in the period from 1980 ( July) to 1984 (April) in the province of Kandahar, special tasks were carried out by the “Cascade Detachment” (special purpose detachment) of the KGB of the USSR “Kavkaz”.
Armed formations of the Mujahideen, concentrated along the route "Shindand - Helmand - Kandahar" caused significant damage to the moving columns of Soviet troops.
During the large-scale (army) combined-arms "Kandahar operations", the wide front of which covered the Afghan-Pakistani border zone, the OKSVA group was built up, to which other units and formations of the OKSVA were involved.
Attracted forces and means:
371st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment, 5th Guards MSD (Shindand)
101st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 5th Guards. MSD (Herat)
56th Guards Separate Air Assault Brigade (Gardez)
191st separate motorized rifle regiment (Ghazni)
"3rd Airborne Battalion of the 317th RAP" of the 103rd Airborne Division (Kandahar, Lashkargah) 1980-1984.
"3rd Airborne Battalion of the 350th RAP" of the 103rd Airborne Division Girishk 1980-1984.
"173rd Separate Special Forces Detachment" of the 22nd Separate Guards Brigade Special Forces GRU General Staff (Kandahar)
"370th Separate Special Forces Detachment" of the 22nd Separate Guards Brigade Special Forces GRU General Staff (Lashkargah)History and course of military operations
The course of the "KANDAGAR and HELMAND OPERATIONS" was carried out on a wide front and was accompanied by:
implementation of intelligence data and ambush actions
convoys of military, civilian and humanitarian cargo to the southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar, stationed at a considerable distance from other parts of OKSVA
reflection of numerous fire raids and organized ambushes of the armed formations of the Mujahideen
mining by the rebels of the main routes and the roads adjacent to them, to which, in order to destroy columns of armored vehicles and personnel of OKSVA, a large amount of weapons and ammunition was delivered from the nearest transshipment bases.
massed fire strikes from both sides from all types of weapons
the death of OKSVA personnel and members of anti-government armed groups.
damage and destruction - transport, military equipment, weapons OKSVA.
tactical air assault landing from Mi-8 helicopters on the dominant heights of mountain ranges, in order to eliminate strongholds: Islamdara, Khakrez, Khadigar, Vasatichignai, Chinartu, Opushello, Islamdad, gorge "Shinaray" and transshipment bases. The 70th separate guards motorized rifle brigade, parts and subunits of which were stationed in the province of Kandahar, for the period (1979-1989), participated in military operations and combat raids of various scale, goals and composition, implementation intelligence and ambush operations, completing their efforts:
mastering strongholds and transshipment bases
the defeat of numerous opposition groups
the appeal of many of its members to the side of the DRA government forces
the capture of a wide arsenal: weapons and ammunition. The personnel of the sapper units of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade and other parts of OKSVA neutralized a large number of land mines, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.
From the memoirs of Army General Varennikov V.I.
“During my stay in Afghanistan, a number of interesting and complex operations were carried out. Of course, the operation of the operation is different. Some left no memories. Others will never fade. I especially remember the operations in the Kunar Gorge, during the assault on the Jawar base, on the Parachinar ledge, in the Kunduz region, west of Herat to the Kokari-Sharshari base on the Iranian border, in the Lurkoh mountain range, in the Lashkargah region, in the KANDAGAR province and directly beyond KANDAGAR » — Varennikov V.I. "Unique" (book 5th chapter 4th)
“I will dwell only on some fragments of the operation in KANDAGAR. This operation lasted six months (from April to October 1987), and I spent almost all this time there. It was necessary to change the situation, and we achieved this. Moreover, the operation included a complex of various actions, and not only combat ones. As for the combat, they were conducted simultaneously: in some areas of the city itself, especially near the prison, in the area of Black Square, the fuel depot and the elevator; south and especially west of the city, along the road to Herat (the most intense fights took place in the green zone south of the city); in the area of the village of Kishkinakhud, which is about 50 kilometers west of Kandahar, and near the border with Pakistan - in the area of the settlement of Spinbuldak. Periodically, hostilities broke out in the area of the airfield, although it was well guarded, and there were continuous minefields around it.
“The rebels were irreconcilable. Mullah Naseem had a particularly evil gang. Whatever approaches we did, however, it was not possible to persuade him to a peaceful dialogue. Therefore, they were forced to make a decision: directly in the city, on its outskirts, as well as in the green zone to the south and west of Kandahar, all the gangs were to be crushed. The task was very difficult. The city lives, the population is large, trade communication with other cities of the country, as well as with Iran and Pakistan, cannot be violated. And the gangs need to be beaten out!
“And yet, no matter how irreconcilable they resisted, by the autumn of 1987, directly in Kandahar and in the vast majority of districts of the province, the situation had radically changed for the better.”
Army General Varennikov V.I. "Unique" (book 5th part 4th)
Warlords in command of the "Kandahar and Helmand" operations
Commanders of the 40th Army - OKSVA
Lieutenant General Tukharinov Yuri Vladimirovich. Entering OKSV into the DRA - September 23, 1980.
Lieutenant General Tkach Boris Ivanovich September 23, 1980 - May 7, 1982
Lieutenant General Ermakov Viktor Fedorovich May 7, 1982 - November 4, 1983
Lieutenant General Generalov Leonid Evstafievich 11/4/1983 - 04/19/1985
Lieutenant General Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich 04/19/1985 - 04/30/1986
Lieutenant General Dubynin Viktor Petrovich 04/30/1986 - 06/1/1987
Lieutenant General Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich 06/1/1987 - 02/15/1989 Commanders of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade
Soltanov, Annamurat Soltanovich - 1980, former commander of the 373rd Guards MSP,
Shatin, Mikhail Vladimirovich - 1980-1982, appointed commander of the 201st Motor Rifle Division
Meshcheryakov, Evgeny Ivanovich - 1982-1983,
Loginov, Valery Alexandrovich - 1983-1984,
Zubko, Ivan Vasilyevich - 1984-1985,
Stepanov, Pavel Vladimirovich - 1985-1987,
Nikulin, Victor Anatolyevich - 1987-1988,
Grishin, Nikolai Nikolaevich - 1988.
Heroes of the USSR for participation
in the "Kandahar and Helmand operations"
Heroes of the Soviet Union for participation in the Kandahar and Helmand operations
“For the courage and heroism shown in providing international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan by the Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the highest rank of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal”, the “internationalists won” were awarded:
Demakov, Alexander Ivanovich, senior lieutenant of the guard (posthumously)
Arsenov, Valery Viktorovich, private guard
Chernozhukov, Alexander Viktorovich, senior lieutenant of the guard
Gushchin, Sergey Nikolaevich, guard captain
|
1979-1989
Republic of Afghanistan
Defense of the southern borders
Withdrawal of Soviet troops
USSR DRA | Afghan Mujahideen Foreign Mujahideen |
Various in scale, goals, composition of participants - ground, air-ground planned combined arms operations of units and formations of the 40th Army (Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan, OKSVA) during the Afghan War (1979-1989) involving significant forces and means.
Army, divisional, private (brigade, regiment, battalion), military operations were carried out by units and formations of OKSVA in various provinces of Afghanistan, in order to stabilize the military-political situation and strengthen the state power of the DRA.
They originate from a military operation in the Nakhrin district of Baghlan province in early January 1980, where units of the 186th separate motorized rifle regiment, which had barely entered the DRA, suppressed an armed rebellion of the 4th artillery regiment of the DRA army.
- 1 Military operations in Afghanistan (1979-1989)
- 2 History and course of military operations
- 2.1 Forces and means of military operations
- 2.2 Nature and objectives of military operations
- 2.3 The first military operation in the county of Nahrin. REBELLION OF THE ARTPOLK
- 3 Types and scale of military operations
- 3.1 Independent (private) military operations
- 3.2 Joint military operations
- 4 Periods of military operations
- 4.1 First period
- 4.2 Second period
- 4.3 Third period
- 4.4 Fourth period
- 5 Combat activities of the Afghan Mujahideen
- 5.1 Ambushes and raids
- 6 Territorial zones of military operations
- 6.1 Northern territorial zone of military operations
- 6.2 Northeast territorial zone of military operations
- 6.3 Western territorial zone of military operations
- 6.4 Central territorial zone of military operations
- 6.5 Eastern territorial zone of military operations
- 6.6 Southeast territorial zone of military operations
- 6.7 Southern territorial zone of military operations
- 7 The most famous military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan
- 8 Areas of responsibility and deployment of OKSVA units and formations
- 8.1 103rd Vitebsk Guards. VDD
- 8.2 108th Nevelskaya MSD
- 8.3 5th Zimovnikovskaya Guards. MSD
- 8.4 201st Gatchina MSD
- 8.5 Separate brigades as part of OKSVA
- 8.6 Separate regiments as part of OKSVA
- 8.7 GRU Spetsnaz Brigades
- 9 OKSVA military operations by years
- 9.1 1979
- 9.2 1980
- 9.3 1981
- 9.4 1982
- 9.5 1983
- 9.6 1984
- 9.7 1985
- 9.8 1986
- 9.9 1987
- October 9, 1988
- November 9, 1989
- 10 Combined-arms operations to capture fortified areas
- 11 See also
- 12 Notes
- 13 Links
- 14 Links
Military operations in Afghanistan (1979-1989)
“The search for and improvement of the forms of combat activity of the army took place throughout the war. The following forms of combat activity of the 40th A were finally formed:
- carrying out operations to defeat the most dangerous groups of the armed opposition;
- defense of communications, regime zones, important national economic facilities;
- ambush combat operations of units and subunits in common system sudden and covert strikes by army troops;
- combat operations for the implementation of intelligence data by duty forces and means of the army;
- combat operations on the wiring of columns with material and technical means in especially dangerous directions;
- covering the state border.
An analysis of the forms of combat activity, types of operations, methods of conducting them and defeating individual enemy groupings made it possible to reveal their structural-logical dependence. connection with the creation of large formations by the armed opposition, the improvement of their methods of combat, the use of unexpected tactics, effective ways by the end of 1980, a qualitatively new form of combat activity of the 40th A began to take shape - military operations.
The essence of operations 40-A to defeat especially dangerous rebel groups consisted in the totality of coordinated and interconnected by:
Goals, tasks, area and time of combat and reconnaissance and search operations, strikes and maneuver of formations and units of the ground forces, aviation, missile forces and artillery, helicopter landings, bypassing, raid and assault detachments, armored groups, formations, formations and units of the Afghan army carried out both simultaneously and sequentially.
In terms of scale, these could be either large-scale operations or military operations in a limited area. in turn, depending on the participating forces and means of the operation, it is advisable to divide as follows.
Large-scale operations were subdivided on: independent fighting; joint combat operations with formations, formations and units of the Afghan army; support for the combat operations of formations and formations of the Afghan army.
The fighting in a limited area was divided into: private fighting; implementation of intelligence data; ambush and search and reconnaissance operations.
By the nature of the hostilities, they distinguished three types of operations:
- air-ground to defeat large enemy groupings and its base areas;
- offensive with the aim of breaking through the enemy's defenses and ensuring the combat activities of the surrounded points of permanent deployment of formations and units of the 40th A and Afghan troops;
- defensive on the main road directions, especially during the withdrawal of troops.
The analysis of the performed operations made it possible to divide them into two types - planned and unscheduled. A total of 426 scheduled and 47 unscheduled operations were performed. They differed from each other in tasks, methods and levels of planning, involved forces and means.
Planned operations - the actions of troops to defeat large enemy groupings, provided for in the combat plans of the army headquarters and the apparatus of the chief military adviser in the armed forces of Afghanistan for a month, in large areas, involving significant forces and means, or to solve tasks that must be performed within long time. In addition, in a war without a front line, the enemy created large armed detachments in the most important areas, the decision to destroy which must be taken in a short time in order to quickly disrupt the plans of the rebels.
Thus, unscheduled operations are military operations aimed at the immediate destruction of precisely established enemy units, the actions of which could lead to dangerous consequences. In connection with the increase in the activity of enemy operations, the role of unscheduled operations increased, which required the formations and units capable of solving suddenly arising tasks to be ready.
Experience shows that, according to the special conditions for conducting operations, it is advisable to divide them into operations in mountainous areas, operations in valleys with a green and village zone, and operations in populated areas.
Independent combat operations are typical of the first period of the war, when the Afghan army had not yet been fully formed organizationally, the command and troops had no combat experience, and the personnel had low morale and fighting spirit. At this stage, the troops of the 40th A had to bear the main burden of conducting combat operations, the main efforts were focused on defeating the rebel groups along the main communications, in the most threatened areas that make up the bases of the counterrevolutionary forces.
The increased activity of the armed opposition formations, their better equipment, as well as the completion of the creation of the Afghan army made it possible to switch to joint operations at the second stage of the war.
Evolution of Forms and Methods of Conducting Combat Actions OK SV (1980-1984) Joint military operations were carried out to defeat the largest enemy groupings in the most important areas in order to achieve more significant goals. They were carried out by formations and units of the OK SV, the Afghan army, together with units of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At first, military operations were carried out in a certain area, with the mastery of which the goal of the operations was achieved, then they took on the character of a small military operation.
In connection with political changes in the general strategy of the leadership of the opposition in 1982, changes were made to the tactics of conducting armed struggle. The main efforts of the Afghan opposition were focused on maintaining and expanding the sphere of their territorial control. Active work was carried out to reorganize the armed formations on the basis of the introduction of a clearer organizational structure, close to the army.
The current situation in the country required decisive action to eliminate the anti-government underground and destroy enemy detachments.
The 40th A, in cooperation with the Afghan troops, conducted a number of large-scale planned and unscheduled operations.
The most characteristic operations of the second stage were the Panjers and Kunar.
In 1984, in connection with the decision by the leadership of the opposition not to reduce activity in the winter, it was necessary new approach to conduct joint large-scale operations. The duration of the operation averaged about 10 days. The number of troops attracted from the 40th Army (up to 30 battalions) and the RA Armed Forces (up to 19 battalions) has increased. The geography of hostilities also expanded, their number in the green zone increased, more hostilities were conducted at night. An example of the largest-scale operations can be operations carried out in the winter of 1984 in the province of Paktika (Urgun district), in the summer - in the Panjer and Andarab valleys "
History and course of military operations
Forces and means of military operations
“The composition of forces and means for conducting each operation was determined based on its scale, position, nature of the enemy’s actions and the chosen method of defeating him, as well as terrain features. At the same time, it was taken into account that the partisan nature of the actions of the armed opposition formations in the mountains required the involvement of much more forces and means than to carry out the same task under normal conditions. This led to the participation in a number of operations of four to five or more combined arms formations and a number of units of various branches of the military and special forces of the army "
The nature and goals of military operations
“By the nature of the tasks being solved, the operations were carried out in order to defeat large enemy groupings in areas controlled by him, to protect military and national economic facilities, to ensure the escort of transport convoys, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Operations to defeat large enemy groupings in areas controlled by him were offensive in terms of the type of troop actions, although defensive operations could also be carried out in some areas. In terms of organization and practical implementation, these operations were among the most complex. At the same time, the expenditure of forces and means was not always adequate to the results obtained. Nevertheless, the Soviet command, deprived of the opportunity to effectively influence the military-strategic situation in the country in other ways, was forced to conduct such operations.
The first military operation in Nakhrin County. REBELLION OF THE ARTPOLK
To suppress the anti-government speeches of the 4th artillery regiment of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan, the 2nd MSB of the 186th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment, reinforced by a tank company, the artillery division of the regiment, the 2nd MSR of the 1st MSB with a tank platoon and a mortar battery of the battalion were used.
January 9, 1980 at 9.00 (local time) the battalion passed the starting point elev. 525.0 and began to advance along the route: Kunduz airfield, Ishakun, Ishkashim, Burka, Nakhrin. The 2nd MSR started moving at 11.00 on January 9, 1980 (two hours later) along the route: Baghlan, per. Shehjamal, Nahrin.
The head marching outpost of the 2nd MSB, having passed 4 km after the starting point, was fired upon by a group of horsemen numbering 100 people. The attack helicopters accompanying the convoy dispersed the rebels. However, the matter did not end there. GPZ of the 2nd SME by 10.30 a.m. The village of Ishakchi met with resistance from a group of rebels numbering up to 150 people. (with three guns), whose firing positions were located on the southern outskirts of Ishakchi. With organized fire from the GPZ, a tank platoon and with the support of helicopters, the rebels retreated into the mountains and suffered losses of up to 50 people. killed. All three weapons of the rebels were destroyed.
- By 11.30 the 2nd MSR reached the Shehjamal pass, where they met a blockage covered by a group of rebels with two mountain guns. Having destroyed up to 15 soldiers and both guns, the company, having cleared the blockage, continued to advance.
- By 15.00 on January 9, 1980, the GPZ of the 2nd MSB again met a group of riders numbering up to 50 people on the northern outskirts of Burk. The company turned around and, together with the Afghan infantry company, attacked the rebels and by 1600 reached the southern outskirts of Burk. At 1700 hours, the 2nd motorized brigade reached the Tovamakh pass (3 km north of Nakhrin), where it ran into a blockage. It was not possible to pass the pass on the move. Only after clearing the blockage did the battalion continue its advance.
- By this time, the 2nd MSR had entered the Avsari area. Encountering no resistance, the 2nd MRB from the north, the 2nd MSR from the west reached the city of Nakhrin by 21.00 and blocked the roads from the city, surrounding the military camp of the 4th AP of the Afghan army. during the night, the units were in readiness in case of reflection of the organized rebellion of the 4th Ap.
- From 10:00 am on 10:10 am, the artillery deployed in firing positions in readiness to open fire on the Afghan military camp. Under the cover of fire from combat helicopters, Soviet units, on BMPs, quickly advanced to the barracks of the 4th ap, dismounted and disarmed the garrison.
The losses of the 4th artillery regiment were: killed - up to 100 people, 7 guns and 5 cars were destroyed. Losses of the Soviet troops: killed - 2 people, wounded - 2 people, one BMP fell into a cliff on the pass. Trophies: 76-mm guns - 15 pieces, ammunition for 76-mm guns - 500 boxes, for 122-mm howitzers - 75 boxes, for 82-mm mortars - 60 boxes, cars - 20, armored personnel carriers - 2, 57-mm guns - 3 pcs.
The suppression of the rebellion in the city of Nakhrin in the province of Baghlan was the first organized battle of the 40th army in almost a ten-year Afghan war (1979-1989).
Types and scale of military operations
“To solve large-scale tasks of armed struggle, the command of the 40th Army prepared and carried out combined arms operations. According to the nationality of the troops involved, they were divided into independent and joint, and according to the number of forces and means - into army and private "
Independent (private) military operations
“At the same time, small-scale private operations often took place during the war. For their implementation, by decision of the army command, a part of the forces of one or more combined arms formations, reinforced by units and subunits of the military branches and special troops of army subordination, was involved. In addition, aviation was widely used in operations of all sizes. Its quantity was determined depending on the areas where enemy objects were located, the state of its air defense, the time of year and day.
Independent Operations were especially common in the second period of the war. They were carried out exclusively by the troops of the 40th Army according to the plans and under the guidance of its command. In total, during the stay of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, about 220 independent operations were carried out.
Joint military operations
“To solve large-scale tasks of armed struggle, the command of the 40th Army prepared and carried out combined arms operations. According to the nationality of the troops involved, they were divided into independent and joint, and according to the number of forces and means - into army and private.
joint operations widely practiced in the third and fourth periods of the war. They were carried out according to plans developed by the Soviet command, but with the participation of not only Soviet, but also Afghan government troops. In total, more than 400 such operations were carried out during the war in Afghanistan.
According to the nature of the military-political tasks being solved and the peculiarities of the armed struggle, the military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four periods.
Periods of military operations
First period
“By the nature of the military-political tasks being solved and the peculiarities of the armed struggle, the combat operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four periods. The first period (December 1979 - February 1980) included the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, its placement in garrisons, the organization of protection and defense of permanent deployment points and the most important military and economic facilities, as well as the conduct of military operations to ensure solutions to these problems.
The first period (December 1979 - February 1980) included the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, its placement in garrisons, the organization of protection and defense of permanent deployment points and the most important military and economic facilities, as well as the conduct of military operations to ensure solving these problems ... The winter of 1980 was difficult for Soviet soldiers. Hopes that the main tasks of the armed struggle against the opposition will be solved by the Afghan army have not justified themselves. Despite a number of measures to increase its combat readiness, the government army remained weak and incapacitated. Therefore, the Soviet troops bore the brunt of the fight against the armed opposition detachments. The rebel formations acted against the Soviet troops with relatively large forces and did not avoid direct confrontation with them. This made it possible to defeat large counter-revolutionary groups in the areas of Fayzabad, Talikan, Takhar, Baghlan, Jalalabad and other cities.
Second period
“The second period of the stay of the OKSV in Afghanistan (March 1980 - April 1985) is characterized by the introduction of active large-scale hostilities, mainly on its own, as well as together with Afghan formations and units ... .. The opposition, having suffered a number of major military defeats in the first period war, moved the main groupings of its troops to hard-to-reach mountainous areas, where to use modern technology it became almost impossible .... In addition, they skillfully began to hide among the local population. The rebels skillfully used various tactics. So, when meeting with superior forces of the Soviet troops, they, as a rule, evaded the battle.
The rebels skillfully used various tactics. So, when meeting with superior forces of the Soviet troops, they, as a rule, evaded the battle. at the same time, the dushmans did not miss the opportunity to deliver a sudden blow, mainly using small forces. In fact, during this period, the detachments of the armed opposition abandoned the positional struggle and maneuver actions were widely used. And only in those cases when the situation forced them, battles were fought. This happened when defending bases and base areas, or when the rebels were blocked and they had no choice but to take the fight. In this case, the blocked detachments acted in close combat, which practically excluded the use of aviation and sharply narrowed the possibilities for using artillery, especially from closed firing positions.
Third period
“During the third period of their stay in Afghanistan (April 1985 - January 1986), the troops of the 40th Army acted, having the most numerous composition. The grouping of their ground troops included four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments and six separate battalions. These forces included about 29 thousand units of military equipment, of which up to 6 thousand tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles. To ensure the actions of troops from the air, the commander had four aviation and three helicopter regiments at his disposal. The total number of OKSV personnel reached 108.8 thousand people, including 73 thousand in combat units. It was the most combat-ready group for the entire period of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, but views on their use have changed significantly.
The fourth period
“The beginning of the fourth period was laid in December 1986 by the Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, which proclaimed a course towards national reconciliation. By this time, it became clear to sensible people that there was no military solution to the Afghan problem. The adoption of the course of "national reconciliation" reflected the real situation in the country, when it was impossible to achieve an end to the war by military means. However, the implementation of the policy of reconciliation became possible only after the implementation, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, of a whole range of preliminary measures that created the necessary ground for this. The main and decisive step was the decision of the USSR government, agreed with the Afghan leadership, to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, subject to the cessation of armed assistance to the Afghan rebels from Pakistan and other countries.
Combat activities of the Afghan Mujahideen
“The main force of the rebels were regional groups and detachments. Their goals, organizational forms and tactics of warfare were determined by local tribal and religious authorities - "field commanders", and the zone of action was limited to the areas of residence of the Mujahideen. These formations, as a rule, did not have a permanent composition and organization. In case of danger, dushmans were dissolved among the local residents, which made their identification almost impossible. The composition of detachments and groups in socio-ethnic terms was heterogeneous. such formations included residents of the same national-ethnic group. In most cases, their commanders did not have constant contact with foreign organizations of the Afghan counterrevolution, but the main advantage was the active support of the local population.
“In the course of the armed struggle, the opposition forces used various methods of military operations, the main of which were ambushes, raids, shelling. Mining, sabotage and terrorist activities and hostilities associated with the escort of caravans were also widely practiced. Ambush actions were carried out with the aim of disrupting the supply of national economic and military goods, seizing materiel, weapons, ammunition, as well as the physical destruction of military personnel. Cases of their device were especially frequent.
Ambushes and raids
“The ambush was most often carried out by a small group of 10-15 people. Her battle order consisted of observers and three or four subgroups. The observers created observation posts in the mountains or advanced to the probable routes of movement of enemy columns. In the latter case, they did not have weapons and pretended to be civilians (shepherds, peasants). There have been cases of using children as observers”
“The basis of the ambush was the fire subgroup, which included the main forces and fire weapons of the dushmans. It, as a rule, was located in the center of the battle formation in the immediate vicinity of the enemy's area of destruction and was carefully camouflaged. The rebels were usually placed along the road at a distance of 150 to 300 m from the canvas. On the flanks were grenade launchers, machine gunners, snipers. At the dominant heights, DShKs were installed, adapted to fire at ground and air targets.
“So, in just three years (from 1985 to 1987), more than 10 thousand ambushes were recorded. Ambushes, as a rule, were arranged on roads passing through passes, gorges and other narrowness. In the mountains, positions for ambush were arranged on slopes or ridges of heights, the entrance or exit from the gorge, on the pass sections of the roads, "green zones" they were organized in places where the government and Soviet troops were likely to rest or in the directions of their expected actions. a place for ambushes, which were set up at several lines as the troops advanced both in columns and in battle formations.
Territorial zones of military operations
Excerpts from the book by Valentin Runov “The Afghan War. All military operations:
“By the nature of the tasks being solved, the operations were carried out in order to defeat large enemy groupings in areas controlled by him, to protect military and national economic facilities, to ensure the escort of transport convoys, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan”
“The actions of formations and units in areas of responsibility were frequent. This method was used in cases where the enemy grouping was located over a large area in relatively small detachments occupying settlements, gorges, mountains, which did not allow its encirclement. Then the entire area was divided into zones, in each of which a division or regiment operated independently. Aviation at that time, according to the plan of the commander, provided support to those troops that most needed it, and also blocked the entire area of operation "
“The entire combat zone on the territory of Afghanistan was conditionally divided into four regions, which were controlled by army aviation units and partly by troops:
- In the north of the country, these are the districts of the cities: Kunduz, Khanabad, Fayzabad, Puli-Khumri, Tashkurgan, Mazar-i-Sharif
- East: Khost, Asabad, Jalalabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Kabul, Bagram
- In the south: Munarai, eastern and southern border zone with Pakistan, Kandahar, Lashkargah
- In the west - areas: Faraha, Shindanda and Herat "
Northern territorial zone of military operations
Provinces, counties, suburbs of cities and towns provinces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan - the zone of the most active confrontation between the armed Afghan opposition (Afghan Mujahideen) and the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in the period (1979-1989)
"Northern Territorial Zone"- includes provinces: Balkh, Samangan, Sari-Pul, Faryab, Jowzjan
- Balkh: Alburz, Kaflandara, Chashmayi-Shafa, Marmol, Dzhangali, Alakjar, Bagi-Pakhlavan, Kuland, Kurbaka Khan, Baluchi, Sari-Asia, Khoja-Iskander, Tajikoilton, Agarsai (Agirsai), Tashkanda, Alagan, Dakhnayi-Karnay , Sari-Mang, Paykamdara, Tangimarmol, Kishinda-Payin, Toragay, Julga, Akkupruk, Bogosht, Chashmayi-Soval, Bauragay, Baigizi, Balanddarik, Tukzar, Langari-Shah-Abdulla, Nawabad, Sokhtayi-Sufla, Bayramshah, Shorcha, Mui - Mutorak and others.
- Samangan: Tashkurgan, Aibak, Naibabad, Akmazar, Lorgan, Daulatabad (Davlatabad), Pirnakhchir, Dekhi-Nau, Darai-Suf, Kuli-Ishan, Rabok, Daulati-Koh(Kuh), Khodjaprayshan, Sayad, Chakmakli, Kokdzhar, Hasanheil, Kokhnasamangan-Kalan, Juyi-Zindan, Mangtash, Zorget, Chogay, Sheikhala, Kochnehal, Kokdzhar, Delkhaki, etc.
- Faryab, Jauzdzhan: Andkhoy, Zarshoy, Karamkul, Charmgarkhana, Belchirag, Katakala, Babavali, Kaisar, Darband, Darzab (Derzab), Mugul, Sardar, Belarsai, Tirgali, Pirgarib, Almar, Dzhigilda, Khoja Pogakli, Baragani-Kalan, Khojadokoh ( Khojadokukh), Akcha, Khaval, Pasnay, Khanedan, Ganjia, Jargan, Dekhi-Surkh, Bedistan, etc.
"Northern territorial zone" - the territories of the so-called lands: "Afghan Turkestan" and "Khazarjat". The peoples inhabiting this territory have historical, cultural, and family ties with the peoples of the former Soviet Central Asian Republics. Populated by: Tajiks (majority); Uzbeks (tribes: Kattagans, Sarays, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais, Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kangly, Chagatai, etc.); Hazaras - (in equal shares); Pashtuns (at different times settled by Afghan rulers - tribes: shinvari, safi, mangal, salarzai, jaji, chitrali, turi, afridi, etc.); Turkmens (tribes: Ersars (and), Ali-Eli, Saryk, Salors, Tekins); also Kazakhs; Arabs, etc.
North-Eastern Territorial Zone of Military Operations
"North-Eastern Territorial Zone" includes provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhshan
- Kunduz: Kunduz, Chahardara (Chardara), Madras, Aliabad, Khanabad, Mulla-Ghulyam, Bala-Hisar, Imam-Sahib, Dasht-i-Archi, Asiabad, Kalai-i-Zal, Alchin, Zaheil, Isaheil, Kataheil, Aliheil , Chugayi-Sufla, Umarkheil, Mullaheil, Mahajirin (Makhidzhirin), Ibrahimheil, Chinzai, Musazai, Kulabi, Dzhangalbash, Murshek, Chimtana, Arab, Arabha, Khushka-Dara, Dara-e-Bachi, Dam-e-Yankala, Basiz, Kubak, Derzan, Tundai-Kalai, Kyzyltash, Munkhesh, Shinkamysh, Begalak, Dzhunguli, Khojapista, Garuchy, Chaharsavi, Abaka, Shah-Ali, etc.
- Baghlan: Nakhrin, Banu, Chaugani, Logaryan, Fuloli, Shafiheil, Lakanheil, Taraheil, Burka, Seyid, Khost-O-Fereng, Shamark, Andarab, Malkhan, Doshi, Khinjan, Buzdara, Tilkhana, Dakhana-Gori, Lagay, Baghlan- i-Jadid and others.
- Takhar (aka Tahor): Talukan (Talikan, Tulukan, Talekan), Bangi, Chah Ab (Chakhi Ab), Varsaj, Dargad, Khazar Sumuch, Chal, Majir, Mugul, Ishkamysh, Farkhar, Nakhrin, Mirheil, Shastdara, Yafsaj, Jarav, Dehmiran, Yangi Kala, Kalafgan, Darra-Kalan, Khojagar, Khavadshah Bahaudin (Khoja Bahautdin), Balajari, Lashi-Jawaii, Chinzai, Ishanan, Shafak, Gaoharsang, Zardalu-Darayi-Paine, etc.
- Badakhshan: Faizabad, Kishim, Baharak, Shaesta, Yavarzan, Balajara, Ishkashim, Kufab, Saigan, Zardev, Varzhdud, Gulkhana, Artynzhylau, Rustak, Pasha-Dara, Busht, Dakhan-Spingav, Mangu, Gavaki, Dekhi-Basi, Gorji, Suskan, Uzunkul, Tashnap, Gurisang, Vojib, Porani, Karamugul (Karamugol), Guzyk-Dara, Bagi-Shah, etc.
"North-Eastern territorial zone", historically - the lands of "Kattagan and Badakhshan". Inhabited by: Tajiks (evenly distributed); Pashtuns - mainly in the provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan (tribes - Ghilzai, Shinvari, Safi, Mangal, Salarzai, Jaji, Chitrali, Turi, Afridi, etc.); Uzbeks - mainly in the provinces: Takhar, Kunduz (tribes: Kattagans, Sarays, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais, Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kangly, Chagatai, etc.); the Hazaras - in the province of Kunduz, Baghlan; also the Arabs; pashai; Kazakhs in the provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan. Badakhshan provinces live: Tajik Ismailis; various Pamir peoples: Rushans (Rykhen, Rukhni), Ishkashims (Ishkoshumi, Ishkoshims), Vakhans (Vakhs, Khiks), Sangli, Zebak, Munjan, Shughni (Khugni), Darvaz, etc.; the highlands of the extreme northeast of Afghanistan in the area (Wakhan corridor) of the same province live Afghan Kyrgyz.
In the period from the beginning of 1918 to the beginning of the 1940s, the counties of the provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, Faryab, Badgis were an outpost and a transshipment base for thousands of armed formations of the Basmachi and their leaders "Kurbashi" - Ibrahim-Bek, Madamin-Bek, Muetdin-bek, Mahmud-bek, Junaid-khan, Utan-bek, Kurshirmat, Abdul Ahad Kary, Katta Ergash, Kichik Ergash, Seyid-Mubashir-Khan Tirazi, Enver Pasha, Jafar-Khan, D. Sardar, Nurmamad, Kizil -Ayaka and others. During the many years of armed confrontation, the Basmachi detachments were either destroyed or squeezed out by the detachments of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army outside the borders of "Red Turkestan" to adjacent territories - to the Emirate of Afghanistan. A significant part of the survivors - active, irreconcilable members of the Basmachi movement settled in the counties of the northeastern provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan and integrated into Afghan society. In the early 1990s, strongholds and transshipment bases of the “irreconcilable Tajik opposition” were located on this territory.
Western territorial zone of military operations
"Western Territorial Zone" includes the provinces: Herat, Badghis, Ghor, Farah - (it also includes: northwestern, southwestern - parts of Afghanistan)
- Herat: Herat, Shindand, Sharshari, Karvangah, Siyah-Kort, Zinjan, Cherdobag, Sangi-Siyah, Amrud, Dargara, Karyani, Bartakht, Khushnak, Karezi-Ilyas, Islamkala, Adraskan, Rabati-Mirza, Karyayi-Gukhar, Kafasan, Khoja-Galten, Tangitanchi, Toragundi (Turagundi), Karakishyan, Takhti-Safar, Shevan, Karukh and others.
- Badgis: Kalayi-Nau and others.
- Gor (aka Gur): Surkhakan, Chagcharan, Pasaband, etc.
- Farah: Anardara, Bidikash, Lurkoh, Farahrud, Kokhi-Yakadara, Suji (Sudjik), Khaki-Safed, Tarnakrud, Khuji, Kale-Amoni, etc.
"Western territorial zone", historically - the lands of the Persian "Khorasan", the territory earlier, for the most part, was part of the Persian Empire. It is inhabited mainly by Tajiks (some of whom are Shiites), there are also: Farsivans (Persians), Charaimaks, Pashtuns (tribes: Nurzai, Achakzai, Isakzai, etc.); qizilbash; afshars; Turkmens (tribes: Ersars (and), Ali-Eli, Saryka, Salors, Tekins); Uzbeks (tribes: Kattagans, Sarays, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais, Durmens, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kangly, Chagatai, etc.); Hazaras; talish; Kurds; firuzkuhi; teimuri; taimon; jamshids, etc. The population of this region has ancient historical and cultural ties with neighboring Iran. For many years, the Iranian government has provided political and financial support to the region.
Central territorial zone of military operations
"Central territorial zone" includes provinces: Kabul, Wardak
- Kabul, Wardak: Kabul, Kattaheil, Jun-Zindan, Kala Atamukhamed-Khan, Paghman, Surubi, Mirbachakot, Maidanshahr, Shamali, Shakardara, Karabagh, Mukur, Yakdara, Istalif, Guldar, Sarpul (Surpul), Hosseinkot, Kofi-Safi, Kuz-Myaheil, Khairad-khana, Dehsabab (Dehsaba), Husseinheil, Mizan, Vakh, Vaka, Sheikhabad, Saidabad, Mahalla, Karezi-Mir, Dehi-Kazi, Dekhi-Sabz, Luku, Chakhorasiab, Cha-Khordegi, etc.
The “central territorial zone” is inhabited by: Tajiks (majority), Pashtuns of the Ghilzai and Karlani tribal unions, Hazaras, Kyzylbash, Indians, etc. The environs of Kabul and the province of Wardak are also inhabited by Pashtun tribes: Dotani, Mullakheil, Babrakheil, etc.
"Central territorial zone, including the Panjshir Gorge" includes the provinces: Bamyan, Parvan, Panjshir, Kapisa (places of compact residence of Panjshir Tajiks Panjshirs - Afg. Panjeri) and Hazaras (Khazars) - Bamiyan, the historical and cultural capital of the Khazars, the so-called "Khazarjat".
- Bamiyan: Sokhdara, Bamiyan, Qalayin-Talib, Lalaheil, Sheray, Taibuti, Qalayi-Mulla, Dekhi-Khazar, Duabi, Munara, Hawal, Selkash, Chahardeh, Munari, Shashpul, Akhangaran and others, inhabited by Hazaras (Afg. Hazara) .
- Parvan; Jabal-Us-Saraj, Charikar, Bagram, Durmala, Shinaraheil, Karabakh, Katali, Ayeli-Kazi, Dilak, Dani-Rivat, Kalatan (Kalatak), Astana, Gyakhheil, Sangsulak, Khidzhani-Belandi, Ferenzhal, Kishi-Charikar, Dekhinau , Naddeh, etc., inhabited by: Tajiks, Hazaras, Pashtuns (tribes: Shinwari, Ahmadzai, Momand).
- Panjshir: Gorband, Rukh, Bazarak, Khazar, Shutul, Pishgor, Pasi-Shakhi-Mardan, Anava, Mahmudrak, Gulbahar (Gulbahor), Dekhi-Khazar, Kijol, Pini, Pyavusht, Taveh (administrative and spiritual center of the Hazaras and others inhabited by Panjshir Tajiks (Afg. "panjsheri"), partly Hazaras.
- Kapisa: Nijrab, Shatori, Tagat, Hasankhanheyl, Hisarab, etc., inhabited by: Tajiks, Sunni Hazaras, Pashtuns, etc.
Eastern territorial zone of military operations
"Eastern Territorial Zone" includes provinces - Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman
- Nangarhar: Hisar, Parachinar, Khyber, Narai, Marulgad, Saidoni-Fuvladi, Shibokan, Aukaf, Birinjau, Mamaheil, Bandu, Hada, Ada, Charbag, Huvaizi, Shakidan and others, inhabited by Pashtun tribes: Mohmand, Khugyani, Orakzai, Masud , Vaziri, Zaimukhti, Bajauri, Diri, Swat, Bunerami, Shinvari, Afridi, etc.
- Kunar: Asadabad, Asmar, Ganjgal, Sangam, Daridam, Pajigal, Maravara, Birkot, Khara, Votapur, Perone, Shamirkot, Cognac, Shawl, Gola, Bar-Narang, Sarkani, Damdara, Shpelai, Bargundai, Loya-Bacha, Dalikandao, Mukur, Bar-Mangish, Alatrol, Zangboshahuna, Vutolanta-Gai, Tangai, Shahid, Mangval, Sarband, Shaunkrai, Shigal, Binshaikandao, Lobkam, Kacha, Nava, Spinatsuka, Baruga, Janshagal, etc.
- Lagman: Alishang, Mehterlam, Surkhrud, Rodbor, Birkot, Khairohel, Sangi-Daulatkhan, Shahidan, Shakhi, Shukundurbab and others.
The “Eastern Territorial Zone” is inhabited by the tribes of the Pashtun union of Karlani (Karrani), the largest of which is the Safi tribe (Gandari clan), also by tribes: Momand, Gigiani, Shinvari, Khugyani, Tarclani, Myshvani, Sarkani, Safi, Vaziri, etc .; various Nuristani peoples. This territory has always been a zone of absolute influence of the Pashtun tribes - historically using their geographical position for military and economic purposes from the time of "Western India" and the Anglo-Afghan wars to the present day.
Southeastern territorial zone of military operations
"South-Eastern Territorial Zone" includes provinces: Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Zabul
- Ghazni: Kunsaf, Kulidzhana, Aukaf, Birinzhau, Bandu, Mamkheil, Sheikhabad, Duranay, Drusarugar, Abdara, Durinai, Vulusvali, Safedsanga, etc.
- Logar: Baraki-Barak, Dubandai, Dehi-Manaka, Vagjal, Chaunay, Vali-Sufla, Nave-Kala, Charkh, Mazgin, Aushar, Abchakan, Tandan, Dobari, Kalabahadur, Gardezkheylutir, Bedak, Surkhob (Surhab), Sepest, Naikaray , Altamur, Mulla-Bahadur, Shikarkaladak, Mukhameddaga, Kalatajkhan, Mamaheil, Puli-Alam and others.
- Paktia: Gardez, Mukhammedaga, Chamkani, Shaboheil, Aliheil, Daj, Sufla, Urgun, Kvash, Nazarjay, Gurbaz, Barankalai, Safidsang, Padhabi-Shana, Shasti-Saidabad, Puli-Kandahari, etc.
- Paktika and Khost: Vazakhway and others.
- Zabul (aka Zabol): Kalat, Jilavur, Loy Manar, Shukurkalai, Apushello, Shekude, Duri, etc.
The "South-Eastern Territorial Zone" is inhabited by Pashtuns of two large tribal unions: The first - "Gilzai" includes: Suleimanheil, Haroti, Khatoki, Tokhi, Nasyr, etc. The second - "Karrani" (Karlani), includes: Jadran, Jadzhi, Tani, Vaziri, etc. The Pashtun tribes inhabiting the provinces: Paktika, Paktia, Khost, Zabul include the tribal union "Karlani" (Karlanri, Karrani), consisting of tribes - Jadzhi, Jadran, Mangal, Makbil, Chamkani, Vaziri, Gurbuzi , Mandozai, Sabri, Tani, Turi, Orakzai, Shinwari, Hugyani and others. Tribes: Orakzai, Shinwari, Hugyani, also belonging to the Karlani union, live mainly in the "Eastern Territorial Zone" in the province of Nangarhar and Kunar. The territory of Kalat-i Ghilzai, the Ghazni-Kandahar Plateau are the place of the traditional settlement of the “Pashtun-Ghilzais” of the tribal “Hotaki clan”, the territories to the north are inhabited by the tribes of the “Pashtun-Ghilzais”: Tokhi, Kharoti (Haruti), Taraki, Andari, Suleimanheil, Ahmadzai and In other provinces of Ghazni and Logar there are settlements of Pashtun tribes: Dotani, Mullakheil, Babrakheil, etc. Ormuri and Parachi also live, and in other provinces of Ghazni and Paktia, many Uzbeks live (tribes: Kattagans, Sarays, Keneges, Kuramins, Mangits, Kungrads, Lokais , Datura, Mings, Yuzes, Barlases, Karluks, Sunaks, Kipchaks, Naimans, Kanglys, Chagatai, etc.).
This territory, as well as the "Eastern Territorial Zone" has always been a zone of absolute influence of the mountain Pashtun tribes - historically using their geographical position for military and economic purposes from the time of "Western India" and the Anglo-Afghan wars to this day.
Southern territorial zone of military operations
"Southern Territorial Zone" includes the provinces: Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan - (it also includes the southwestern part of Afghanistan)
- Kandahar: Kandahar, Nagahan, Sinjaray, Santaray, Shinarai, Torshikot, Mahajiri, Spinehun-Tana, Payi Mulu, Islamdara, Khusravi-Sufla, Gundshan, Kishkinahud, Nagahan, Mahajiri, Spinehun-Tana, Spinbuldak, Spinahula, Anizani, Anizamal, Arghandab , Haji-Razmukhammed, Pasab, Palmukhamed, Zakiri-Sharif, Kara, Gulyamuddinkhan and others.
- Nimroz: Dilaram, Bagar, Karyati-Chara, Kotalak, Chakhansur, Khushkhadir, etc.
- Helmand (aka Helmand): Girishk, Lashkargah, Kajaki-Sufla, Shinkarai, Nikazi, Sangin, Musa-Kala, etc.
The "southern territorial zone" is inhabited by Pashtuns of two large tribal unions, one of which is: "Durrani" or (Abdali). It consists of two branches - "Zirak", tribes: Popalzai, Sadozai, Alikozai, Barakzai, Muhammadzai, Achakzai; and also - the branch "Panjpay": Nurzai, Alizai, Iskhakzai, it includes: Mohamedzai, Yuzufzai, Nurzai and others .... The second major tribal union is Gilzai. It consists of branches - "Turan", it includes tribes: Hotaki, Tokhi (Toki), Haroti (Haruti), Nasir (Nasyr); ... .. And "Burkhan", it consists of tribes: Ibrahimkheil, Suleimanheil, Aliheil, Sahak, Andarkheil, Nasar, Tarakheil and others; also a branch of "Musa", consists of tribes: Ahmadzai, Andar, Taraki, Sahak, etc. The south of Afghanistan is also inhabited by Balochs, Braguis, Kyzylbashs, Tajiks, Afshars, Hazaras, etc. This territory has always been a zone of absolute influence of the Pashtun tribes Durrani and Ghilzai - historically using their geographical position for military and economic purposes from the time of "Western India" to the present.
Notable military operations- "Mountains-80", "Spring-80", "Autumn-80", "Strike-1,2", "Volley", "Maneuver", "Trap", Operation "Highway", "Granite", "Thunderstorm "(in the province of Ghazni), "Jawara", "South" (Kandahar), "Typhoon", etc.
Memoirs of General of the Army Varennikov V.I. about the conducted military operations :
During my stay in Afghanistan, a number of interesting and complex operations were carried out. Of course, the operation of the operation is different. Some left no memories. Others will never fade. I especially remember the operations in the Kunar Gorge, during the assault on the Javara base, on the Parachinar ledge, in the Kunduz region, west of Herat to the Kokari-Sharshari base on the Iranian border in the Lurkokh mountain range, in the Lashkargah region, in the province of Kandahar and immediately beyond Kandahar .
From the memoirs of General of the Army Varennikov V.I.
The result of "major combined arms operations" was the defeat of numerous well-organized formations of the Afghan Mujahideen throughout Afghanistan, the capture of important strongholds (fortifications) and transshipment bases, with a wide arsenal of weapons, ammunition and intelligence documentation.
Areas of responsibility and deployment of OKSVA units and formations
Government tasks to protect the southern borders of the USSR and provide international assistance to the Republic of Afghanistan by a limited contingent of Soviet troops were carried out to a greater extent by the forces and means of the units and formations indicated below:
- DIVISIONS: three "motorized rifle", one "airborne"
- SEPARATE BRIGADS: two separate motorized rifle, one airborne assault, (since 1985) two special-purpose GRU General Staff, material support
- SEPARATE REGIMENTS: two motorized rifle, one parachute, one engineering and sapper, one rocket artillery
- POLKOV and SQUADRILES of Air Force units OKSVA and KSAPO
The deployment of formations on the territory of the DRA assigned to each area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility, taking into account the peculiarities (section) of the terrain, the concentration of military tension, and the political and military tasks that stand.
“In connection with the transition of the rebels to the constant tactics of sabotage, terror, shelling of troops, the capture of outposts of the formation and part of the 40th A, they were forced to defend the most important communications linking Afghanistan with the territory of the USSR: Termez-Kabul-Jalalabad; Kushka-Herat-Kandahar; Mazar-i-Sharif-Kunduz-Fayzabad with a total length of more than 2 thousand km. The purpose of the defense of communications was to defeat the rebel groups along the road, disrupt their sabotage, and ensure the unhindered movement of Soviet and Afghan columns. The defense was carried out by divisions, regiments, battalions and companies. The area of responsibility in the defense was along the front: 108 MSD - 420 km; 5 MSD - 640 km; 201 MSD - 400 km. The battalions defended the area for an average of 30-40 km. So, the front of defense of the 177th SME of the 108th MSD in the especially dangerous section of the Salang Pass was up to 120 km. In total, the defense of communications and regime zones was carried out by about 1000 outposts, set up by formations, units and subunits of the 40th Army.
103rd Vitebsk Guards. VDD
The capital of Afghanistan - the city of Kabul, the airport, the airfield, and other strategic facilities of the capital were assigned to the 103rd Guards Vitebsk Airborne Division (Guards Airborne Division: 317th, 350th, 357th; 1179th Guards Artillery - airborne regiments and other parts of the division).
In various periods from 1979-1989, the forces and means of the 2nd and 3rd (PDB) paratrooper battalions of the units of the 103rd Guards. The Airborne Forces were deployed at a distance from the main forces of the PPD - in the Afghan provinces:
- Panjshir (Anava) - 2nd PDB 345th OPDP
- Bamiyan 2nd RDB - 345th RAP, 357th RAP
- Kandahar 3rd RDB 317th RAP from 03.1980-03.1981, later transferred to Dilaram, then to Lashkargah
- From Lashkargah, Helmand province, the 3rd airborne infantry regiment, the 317th airborne infantry regiment, from 03.1985, was relocated to Shahjoy, Zabul province
- In Helmand (Girishk), the 3rd RDB of the 350th RAP was also stationed
The management of these PDBs during large-scale planned combined-arms operations in the provinces of Farah, Helmand, Kandahar was carried out under the general control of the commanders of the formations of the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade and close interaction of troops.
Parts of the 103rd Guards. Airborne Forces (Kabul) participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from the points of permanent deployment in the provinces: Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, etc. in divisional and private military operations and raids, in implementation of intelligence data and ambush actions in the immediate area of responsibility (Kabul, Parvan, Panjshir, Kapisa, etc.).
108th Nevelskaya MSD
108th Nevelsk motorized rifle division - the largest formation of OKSVA: motorized rifle (SME):
- 177th (Jabal Ussaraj);
- 180th (Kabul) - reserve of the 40th army; 181st (Kabul);
- 682nd (Rukh, formed on the basis of the 285th tank regiment);
- 1074th artillery - regiments,
- The 781st separate reconnaissance battalion and other parts of the division, was responsible for the situation: around Kabul, Bagram, in the area of "South Salang", "Panjshir Gorge", on the routes: "Jabal Us-Saraj - Kabul", "Kabul - Jalalabad" ( Provinces: Parwan, Kapisa, Wardak
Parts of the 108th MSD (Bagram) participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from the points of permanent deployment, provinces: Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan etc., in divisional and private combat operations and raids, in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush operations in the immediate area of responsibility, provinces: Kabul, Wardak, Parvan, Panjshir, Kapisa, etc.
5th Zimovnikovskaya guards. MSD
5th Guards Zimovnikovskaya Motor Rifle Division:
- 101st (Herat),
- 371st (Shindand) - Guards
- 12th (Herat) motorized rifle
- 1060th Artillery (Shindand) - regiments
- The 650th separate reconnaissance battalion and other parts of the division provided control over the military situation in the west of Afghanistan, the border with Iran (provinces: Badghis, Herat, Farah, Helmand), including on the route: "Kushka - Herat - Shindand - Kandahar"
Parts of the 5th Guards. MSD (Shindand) participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from the points of permanent deployment, provinces: Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, in divisional and private combat operations and raids, in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush actions in the immediate area of responsibility, provinces: Herat, Badghis.
201st Gatchina MSD
201st Gatchina motorized rifle division:
- 122nd (Tashkurgan, Samangan province)
- 395th (Puli-Khumri, Baghlan Province)
- 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment (Kunduz
- 998th Artillery (Kunduz) - regiments
- 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion and other parts of the division)
The division was traditionally responsible for the north-east of Afghanistan (provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan, Balkh, Samangan, Takhar), including for the routes: "Hairaton - Salang Pass", "Kunduz - Talukan - Faizabad". provinces: Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar, Samangan, Balkh; settlements: Aybak, Banu, Doshi, Baghlan, Khanabad, Talukan, Bangi, Aliabad and others, units of the 201st MSD units were deployed, serving in guards and outposts.
Parts of the 201st MSD (Kunduz) participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from the points of permanent deployment, provinces: Kunar, Paktia, Herat, Kandahar, Panjshir, Parvan, etc., in divisional and private military operations and raids , in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush operations in the immediate area of responsibility, the provinces: Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, Badakhshan, Samangan, Balkh.
Separate brigades as part of OKSVA
INDIVIDUAL BRIGADS. In the east, south and southeast of the Republic of Afghanistan, along the long border with Pakistan, combat missions were carried out by: 66th separate motorized rifle brigade (formed on the basis of the 186th motorized rifle regiment) area of responsibility of the province: Lagman, Nangarhar, Kunar; 70th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (formed on the basis of the (373rd Motorized Rifle Regiment), area of responsibility of the province: Helmand, Nimruz, Uruzgan, Kandahar; 56th Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (formed before the entry of troops into the DRA on the basis of 351 1st Airborne Regiment), the area of responsibility of the province: Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, their outposts were dispersed along the strategic highways "Jalalabad - Kabul", "Girishk - Kandahar", "Baraki-Barak - Gardez", respectively.
"Separate brigades" participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from the points of permanent deployment, provinces: Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kandahar, Panjshir, Kapisa, Parvan, Baghlan, Kunduz , Takhar, Badakhshan, etc., in private combat operations and raids, in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush actions in the immediate area of responsibility.
Separate regiments as part of OKSVA
SEPARATE REGIMENTS - two "motorized rifle", "airborne parachute", "engineer-sapper": 860th OMSP, 191st OMSP, 345 OPDP, 45th OESP were deployed in the provinces: Badakhshan, Ghazni and Parvan.
"Individual regiments" participated in large-scale (army) planned combined arms operations at a considerable distance from the points of permanent deployment, provinces: Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kandahar, Panjshir, Kapisa, Wardak, Parvan, Baghlan , Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan and others, in private military operations and raids, in the implementation of intelligence data and ambush actions in the immediate area of responsibility.
GRU Spetsnaz Brigades
TROOPS SPN GRU. In the spring of 1985, as part of the “Veil” plan developed in the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense, to the “separate motorized rifle battalions” (OMSB) previously operating in Afghanistan, in fact, the special purpose GRU GSh: 154th (1st OMSB Jalalabad); 177th (2nd MSB Ghazni-Pajak); The 173rd (3rd Motorized Rifle Brigade Kandahar) - detachments (battalions) of the Special Forces and the 459th separate company of the Special Forces (Kabul) were additionally introduced six more: ); 668th (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade Baraki-Barak, Sufla) - included in the 15th ObrSpN, parts of which were stationed in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan: Nangarhar, Ghazni, Kunar, Logar - respectively.
Separate detachments of the Special Forces of the GRU: 186th (7th OMSB Shahdzhoy); 370th (6th MSB Lashkargah); 411th (8th Motorized Rifle Brigade Farahrud) - became part of the 22nd Guards ObrSpN and were stationed in the southeastern and southern provinces bordering Pakistan: Zabul, Helmand, Kandahar, (with the exception of SPN detachment in Farahrud, Farah province), he was based close to the Iranian border.
The indicated units of the Special Forces of the GRU were included in the 15th and 22nd "separate brigades of the special forces of the GRU General Staff" with the deployment of headquarters in the cities of Jalalabad and Lashkargah (respectively), where planning and management of private military operations, raids in the immediate area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility were carried out . the list of tasks of these units included: reconnaissance and search, ambush actions, raids.
Military operations OKSVA by years
1979
Events preceding the "Operation Storm 333" and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan
- April-May 1979, at the request of the Afghan leadership, the CPSU Central Committee decided to supply Afghanistan with “special property” worth 53 million rubles: 140 guns and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers, 48,000 small arms, 100 grenade launchers, 680 air bombs
- May 5 - TurkVO began the formation of the "Muslim battalion" of the GRU. It was completed with people of the indigenous nationalities of the Central Asian republics.
- July - Bagram relocated a parachute battalion to provide protection for Soviet transport aircraft (see photo). KGB special group "Zenit-1" began work in Afghanistan
- August 5 - Mutiny in the 26th Afghan Parachute Regiment and Commando Battalion Kabul
- August 28-25 - Visit to the DRA of the Soviet military delegation headed by the commander in chief ground forces I. G. Pavlovsky
- September - KGB special group "Zenit-2" arrived in Kabul.
- November 22 - Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lieutenant General V. S. Paputin, flew in to the DRA
- December 3-14 - "Muslim battalion" (154th separate detachment of special forces) of the GRU General Staff and the 3rd infantry brigade of the 345th opdp were transferred to the Bagram airbase
- Early December - The opposition increased the number of its armed formations to 40 thousand people and launched hostilities against the new government in 12 provinces of Afghanistan
- KGB General Kirpichenko arrived in the DRA - the first deputy. head of foreign intelligence of the KGB.
End of 1979. Representatives of the PDPA, headed by Babrak Karmal, who has been living in Czechoslovakia as an emigrant since August 1978, with the support of the special services of the socialist states, create illegal structures to combat the regime of X. Amin. Moscow is preparing for a coup in Kabul. Islamists in Afghanistan also continue their struggle. In fact, a civil war broke out in the country. December 1979
- At the request of Amin, two Soviet battalions were transferred to Afghanistan to strengthen the protection of the residence of the head of state and the Bagram airfield. B. Karmal arrived with one of them.
- December 10 - Minister of Defense D. Ustinov informed the Chief of the General Staff N. Starkov that the Politburo had made a preliminary decision on the temporary entry of troops into the DRA, and set the task of preparing an approximately 75-80 thousandth group of troops. At the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense, D. Ustinov said that it was necessary to prepare a group of troops. troops sent directive No. 312/12/00133.
D. Ustinov gave an oral order to N. Ogarkov on the formation of a new combined arms army in TurkVO
- December 12 - At a meeting of the Politburo, a decision was made to send Soviet troops into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. According to the memoirs of A. A. Gromyko, the decision “on the introduction of some contingents of Soviet troops stationed in the southern regions of the country into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as to create favorable conditions for the prohibition of possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states ...” was unanimously adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
- December 13 - A task force of the USSR Ministry of Defense was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S. F. Akhromeev, a little later the group was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov. The commander of the TurkVO troops, Colonel General Yu. P. Maksimov, ordered his first deputy, Lieutenant General Yu. V. Tukharinov, to prepare troops for entry. He flew to Termez and was appointed the first commander of the 40th Army.
- December 14 - A special group of the KGB of the USSR "Thunder" arrived in Kabul, reinforcing the Zenit-2 group.
- At 22:00, the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense arrived in Termez.
- December 17 - The "Muslim battalion" advanced from Bagram and concentrated in the area of the residence of X. Amin - the Taj-bek / Kabul / palace.
- December 23 - The operational group of the headquarters of the Airborne Forces, headed by the deputy Commander of the Airborne Forces General Guskov arrived in Kabul.
- December 24 - Directive No. 312/12/001 33 of the Ministry of Defense and the National Guard of the Army defines specific tasks for the entry and deployment of troops on Afghan territory. Participation in hostilities was not provided.
- December 25 - 12:00 /claim../ an order was received to cross the state border. 15:00 began the entry of troops / 108 honey, 103rd airborne division /.
- December 27 - Directive of the USSR Ministry of Defense N 312/12/002 set specific combat missions to suppress the resistance of the rebels.
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 86 people.
- Losses: tanks-1, armored vehicles-1, aircraft and helicopters-6
1980
Troop operations and general reports for 1980
- Large-scale "1st Kunar" combined arms operation to neutralize the rebellious Afghan mountain infantry regiment in the Asmara Gorge by the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 180th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division (Bagram) and the 317th airborne regiment of the 103rd airborne airborne division. The personnel of the 3rd Airborne Battalion of the 317th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, landed by helicopters on February 28-29 in the area of the settlement of Asmar, was blocked by Afghan armed formations in the Asmar Gorge. As a result, 35 Soviet servicemen were killed in the clash, 40 were wounded, and 1 serviceman went missing.
- The first combined arms operation in Nakhrin district, Baghlan province.
- 1st Combined Arms Panjshir Operation.
- August 3 - during the arrival to the rescue of the units of the 149th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, fighting in the mountainous area of the Mashkhad Gorge of Kishim County, Badakhshan Province - the 783rd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (783rd ORB) was ambushed and took the fight near the village of Shaest 201st MSD, 49 servicemen were killed (37 scouts of the 783rd ORB and 12 guards of the 149th Guards SME), 48 were wounded.
- autumn - 2nd Combined Arms "Panjshir operation".
- fighting in the provinces of Kapisa, Kabul, Logar, Wardak, in the Lurkoh (Farah) mountain range - "Purge of Herat".
- The first large-scale combined-arms operation "Strike" -1 ~ in the central provinces.
- The rebels (oppositionists) set about equipping warehouses and bases for weapons, ammunition, food in hard-to-reach mountainous areas, as well as preparing caves for winter.
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 1484 people.
- Injuries and diseases - 30612
- Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 725
- Losses: tanks - 18, armored vehicles - 173, aircraft and helicopters - 40
1981
Military operations and general reports for 1981. Military operations were carried out under the code names "STRELA", "NORTH", "COVERAGE" and "SQUARE", etc.
- January-February - Operational military operations to eliminate the counter-revolutionary underground in the cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Khost
- March - "3rd Panjshir operation"
- in eight northern provinces of Afghanistan (out of 26) there are 200 rebel detachments with a total number of 8.5 thousand people.
- early September - "Marmal operation" defeat of the base areas of the rebels 30 km south of the city of Mazar-i-Sharif
- from September 6 - "4th Panjshir operation" - "Canyon".
- mid-October - "Urgun operation"
- (September-December) - 46 operations were carried out against the Mujahideen, 250 actions of duty units.
- December - military operation to defeat the large base area of the rebels "Darzab" in the north of the DRA
“During the year, hostilities were especially active in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Nangarhar, around Kabul. For 1981 - Organized 4 points for collecting and sending the bodies of the dead personnel in Shindand, Bagram, Kabul, Kunduz. According to the General Staff, more than 20 thousand rebels were destroyed, 7763 were captured, up to 12 thousand small arms, 1.5 million various ammunition, 79 DShK, 22 mortars, etc. were captured ... "
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 1298 people.
- Injuries and diseases - no data
- Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) no data
- Losses: Tanks - 28, Armored vehicles - 128, Aircraft and helicopters - 26, Guns and mortars - 17
1982
Military operations and general reports for 1982
“Planned combat operations were, as a rule, large-scale, relatively long in time, and a large number of troops participated in them. In total, during the years of our stay in Afghanistan, our troops acted in 416 planned operations. In 1982, operations were carried out that could be entered into the annals of the Afghan war ... "
"In late January - early February, opposition formations were defeated in a wide valley - the "green zone" of Jabal-Ussaraj, Charikar, Mahmudrak. IPA groups of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan operated in this zone. They constantly fired at the Bagram airfield, garrisons and buildings of organs authorities, robbed civilian vehicles, committed sabotage against Soviet outposts and columns. The presence of a large IPA group near the capital had a destabilizing effect on Kabul ... "
“By the end of January 25, our units suddenly blocked the area for the enemy. The employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan organized filtration points. the following days, the encirclement was shrinking, resisting groups of rebels were destroyed. On February 5, sweeping operations were completed. The enemy suffered heavy losses. The situation in the provinces of Kabul, Parwan and Kapisa has improved significantly, which has had a positive impact on the situation in the capital and on the Hairatan-Kabul highway ... "
“Another example of a major military operation is the defeat of a large opposition base area in the Darzab region on the border of the provinces of Jowzjan and Faryab:
- held from 15 to 19 February 1982. But the most famous were six operations in Panjshir.
- in (April-May) 1982, the so-called “2nd Panjshir” was carried out - the loudest operation in the history of the Afghan war ... "
“The valley of the Panjshir River is one of the most geographically complex regions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. It stretched 70 km long and 12 km wide all the way to the Pakistani border. It has a huge number of caves, holes, gorges, passes, dominant heights, passages (adjacent to the main valley and giving free access to various regions and to the main highway connecting Kabul with the Soviet Union through the Salang pass ... "
“That is why the Panjshir, which also has significant wealth of emeralds, rubies and lapis lazuli, was chosen to host the so-called Central Guerrilla Base of Ahmad Shah Massoud. He created here a well-equipped system of defense, fire and control of the rebel forces operating in a huge vital territory ... "
“Fighting began on the night of May 16, 1982. The Soviet subunits, suddenly for the enemy, seized all the dominant heights at the entrance to the gorge and at a depth of up to 10 km from the entrance to it. Then the landing of an airborne assault began, which dismembered the entire enemy grouping into four isolated parts .... "
“Soviet and Afghan battalions moved along the heights to the right and left of the gorge and military equipment along its bottom to join the landing force on foot. During the hostilities, 203 firing structures, 25 mortars, 120 heavy machine guns, about 30 warehouses with weapons and ammunition were destroyed and captured, about 100 caves adapted for defense were blown up ... "
“During the year, along with planned combat operations, private military operations were also carried out by the OKSVA command or by decisions of the commanders of formations and units. In terms of tactics, they did not differ from major operations. If the situation required, detours were used, landings were made, the enemy was surrounded, settlements were blocked, etc. Operations were most effective if they were carried out at a distance of no more than 10-15 km from deployment points, with advancement to areas at night. In total, more than 220 private operations of various scales have been carried out in Afghanistan…”
Continuation of large-scale military operations of Soviet troops in the provinces:
- Kandahar, Kapisa and Parwan
- January-February, (particularly intense battles took place in the provinces of Parvan - in the "Green Zone" of Charikar, near Jabal-Ussaraj at the entrance to the "Panjshir Gorge", and Kapisa - near the settlement "Mahmudraki"
- April - combined arms operation in the province of Nimroz
- "5th Panjshir operation"
- May-June - large-scale combined arms operation in Logar province
- December - withdrawal of troops from the "Panjshir"
- January, fighting in Kandahar.
- end of January-beginning of February-Fighting in the green zone Jabal-Ussaraj, Charikar, Mahmudraki
- operation in Nimruz province
- May 16-June, "5th Panjshir operation." 36 battalions were involved in it: (20 Afghan and 16 Soviet, with a total number of about 1.2 thousand people), more than 320 armored vehicles, 155 guns and mortars, 104 helicopters and 26 aircraft. Soviet units lost 93 people killed and 343 wounded.
- August-September, "6th Panjshir operation"
The situation around Kabul has become much more complicated due to the strengthening of the Mujahideen detachments in the provinces of Parvan, Kapisa, Logar, Wardak, Laghman and their effective actions. Significant forces of the Mujahideen were concentrated in the province of Kunar. On March 1, 1982, in the camp of the rebels, the number of detachments reached the number of up to 50 thousand people.
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 1948 people.
- Injuries and diseases - 29455
- Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 894
- Losses: Tanks - 17, Armored vehicles - 107, Aircraft and helicopters - 40, Guns and mortars - 14
1983
Military operations and general reports for 1983
“The main small arms were Kalashnikov assault rifles of Chinese and Egyptian production, American rifles, machine guns and grenade launchers of West German, English, Swedish and Israeli production. Widely used heavy machine guns DShK, mortars caliber 60-82 mm. Since 1983, a large number of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines began to appear: Italian, American, British. The most widely used were mines and plastic case, as well as land mines with remote control and radio-controlled mines. Handicraft surprise mines were also often used ... "
- January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans abducted a group (16 people) of our civilian specialists. They were released only a month later, while six of them died.
- fighting in Logar province
- April - Operation to defeat opposition groups in the "Nijrab Gorge" (Kapisa province). Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
“Autumn - For the first time, opposition detachments did not leave for the winter to rest in Pakistan and Iran. The creation of fortified areas and bases directly in Afghanistan began. At the end of 1983, there were a total of 212 specialized centers and training centers for rebels (1,178 in Pakistan and 34 in Iran), which made it possible to train more than 75,000 people a year.
For a year - in funerals they are most often called: Kunduz, Puli-Khumri, Kabul, Herat, Shindand, Kandahar ... "
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 1446 people.
- Injuries and diseases - 4127
- Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 945
- Losses: Tanks-13, Armored vehicles-186, aircraft and helicopters-37
1984
Military operations and general reports for 1984
“1984-1985 became a period of maximum intensification of hostilities in Afghanistan. In essence, OKSVA was drawn into a full-scale civil war that unfolded throughout the country. The political and military leadership of the USSR set two tasks for the Soviet troops: together with the Afghan government army, to defeat large armed formations of the rebels in the base areas and to assist Kabul in strengthening the state authorities on the ground ... "
"AT military history 1984, operations in the provinces of Parvan, Kapisa, Kabul, Laghman (February-March) should be noted. Due to the partisan nature of the enemy's actions, as well as serious miscalculations, not all operations achieved their goal. The year was the most tragic in terms of the number of losses suffered by our troops - 2343 soldiers and officers died ... "
“The Mujahideen got a large number of Chinese-made rockets and installations. The American Stinger MANPADS and the British Bluepipe appeared. On April 20, the number of Stingers reached 47. In 1984, 62 launches of MANPADS were noted.
- (late February - early March) Fighting in the provinces of Parvan, Kapisa, Kabul, Laghman
- since April 21 - a large-scale combined-arms operation in the Panjshir Gorge. during which he was ambushed and suffered heavy losses by the 1st motorized rifle battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment and lost: 53 killed, 58 wounded.
- the largest "in terms of composition, involved forces and means, duration and significance" were operations in the river valleys: Panjshir, Andarab and in the "green zones" around the cities of Kabul and Herat
- December, an operation to defeat the base areas of the rebels in the mountains of Lurkoh, Farah province), located in the three gorges.
- (January-May) 85 operations were carried out, of which 51 were joint with units of the Afghan army and 84 were independent, - 18 thousand rebels were destroyed, 3839 small arms, 146 DShK, 42 mortars, 101 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers were captured .
1984 is the bloodiest year in the history of the Afghan war (1979-1989)
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 2343 people.
- Injuries and diseases - 7737
- Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 1388
- Losses: Tanks -7, Armored vehicles - 88, aircraft and helicopters - 66
1985
Military operations and general reports for 1985
“This year, the fighting in Afghanistan has reached a kind of peak. The fighting became more and more fierce, and the Soviet troops still remained the main force in the confrontation between the official Afghan authorities and the armed opposition. It was in 1985 that the largest operations were carried out against the counter-revolutionary forces in the provinces of Panjshir, Kunar, Herat, Paktia, Khost and a number of other regions of Afghanistan. Particularly heavy and bloody were the battles against the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud in Panjshir and the province of Kunar. Parts of the limited contingent of Soviet troops, continuously participating in operations, suffered significant losses. For a year in battles in Democratic Republic Afghanistan killed 1868 people.
- April 1, another military operation in the "Panjshir Gorge" against the formations of Ahmad Shah Massoud.
- April 21, battle of the 1st company of the 500th (later the 334th) separate battalion special purpose 15th separate brigade special forces of the GRU General Staff (5th separate motorized rifle battalion), as a result of which 28 intelligence officers were ambushed and killed in a gorge in the zone of the Afghan-Pakistani border.
- A large-scale combined-arms operation involving significant forces and means (including the government forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan) to capture the Javara base area in Paktia province
- On April 26, a group of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war (24 people), who had been held for several years in a special prison in the Badaber region (24 km south of Peshawar in Pakistan), made an armed uprising in order to free themselves from captivity. All died in battle with dushmans. Main article: Uprising in the Badaber camp
- May, fighting in Helmand province
- (May-June), large-scale "Kunar operation" - fighting throughout the "Kunar Gorge" from Jalalabad to Barikot (170 km), during the 1st stage of the operation, more than 11 thousand people landed by helicopters. (units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 56th Guards Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, 108th Motorized Rifle Division, 201st Motorized Rifle Division, 45th Engineer Regiment, Air Force 40 th army) and other parts of OKSVA
- On May 25, during the "Kunar operation (1985)" - the personnel of the guards of the 4th company and the attached forces of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 149th guards motorized rifle regiment took a fierce battle near the village of Konyak near the city of Asadabad in the province of Kunar with a large number of casualties losses (23 died, 19 were injured of varying severity)
- September, large-scale "Marmol operation" in the province of Balkh
- mid-October, a large-scale military operation in the south of Baghlan province, counties (Andarab, Banu, Nakhrin, Burka, Seyid)
- On October 19, during the fighting in the Panjshir gorge, as a result of an error in orientation from hypothermia, 5 servicemen died and 35 received frostbite of varying degrees.
- October, fighting in the provinces: Farah, Baghlan, Kapisa, Parwan
- performed more than 80 operations
- OKSVA reached its maximum number - 105.8 thousand people.
- the losses of the rebels amounted to 17 thousand people.
- the blackest year for our border guards - 124 dead
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 1886 people.
- Injuries and diseases - 8219
- Dismissed from the army (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 1751
- Losses: tanks - 18, armored vehicles - 185, aircraft and helicopters - 66
1986
Military operations and general reports for 1986
By the beginning of 1986, the internal political situation in Afghanistan continued to worsen. If in 1981-1983 opposition formations were active in the territory, numbering 45 thousand people, then by 1986 their number was already 150 thousand.
- in February-April, a large-scale military operation was carried out in the Khost district, during which the IPA transshipment base of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Jawara - Wolf Pit) was destroyed
- large-scale military operation against the grouping of Abdul Basir in the province of Badakhshan
- the defeat of the transshipment "base Marulgad" (Nangarhar)
- March, large-scale hostilities in the Shekude region (Paktia)
- repeated large-scale combined arms operation in "Marulgada"
- large-scale combined-arms operation to defeat the grouping of Abdul Wahed Vadud (Badakhshan)
- large-scale military operation in the area of the "Apushello gorge" (Zabul)
- April, a large-scale military operation against the groups of Najmuddin (Badakhshan) and S. Mansur (Baglan)
- April, large-scale combined-arms operation in the province of Paktia (near Khosta), the result - the defeat of the Javara base
- large-scale military operation in the province of Baghlan
- (May 10-25), fighting in Paktia province (Daj and Aliheil counties)
- June, fighting in Kandahar province
- June, large-scale combined-arms operation "Maneuver" in the provinces: (Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan)
- fighting in the province of Parvan (Panjshir Gorge)
- fighting in Laghman province
- (August 18-26), a large-scale combined-arms operation "Trap" in the province of Herat, the defeat of the Kokari-Sharshari base area, the elimination of the rear services of Ismail Khan's formations.
On July 15, the number of armed opposition reached 150 thousand people. In a year. 847 launches of MANPADS were noted. US assistance to the armed opposition amounted to $ 500 million.
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 1333 people.
- Injuries and diseases - 62,129
- Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 1311
- Losses: tanks - 14, armored vehicles - 126, aircraft and helicopters - 61
1987
Military operations and general reports for 1987
"The most famous operation of 1987 was Operation Magistral. The situation in the province of Paktia, namely in the Khost district, was extremely difficult. Armed opposition detachments practically completed the blocking of Khost. By the autumn of 1987, the Mujahideen had restored their Javara base here, which had been destroyed by Soviet troops in the spring of 1986. The situation was further complicated by the fact that it was here that the so-called “Afghan government” was supposed to be located, as opposed to the “government of Najibullah”. At the request of the Afghan leadership, the OKSV command decided to plan and conduct a major military operation to break the blockade to provide the population of Khost with food and the necessary material resources.Such an operation was successfully carried out in November 1987 - January 1988.
“After the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation, the Soviet troops tried to stop active hostilities, focusing on the protection of communications, but this did not succeed, and at the request of the Afghan leadership, a number of operations were carried out against the irreconcilable counter-revolution - around Kabul, in the Kandahar region. It was necessary to conduct constant hostilities against caravans that delivered weapons and ammunition from Pakistan and Iran to the opposition detachments. Second half of January. The opposition stepped up the fighting."
- from January - February 21, large-scale combined-arms operation "Strike" (Kunduz province)
- February 4 - March 11, large-scale combined-arms operation "Shkval" (Kandahar province)
- March 2 - 21, large-scale combined-arms operation "Thunderstorm" (Ghazni).
- March 8 - March 21 large-scale combined arms operation "Circle" (Kabul, Logar)
- April 11-1, fighting in the province of Herat
- April 12-24 large-scale combined-arms operation "Spring" in the province of Kabul
- May - large-scale combined-arms operation "Volley" (provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul)
- end of May, large-scale combined-arms operation "South-87" (Kandahar province, Arghandab river valley)
- (November January - 1987, 1988) large-scale combined-arms operation "Magistral" to unblock the road Gardez - Khost
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 1215 people.
- Injuries and diseases - 56,498
- Dismissed from the Armed Forces (for wounds, injuries and diseases) - 1472
- Losses: tanks - 7, armored vehicles - 128, aircraft and helicopters - 68
During the year, US assistance to the Afghan armed opposition amounted to $706 million.
1988
Military operations and general reports for 1988
“After the withdrawal of Soviet garrisons from Kunduz, Talukan and Khanabad, these settlements were handed over by government forces to Afghan armed formations virtually without a fight. President Najibullah appealed to our command with a request to assist in the liberation of Kunduz. in a short time the city was captured.
- With the withdrawal of a number of parts of OKSVA, four provinces - Kunar, Paktika, Takhar and Bamiyan - gradually came under the control of the opposition. The centers of the provinces of Kandahar, Ghazni, Uruzgan, Badakhshan were blocked. Rocket and artillery shelling of Kabul and many provincial centers of the country intensified.
- May 15 - August 1, Soviet troops left the garrisons of Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Kandahar, Faizabad, Kunduz
- On August 7, the RA government troops fled from Kunduz without resistance. In addition to Kunduz, the rebels captured Khanabad, Talukan, Bamiyan
As a result of the combat activities of the 40th Army, more than 1,000 anti-aircraft mountain installations and more than 30,000 rockets for them, more than 700 mortars and approximately 25,000 mines were captured. From the GRU reference: “... the volume of official US assistance to the counter-revolution exceeded $ 2 billion. In 1988, assistance in the amount of more than $ 700 million is planned ...”
OKSVA DATA
- Irretrievable losses - 759 people.
- Injuries and diseases - 55121
- Dismissed from the Armed Forces (due to injury, injuries and diseases) - 1549 4.
- Losses: tanks - 22, armored vehicles - 176, aircraft and helicopters - 30
1989
Military operations and general reports for 1989
“The withdrawal of units of the 40th Army in January-February continued strictly according to plan. At the same time, communications from Kabul through the Salang Pass were reliably protected from possible attacks by the Mujahideen, especially by the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud. But it was not possible to avoid a large-scale military operation.”
“January 23 - 26, a joint military operation of the Soviet troops against the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud in South Salang. On the morning of January 23, an air and artillery fire attack was carried out on Panjshir and the adjacent gorges. Combing of the area from bands of rebels and setting up blocks on the highway by Afghan troops began. The main efforts were concentrated on the protection of bridges, galleries and tunnels. For two days of hostilities, more than 600 rebels, 10 warehouses, 36 strongholds, a large number of weapons were destroyed. In the Chaugani region, a tent camp was set up to receive local residents who left the combat area and provide them with material and medical assistance. Losses of Soviet troops - 3 killed, 5 wounded.
- February 4, 1989 Last division Soviet army left Kabul
- On February 15, the last unit of the 40th Army and with it the army commander, Colonel-General B.V. Gromov left Afghanistan. The opposition, in turn, began large-scale military operations against the Najibullah regime.
OKSVA DATA
- irretrievable losses - 53 people.
- injuries and diseases - 93
- losses: tanks - 2, armored vehicles - 17, aircraft and helicopters - 7
Combined-arms operations to capture fortified areas
Excerpt from Valentin Runov's book “The Afghan War. Fighting »:
“In the areas of responsibility of large opposition groups, base areas were created, located in areas of hard-to-reach terrain near the areas of upcoming actions. they created stocks of means of armed struggle and material and technical means, organized a control system, warning, air defense, there was a center for training rebels, workshops for the repair of weapons and the manufacture of home-made ammunition, a garage, a prison, a hospital, and recreation areas for personnel. As a rule, up to 500 people could be located in such a base area at the same time.
“Transshipment bases were organized for temporary storage of weapons, ammunition, materiel and on caravan routes near the borders with Pakistan and Iran. They were intermediate bodies for the supply of groups and detachments, where the distribution and sale of weapons was carried out, a pass regime was established, a system of observation, warning, air defense, and security. Sometimes transshipment bases were combined with base areas. 18 large supply bases functioned on the territory of Afghanistan, including 9 base areas, two transshipment bases and 7 transshipment points.
see also
- Afghan Mujahideen
- Islamic Party of Afghanistan ("IPA")
- Islamic Society of Afghanistan ("ISA")
Notes
- OFFICIAL DATA ON SOVIET LOSSES IN AFGHANISTAN
- Class struggle in Afghan society in the 2nd half. XX century
- 40th Army, the number of which at various times ranged from 100 to 120 thousand soldiers and officers. In total, the Soviet and Afghan armed forces (taking into account the military units of all power structures) did not exceed 300 thousand. See NVO.
- Nikitenko E. G. Afghanistan: From the war of the 80s to the forecast of new wars. -M.: Astrel; AST, 2004. - S. 94, 110.
- Air Force: Out of the impasse. Ending the Afghan war proved harder than starting it.CentrAsia. Retrieved November 20, 2009. Archived from the original on June 1, 2012.
- David C. Isby. Russia's War in Afghanistan. - Books.google.es. - ISBN 978-0-85045-691-2.
- V. V. Basov, G. A. Polyakov. Afghanistan: the difficult fate of the revolution. M., "Knowledge", 1988. S. 52.
- Antonio Giustozzi. War, politics and society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992. - Hurst, 2000. - ISBN 1-85065-396-8. Original text (English)
A tentative estimate for total mujahideen losses in 1980-02 may be in the 150–180,000 range, with maybe half of them killed.
- "Afghan campaign: unclaimed experience. 4 Evolution of forms and methods of warfare" E.G. Nikitenko
- 1 2 Valentin Runov "The Afghan War. Combat Operations"
- AND CONFLICTS. Afghan campaign: unclaimed experience.12 "Start of hostilities" by Andrey Mikhailov
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Runes "Afghan war. Combat Operations"
- Valentin Runov "The Afghan War. Combat operations"
- Valentin Runov "The Afghan War. Fighting »
- 1 2 3 4
- Valentin Runov "The Afghan War. All military operations
Links
- The book "The Unique" Book.5 Part.4 author General of the Army V.I. Varennikov
- The book "Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan" author General A.A. Lyakhovsky
- "Wars and military conflicts (Afghanistan)" author Major General E.G. Nikitenko Military Space Defense Magazine (VKO)
- The book "The Hot Sky of Afghanistan" by General V. Markovsky
- Combat operations of the 40th Army
- AFGHAN DIARY
- "The Truth About Undeclared War"
- "AFGAN: history of war - 1986"
- Documentary film by M. Leshchinsky "The Hidden War"
- "Organization and conduct of hostilities for the wiring of transport convoys"
- Documentary film "Operation in the province of Tahor" TV channel "Zvezda"
- “Ours in Afghanistan or how they “took” the Stinger”, A.K. Shultz (intelligence point Herat)
- Documentary "The Truth About the 9th Company"
- Documentary film Operation "Trap" in the province of Herat (Afghanistan) 19-25.08.1986 TV program "Military Secret" No. 173 TC "Ren TV" 02/18/2013
- Operation "Maneuver" (1985-1986) site of veterans kunduz.ru
- "General characteristics of the Pashtun tribes"
- "Pashtun tribes want to be masters of their territories", by Vasily Kravtsov
- "Peoples and Tribes of Afghanistan"
- "Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and others"
- "Diverse Afghanistan" author Yu.O. Serdyuk
- Pashtuns - "people of honor"
- “Pashtuns are the most numerous people of Afghanistan” M. Drambyan
- "Pashtun Tribes - Endless War"
Afghan war (1979-1989) | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Main events | Articles on the topic | government forces | Mujahideen | Help the Mujahideen |
1979
1980-1985
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
|
|
|
|
|
Links
- "Army, units border troops(deployment on the territory of Afghanistan) "" The main combat formations and units of the 40th Army "
- Detailed calendar of military operations of the Afghan war (1979-1989) heading "Wars and military conflicts (Afghanistan)" author Major General E.G. Nikitenko Magazine "Military Space Defense" (VKO)
- Armed Forces of Afghanistan
- Provinces of Afghanistan
- Pashtuns
- Tajiks of Afghanistan
- Uzbeks in Afghanistan
- Turkmens in Afghanistan
- Kyrgyz in Afghanistan
- Durrani, Gilzai, Karani, Charaimaki, Kyzylbashi, Farsivans
- Ismailis
- Sunnis
- Shiites
- 1 2 3 4 5 Pashtun tribes want to be masters of their territories
- 1 2 Pashtuns. Settlement, main occupations
- "Afghan campaign: unclaimed experience. 4" "Evolution of forms and methods of warfare" General E.G. Nikitenko
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Army, parts of the border troops (deployed on the territory of Afghanistan) "The main combat formations and units of the 40th Army"
- Afghan airborne intelligence In action. Valery Marchenko
- 1 2 Valentin Runov's book "The Afghan War. Fighting »