revolutionary movement in China. Rise of the revolutionary movement
5. Rise of the revolutionary movement
Along with the liberal opposition, which acted legally on the territory of the empire, as well as in emigration (here the leaders of the reform movement of 1898 Kang Yuwei and Liang Qichao continued to enjoy special influence), leaders of the revolutionary movement led by Sun Yat-sen did not leave hope to achieve the overthrow of the Manchu despotism. . After a series of attempts to organize uprisings that ended in failure, the revolutionaries tried to unite the efforts of several revolutionary organizations that had formed in the southern provinces of China at the beginning of the 20th century. In addition to the China Revival Union, in which Sun Yat-sen played a leading role, the largest organizations were those operating in the provinces of Hunan, Zhejiang and Jiangsu. In Hunan, the Chinese Renaissance Union (Huaxinghui) was headed by Huang Xing (1874-1916), who came from the family of a school teacher, a courageous man and a talented organizer. Huang Xing was to play a prominent role as the military leader of the revolutionaries. In Zhejiang, the prominent intellectual Zhang Binglin (1868-1936) was at the head of the Chinese Glory Revival Union (Guangfuhui).
In the summer of 1905 in Japan, on the basis of the unification of revolutionary organizations, the largest of which was, of course, the Chinese Revival Union, the Chinese Revolutionary United Union (Zhongguo gemin tongmenghui) was formed. The organization's program was based on the "Three People's Principles" formulated by Sun Yat-sen and propagated on the pages of the League's print organ, the Ming Bao (People's Newspaper) magazine. The "Three People's Principles" are nationalism, democracy, and people's welfare. Under nationalism in this period, Sun Yat-sen meant the overthrow of the ruling dynasty, which was foreign in origin, and the return to Chinese rule. Democracy meant the establishment of a democratic republic in China. And, finally, the welfare of the people meant the solution of the agrarian issue by establishing a system of a single state tax on land depending on its market price, which, according to Sun Yat-sen, should have led to the mobilization of differential rent in the hands of the state, which should turn it for the benefit of the whole society. . Sun Yat-sen believed that this system would gradually solve the historical problem - to give land to those who cultivate it, and thereby block the way for China's capitalist development.
Despite the fact that the program of the revolutionaries was aimed at liberation from Manchu rule, and the revolutionaries themselves counted on help from the Western powers in achieving this goal, in essence, this was precisely the doctrine of Chinese nationalism, which sought, as noted above, to combine the restoration of China's sovereignty with ideas for the modernization of society. The publications in the pages of Ming Bao, inspired by a just protest against the semi-colonial dependence in which China was placed by the West, confirmed this.
In the struggle to achieve the intended goals, the "United Union" used approximately the same tactics as the "China Revival Union". The "United Union" did not set itself the task of organizing a mass popular movement; its participants believed that Chinese society was already sufficiently prepared to unite under the slogan of overthrowing the ruling Manchu dynasty. All that remains is to prepare a revolutionary explosion in one of the regions of China, and this will provoke a nationwide uprising against the Qing despotism. For this reason, the members of the "United Union" focused on preparing anti-government speeches, trying, as before, to involve secret societies in this. Particular attention was paid to propaganda work among the soldiers and officers of the Chinese new army, mainly those units that were more prepared to accept revolutionary ideas.
Subsequently, Sun Yat-sen said that the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty was preceded by 10 unsuccessful attempts at revolutionary actions undertaken by him and his supporters. After the formation of the United Union, its members organized eight uprisings, mainly in the southern provinces of China, which ended in defeat. Huang Xing played a prominent role in organizing and conducting them, but Sun Yat-sen himself took part in some speeches. During the sixth uprising in Southern Guangxi (December 1907), he led a line of revolutionaries under bullets who stormed the fortifications of the city of Zhenan-guan, the capture of which opened the way into the depths of the province. However, this time the revolutionaries failed.
The most powerful and well-prepared was the performance in Guangzhou in the spring of 1911. It was attended by more than 800 militants, united in a detachment of "defying death." At the head, as always, was the courageous Huang Xing, who arrived in Guangzhou at the end of April. The plan, as in the first action of the Chinese Renaissance League in 1895, was to seize government offices by militant groups and proclaim revolutionary power. However, shortly before the scheduled date of the uprising, a lone terrorist, on his own initiative, made an attempt on the commander of the Manchu troops, and the governor ordered additional precautions to be taken. The ships that arrived in Guangzhou were thoroughly searched, and the soldiers of the "new troops", who were not without reason suspected of revolutionary moods, were confiscated cartridges and edged weapons. Despite the fact that part of the detachments could not arrive in the city, on April 27 the uprising began. Huang Xing, at the head of a detachment of fighters, attacked and took the governor's residence with a fight. However, after that, the revolutionaries had to engage in a bloody battle with a large detachment of government troops that arrived in time. The clashes continued until late at night, Huang Xing was wounded in the hand, the revolutionaries had to retreat. After waiting a few days in a safe house, Huang Xing fled to Hong Kong. The "United Union" lost 72 people in this performance. Despite the defeat of the uprising in Guangzhou, the news of it spread widely in China, and this performance played a role in the growth of anti-Manchu and revolutionary sentiments.
The first half of 1911 passed under the sign of a deepening social crisis, a vivid manifestation of which was the movement "In Defense of the Railways". In May 1911, the Beijing government decided to nationalize the railway lines under construction that connected Hankou (province of Hubei) with the provinces of Sichuan and Guangdong. As a result of this decision, Chinese shareholders who have already invested in this enterprise suffered. Having announced nationalization, the Qing government simultaneously agreed on a loan from a consortium provided by the capital of the Western powers (England, France, Germany, USA). Thus, the authorities hoped to improve their financial situation. At the same time, this meant the actual transfer of control over this largest project in the field of national entrepreneurship to foreigners.
The actions of the Beijing government caused an outburst of indignation among the business circles of the provinces involved in the implementation of this project. Depositors in Sichuan, in particular, were hit hardest, with a constitutional advisory committee spearheading a movement to protest against the government's decision. In the autumn of 1911, it escalated into armed clashes with government troops, which the Qing troops were no longer able to suppress.
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The end of the world war, in which China was also involved, revealed with new acuteness the main contradictions of Chinese society and, above all, its semi-colonial position. At the same time, its fragmentation, which did not allow the use of the formally preserved national statehood for solving national problems, became more and more recognized as the first obstacle to national revival. That is why, in the very first months after the end of the war, new attempts are made to unite the North and the South. They were stimulated both by the awareness of the need to overcome the fragmentation of the country, which had become more acute during the war years, and by the political maneuvering of the powers, in particular, the unwillingness of the United States and some European states to come to terms with the increased influence of Japan in China.
Attempts to convene a new unification conference had already been made since the end of 1918. In February 1919, representatives of the Beijing and Guangzhou governments met in Shanghai and began to discuss ways to end hostilities between North and South, as well as measures necessary to restore the unity of the country. Contradictory militaristic interests did not allow the conference to achieve any constructive results and, interrupted in May 1919, it never managed to resume its work. However, the development of political events in the country in the spring of the same year revealed new political and ideological factors that in the future could contribute to the unification of China, but in other ways, without the militarists and contrary to their interests.
At the beginning of 1919, the attention of the Chinese public was drawn to the peace conference that opened in January in Paris, at which China, counting on the "gratitude" of the Entente countries, intended to significantly improve its international positions. Reflecting the increased public pressure, the Chinese joint government delegation demanded the elimination of the shameful Japanese-Chinese agreement of May 9, 1915 ("21 demands") and spheres of influence, the return of concessions and customs autonomy to China, the withdrawal of foreign troops, etc. But above all, the Chinese delegation hoped for the return to China of all the rights and possessions of Germany in Prov. Shandong, actually captured during the war years by Japan. However, the Chinese delegation and the Chinese public were deeply disappointed. The allies refused to even consider the question of restoring China's sovereignty, trampled on by unequal treaties, and, succumbing to political blackmail by Japan, on April 30 recognized her seized "right" to the German "inheritance".
This cynical decision caused an explosion of spontaneous indignation in different cities of China and in various social strata. Beijing students were the first to speak. On May 4, more than 3,000 students from 13 higher educational institutions in Beijing took to Tiananmen Square demanding not to sign the Treaty of Versailles, to annul the 21 Demands, to expel pro-Japanese ministers from the government, and so on. The attempts of the Japanophile government of Duan Qirui to suppress the youth protest movement by force only caused a new and wider wave of anti-Japanese and anti-government protests not only in Beijing, but also in Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Changsha and other cities. In the days of May, students of higher and secondary educational institutions actively participated in the protest movement. However, new government repressions in early June led to the fact that the social composition of this anti-Japanese movement expanded, and its center moved to Shanghai, where on June 4, in solidarity with the student youth, merchants declared a general strike, which was supported by a strike by Shanghai workers. Approximately 60,000 Shanghai workers, and then workers from other cities, took part in the patriotic protest movement. They used the traditional means of proletarian struggle - the strike, and this became a fundamentally new phenomenon in the political life of the country.
The mass protest campaign forced the government to refuse to sign the Treaty of Versailles, dismiss the Japanophile ministers, and stop repressions against members of the patriotic movement. All this spoke of his considerable success. However, the historical place of the May 4th Movement is determined not only by this. Starting as a spontaneous protest, the May 4th Movement gradually took on the features of a conscious anti-imperialist movement (although in this case directed only against Japanese imperialism), which for the first time united socially diverse forces - student youth, the bourgeoisie, and the working class. The nationwide character of the rise was so significant that even some militarists (for example, Wu Peifu) were forced to support it. Although the anger of the Chinese public was directed primarily against Japanese imperialism, active opposition to the Versailles Peace Treaty and demands for the restoration of the country's sovereignty indicated that important step to a conscious nationwide struggle against the entire system of colonial oppression.
The May 4th Movement was prepared by the entire ideological and political development of the country in the post-Xinhai years, the gradual formation of a powerful potential for national struggle, and an ever clearer awareness of genuine national interests. The growing national and nationalist potential in the events of May-June 1919 received its vivid expression. At the same time, the mass patriotic uprising itself became a turning point in China's ideological and political development, bringing to the fore the problem of national salvation and raising the question of the ways of the country's development and revival with renewed urgency. The “May 4th Movement”, as it were, completes the educational “Movement for a New Culture”, testifies to the beginning of the active politicization of the advanced Chinese intelligentsia and the strengthening of radical sentiments. This turn, which had a fateful significance for China, was largely influenced by the victory of the October Revolution in Russia.
The victory of the October Revolution could not fail to draw the attention of the radical participants in the May 4th Movement to the Experience of October, to Marxism. From among the radical intelligentsia, from the activists of the May 4th Movement, came the first supporters of Marxism - Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Deng Zhongxia, Cai Hesen, Zhang Tailei, Peng Bai, Yun Daiying and some others. Of particular importance for the spread of Marxism in China was the transition to the Marxist positions of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, leaders of the New Culture Movement and the May 4th Movement, who had great political and moral authority among progressive youth.
It was Li Dazhao who called on the Chinese people to “follow the example of the Russians,” proclaimed by him at the end of 1918. In the autumn of 1919, he published an article in the journal Xin Qingnian, which can be regarded as the first attempt in China to give a systematic exposition of the foundations of Marxist teaching. The appeal of Li Dazhao and other revolutionary-minded Chinese young intellectuals to the experience of October was quite natural. In the victory of the young Soviet republic in the fight against the intervention of the Entente countries (that is, the same imperialist powers that tore China apart), in the program of social transformations, in the anti-colonial foreign policy of the new Russia, they saw ways to solve their own problems. In fact, the spread of Marxism in the postwar years is largely connected with the study of the experience of the Russian Bolsheviks and October. It is no coincidence that the first supporters of Marxism translated primarily the works of Lenin and Trotsky written after February 1917, seeing in them the expression of revolutionary Marxism. It was, therefore, about the perception of Lenin's ideas, generalizing the experience of the October Revolution, about the perception of Leninism outside the complex and lengthy development of all Marxist thought.
“The Chinese acquired Marxism as a result of its application by the Russians…” Mao Zedong would later write. “To follow the path of the Russians - that was the conclusion.” In the experience of October, in the ideas of Leninism, young Chinese radicals were attracted by the idea close to them that the process of natural historical development (“tianyandi jinbu” - according to Sun Yat-sen) can be interrupted and go on to such a revolutionary development (“zhenlidi jinbu” - according to Sun Yat-sen ), which would make it possible to build a just socialist society not as a post-capitalist one, but as an alternative to it. However, the advanced Chinese intelligentsia by no means unequivocally approached the experience of October, the ideas of Leninism. In post-war China, a sharp controversy unfolded about the ways of the country's development - it continued those disputes that began at the end of the 19th century. and were active in the pre-Xinhai and post-Xinhai years.
The dispute continued about the historical place of traditional Chinese civilization, or - somewhat broader - about the features of history and the interaction of cultures of East and West. The philosopher Hu Shih, who rose to prominence and influence during the New Culture Movement, continued to push for the abandonment of traditional Confucian values and full Westernization as the only way to revive China. “Without any reverence,” wrote Hu Shih, “I condemn our Eastern civilization and ardently sing of the modern civilization of the West.”
The authoritative scholar of the older generation, Ku Hongming, spoke from opposite positions, seeing precisely in the Confucian tradition the possibility of reviving a rich and powerful China. The same point of view was advocated by the young philosopher Liang Shuming, one of the most brilliant traditionalist thinkers, who became popular thanks to his speeches in defense of Chinese traditional culture. The pathos of his speeches consisted primarily in ascertaining the disastrous path of Westernization for China and in asserting the possibilities of renewing the country along the path of reviving Confucian moral and ethical values. Liang Shuming even argued that Chinese culture, based on Confucianism, would eventually supplant all others and become world culture: “The future world culture is the revived culture of China ... for Confucianism is not just an idea, but life itself.” Prominent philosophers Xiong Shili, Zhang Junmai, Feng Yulan and some others sought to renew traditional Confucian thought. These thinkers did not play a significant social role, they failed to captivate the patriotic progressive youth, but their scientific and journalistic activities contributed to the preservation and development of traditional Chinese thought, interest in which increased significantly at subsequent historical stages.
However, such extreme approaches to assessing the historical place of Chinese civilization did not prevail, because by the post-war burden among the Chinese intelligentsia, the idea of the need for a synthesis of cultures and civilizations in the course of China's inclusion in the world process of cultural and economic development is increasingly asserted. At the same time, this controversy once again drew the attention of the Chinese public to the problem of choosing ideological guidelines, becoming a kind of prelude to the ongoing discussion about socialism.
A fundamentally new moment in the eternal dispute about the ways of China's development was introduced by the revolutionary experience of October, by the ideas of Leninism. The most radical youth took them as a convincing example, which they thought could be successfully repeated on Chinese soil. This, of course, could not but cause concern and ideological resistance among the sensible part of the Chinese intelligentsia. Thus began a new round of discussion about socialism.
On July 20, 1919, in the Meizhou Pinglun newspaper, Hu Shi published an article under the remarkable headline - "Deal more with specific problems, talk less about 'isms'!" In particular, it said: "Addiction to paper "principles" is very dangerous, since empty slogans can be easily used by shameless politicians for their pernicious deeds." Hu Shi urged not to embark on the path of revolution, but to follow the slow but sure path of gradual reforms, to solve specific problems in the life of the country, to overcome backwardness “step by step”.
And although Hu Shih's article was not directly addressed to the Chinese supporters of Marxism, they hastened to rebuff him. On August 17, the same journal publishes an article by Li Dazhao "Once Again About Concrete Problems and "Isms"". Li Dazhao wrote not only about the right to discuss theoretical problems, but also about the need for such theoretical work. “Our social movement, on the one hand, needs, of course, the study of practical issues, and on the other hand, the propaganda of theoretical principles. These are two inextricably linked sides of the same case. Li Dazhao defended and defended the right of the early supporters of Marxism to propagate socialist ideas. This was the first literary clash between supporters and opponents of Marxism. Over the next two years, this theoretical struggle continued and intensified.
This struggle was exacerbated by the arrival in China of the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey and the English philosopher Bertrand Russell and their lectures and in the press on how they understand the path of China's development. These scholars had great respect for Chinese culture and sympathy for the struggle of the Chinese people for their national and social liberation. They convinced their listeners of the need for painstaking daily work to overcome China's backwardness, spoke about the lack of socio-economic and cultural grounds in China for propaganda, and even more so for the implementation of socialist ideas. Their performances were treated differently.
Naturally, these speeches were supported by a consistent opponent of the revolutionary methods of transforming society, one of the most authoritative politicians and ideologists, Liang Qichao. Nor was he surprised by his rather sharp criticism of the attempt to spread socialist ideas on Chinese soil. More significant were the articles of the talented publicist Zhang Dongsun, a supporter of socialist ideas. It was precisely as a socialist that he strove to deeply analyze Chinese reality and, on the basis of this, answer the question of the possibilities of China's socialist development. He did not see such opportunities for the historically foreseeable period. Hence his call for a gradual transformation of Chinese reality, for the industrialization of the country, the development of cultural and educational work, the development of education, the expansion of the cooperative movement, and other concrete deeds that will change China. In fact, he saw the path to socialism in the development of capitalism. He claimed that his approach was based on the teachings of Marx. Rightly afraid in these conditions of the vulgarization of the very idea of socialism or the appearance of false, false socialism, Zhang Dongsun argued that "... in China now there is absolutely no need to propagate socialism." Other publicists (Lan Gunwu, Peng Yihu, Fei Juetian) criticized the idea of China's socialist development from similar positions.
In late 1920 and early 1921, these speeches evoked a sharp rebuff from the first supporters and propagandists of Marxism in China - Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Li Da, Li Ji, Shi Cuntong and some others. Responding to the main thesis of the opponents of socialism about the absence of appropriate prerequisites in China, Li Dazhao shifts the dispute, as it were, to another plane, believing that in order to answer this question, “... one must first answer another question: are the economic prerequisites for socialism ripe in the world scale? And, of course, the answer is yes. Li Da also developed this idea in his article: “By uniting with the working people of world socialism, the Chinese working people will jointly crush the capitalists and together build a socialist Middle Kingdom!” Within the framework of this thesis, Chinese Marxists developed the idea that China was fully ripe for the struggle for a non-capitalist perspective of development, for a social system alternative to capitalism. “Perhaps there will be people,” Ji Sheng wrote, “who will tell you: communism can only arise when there is already capitalism. Answer this: that is why we are implementing communism in order to prevent the emergence of capitalism.
Moreover, China's pre-capitalist character and its economic backwardness were seen by many Chinese Marxists as China's advantage, a favorable precondition for the country's socialist development. Arguing from these positions with the opponents of the propaganda of socialism in China, the Chinese Marxists felt the insufficiency of turning to the ideas of Marx and sought arguments primarily in the experience of October, in Lenin's experience. Li Da emphasized the role of Lenin, who “... managed not only to brilliantly reveal the true essence of Marxism, but also skillfully apply it. This is the greatness of Lenin, and his contemporaries should bow before him. Illuminated by Lenin's light, Marxism, distorted by Liebknecht, Bebel, Bernstein, Kautsky and others, has revived its true essence. Not having had enough time to seriously get acquainted with the theoretical heritage of Marx, the first Chinese Marxists immediately adopted Leninism.
However, not only young Marxists came out in defense of the ideas of socialism. Other supporters of China's socialist development also joined the controversy. Thus, in his pamphlet Socialism and China (1920), Sun Yat-sen's associate Feng Jipo enthusiastically promotes the idea of socialism as a means of saving and reviving China. It is characteristic that the argumentation of this adherent of Sun Yat-senism, and above all his conviction that China's backwardness favors the country's transition to the socialist path of development, largely coincided with the argumentation of the Chinese Marxists. Feng Ziyu expressed confidence that the time had already come for the implementation of socialism in China and that, relying on the experience of the Russian Bolsheviks, success could be achieved quickly: "In less than ten years, a socialist state will be built in China."
The anarchists, who already played a prominent role in the ideological and political life of China, led a number of workers' trade unions and published dozens of magazines and newspapers, also came out in defense of the ideas of socialism. However, the anarchists not only defended socialist ideas, not only defended the notion of the necessity and possibility of China's socialist development, but also sharply argued with the Marxists. They differed from them primarily in their assessment of the experience of the Russian revolution. They criticized the Bolsheviks for establishing a dictatorship, believing that any dictatorship, including the dictatorship of the proletariat, inevitably leads to despotism. “We do not recognize the power of capitalists, we do not recognize the power of politicians. Likewise, we do not recognize the power of the workers,” wrote the article “We are against the Bolsheviks” in the anarchist magazine Fandow. The Marxists, naturally, came out in defense of their understanding of the experience of the Russian Bolsheviks, in defense of the very idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
“As we see,” emphasized L.P. Delyusin, who was the first to draw our attention to the historical significance of this "dispute," that in the discussion about socialism very important problems were touched upon, the theoretical solution of which was supposed to have (and did have) an impact on the nature of the political activity of the active and conscious part of Chinese society, to help it in determining the aims and means of the struggle for a new China." The pragmatic reformists, who opposed the setting of directly socialist tasks, were not successful in this dispute, they did not receive the support of the bulk of the searching youth. The supporters of the immediate socialist reorganization of China are another matter - they clearly won this dispute, attracted sympathy for the ideas of socialism, creating a certain mass base for their dissemination.
This success was not accidental, it was largely due to the political impatience and radicalism of patriotic youth, who were looking for simple and quick solutions to the difficult problems of national and social liberation of the country. And the first Chinese Marxist-Leninists proposed such solutions. At the same time, it is important to note that the supporters of Marxism and Leninism themselves regarded the solutions they proposed as a radical break with the traditional ideology, with the traditional socio-political orders, although in fact these Marxist recipes for China's renewal to the greatest extent corresponded to the traditional type of public consciousness with its desire to restoration of a "fair" and "harmonious" social order through the total regulation of the entire life of society by a powerful state. And in this correspondence, in this consonance, one of the main reasons for the growing ideological and political success of the utopian revolutionaries.
The utopian revolutionaries defeated the pragmatic reformers in a literary and theoretical dispute, which gradually developed into an ideological and political dispute, which significantly affected the entire subsequent history of China.
2. Formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
The increased ideological and political activity of the first supporters of Marxism-Leninism attracted the attention of the Comintern. In April 1920, a group of Vladivostok communists headed by G.N. Voitinsky went to China in order to study the political situation and establish contacts with progressive figures. This group quickly found common ground with the Chinese supporters of Marxism. On her initiative and with her help, the first Marxist circles began to be created. In July 1920, the first circle was organized in Shanghai, and Chen Duxiu became its leader. In October 1920, under the leadership of Li Dazhao, a circle was established in Beijing. Mugs also arose in Changsha (leader Mao Zedong), Guangzhou, Wuhan, Jinan, and among Chinese emigrants in Tokyo. In February 1921 an attempt was made to organize a circle among the Chinese youth in France. Many future prominent figures of the CPC came out of this Marxist circle (Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Li Lisan, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, Nie Rongzhen, Li Weihan, and others). The actual management of the activities of the circles was carried out by the Xin Qingnian magazine, which since the autumn of 1920 became (not without the financial support of the Comintern) in fact the first political organ of the communist movement in China, and its updated edition (after disagreeing with the new orientation Hu Shi left the magazine) was headed by Chen Duxiu.
The members of the circles not only studied Marxism, but also took the first steps towards popularizing the Marxist doctrine. The first complete translation of the "Manifesto of the Communist Party", translations of some other works of Marx and Engels, and then of Lenin, are published. Since November 1920, for about a year, the journal Gunchandan (Communist) has been published semi-legally. Workers' magazines and newspapers, as well as pamphlets and leaflets, begin to be published. Schools for workers, workers' clubs are organized, attempts are made to celebrate May 1, and so on. The Comintern provided not only theoretical and organizational, but also financial support to all these activities.
The social composition of the first Marxist circles was heterogeneous. Among the first supporters of Marxism, there were no workers yet, the progressive student youth prevailed, mostly coming from a socially privileged environment. In the first circles there were supporters not only of Marxism, but also of anarchism and some other socialist trends, and most of all there were revolutionary nationalists. It is no coincidence that at that time many prominent figures of the Kuomintang later joined the communist circles (Dai Jitao, Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Gan Naiguang, Shi Cuntong, and others).
The political activity of the first Marxist circles, the ideological and theoretical demarcation, which accelerated during the "discussion about socialism", the general national upsurge pushed the leadership of these circles to the idea of the need to speed up the formation of the party. This decisive step was the congress of representatives of Marxist circles, which also became the First Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP). The congress was held illegally in Shanghai from July 23 to August 5, 1921. The congress was attended by 12 delegates from seven circles, numbering 53 people: Zhang Guotao, Liu Renjing (Beijing), Li Hanjun, Li Da (Shanghai), Chen Tanqiu, Dong Biu (Wuhan), Chen Gongbo, Bao Huiseng (Guangzhou), Deng Enming, Wang Jinmei (Jinan), Mao Zedong (Changsha), Zhou Fohai (Tokyo).
Despite the sharpness of the pre-Congress ideological and theoretical demarcation, the congress participants were very diverse in their ideological and political appearance, which predetermined the nature of the congress discussions. Most of the participants in the congress, led by Zhang Guotao, defended the idea of creating a militant, disciplined and well-organized party of the Bolshevik type, the goal of which is to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. This position was supported by the representative of the Comintern, G. Maripg, and the representative of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Nikolsky, who took an active part in organizing and holding the congress. The minority of the congress, headed by Li Hanjun, stating the weakness of the Marxist forces, called for the creation of a legal organization that would concentrate its efforts on the study and propaganda of Marxism. Rejecting the position of the minority, the congress considered the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the immediate task of the party being created. The congress counterposed the political struggle of the working class to all other political currents, actually taking a sectarian position. A number of program documents were approved at the congress. The Congress elected a Provisional Bureau composed of Chen Duxiu (Secretary), Zhang Guotao, and Li Da.
Implementing the decisions of their first congress, the communists sought to actively engage in labor movement, to become its true initiators and organizers. Unfolded in the early 20's. the rise of the spontaneous strike movement favored the work of the communists. In July 1921, on the initiative of the Communists, the All-China Secretariat of Trade Unions was created in Shanghai, which gradually became the true leading center of the labor movement. The successful strike of Hong Kong sailors (January-March 1922), supported by the government of Sun Yat-sen in Guangzhou and the solidarity strikes in Shanghai, was of great importance for the labor movement, and met with sympathy and help abroad.
The subsequent political events associated with the rise and defeat of the working-class movement clearly revealed the peculiarity of the objective position of the CCP under the dominance of militaristic regimes in a semi-colonial country. The fate of the strike on the Peking-Hankow railway in February 1923 was of paramount importance. Here the trade unions led by the communists, who fought successfully for the rights of workers, enjoyed great influence. Frightened by the growing influence of the trade unions, the militarist Wu Peifu brutally cracked down on the strikers on February 7 and crushed the trade unions. This terrorist act marked the beginning of a certain decline in the labor movement. The events of February 7, 1923 once again showed the isolation of the working-class movement from the general national upsurge, from the national democratic movement. Thus, the very logic of the communists' first steps in the political struggle led them to understand the need to unite with the national democratic forces in order to achieve victory in the struggle against militarism and imperialism.
At the same time, it was very difficult for the first Chinese communists, who “followed the example of the Russians” and were adherents of extreme political radicalism, the idea of a permanent socialist revolution, to realize this political imperative. For such an ideological and political turn, the decisions of the Second Congress of the Comintern (1920) were of great importance. At this Congress, Lenin, while maintaining his adherence to the concept of a permanent socialist revolution for the countries of the West, put forward for the countries of the East, for colonial and semi-colonial countries, the concept of an anti-colonial, national liberation revolution and, in this connection, the concept of a united anti-imperialist front. This Leninist idea was based on the realization of the impossibility of the social liberation of the peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries before the overthrow of the colonial rule of imperialism. Within the framework of a united anti-imperialist front, the communists, according to Lenin, should strive to occupy active and leading positions, radicalize the anti-colonial revolutions as much as possible and, if successful, try to transfer the liberated countries to a non-capitalist path of development. Remaining within the framework of the Leninist utopia of development alternative to capitalism, this concept at the political level opened up enormous opportunities for solving really urgent tasks of national liberation, for uniting heterogeneous social forces in the fight against colonialism.
Based on this new conceptual approach, the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) developed and recommended to the CPC a new tactical line. These problems were discussed for the first time by the Chinese Communists at the Congress of the Peoples of the Far East (Moscow-
Petrograd, January 21-February 2, 1922), where a Chinese delegation was present, which included not only communists, but also representatives of the Kuomintang (Zhang Qiubo), anarchists (Huang Lingshuang); the Socialist Party (Jiang Kanghu) and others. Rejecting the ideas of the Chinese communists about the socialist character of the Chinese revolution, the Cominternists raised for discussion the question of the relationship of the communists with other anti-imperialist political forces, the relationship between the problems of national and social liberation. The congress clearly formulated the idea of a united anti-imperialist front. Some of the Chinese delegates were received by Lenin, and there is evidence that he raised the question of cooperation with the Kuomintang before them.
These new program guidelines were already reflected in the work of the Second Congress of the CPC, held in Shanghai from July 16 to July 23, 1922. Twelve delegates from 123 party members participated in the work of the congress. The congress paid great attention to the analysis of the work of communists in the labor movement, adopted the Charter of the CPC, focused on the creation of a mass proletarian party of the Bolshevik type, and decided on the entry of the CPC into the Comintern. Of great importance was the adoption by the congress of the minimum program published in the form of the "Declaration of the Second Congress of the CPC." This document formulates the concept of a united anti-imperialist front and the need for the working class to support the revolutionary bourgeois-democratic movement. However, implementing this policy proved more difficult than stating it.
3. Reorganization of the Kuomintang and establishment of a revolutionary base in Guangdong
Sun Yat-sen did not take direct part in the May 4th Movement, but he could not but experience the enormous influence of the national upsurge. If during the war years Sun Yat-sen became more and more deeply aware of China's objective place in the colonial system of imperialism, after the war the connection between imperialism and Chinese militarism becomes more and more obvious to him. He comes to the logical conclusion that the victory of the Xinhai Revolution has not yet led to the realization of either the principle of nationalism or the principle of democracy. The realization of these principles is possible only with the complete victory of the "national revolution" directed against colonial dependence, and the "political revolution" directed against militarism and disunity.
To achieve these goals, Sun Yat-sen on October 10, 1919, announced the need to reorganize the Zhonghua Gemindan (Chinese Revolutionary Party) into the Zhongguo Kuomintang (Chinese National Party). It was about transforming a narrow, conspiratorial organization operating mainly outside of China into a mass and militant party, operating primarily on the basis of local cells within China. A long and complex process of reorganization of the Kuomintang began, turning it into the leading political force of the national revolution. This process took place under fundamentally new conditions associated with the gradual creation of a revolutionary base in Guangdong, which was associated with the invitation of Sun Yat-sen to Guangzhou, where the militarist Chen Junming seized power at the end of 1920. In April 1921, at the initiative of Sun Yat-sen, the old (1913) Republican Parliament met in Guangzhou and elected Sun Yat-sen as President Extraordinary of the Republic of China. In this post, Sun Yat-sen sought to make the province of Guangdong the base of the country's revolutionary forces, the stronghold of the military unification campaign in the North.
As president, Sun Yat-sen sought to expand the social base of his power, in particular by supporting the strikers in Hong Kong, attracting communists to his government (because of this, Chen Duxiu could not take part in the 1st Congress of the CPC), expanding and strengthening the Kuomintang. However, this activity met with resistance from the powers and militarists, including Chen Junming, who in June 1922 staged a military coup and expelled Sun Yat-sen. But in February 1923, Chen Junming himself was driven out by rival Guangxi and Yunnan militarists, who again invited Sun Yat-sen to head the government. Sun Yat-sen accepted the invitation but tried to learn from his past defeats in Guangzhou. Sunyatsen's interpretation of these lessons can be reduced first of all to an understanding of the need to get rid of dependence on the militarists and, for this, to complete the creation of a well-organized party, relying on its own party revolutionary army and on the support of the masses of the people. Of great importance for the implementation of these lessons were Sun Yat-sen's connections with Soviet Russia.
Russia's friendly policy towards China could not fail to attract the attention of Sun Yat-sen. In an alliance with Soviet Russia, he saw an important factor in strengthening his political positions inside and outside China. In 1920, in Shanghai and Guangzhou, Sun Yat-sen met and talked with G.N. Voitinsky, and then with other workers of the Comintern - G. Maring (in 1921) and S.A. Dalin (in 1922). Sun Yat-sen also enters into correspondence with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G.V. Chicherin. In one of his letters to Chicherin in August 1921, Sun Yat-sen emphasized: "I am extremely interested in your cause, especially in the organization of your Soviets, your army and education." Of great importance for determining the position of Sun Yat-sen in relation to Soviet Russia and the communist movement were his negotiations with the representative of the RSFSR A.A. Ioffe, culminating in the signing of a communique in Shanghai on January 27, 1923, which, in particular, stated: “Dr Sun Yat-sen believes that at present the communist system or even the Soviet system cannot be introduced in China, since the conditions necessary for the successful establishment of communism or sovietism do not yet exist there. This point of view is entirely shared by the plenipotentiary of the RSFSR, who, further, considers that China's most urgent and important task is its national unification and the acquisition of complete national independence. In this great cause, he assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen, China enjoys the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.
This support was extremely important for Sun Yat-sen, for he understood more and more clearly that with all the sympathy of the United States, Europe, Japan for him personally and for his cause, he could not count on the direct military, economic, political support of these powers. And without such support, it was impossible to complete his plans for the unification and liberation of the country. The solidarity of the government of the new Russia and its ruling party with the Chinese revolution inspired great hopes in Sun Yat-sen. This solidarity reflected the peculiarity of the position of Soviet Russia towards China. On the one hand, Moscow was negotiating with Beijing on the resumption of diplomatic relations, emphasizing its respect for the Republic of China. On the other hand, Moscow was ready to support those political forces in China that opposed the Peking government and with which it was possible to link the prospects for China's revolutionary transformation. From the point of view of the Moscow party and state leadership, there was no contradiction in this position, it fit perfectly into the corresponding understanding of the relationship of national interests. Soviet state and interests of the world revolution.
Sun Yat-sen's political rapprochement with Soviet Russia logically led him to cooperate with the Chinese communists, who were taking the first, but already politically noticeable, steps in organizing the workers' movement. Cooperation with Soviet Russia and the communists, the experience of the Russian revolution became important factors in the reorganization of the Kuomintang. As early as the end of 1922, in Shanghai, Sun Yat-sen convened a conference on the reorganization of the Kuomintang and, based on the results of its work, on January 1, 1923, published a declaration in which he formulated the goals of the party and the ways of its reorganization. Returning to Guangzhou and heading the government, Sun Yat-sen stepped up the reorganization of the Kuomintang. In August 1923, he sent to Moscow a military-political delegation headed by Chiang Kai-shek, which also included the communist Zhang Tailei. For several months, the delegation got acquainted with the organization of party, state, military work, met with the leaders of the Soviet state and the Comintern. The delegation held negotiations, which resulted in the provision of military, financial, technical assistance to the Kuomintang for the reorganization of the party, the creation of a new army, and the strengthening of the state apparatus.
The Kuomintang delegation established close ties with the leadership of the Comintern, counting on its political support. On November 28, 1923, the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee discussed the problems of the Chinese revolution with the participation of the Kuomintang delegation. A special resolution was adopted, which spoke of the Comintern's solidarity with the liberation struggle of the Chinese "people, led by Sun Yat-sen, and at the same time contained certain political recommendations. The main thesis of this resolution is "... nationalism ... should mean the destruction of oppression as foreign imperialism and domestic militarism "- fully corresponded to the evolutionary trend of Sun Yat-sen's views. However, another - very important for the Comintern - the thesis of this resolution that it is necessary to destroy "... the institution of large and numerous medium and small landowners who do not work on the land" , was completely unacceptable to Sun Yat-sen and his followers and at the same time did not reflect the realities of the agrarian system and the peasant movement in China.
The trip of this delegation contributed to the rapid development of Kuomintang ties with the Soviet Union. Already in October 1923, an experienced party worker, M.M., arrived in Guangzhou at the invitation of Sun Yat-sen. Borodin, appointed chief adviser on the reorganization of the Kuomintang. At the same time, the first group of military advisers arrived in Guangzhou from the USSR, invited to create a Kuomintang military school and organize a new, party army. Soon, weapons for this army begin to arrive.
At the same time, Sun Yat-sen appointed a commission for the reorganization of the Kuomintang, consisting of Liao Zhongkai, Wang Jingwei, Zhang Ji, Dai Jitao and Li Dazhao. In November, the "Manifesto on the Reorganization of the Kuomintang" was published, and elections were held for delegates to the first congress of the party. The reorganization took place, quite naturally, with great difficulties, with the political struggle of various groups and trends in the Kuomintang, which had different ideas of the goals and nature of the reorganization of the party. One of the main points of this struggle was the question of the form and nature of cooperation with the communists.
The cooperation of the Kuomintang with the Soviet Union, and even more so with the Comintern, could not but raise this problem before Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang. The step towards cooperation with the Chinese Communists was made by the Kuomintang thanks to Sun Yat-sen. However, Sun Yat-sen did not agree to the creation of a united front on an inter-party basis, not wanting to give up his claims to a political monopoly and agreeing only to the individual entry of the Communists into the Kuomintang. On the other hand, the Comintern also had to do significant explanatory work in the CPC, aimed at overcoming certain left-wing sectarian tendencies and the distrust of a number of communists in Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang.
Already the decisions and materials of the II (1920) and IV (1922) Congresses of the Comintern directed the Communists of China to formulate a policy of a united anti-imperialist front. At the same time, the executive committee of the Comintern also prepared special documents concerning the creation of a united front of the CCP and the Kuomintang. In addition to the already mentioned decision of the Presidium of the ECCI of November 28, 1923, two more documents were adopted: the resolution of the ECCI of January 12, 1923 "On the attitude of the CPC towards the Kuomintang Party" and the "Directive of the ECCI to the Third Congress of the CPC" of May 24, 1923.
All these documents proceeded from a clear understanding of the national character of the revolutionary process developing in China, from the recognition of the objective fact of the growing anti-imperialist struggle of various sections of the Chinese people, from a correct assessment of the leading political role of the Sun Yat-sen Kuomintang. The resolution of January 12 pointed out the need for cooperation between the Communists and the Kuomintang based on the fact that "... the only serious national revolutionary group in China is the Kuomintang Party" and that "... under the current conditions it is expedient for members of the CPC to remain within the Kuomintang Party" .
In an effort to overcome the distrust of many communists in Sun Yat-sen, who again came to power in Guangzhou thanks to the support of the militarists, the directive stated: "... in the issue of civil war between Sun Yat-sen and the northern militarists, we support Sun Yat-sen." At the same time, the need was emphasized to transform this war into a truly revolutionary, people's war, not bound by militaristic combinations. While noting the theoretical and political sobriety of these Comintern documents, one cannot help but see many weaknesses and mistakes that stem from the undeveloped theoretical analysis of Chinese socio-economic reality, from an erroneous assessment of the balance of class forces, from the dogmatism of political thinking. Thus, all these documents proceeded from the premise that "it is precisely the peasant question that is the central issue of all politics" and that "only by bringing the agrarian basis under the slogans of the anti-imperialist front can we hope for real success." These provisions were based not on an analysis of the agrarian system of the Chinese countryside, not on a real assessment of the level of the peasant movement, and not on the possibility of adopting this approach even by the most faithful followers of Sun Yat-sen, but rather on analogies with the experience of the Russian revolution. The assessment of the level of the labor movement was not distinguished by sobriety, which led to the assertion that the leading role of the party of the working class in the united front was "taken for granted". While not much of a hindrance to the creation of a united front, these dogmatic propositions made it difficult to carry out the policy of the united front in the subsequent stages of the revolutionary process.
Thus, Moscow, providing significant political and military support to the Sun Yat-sen Kuomintang, regarded it as a mass nationwide organization, and the CPC as a political vanguard that would be able to become an effective leader of this united front of the victorious struggle of the Chinese people against militarism and imperialism and thereby the transition of the revolution to new stage. For the leaders of the Comintern - supporters of the world socialist revolution - the question of the legitimacy of such interference in the internal affairs of China, of course, did not arise.
The problems of the united front were at the center of attention at the next, III Congress of the CPC, held from June 10 to 23, 1923 in Guangzhou, where by that time the Central Committee had already moved from Shanghai and where the communists now had opportunities for legal work. The 30 congress delegates represented 420 party members. Chen Duxiu's summary report described the whole complexity of the development of the party, which claimed to be proletarian, but was only taking the first steps in organizing the workers' movement. The party managed to do even less in organizing the peasant movement. Groupism and factionalism, the weak connection of some party members with party organizations, and non-payment of membership dues (the activities of the party were mainly financed by the Comintern) caused alarm in inner-party life.
Main question work of the congress - the question of joining the Kuomintang. The majority of the congress (Chen Tuxiu, Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo, Zhang Tailei, and others) supported the directive of the Comintern on the individual entry of the Communists into the Kuomintang, while maintaining the organizational and political independence of the party. A minority (Zhang Guotao, Cai Hesen, and others) criticized this idea from leftist, sectarian positions. The resolution on individual entry into the Kuomintang was adopted by a small majority, which testified to the influence of leftist sentiments, which significantly affected the policy of the party in the future. 9 people were elected to the Central Committee: Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Cai Hesen, Wang Hebo, Mao Zedong, Zhu Shaolian, Tan Pingshan, Huang Delong (Xiang Ying), Luo Zhanglong. Chen Duxiu was elected General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee for the third time.
The decisions of the congress served as one of the prerequisites for the active participation of the Communists in the reorganization of the Kuomintang, in the actual creation of a united front. As already mentioned, Li Dazhao was included by Sun Yat-sen in the commission for the reorganization of the Kuomintang, and Zhang Tailei was included in the Kuomintang delegation that went to Moscow. Many prominent communists did a great job of reorganizing local Kuomintang organizations: Li Dazhao in Beijing, Qu Qiubo, Zhang Tailei, Deng Zhongxia in Shanghai, Tan Pingshan in Guangzhou. This contributed to the political rapprochement between the Communists and the Kuomintang, the actual formation of a united front, and the accumulation of experience in this difficult cooperation. Participation in the work on the reorganization of the Kuomintang adviser M.M. Borodin, the help of Soviet military specialists in creating a party army, the cooperation of the Kuomintang with the Comintern also contributed to the rapprochement between the Kuomintang and the Communists.
The most important stage in the reorganization of the Kuomintang and the formation of a united front was the First Congress of the Kuomintang, held in Guangzhou from January 20 to 30, 1924. The congress was attended by 165 delegates, representing more than 11 thousand members of the party. The program of the new, reorganized Kuomintang was formulated in the main document of the congress - the manifesto, in which the Communists took part, as well as M.M. Borodin. The manifesto gave an updated interpretation of the “Three People's Principles”, and the task of implementing the principle of nationalism in its new formulation, focusing on the struggle against world imperialism and Chinese militarism, was brought to the fore: “The unrest in our country is created by the great powers, whose interests in China collide and who, in the name of their goals, exterminate our people with the hands of militarists.” Interpreting the principle of democracy, the manifesto considers the future constitutional structure based on the constitution of the "five powers" - legislative, judicial, executive, examination and control. The manifesto proclaims the desire to "avoid the shortcomings that parliamentarism brings with it", "eliminate the vices inherent in the electoral system". Traditionally, the principle of popular welfare is expounded, which included, first of all, the equalization of rights to land and the idea of limiting capital.
The interpretation of the "three people's principles" in the manifesto, which emphasized their anti-imperialist orientation and anti-capitalist coloring, reflected the influence of the October experience on Sun Yat-sen, the influence of his cooperation with the Comintern, the Chinese Communists, with M.M. Borodin. However, this interpretation, readily accepted by the left in the Kuomintang and the communists, was not supported by the influential conservative, right-wing forces in the Kuomintang. Only the enormous personal authority of Sun Yat-sen made it possible to adopt the manifesto and "admit" the Communists into the Kuomintang, temporarily mitigating the contradictions of these positions.
The congress devoted much attention to the problems of party building. In his speech, Sun Yat-sen said that he would like to make the Kuomintang party "...as well organized and strong as the revolutionary party of Russia." He was guided by the creation of a party of the Leninist, Bolshevik type with iron discipline and strict centralization, with a claim to a political monopoly. One of the congress resolutions stated that "...the organizational principle of the Kuomintang is democratic centralism." The Bolshevik interpretation of the organizational principles of building the party was supplemented by the establishment of a special role for the president (zongli) of the party, who had essentially dictatorial rights.
The Congress elected the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Kuomintang, consisting of 41 members, among whom were 10 communists. Many communists took leading positions in the apparatus of the Kuomintang and worked in local organizations. This was the actual formation of a united front.
The ideological and theoretical banner of the united front, of the entire developing national liberation movement, is increasingly becoming the Sun Yatsen program for the revival and liberation of China, its "three people's principles." And the point is not only in the personal authority of the first President of the Republic of China, but above all in the fact that the program he developed formulated tempting goals and showed real ways to achieve them. In the post-war years, Sun Yat-sen continued to improve his program, striving to make it the main document of the reorganized Kuomintang Party. Of particular importance was the series of Lectures on the Three Principles of the People, which he read in 1924.
The combination - not opposition - in Sun Yat-senism of the ideas of national and social liberation was the strength of Sun Yat-sen's program. In his lectures, he paid great attention to this, arguing, in particular, on this issue with Marxists. Rejecting the Marxist concept of the class struggle, he saw the driving force behind historical progress in "the reconciliation of the interests of the vast majority of society." Developing his social ideal, Sun Yat-sen, not without polemical poignancy, emphasized that "... the well-being of the people - this is socialism, or, as it is called in another way, communism." Moreover, Sun Yat-sen does not want to give priority in formulating this idea of social justice not only to Marxist, but also to European thought in general, developing the thesis about the Chinese origin of this circle of ideas. He connects the origin of socialist and communist ideas with the Chinese traditional (largely Confucian) concept of "great harmony" (datong). This tradition has behind it not only thousands of years of theoretical development, but also the experience of practical implementation, for communism in China “... was put into practice during the period of Hong Xiuquan. The economic system created by Hong Xiuquan was a communist system. And that was communist reality, not just theory.”
Speaking about his social ideal, Sun Yat-sen emphasized the connection of times: "If everything belongs to everyone, then our goal - the well-being of the people - will really be achieved and the world of "great harmony" that Confucius dreamed of will reign." The appeal to traditional thought and traditional phraseology reflected not only the political needs of finding ways to the heart and mind of every Chinese, but also a certain evolution of the views of Sun Yat-sen himself, who, in his lectures, more deeply comprehends the connection of his ideas with traditional Chinese thought.
At the same time, it is impossible not to see that a certain Confucianization of Sun Yat-senism meant at the same time the strengthening of the utopian element of his worldview. However, this utopianization of Sun Yat-sen's worldview did not significantly affect his political program and policy. In Sun Yat-sen, a utopian thinker and a pragmatic politician coexisted in a peculiar way. In the post-war years, as in the previous decades of his political activity, Sun Yat-sen demonstrated common sense, the search for a mutually beneficial compromise, a preference for reformist methods of solving pressing problems, and a clear understanding that violent, revolutionary methods should be resorted to only in extreme cases. Such a social ideal and such ways of achieving it had an enormous attraction. The ideas of Sun Yat-senism took possession of the masses.
4. China on the eve of the national revolution of 1925-1927.
The reorganization of the Kuomintang helped to strengthen the positions of the Sun Yat-sen government in Guangdong and expand the sphere of its political influence. The creation of a revolutionary army, to which Sun Yat-sen attached particular importance, also helped stabilize the power of the Canton government. Under conditions of militaristic revelry, the Kuomintang could really strengthen its political positions only with its own effective military force, independent of the whims of the Chinese generals. It was very difficult to create such an army, because Sun Yat-sen had neither experienced military personnel, nor weapons, nor money. Significant Soviet assistance made it possible in the main to solve these problems.
Already at the very beginning of 1924, on the island of Whampu (Huangpu) at the mouth of the Zhujiang, 25 km from Guangzhou, a military school, designed to train cadres of revolutionary officers for the party army. Within a year and a half, three intakes of cadets with a total number of about 2 thousand people were held in it. Soviet military specialists taught and conducted political and educational work at the school. In May 1924, P.A. arrived in Guangzhou as the chief military adviser. Pavlov, who did a lot to organize the Wampu school and the revolutionary army. In July 1924 he died tragically. In this post, he was replaced by the famous Soviet commander V.K. Blucher. Soviet military specialists of various profiles were involved in teaching and organizational work in the revolutionary army. Both prominent Kuomintang members (for example, Dai Jitao) and prominent CCP figures (for example, Zhou Enlai) took part in political work at the school, seeking to influence the political orientation of the cadets. The head of the school was Chiang Kai-shek. At the same time, training units were also formed - first battalions, and by 1925 - two training regiments. The arrival of Soviet weapons and equipment helped make the Wampu school and training units a real military force.
In the very first year of their existence, they received a baptism of fire, defending the government of Sun Yat-sen from the rebels. The difficult economic situation forced the government to take financial measures that were very unpopular among the Guangzhou merchants - to introduce new taxes. The elite of the merchant class, closely connected with British capital (especially through Hong Kong) and disagreeing with the policy of the Kuomintang government, took advantage of the crisis situation and attempted to carry out an anti-government coup by means of the merchant militia (shangtuan). Sun Yat-sen tried to resolve this crisis by compromise, sought the support of the merchants, and even hoped to include the Shangtuan in his army. However, the leaders of the Guangzhou merchants, and above all the head of the Shangtuan (and the richest merchant in Guangzhou) Chen Lianbo, supported by the Hong Kong authorities, decided to use the crisis to overthrow the government of Sun Yat-sen. On the thirteenth anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution (October 10, 1924), the merchants of Guangzhou and a number of other cities in Guangdong stopped trading, and the Shantuan rebelled. This performance, known as the Paper Tiger Mutiny, forced Sun Yat-sen to turn to military force. The revolutionary cadet units, work detachments, the first artillery units under the general command of Chiang Kai-shek were thrown against the rebels according to a plan drawn up by Soviet military advisers. The rapid defeat of the "paper tigers" strengthened the military and political positions of the Kuomintang government and allowed it to inflict a heavy defeat at the beginning of 1925 on the main enemy of the Kuomintang government - Chen Jiongming (1st Eastern Campaign), significantly expanding its influence in Guangdong, strengthening the revolutionary base. In these battles, the formation of the revolutionary army took place.
The expansion and consolidation of the influence of the Kuomintang government created favorable legal conditions for the development of the workers' and peasants' movement, which, in turn, became an important factor in strengthening the revolutionary base and increasing the influence of the Kuomintang in the national liberation movement.
The workers' department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, in which the Communists played an active role, carried out significant activities in Guangzhou and Guangdong in organizing the working class and restoring the trade union movement. By May 1924, about 100,000 workers had been organized into trade unions. The significance of Guangzhou as one of the centers of the labor movement was demonstrated in the anti-imperialist strike of Chinese workers in July-August 1924, caused by the repression of the Anglo-French concession administration in Shamyan (Guangzhou region). In protest, the striking Chinese workers began to leave the concession area. The strikers were supported by the workers of Guangzhou, as well as the Kuomintang government. All this forced the authorities of the concession to succumb to the pressure of the strikers. This victory marked the beginning of a new upsurge in the labor movement.
Guangdong was also the first province where an organized peasant movement took shape. Its initiator was the Communist Peng Bai, who as early as 1921 set about organizing a peasant union in Haifeng County. By 1923, this union united almost a quarter of the peasant families of the county. The defeat of Chen Junming and the strengthening of the power of the Kuomintang government contributed to the development of this work in other counties as well. The organizers of the peasant unions were primarily communists who actively worked in the peasant department of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, who became the initiators and organizers of the courses of the peasant movement. In May 1925, there were more than 200 thousand people in the peasant unions of 22 counties of Guangdong. At the congress of representatives of these unions in May 1925, a peasant organization was created, which set as its tasks the reduction of rent and taxes, the organization and arming of the peasants, which basically corresponded to the objective conditions for the development of the province.
The strengthening of the revolutionary base in Guangdong was also favored by the general situation in the country in 1924-1925, which was characterized by the revival of the national liberation struggle. This revival prompted the Peking government to sign on May 31, 1924, the "Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of Questions between the USSR and the Republic of China." The signing of this agreement was the result of intense diplomatic activity and pressure on Beijing by the progressive Chinese public. The agreement provided for the establishment of diplomatic relations, the renunciation of the USSR from "special rights and privileges", from the Russian part of the "boxing indemnity", from the rights of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction. With regard to the CER, a special agreement was signed, according to which the CER was declared a "purely commercial enterprise" and managed on an equal footing by the USSR and China. It was the first in the 20th century. an equal treaty between China and a great power, which laid the foundation for close and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two neighboring states. Its signing also reflected the increased understanding by the Peking government of the importance of cooperation with the USSR for the protection of national interests.
Another manifestation of this revival was the protracted crisis of militaristic regimes. Since 1920, the Zhili grouping has been in power in Beijing, almost constantly competing with other groups. The manifestation of this rivalry was the Zhili-Fengtian war of 1922, the victory in which allowed the Zhili leader Cao Kun to take the post of president of the republic the following year. However, the rivalry of these strongest groups continued. A new Zhili-Fengtian war began in the autumn of 1924. At the height of this war, in October 1924, one of the Zhili generals, Feng Yuxiang, opposed the leaders of the Zhili group, Wu Peifu and Cao Kun. This time it was not the usual militaristic strife. Behind this speech was a certain socio-political reorientation of General Feng Yuxiang under the influence of the upsurge of the national liberation struggle. Feng Yuxiang, who had previously had friendly relations with the Kuomintang, declared his support for the program of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang, legalized the activities of the Kuomintang and the CPC in the subject territory, asked (and received) military assistance from the Soviet Union. He renamed his troops the "national army" (guominjun). Because on the subject rebel general Beijing was also located on the territory, which naturally led to an acute political crisis. The new government was headed by the Anfuist leader Duan Qirui, who included supporters of the Fengtian people and Feng Yuxiang in the government. The presence of General Feng Yuxiang's troops in Beijing, the strengthening of the Sun Yat-sen government in the south of the country, and the general national upsurge forced Duan Qirui to come up with the initiative to convene an all-China conference to unify the country and invite Sun Yat-sen to this conference.
Sun Yat-sen, who until recently, in September, was ready to lead the Northern campaign of his army, taking advantage of militaristic strife, accepted this invitation without hesitation. On November 13, 1924, accompanied by his wife Soong Qingling, the leaders of the Kuomintang, and adviser M.M. Borodin, he went to Beijing. His trip to the north turned into a bright patriotic demonstration and became an important factor in expanding the influence of the Kuomintang and the ideas of a national revolution. For several months, the attention of the country was riveted on the trip of Sun Yat-sen, to his speeches against militaristic machinations, for convening a genuine National Assembly, for the abolition of unequal treaties. This was the last political battle of the seriously ill Sun Yat-sen. On March 12, 1925, he died. The death of the "father of the Chinese revolution", the true leader of the national liberation struggle, the authoritative leader of the Kuomintang, was an irreparable loss for the Chinese people.
A manifestation of the growing national upsurge was the revival of the labor movement following Guangdong in other provinces of China. Gradually, trade union organizations were restored, and the workers' struggle for their rights intensified. The struggle of the railroad workers of the North and the textile workers of the seaside towns developed especially rapidly. The strikes at the Japanese textile factories in Shanghai in February and Qingdao in May 1925 were of great importance. Starting as a spontaneous protest against the intensification of oppression and oppression on the part of Japanese entrepreneurs, these actions of the working class developed into national, anti-imperialist ones. One of the appeals of the Shanghai strike committee said: "Dear compatriots, quickly rise up to fight for the sovereignty of China." These strikes enjoyed the support of broad sections of the population.
The CCP sought to use this rise to increase its influence in the working environment. Communists Qu Qiubo, Cai Hesen, Zhang Guotao, Zhang Tailei, Deng Zhongxia, Li Lisan, Liu Shaoqi and others carried out organizational and political work here. on which the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was formed, uniting 540 thousand members of trade unions.
In this situation of revival of the working-class movement, the general upsurge of the national liberation struggle, in January 1925 the Fourth Congress of the CPC was held in Shanghai. It was attended by 20 delegates representing about 1,000 party members. The work and decisions of the congress reflected the search for ways to turn the CPC into a mass political party of the proletariat, which has a strong peasant ally. Therefore, the congress set the task of drawing workers into the party, strengthening the party leadership of the trade unions. At the same time, at the congress, the first experience of the peasant movement in Guangdong was interpreted as dictating the advancement of agrarian demands, the previous slogans were supplemented by a directive to fight the big landowners, the village world eaters (tuhao and lesheng). The effectiveness of the decisions of the congress aimed at expanding the participation and political influence of the party in the national liberation movement, however, was largely weakened by the left-wing sectarian tendencies that dominated the congress, which emerged as early as the second half of 1924. In the context of the intensification of the political struggle in the Guangdong revolutionary base, part of the leadership of the CPC (First of all, Chen Duxiu, Cai Hesen and Mao Zedong), criticizing Sun Yat-sen's government from leftist positions, led the line towards the actual withdrawal from the Kuomintang. In the decisions of the congress, this tendency manifested itself primarily in the raising of the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in the national revolution. Moreover, this question was posed not in theoretical terms, but as a practical task, as a slogan for action. The congress elected a new Central Committee consisting of 9 people. Chen Duxiu was re-elected General Secretary.
The failure of the unification conference in Peking and the ongoing militarist wars demonstrated the inherent inability of the militarists to solve the problem of national unification by peaceful means. The strengthening of the revolutionary base in Guangdong, the development of the united front, the growth of the workers' and peasants' movement created the preconditions for the formation of a powerful new force capable of uniting China by revolutionary methods. A revolutionary situation was brewing in the country.
5. The initial stage of the national revolution (May 1925 - June 1926)
By the summer of 1925, the growing class struggle of the Chinese workers in the coastal towns developed into mass anti-imperialist actions, which became the beginning of the National Revolution. In Shanghai, strikes at Japanese textile factories that began in February expanded in May in response to repression by the owners and authorities. However, the struggle of the workers for their economic interests under the conditions of severe repression by the authorities and the Japanese imperialists was extremely difficult, and the Central Committee of the CPC decided to put national slogans in the forefront, to turn the purely economic struggle of the workers into a mass anti-imperialist uprising. Since the goal was not only to alleviate the plight of the strikers, but also to strengthen the influence of the CCP among the broad masses, it was decided to organize a student demonstration in Shanghai on May 30 under anti-imperialist slogans.
This demonstration of students was shot by the British police of the International Settlement, which only intensified and expanded the mass demonstrations in Shanghai - in various forms they covered almost all sections of the Chinese population. Workers not only of all Japanese enterprises, but also English ones, went on strike. All students and pupils of secondary schools stopped their studies, trade ceased, and a boycott of Japanese and English goods began. Shanghai responded to brutal repressions with a genuine outburst of national patriotic feelings.
In this upsurge of the national struggle, a particularly important role was played by the Shanghai working class, organized primarily by the Communists. As early as May 31, the Communists established the General Council of the Shanghai Trade Unions, with Li Lisan as chairman. During the strike, the General Council did a great deal of work in creating trade unions, and above all in Japanese and British enterprises, managing to organize the workers. The General Council actually became the legal organ for guiding the struggle of the Shanghai working people. In early June, more than 130,000 workers from 107 foreign enterprises were on strike under the leadership of the General Council. The most active were the textile workers of Japanese and British factories. The strike also affected a small number of Chinese enterprises (26,000 strikers at 11 enterprises).
The United Union of Students, which played such an important role in the development of the anti-imperialist struggle, was also under the influence of the Communists. The united union of merchants of various streets not only directly participated in patriotic actions (demonstrations, boycotts of foreign goods, closing of shops), but also provided material assistance to the strikers. On June 7, on the crest of the national struggle, on the initiative and under the leadership of the communists, the Joint Committee of Workers, Traders and Students was created, which was in fact an organization of the united front. The Joint Committee put forward a program of national demands, consisting of 17 points, which became the de facto platform of the May 30 Movement.
The main content of this platform was of a national nature and was aimed primarily at eliminating the political dominance of foreigners in Shanghai and the humiliating position of the Chinese in their hometown, which led to such tragic consequences as the murder of a young worker Gong Zhenghong in a Japanese textile factory on May 15 or execution British police student demonstration on 30 May. Actually proletarian interests were expressed in only one point - in the demand to introduce labor legislation and freedom to organize trade unions and strikes at foreign enterprises.
The Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce, a stronghold of the Shanghai bourgeoisie, refused to join the Joint Committee and put forward its own 13-point program, which also contained anti-imperialist demands, but in a less radical form. Thus, the highly heterogeneous Shanghai bourgeoisie was captured by the anti-imperialist upsurge, participated in the protest movement, although, quite naturally, the degree of their activity was not the same. The patriotic upsurge even affected the Beijing government: Duan Qirui announced support for the national struggle in Shanghai and the 13-point program, donated money to a strike fund, and sent notes of protest to the diplomatic corps. Even the militarists Zhang Zuolin and Sun Chuanfang declared their solidarity with the patriotic movement in Shanghai.
However, the conditions of the struggle in one of the centers of imperialist domination were difficult, the patriotic movement had to deal with the most experienced political opponents. At the cost of some concessions to the imperialists and the militarist authorities (and on June 13, the troops of the Fengtian group of militarists entered Shanghai and introduced martial law in the city), they managed to neutralize the big bourgeoisie, and in July the middle and small merchants gradually stopped the strike. The workers continued to strike, but their situation became more and more difficult. Under these conditions of repression and the retreat of the allies, leftist sentiments intensified among some leaders of the CPC in Shanghai (Li Lisan) and part of the workers, pushing them to put forward desperate proposals for a way out of this difficult situation (up to proposals for an armed uprising, naturally doomed in that situation for severe injury). The CPC Central Committee did not support these adventurous proposals and, on the advice of the Comintern, in early August decided to withdraw political slogans and gradually end the strike struggle in order to save the trade unions from the blow of repression.
In the Shanghai events, the idea of a united front was actually realized, but not in the Kuomintang form, but in the form of a broad strike association of various socio-political forces. In the course of the struggle, the CPC had to solve complex tactical problems of relations with the participants in this united front. If in relation to the petty-bourgeois strata the position of the CPC was consistent, then in relation to the bourgeoisie it was very ambivalent, because the CPC sought in practical struggle to attract the bourgeoisie, to use its means and influence to increase pressure on its opponents, but at the same time in propaganda and political materials considered it as "compromising". This duality of tactics reflected a vague understanding of the driving forces of the national liberation movement, which later affected the policy of the CPC in the united front.
The Shanghai events, quite naturally, found the greatest response in the revolutionary south of the country. The reaction of the Chinese population of the English colony of Hong Kong was so strong that on June 19 the Communists managed to organize a mass strike in support of the Shanghai workers and their 17 demands, to which six more demands were added, reflecting not only the social interests of the Hong Kong workers, but also the common interests of all Chinese. who lived in Hong Kong. On June 21, workers from the Anglo-French Shamian concession in Guangzhou joined the Hong Kong strikers. The strikers were supported by the bulk of the Guangzhou merchants. A boycott of British goods began. The joint committee of students declared a strike of educational institutions. On June 23, the strikers organized a mass demonstration, which was shot on the orders of the British authorities. This bloody atrocity not only did not stop the movement of solidarity, but even made the strike really general. In Hong Kong, 250 thousand Chinese workers went on strike and most of them left Hong Kong, most of the Chinese also left Shamian.
The initiators and main organizers of these national uprisings were the Communists, who acted in cooperation with the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang government. The leading body of the general strike was the strike, led by the leader of the Hong Kong sailors, the communist Su Zhaozheng. The Kuomintang government provided the strikers with great political and material assistance. With their help, the strikers held out for 16 months and achieved satisfaction of some of the demands. In turn, this grand strike strengthened the political and military position of the revolutionary base in Guangdong, raised the authority of the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang government, and expanded the experience of political cooperation between the Communists and the Kuomintang within the framework of the united front.
The national upsurge also embraced some other regions of the country, in particular Beijing. Strikes, demonstrations, rallies, and a boycott of Japanese and British goods drew significant sections of the urban population into the struggle. However, for the most part, these uprisings were of an uneven and spontaneous nature, and, having met with serious resistance from the militarist authorities and the imperialists, they began to decline by the end of the summer. Despite this retreat, the rise of the anti-imperialist struggle played an enormous role in the development of the revolution.
The May 30 Movement was above all a mass workers' uprising, in whose organization and leadership the Communists played an important role. This contributed to the growth of the party's prestige among the working masses, the influx of workers into the ranks of the party, whose membership increased 2.5 times (up to 3.8 thousand) in four months after the start of the May 30 Movement.
The May 30 Movement had a great international resonance. Solidarity with the national struggle of the Chinese people of the Soviet workers, organized workers of many capitalist countries was a moral and political support. The material assistance of the international proletariat played a definite role in the development of the strike struggle.
All these events were of crucial importance for the fate of the national liberation movement. The spontaneous nationwide patriotic upsurge dramatically changed the situation in the country, initiating the revolution of 1925-1927.
The upsurge in the national liberation struggle, primarily in South and East China, had a peculiar effect on the military-political situation in the North. The rivalry between the two main militaristic groups continued - Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian and Wu Peifu's Zhili. With the gradual weakening of Zhang Zuolin's positions, the influence of Feng Yuxiang's "national army" on the political situation increased. The actions of Feng Yuxiang's army, which openly sided with the struggle of the Kuomintang government, fettered the military forces of the northern militarists, deepened the political split and rivalry among them, and created certain conditions for intensifying the activities of the Kuomintang and the CPC in these areas. This was fully manifested in the autumn of 1925. The intensified militaristic struggle also favored the actions of the "national army". Thus, General Sun Chuanfang from the Zhili group, using the military weakening of the Fengtians and their political unpopularity, occupied Shanghai and the entire lower reaches of the Yangtze, inflicting a serious military defeat on the troops of Zhang Zuolin. At the same time, the Fengtian general Guo Songling established political contacts with Feng Yuxiang and, from a patriotic position, decided to fight against his recent patron, supporting the offensive of Feng Yuxiang's "national army" on the Fengtian positions. On November 26, 1925, Feng Yuxiang's troops entered Beijing, and on November 27, General Guo Songling rebelled and declared war on Zhang Zuolin. Having quickly occupied Southern Manchuria, his troops began to advance towards Zhang Zuolin's headquarters - Mukden, and at the end of December reached its environs. The situation of the Fengtian grouping became critical. Only the direct military intervention of the Japanese army saved Zhang Zuolin from complete defeat. Together with the Fengtians, Japanese troops participated in the suppression of Guo Songling's uprising, and Guo himself was treacherously killed by luring him to the Japanese consulate.
The defeat of Guo Songling's uprising complicated the position of Feng Yuxiang, but did not stop the advance of the 1st "National Army" on Tianjin, which was liberated at the end of December 1925. All this forced the militarists and their foreign patrons to look for ways to unite their forces. In February 1926, Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu were able to temporarily agree on the fight against the "national army". The direct intervention of the imperialist powers continued to intensify, and the struggle of the militarist regimes against the patriotic uprisings of the masses intensified.
The military and diplomatic pressure of the powers forced Feng Yuxiang to resign in early 1923 and leave for Moscow. Parts of the 1st "national army" were forced to leave the Beijing and Tianjin area, retreating to the prov. Chahar. The fate of the 2nd "national army" in prov. Henan. In January 1926, an uprising of local peasants broke out against the 2nd "national army", organized by the secret traditional society "Red Peaks". The immediate cause of the uprising was the introduction by the command of the 2nd "National Army" of new taxes to ensure preparations for a further war with the Fengtians. From the point of view of the peasants, this was a struggle against the next militarists who had seized their native province. Wu Peifu took advantage of this performance and completed the defeat of the 2nd "National Army".
The tragic shooting of a mass anti-imperialist demonstration in Peking on March 18, 1926 by Duan Qirui's troops was also explained by the general counter-offensive of the reaction.
Despite the defeat of the "national army", its military-political activity played a big role in destabilizing the militaristic regimes in the North, in diverting the forces of reaction from the revolutionary base in Guangdong.
The change in the general Chinese political situation as a result of the revolutionary events of May 30 had a positive effect on the strengthening of the military and political positions of the Guangzhou government. The leadership of the Kuomintang correctly assessed these changes in the country and the strengthening of the political role of the Canton government, proclaiming it on July 1, 1925, the National Government of the Republic of China and thereby proclaiming the task of uniting all of China under its rule.
The formation of the National Government was the result of a certain compromise between the various Kuomintang groupings, united by the desire to extend the power of the Kuomintang throughout the country. The government was headed by one of the prominent leftists of the Kuomintang, Wang Jingwei, and included leading figures from the main currents within the Kuomintang (Liao Zhongkai, Hu Hanmin, Xu Chongzhi, Sun Ke, Tan Yankai, Dai Jitao, and others). The Communists, without entering the government, provided him with political support, reserving the right to criticize him.
Since the main opponent of the National Government in solving the problems of unifying China was the militarists, who defended their independence by force of arms, then, quite naturally, war became the main method of unifying China, and the new army became the main instrument of this policy. Under these conditions, the reorganization of the army could largely determine the success of this policy. The plan for the reorganization of the army was prepared by a group of Soviet military specialists headed by V.K. Blucher and provided for the creation of a single military organization based on the "party army" with the inclusion of reorganized militarist units in it. The reorganization of the army was announced simultaneously with the proclamation of the National Government. Now it consisted of six corps (commanders - Chiang Kai-shek, Tan Yankai, Zhu Peide, Li Jishen, Li Fulin, Cheng Qian) and was called the National Revolutionary Army (NRA). The general management of military affairs was entrusted to the Military Council, headed by the Prime Minister. Despite the preservation of some features of the old army (primarily its mercenary character), the NRA, thanks to its reorganization and continued politicization (the creation of political agencies in all parts, the active participation of the Kuomintang and communists in political work), gradually turned into a significant military-political force.
Already in the autumn of 1925, the reorganized army was involved in active hostilities. In September, the NRA opposed Chen Junming, whose troops, with British support, again tried to capture the eastern part of Guangdong (2nd Eastern Campaign). Parts of the NRA in this campaign were commanded by Chiang Kai-shek, and Soviet military specialists participated in the leadership of military operations. Within two months, Chen Junming's troops were completely defeated. Then the attention of the NRA was switched to the liberation of the southern part of Guangdong (Southern campaign) up to about. Hainan. In January 1926, Prov. Guangdong was completely liberated from the remnants of the armies of other militarists. It was an important military and political victory for the National Government.
The rise of the national liberation movement and the strengthening of the revolutionary base in Kwangtung intensified the ideological and political struggle within the Kuomintang over the question of the ways of the country's development. A clearer position was taken by the conservative (usually called "right") forces in the Kuomintang, who continued to insist on a break with the CPC and were ready to compromise with the militarists. In November 1925, a group of Kuomintang veterans (Zou Lu and others) held a conference not far from Beijing (Xishan region), which declared itself a "plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang" and decided to expel the Communists from the Kuomintang, as well as the leftist Kuomintang Wang Jingwei, to dismiss adviser M.M. Borodin, etc. However, this speech did not receive a significant response in the Kuomintang. More significant in its consequences was the speech of Dai Jitao, who can be called the ideologist of the "new right", or the center-right core of the Kuomintang, who were anti-communist, but at the same time sought to fight militarism and imperialism and therefore allowed tactical agreements with the CPC.
Dai Jitao sharply criticized the leftists in the Kuomintang (above all, of course, the Communists) for distorting the Sun Yatsen understanding of the goals and methods of carrying out the national revolution, for setting impossible, utopian tasks for the national revolution and thereby dooming it to defeat.
After Sun Yat-sen's death, Dai Jitao claimed to be the leading interpreter of Sun Yat-senism. He sought to present Sun Yat-senism as a purely traditional Chinese teaching, a continuation and development of the teachings of Confucius, free from "Western" influence and developing Sino-centric and messianic concepts of imperial ideology. Focusing on Sun Yatsen's understanding of class cooperation and complete rejection of the ideas of class struggle, Dai Jitao sought to ideologically oppose the communists to the supporters of Sun Yatsen's "Three People's Principles". To this end, in the summer of 1925, he published two theoretical and propaganda works, which, of course, met with mixed reviews. His position was supported and understood by Feng Ziyu, Zou Lu, Hu Hanmin and many other Kuomintang veterans. He was also supported by Chiang Kai-shek, the rising military and political leader of the Kuomintang.
Communists (and above all the brilliant publicist Qu Qiubo) sharply criticized Dai Jitao's speeches, regarding them as a manifestation of racism and nationalism of the rising Chinese bourgeoisie. Having given a sharp rebuff to Dai Jitao, the communists, as subsequent events showed, underestimated the political significance of his activities. And it testified to the growing tendency among a significant part of the Kuomintang activists to rethink the experience of the national liberation struggle over the past two or three years under the influence of the growth of the labor movement, the strengthening of the political role of the CPC, and the aggravation of class conflicts.
By the beginning of 1926, a very complex and outwardly paradoxical situation was developing in the Kuomintang, determined by the ambiguous consequences of the first successes of the national liberation struggle. On the one hand, the increase in the political role of the CPC, the radicalization of the liberation struggle, and the involvement of the working masses in it led to the growth of anti-communist sentiments among the conservative, right-wing section of the Kuomintang, among many old Kuomintang members. The Xishan people and Dai Jitao became the spokesmen for these tendencies. The nationalist position of Dai Jitao was increasingly shared by some of the leftists of the Kuomintang. On the other hand, the political activity of the left wing of the Kuomintang led by Wang Jingwei, who had the support of the communists, increased sharply.
This contradictory situation was reflected in a peculiar way in the work and decisions of the Second Congress of the Kuomintang, held in January 1926 in Guangzhou. All groups of the Kuomintang (except for the extreme right) took part in the work of the congress, representing almost 250 thousand members, but with the complete political predominance of the left, headed by Wang Chingwei. The congress expelled the "Xishan" from the Kuomintang, reaffirmed the Communists' right to individual membership, adopted resolutions on workers' and peasants' questions, and emphasized the importance of cooperation with the Soviet Union. In the governing bodies of the Kuomintang, the congress elected the leftists who made up the majority there, including the communists, and the latter occupied leading posts in the three most important departments of the CEC - organizational, peasant and propaganda. Dai Jitao was re-elected, and Chiang Kai-shek was elected to the CEC for the first time.
The congress passed under the sign of rampant left-wing phrase-mongering, failing to give a sober assessment of either the situation in the country or the political situation in the Kuomintang, and failing to reflect the political realities of the development of the Kuomintang. The predominance of left-wing political phraseology in the documents of the Congress and in its organizational decisions only complicated the further development of the united front. This was fully reflected in the events of March 1926.
The Communists erroneously interpreted the results of the Second Congress of the Kuomintang, seeing in it the growth, and not only among the rightists, of dissatisfaction with the strengthening of the positions of the Communists in the leading echelons of the united front. The inability or unwillingness to reckon with the political interests of other participants in the united front turned into an unexpected action for the CPC and the Comintern by those leaders of the Kuomintang who had by no means belonged to the right before. On March 20, Chiang Kai-shek declared martial law in Guangzhou, brought parts of his corps into the city, and arrested several dozen communists. And although martial law was soon lifted, and those arrested were released, in fact, the events of March 20 became a political coup, because there was a significant shift in power. Wang Jingwei left China under the pretext of illness, Tan Yankai became the chairman of the government, and real power was increasingly concentrated in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek, who relied both on military force and on growing support within the Kuomintang. In these changed political conditions, a plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang was held in May 1926, which decided to limit the activities of communists in the Kuomintang, forbidding them to occupy leadership positions, and to control the worker-peasant movement. Another important political outcome of the plenum was the strengthening of Chiang Kai-shek's power. He became chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, head of the organizational department of military personnel, chairman of the military council, and most importantly, commander-in-chief of the NRA. Having seized the de facto power of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Kai-shek, at the same time, did not openly oppose the concept of a united front, against the CPC, against the workers' and peasants' movement, continued to support the slogans of combating militarism and imperialism, and advocated friendship with the Soviet Union.
The events of the spring of 1926 in Guangzhou in many ways shed new light on the problems of the united front and the prospects for the national liberation revolution. The rallying around Chiang Kai-shek of right-wing nationalist elements in the Kuomintang testified that they were interested in developing a united front, in maintaining support for the CPC and the mass movement, in expanding cooperation with the USSR, but on quite definite political conditions, the main among which was the preservation of hegemony in the hands of these forces. This turn of events required from the Comintern and the CPC a difficult and principled decision on the position of the Communists in the new conditions. This time, the leadership of the Comintern and the CPC soberly assessed the real situation, recognized the fact of an unfavorable regrouping of forces, and considered it necessary to compromise with the political forces represented by Chiang Kai-shek in order to create prerequisites for the further development of the national liberation revolution.
This correct decision, which meant some retreat of the CPC, at the same time preserved the united front and prepared the conditions for a new expansion and deepening of the revolutionary process, primarily associated with the start of the Northern Expedition.
6. NRA Northern Campaign (July 1926 - March 1927)
The idea of the Northern Expedition, which set as its goal the unification of China under the rule of the Kuomintang, belonged to Sun Yat-sen and was extremely popular in the Kuomintang. However, the real conditions for the implementation of this idea were formed only by the summer of 1926.
The May 30 Movement radically changed the political situation in the country, giving a powerful impetus to the national liberation movement of various social strata. The military-political position of the revolutionary base in Guangdong was strengthened. By the summer of 1926, not only prov. Guangdong, but also Guangxi, Guizhou and part of Prov. Hunan. The reorganized militaristic troops of these provinces formed additional corps of the NRA, the total number of which exceeded 100 thousand people. The authority of the National Government also increased in other parts of the country. The militaristic cliques opposing the National Government had armies several times larger than the NRA, but these armies were weakened by internal contradictions and rivalries, as well as by the labor and peasant movement rising in these areas. Feng Yuxiang's "national army" also acted as an ally of the National Government, although it retreated to the west, but retained a significant military force.
The May plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang adopted a resolution on the start of the Northern Expedition, and the national government ordered military mobilization. This decision was supported by all factions in the Kuomintang, which considered the war for the unification of China under the rule of the Kuomintang as a decisive means of establishing Kuomintang hegemony in the country and weakening the Kuomintang opponents both "left" and "right". This idea was especially actively supported, of course, by the grouping of Chiang Kai-shek, which itself could consider the Northern Expedition as a political justification for the March military coup.
The leadership of the CPC, after serious hesitation, / associated with the negative attitude of the Moscow leadership to the very idea of the Northern Expedition, came out in support of the idea and plan of the Northern Expedition, evaluating it as the beginning of a new stage in the national liberation movement. Understanding the calculations of the Kuomintang leadership, the communists set themselves the task of developing a mass workers' and peasants' movement during the Northern Expedition in order, under its pressure, to push the right-wing nationalist elements out of the leadership of the united front and lead the development of the revolutionary process themselves. Having supported the military offensive against the northern militarists, the communists directed their main efforts to organizing and politically enlightening the masses of workers and peasants, counting on the transformation of the CPC in the course of this struggle into a mass political party capable of radicalizing the development of the liberation struggle and claiming to lead it.
The northern campaign, having become possible primarily due to the growing revolutionary situation, caused a new upsurge in the national liberation movement, regardless of the political calculations of its participants.
On July 1, 1926, the National Government officially proclaimed a manifesto on the beginning of the Northern Expedition, and on July 9, the NRA set out on a campaign. The Northern Expedition plan was developed with the participation of Soviet military specialists headed by V.K. Blucher. This plan took into account the significant numerical superiority of the militaristic forces, therefore, it assumed the application of crushing blows by the concentrated forces of the NRA against individual militaristic groups. A major role in increasing the combat power of the NRA was played by the Soviet supply of weapons (rifles, machine guns, guns, aircraft, ammunition, etc.) and the participation of Soviet military specialists not only in planning military operations, but also directly in combat operations (advisers in the NRA units , pilots). The advancing units of the NRA relied on the help of the population of the liberated provinces. The main slogan of the NRA is "Down with imperialism, down with militarism!" - evoked an active response from all segments of the population. He also found a certain response among the soldiers, officers and generals of the armies of the militarists, weakening their resistance.
The offensive of the NRA unfolded in two main directions. The main forces of the Northern Expedition in July-August completed the liberation of Hunan and launched an offensive against the most important political and economic center of the middle reaches of the Yangtze - the city of Wuhan. Wuhan was liberated in October. Wu Peifu's troops suffered a severe defeat.
In September, the NRA launched an offensive against Sun Chuanfang's troops in Jiangxi, where heavy fighting ensued. The transfer of NRA units from Wuhan made it possible in November to liberate the city of Nanchang and launch an offensive in the direction of Prov. Fujian, whose liberation ended in December, and also start fighting in Zhejiang and Jiangsu.
By the end of 1926, seven provinces were under the control of the National Government, and in a number of others the NRA was already conducting offensive battles. The entire military-political situation in the country has changed. All this contributed to the activation of the "national army" in the north of the country. In November, parts of this army occupied Prov. Shaanxi, in December, entered the northwestern part of Henan, where parts of the NRA were moving.
In February 1927, the NRA began to move east, setting as its goal the liberation of the main economic and political center of eastern China - Shanghai. In mid-March, the advanced units of the NRA reached the approaches to the city, in which
On March 21, an armed workers' uprising against the militaristic authorities began. The next day, advanced units of the NRA entered the already liberated city. A day later, the NRA liberated Nanjing. This ended the first stage of the Northern Expedition, the highest military and political success of which was the liberation of Shanghai and Nanjing, which actually completed the unification under the authority of the National Government not only of the entire south of the country, but also of the economically most important region - the Yangtze basin.
The historic victories of the Northern Expedition revealed the decisive role of the military factor in the development of the revolutionary process and further strengthened the political role of the NRA. The heavy defeats of the militaristic forces reflected the internal crisis of these regimes, their complete political disunity, which also led to military disunity. The NRA was inspired by the national idea, which met with the support of the broadest sections of the Chinese nation, the support of the united front, and the support of the Soviet Union. This is the explanation for her victories.
The northern campaign relied on the mass worker-peasant movement and at the same time contributed to its development. This movement weakened the militaristic regimes, it seemed to go ahead of the advancing NRA, and the arrival of the NRA, the establishment of Kuomintang power created new political conditions for the development of this movement.
The labor movement played a big role in the liberation struggle. The most striking example of this is the struggle of the Shanghai workers for the liberation of their city. At the beginning of 1927, the struggle of all sections of the population against the regime of Sun Chuanfang intensified in Shanghai, and a broad anti-militarist united front actually took shape. In February, the first attempt was made to overthrow the hated regime on its own. On February 19, a general political strike began, which escalated into an armed uprising on February 22. However, the unfavorable balance of power led to the failure of this performance. The situation changed fundamentally by mid-March, when Shanghai was almost surrounded by NRA units, and Sun Chuanfang's troops were defeated. Under these new conditions, at the call of the General Council of Trade Unions, local organizations of the Kuomintang and the CPC, on March 21 a general strike began, in which about 800 thousand people took part, and then an armed uprising, the most active role in which was played by armed workers' pickets, numbering about 5 thousand . human. By the evening of March 22, the entire Chinese part of the city was occupied by the rebels. The Shanghai workers convincingly demonstrated their vanguard role in the development of the liberation struggle. The liberation of new provinces and industrial centers by the revolutionary army contributed to the organization of the working class, as evidenced by the growth in the number of trade union members: from 1.2 million people by the beginning of the Northern Expedition to 2.9 million by May 1927. The political activity of the working class is growing sharply. A clear example of this is the decisive role played by the workers in the struggle for the return of British concessions in Hankow and Jiujiang in early 1927. The number of successful strikes at foreign enterprises is growing, where workers are seeking some increase in wages and better working conditions, forcing foreign entrepreneurs to make concessions.
To the extent that the working-class movement, in these new conditions of upsurge in the revolutionary struggle, set and solved the tasks of national liberation, the struggle against militarism and imperialism, it was a significant stimulus for the expansion and deepening of the national revolution. At the same time, attempts to step over these rather limited limits complicated the situation in the united front. Thus, the struggle for social rights is gradually unfolding at Chinese enterprises, and direct clashes with Chinese entrepreneurs begin. Even at the beginning of the Northern Expedition, the National Government introduced compulsory arbitration of conflicts at Chinese enterprises in Guangzhou, and after the liberation of Wuhan, a similar procedure was introduced here. measures fully justified by the interests of combating militarism and imperialism and therefore supported to a certain extent by the CPC, did not eliminate the causes of workers' discontent and could not eliminate the growth of clashes between the workers' movement and the Kuomintang authorities.
The peasant movement also developed in a very contradictory way. The dissatisfaction of the peasantry, and of all its strata, with the militaristic policy of plundering the countryside through a system of taxes and duties led to peasant uprisings against the militaristic authorities and their tax system. These widespread actions weakened the militarist regimes and contributed to their military defeats in the fight against the NRA. The peasant masses welcomed the offensive of the NRA, helped it (the direct participation of peasant detachments in the fighting of the NRA, the supply of food, the provision of porters, etc.), and expected, after the liberation, the implementation of their basic requirements by the new government.
The Kuomintang declared its support for the peasant movement and strove to rely on peasant organizations. Particularly active work in organizing the peasantry (most of all through the Kuomintang structures) was carried out by the communists.
The main provisions of the Kuomintang program on the peasant question (supported by the communists as well) boiled down primarily to the abolition of excessive taxes, a reduction in rent by 25%, the limitation of usurious interest, and the protection of peasant unions. However, the advent of the NRA and the establishment of the power of the Kuomintang National Government often did not lead, and could not lead to the fulfillment of the main peasant demand - a significant reduction in taxation, because the new government did not have other significant sources of income for the war with the northern militarists and was forced to continue the unpopular tax policy.
This situation inevitably led to the deep disappointment of the peasant masses in the policy of the Kuomintang and even to protests against the new government (the most acute of such protests - the uprising of the "Red Peaks" in Henan - has already been discussed). The situation, naturally, was complicated by the fact that in the liberated provinces the political activity of the peasantry grew, and their organization increased. By the spring of 1927, there were about 10 million members in the peasant unions, and about half were in Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi. The rapid growth of the peasant movement in Hunan was caused primarily by the natural disasters that had taken place here for several years, famine, and militaristic arbitrariness. The drastic impoverishment of the countryside forced the pauperized poor to organize and fight for their survival. In the winter of 1926-1927 this led to the unification in unions of about a quarter of the peasantry of Hunan, and thereby made it possible to achieve the satisfaction of some of the demands of the poor. In other provinces, only a few percent of the villagers were covered by peasant unions. However, the real weakness of these unions was not even in their small number, but in their opposition to the rest of the more wealthy part of the village. The deepening of this split in the countryside is the main weakness of the peasant movement.
By the time the first stage of the Northern Expedition was completed, the greatest upsurge of the mass worker-peasant movement also took place, a vivid manifestation of which was the successful Shanghai uprising and the struggle of the peasant unions of Hunan for power in some counties. This upsurge of the workers' and peasants' movement had a great and ambiguous political resonance in the Kuomintang and outside it.
The military-political successes of the Northern Expedition led to a significant quantitative and qualitative change in the Kuomintang as an organization of the united front. This process is inextricably linked with the formation and development of Kuomintang statehood. The revolution itself under the leadership of the Kuomintang acquires the character of planting a new, "national", Kuomintang statehood, and the most visible, real results of this victorious struggle are expressed in the further unification of the country under the rule of the Kuomintang. Thus, the Kuomintang, as the true leader of the revolution, solves the main national task - the task of political unification of the country and the restoration of national statehood.
The development of the Kuomintang and the demarcation within the united front are inextricably linked with the formation of this national statehood. The political doctrine of the Kuomintang, based on the Sun Yat-sen theory of "political tutelage", contributed to the merging of the party and state apparatuses, primarily the merging of the Kuomintang and army leaders. This was also facilitated by the real process of the formation of a new state apparatus, based primarily on direct military control in the liberated provinces. Playing a decisive role in planting the new statehood, the NRA itself is increasingly becoming its most important structural element. In the absence of democratic traditions and the complete underdevelopment of any democratic procedure, even within the framework of the new regime, in the conditions of the destruction of the old and the creation of a new statehood, the NRA acts as a modern type of political organization capable of uniting broad layers of adherents of the new regime and within this new organization ideologically and politically to oppose both traditional corporations and militaristic regimes. Thus, the NRA in many respects functionally replaced the Kuomintang, playing an ever greater political role.
If initially the politicization of the NRA was associated with the decisive role in its creation of Sun Yat-sen, communists, Soviet specialists and expressed primarily the left, radical trend in the development of the Kuomintang, then during the Northern Expedition the appearance of the NRA changes significantly, and its political role also changes. In the Northern Expedition, the NRA was replenished mainly at the expense of defeated militarist armies. However, if at first this replenishment underwent a certain reorganization and political training, then later, as the militarist regimes collapsed, unreformed units were already included in the NRA, often led by former generals and officers, who rather easily changed old banners to new ones, Kuomintang. By the spring of 1927, the number of NRA corps tripled, and its numbers increased accordingly. Of course, this was a great achievement of the Kuomintang, but it turned into a change in the political image of the officer corps of the NRA - its backbone. In the new NRA, the right-wing, conservative part of the officers gradually completely prevailed, the leader of which was Chiang Kai-shek. Its evolution "from left to right" quite accurately reflected the change in the political image and political role of the NRA. Related to this is the process of the gradual improvement of the Kuomintang, which is often called its "rebirth" and which was, in essence, primarily a process of increasing the political role of the new PRA, and consequently of all conservative elements in the Kuomintang.
Thus, it was the military successes of the Northern Expedition that accelerated and deepened the demarcation within the united front, sharpened the struggle between various trends in the Kuomintang, and intensified political differences. In October 1926, at the Kuomintang conference in Guangzhou, the left managed to decide on the tactics of the Kuomintang, aimed at developing the decisions of the 2nd Congress of the Kuomintang, as well as the decision to invite Wang Jingwei to head the government again. In December, the left managed to decide on the transfer of the National Government from Guangzhou to Wuhan, despite the demand of Chiang Kai-shek to transfer the government to Nanchang, where he had his headquarters. On January 1, 1927, the leadership of the Kuomintang proclaimed Wuhan the capital of China and the seat of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, but Chiang Kai-shek was in no hurry to obey this decision. Thus, two political centers began to take shape: the left - in Wuhan, the right - in Nanchang.
The considerable political activity of the Kuomintang leftists, supported by the communists, however, could not stop a significant shift in the balance of power in the Kuomintang to the right, for the rightists relied primarily on the army. In March 1927, a plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang was held in Wuhan, which made another attempt to weaken the growth of Chiang Kai-shek's influence by depriving him of all posts, except, however, the most important one - the post of commander in chief of the NRA. The Plenum elected a new composition of the National Government headed by Wang Jingwei. For the first time, two communists also entered the government: Tan Pingshan (Minister of Agriculture) and Su Zhaozheng (Minister of Labor). The Plenum adopted a number of other decisions aimed at a certain radicalization of government policy. All these decisions, quite reasonable in themselves, however, did not take into account the real correlation of forces and led to an aggravation of disagreements within the Kuomintang.
The policy of the imperialist powers, which changed significantly under the influence of the historic victories of the Northern Expedition, also contributed to the aggravation of these disagreements. On the one hand, the imperialist powers, seeing the military-political weakness of the militarist regimes, already from the end of 1926 launched a "political offensive to the south" in an attempt to split and hold back the revolutionary forces advancing to the north. In December 1926, the initiative to establish "new relations" with the Kuomintang National Government was shown by England, which in February of the following year was forced to sign an agreement with it on the renunciation of the concessions that it had actually lost. Then this initiative was supported by the USA and Japan. The expansion of political contacts with the Kuomintang was calculated to stimulate conciliatory tendencies in it.
On the other hand, after the historic success of the national liberation struggle - the liberation of Shanghai and Nanjing - the imperialist powers also resorted to attempts at direct military intimidation: on March 24, 1927, the warships of Britain and the USA, under the pretext of protecting their artillery bombardment of Nanjing, killing hundreds of civilians and causing significant destruction to the city. On April 11, representatives of the five imperialist powers delivered an ultimatum to the authorities in Wuhan and Shanghai, demanding that those responsible be punished, that foreigners be compensated for their losses, and so on. Simultaneously, the militaristic authorities in Beijing, not without the approval of the powers, carried out actions against the Soviet representatives in China: on April 6, Zhang Zuolin's soldiers broke into the Soviet embassy and captured several Soviet employees, as well as several Chinese communists hiding there. On April 28, the arrested Chinese communists (including Li Dazhao) were executed.
The rise of the mass workers' and peasants' movement during the Northern Expedition is directly connected with the great organizational work of the communists, their selflessness and initiative. At the same time, the CPC itself, precisely in the course of the struggle of the workers and peasants led by it, began to turn into a mass and workers' party. By the beginning of 1927, it already had about 25,000 members, more than half of which were workers. However, the overwhelming majority of its members had only recently joined the political struggle and were poorly acquainted with communist ideas. The backbone of professional revolutionaries was small, and the ties between the leading core of the party and the grass-roots local organizations were weak. The very formation of the CCP as a political party largely depended on the correct strategy and tactics in the national liberation revolution.
After the fundamental decisions taken by the Comintern and the CPC in connection with the "March" events and the beginning of the Northern Expedition, the CPC as a whole pursued a political line to strengthen and develop the united front as the main instrument of the revolution. Therefore, in the workers' and peasants' movement, the CPC, as a rule, acted under the banner of the Kuomintang, on behalf of the Kuomintang. In its work of organizing the masses, the CCP depended on the newly established Kuomintang state apparatus, on the army leadership. At the same time, the communists felt themselves to be the leaders of broad popular actions, realized the growth of their political authority among the workers and peasants, in some army units, saw new opportunities for mobilizing the revolutionary energy of the masses. This could not help but stimulate the mood of revolutionary impatience that was already firmly established in the CPC.
The military and political successes of the Northern Expedition, the entry of the NRA into the Yangtze basin, the approaching defeat of the northern militarists created a new political situation, presupposed a new grouping of political forces. Much in the prospects for the development of the revolution depended on the political course of the CCP. Under these conditions, the 7th Plenum of the ECCI (November-December 1926) adopted important decisions on the Chinese question. These decisions were based on a very optimistic assessment of the balance of class forces in China, proceeding from the premise of a sharply increased political weight of the working class.
The decisions of the plenum stated that "... the proletariat is becoming more and more the hegemon of the movement" and that even "... the proletariat has won hegemony." Therefore, the plenum emphasized that in China "... the original feature of the current situation is its transitional character, when the proletariat must choose between the prospect of a bloc with significant sections of the bourgeoisie and the prospect of further strengthening its alliance with the peasantry." The plenum unconditionally spoke out for the second perspective, for the prospect of an agrarian revolution and thus for the actual rejection of the concept of a united national front (“a bloc with significant sections of the bourgeoisie”), although the decisions of the plenum did not contain a direct recommendation that the communists withdraw from the Kuomintang. Moreover, the plenum recommended that the Communists enter the Kuomintang government and use it as a means of asserting their political leadership of the revolutionary process. The very prospect of a developed Chinese revolution was defined in the decisions of the plenum as a struggle for "... the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasantry and other exploited classes", for the transition to non-capitalist, socialist development.
The decisions of the 7th Plenum of the ECCI were a radical answer to many questions already put forward by the practice of revolutionary development, and above all, an answer to questions about the permissible limits for the formulation and implementation of "workers' and peasants'" (Comintern, communist) demands in the course of a national revolution. The answers, it would seem, were of a tactical nature, but the connection of these new tactical attitudes with the prospect of the existence of a united front turned them into strategic attitudes. The decisions of the Plenum of the ECCI were of fatal importance for the fate of the united front, for the prospects for the development of the revolution.
The new guidelines were by no means unambiguously perceived by the leadership of the CPC, but they certainly corresponded to the ever-increasing leftist tendency to interpret the tasks of the CPC in the new conditions. Characteristic in this respect was the publication in March 1927 of the pamphlet Controversial Questions of the Chinese Revolution, written by one of the leaders of the CPC, Qu Qiubo. The author sharply criticized those leaders of the CPC who considered the question of the hegemony of the proletariat to be premature and did not see the immediate possibilities for the national revolution to develop into a socialist one. Although Qu Qiubo's political course was largely speculative, it had a profound effect on everyday life. practical work Communists, led to an aggravation of contradictions in the united front.
7. Crisis and rearguard action of the national revolution (April-December 1927)
In April 1927, the deep crisis of the revolution, which had been brewing in recent months, came to light with all its acuteness. The strengthening of the class demands of the workers and peasants, the intensification of the political activity of the communists, the expansion of cooperation between the communists and the left Kuomintang, and finally, the direct pressure of the imperialist powers led to the almost universal action of the right Kuomintang, primarily the Kuomintang generals (or "new militarists", as the communists called them) under common anti-communist banner. Shanghai became the main, but not the only center of these events.
Having occupied Shanghai, already liberated by the insurgent people, in March, the troops under the command of Chiang Kai-shek immediately tried to deprive the Shanghai proletariat of the fruits of its victory. The city is under martial law. In opposition to the revolutionary trade unions and armed workers' pickets, Chiang Kai-shek arms and finances detachments of the Shanghai secret societies Qingbang and Hongbang. Ties are being activated with other Kuomintang rightists and with the consuls of the imperialist powers. On April 12, hired gangs provoke armed clashes with workers' pickets. Taking advantage of this, the troops disarm workers' pickets, and about 300 picketers were killed and wounded. Rallies and demonstrations of protesting workers are dispersed by machine guns. The number of dead and wounded is growing. The workers' organizations are dispersed, the communists go underground. The military shows its strength, showing who is the true political master of Shanghai. In the next two or three days, similar performances by Kuomintang generals take place in Nanjing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Anqing, Fuzhou, Canton.
These events are usually called a "counter-revolutionary coup", although, strictly speaking, there were no political coups in these cities - the Kuomintang generals and right-wing Kuomintang in those cities and provinces where they already had real military and political power, took actions against the communists, workers and peasant organizations under their influence against the Kuomintang leftists. It was actually a process of deep disengagement in the Kuomintang, it was its split.
On April 18, 1927, in Nanjing, Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed the formation of his "National Government", which already meant the formalization of the split in the Kuomintang government. The Nanking government was supported by the Shanghai bourgeoisie, the Xishanites, many of the Kuomintang "new militarists," those right-wing forces within the Kuomintang who, after March 20, 1926, began to group around Chiang Kai-shek.
Having established a military regime in Shanghai and Nanjing, opposed the policy of Wuhan, and called for the purge of the Kuomintang of communists, Chiang Kai-shek at the same time proclaimed loyalty to the precepts of Sun Yat-sen and the goals of the national revolution, spoke of the need for cooperation with the Soviet Union. Thus, in the spring of 1927, the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang regime were split, two competing political centers were formed - Wuhan and Nanjing. The speech of Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters, the split of the Kuomintang meant a significant socio-political shift to the right in the course of the development of the revolution.
The situation that developed was characterized primarily by a change in the balance of forces, a deterioration in the position of the revolutionary center in Wuhan, and increased vacillations of the Kuomintang leftists.
and especially the Kuomintang generals who supported Wuhan. Under these most difficult conditions in Wuhan, from April 27 to May 11, 1927, the Fifth Congress of the CPC was legally held, representing about 58 thousand members (about half of them were workers). More than half of the party's members have joined in the last three months. The congress faced extremely difficult tasks - to correctly assess the political situation in the country and work out an appropriate political line.
The congress was unjustifiably optimistic about the situation in the country and the prospects for the development of the revolution. The congress documents stated that the objective conditions "... are favorable for the revolution", that "... at the present moment the revolution is embarking on the path of decisive victories." The congress set the task of direct struggle for the hegemony of the proletariat. The congress saw the expansion of the social base of the revolution in the development of the agrarian revolution through the promotion of a program for the redistribution of land on the principles of egalitarian land use through the nationalization of land. However, at the current stage of the revolution, only large landowners and counter-revolutionaries demanded the confiscation of land. The congress also directed the party towards a bold struggle against the bourgeoisie, up to the implementation of the demands for the confiscation and nationalization of all large enterprises, the participation of workers in the management of enterprises, the establishment of an eight-hour working day, and so on. The congress elected a new composition of the Central Committee, and also for the first time formed a politburo consisting of Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubo, Tan Pingshan, Zhang Guotao, Cai Hesen, Li Lisan. Despite sharp criticism of the activities of General Secretary Chen Duxiu, he was elected to this post for the fifth time.
The offensive line of the Fifth Congress of the CPC fully corresponded to the letter and spirit of the decisions of the 7th Plenum of the ECCI and the subsequent instructions of the Comintern. However, the attempt to put these optimistic decisions into practice ran into insurmountable difficulties and had fatal consequences for the CCP.
The activities of the communists were developed primarily in the areas under the rule of the Wuhan Kuomintang, while the sphere of effective rule of Wuhan was reduced and found itself in fact in a blockade. From the east, Chiang Kai-shek threatened him, from the south - the Kuomintang leader Li Jishen, who supported him, from the west - the Sichuan militarist Yang Sen, from the north, Zhang Zuolin's army was still threatening. Wuhan's economic and political situation worsened. In particular, due to a sharp reduction in tax revenues, the Wuhan government was in a state of financial crisis, government spending was provided primarily by the operation of the printing press, and as a result, prices rose and inflation increased. The generals who still supported the Wuhan Kuomintang were also restless.
Under these difficult conditions, the CCP tried to implement the offensive policy outlined by the Party Congress, tried to push the Wuhan Kuomintang to deepen the revolution as the only way out of the economic and political catastrophe.
In Wuhan, the CCP could draw on the growing labor movement. In December 1926 there were about 300,000 organized workers there (in May 1927, about 500,000) and about 3,000 armed picketers. In the new political conditions that developed here after the liberation of the city, the trade unions turned out to be a great political force, which they sought to use to achieve a number of social goals. The main demands of the trade unions were an increase in wages by about two to three times, a reduction in the length of the working day to 10-12 hours, an improvement in working conditions, and control over the hiring of labor. However, the results of this struggle were not unambiguous. The bourgeoisie reacted in its own way to the gains of the labor movement: foreign and Chinese enterprises began to curtail production, two-thirds of Hankow's banks closed, capital began to flow to Shanghai, production fell, and unemployment increased. All this dealt a heavy blow to the economy of Wuhan, especially after April 12, when Wuhan was effectively blocked. The Kuomintang government found itself in a contradictory position: on the one hand, it supported the trade unions and relied on them, on the other hand, it tried to protect Chinese entrepreneurs. Dissatisfaction with the "exorbitant demands" of the workers was also expressed by the leadership of the NRA. In the end, this led to a clash between the Kuomintang government and workers' organizations, to the "regulation of the labor movement." But the Minister of Labor was a communist, and this further complicated the situation. However, by the summer of 1927, partial concessions on the part of the CPC on the labor issue could no longer alleviate the economic situation of the besieged Wuhan, nor strengthen the united front. from the class world, the need for a decisive struggle against the bourgeoisie, etc., also did not help to mitigate the contradictions between the Kuomintang and the Communists.
An attempt to deepen and expand the peasant movement had even more serious political consequences. It was primarily about Hunan and Hubei, where the communist-led peasant movement achieved the greatest success by the spring of 1927, the main indicator of which was the actual seizure of power by the peasant unions (at least in some counties). Here the communists, in accordance with the accepted political line, tried to shift the emphasis of their slogans to agrarian demands. Perhaps there was a certain political calculation in this: not being able to lower taxes, try to switch the attention of the peasantry to the struggle for rent reduction, to the struggle for land. However, as it turned out, even the peasant poor were not ready for agrarian demands. In fact, the peasant unions, which were dominated by the poor, tried to implement demands that were more understandable and close to them: confiscation of food and other property from the rich, ruinous "collective dinners" from rich landowners, fixing fixed prices for grain, prohibiting the export of grain, etc. In many ways, these actions did not go beyond the traditional actions of the peasant poor, did not encroach on the foundations of the socio-economic order, and were an attempt to restore a “fair” level of exploitation. However, these performances aggravated the struggle between the propertied and propertyless parts of the countryside and led to a clash between the peasant unions and the Kuomintang authorities. Using their strength, the peasant unions in a number of cases brutally dealt with their opponents in the course of the struggle.
The aggravation of the class struggle in the countryside affected the situation and political moods not only of the rural elite, but also of many social strata of the city and, most importantly, the political position of the NRA. Objectively, this struggle of the peasant unions led to a reduction in the receipt of taxes by the Kuomintang government, to an increase in food prices in the cities, and caused fear among all the property-owning elements of the city. This struggle was especially painful for the interests of the officer corps and even part of the soldiers of the NRA, who were closely connected with the landowning strata of the countryside. The CCP's calls for an agrarian revolution only exacerbated the political situation and complicated relations with the Kuomintang. In May-June 1927, many NRA generals, united with wealthy landowners and mintuans, began to strike at politically isolated peasant unions. The Wuhan Kuomintang, for its part, demanded that the CPC curb the peasant struggle. The CCP made tactical concessions, dissociating itself from the "excesses" of the peasant struggle, but it was no longer possible to change the situation.
In the spring of 1927, after the April speech of Chiang Kai-shek, the workers' and peasants' movement turned out to be localized in a very limited area (mainly Hubei and Hunan), and this limitedness of the workers' and peasants' movement for the scale of a huge country was its initial weakness. The attempts of the communists to give the worker-peasant movement a clearly defined class character in the conditions of the national revolution only alienated all other participants in the united front from the CPC, from the organized worker-peasant movement, politically isolated this movement and thereby doomed it to defeat. The policy of "deepening" the revolution, the beginning of which dates back to the winter of 1926-1927. and which fully corresponded to the decisions of the 7th Plenum of the ECCI, turned into a refusal in practice to take into account the socio-economic interests of other participants in the united front and thereby led to the destruction of the social basis for the political unification of heterogeneous class forces. This policy was essentially a rejection of the concept of a united anti-imperialist front as a political line calculated for the entire long period of the national liberation struggle, as a strategy for the national liberation revolution.
Both before April 12 and after, the Kuomintang leftists strove to rely on the mass workers' and peasants' movement so as not to be a plaything in the hands of the Kuomintang generals. This, probably, was primarily the political difference between the Kuomintang currents, which were personified by Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek. However, the real political situation in Wuhan presented them with a difficult choice. On the one hand, the workers' movement proved powerless in the face of right-wing actions in Shanghai, Guangzhou and other cities, while the peasant movement, except for Hunan and Hubei, was crushed by the Kuomintang military. On the other hand, the activation of the workers' and especially the peasants' movement in the territory controlled by the Wuhan Kuomintang deprived them of the support of the majority of the NRA generals, which made Wang Jingwei and his supporters powerless in the face of the threat from Chiang Kai-shek and other competitors. “The Communists offer us to go with the masses,” Wang Jingwei said at one of the meetings of the Political Council of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, “but where are these masses, where is the vaunted strength of the Shanghai workers or the Guangdong and Hunan peasants visible? This power does not exist. Here is Chiang Kai-shek holding on tight without mass. And we are offered to go with the masses, but that means going against the army. No, we'd better go without the masses, but together with the army."
And the Wuhan Kuomintang really made a choice, which was especially evident in the generals' mutinies. In May-June 1927, generals Xia Douyin in Hubei, Xu Kexiang in Changsha, Zhu Peide in Nanchang opposed the communists, against the workers' and peasants' movement. The Wuhan National Government did not put down these rebellions, but sought to appease the generals while at the same time exerting political pressure on the CCP.
At the same time, the Wuhan Kuomintang saw the only prospect of its military-political influence in the completion of the Northern Expedition (against Beijing!), the success of which could keep control of the NRA in its hands and create favorable conditions for political bargaining with Chiang Kai-shek and other rightists. That is why in April 1927 it was decided to start the second stage of the Northern Expedition (at the same time, Chiang Kai-shek also announced the continuation of the Northern Expedition).
The military plan for the second stage of the Northern Expedition was largely based on joint actions with the army of Feng Yuxiang. In April, the Wuhan army, led by General Tang Shengzhi, launched an offensive from the south in Prov. Henan, and Feng Yuxiang's troops advanced from the west. After heavy bloody battles for a month, the Fengtian troops were defeated, the Wuhans united with the army of Feng Yuxiang. The military success of these actions was obvious, but the political consequences are very unfavorable for the united front and the CCP.
This military victory strengthened the political influence of Feng Yuxiang, an ambitious politician whose anti-communist sentiments have recently begun to intensify. At a meeting with Wang Jingwei in Zhengzhou on June 11-12, Feng Yuxiang negotiated a secret agreement against the CCP and the workers' and peasants' movement. Wang Jingwei sought Feng Yuxiang's military and political support to strengthen his position in the fight against Chiang Kai-shek for leadership in the Kuomintang. However, Feng Yuxiang's plans were different. Two weeks later, he met with Chiang Kai-shek in Xuzhou and agreed with him on joint pressure on the Wuhan Kuomintang under the slogan of restoring Kuomintang unity. Addressing Wang Jingwei after this meeting, he wrote: “I am compelled to insist that the present moment is the most opportune time for the Kuomintang to unite in order to fight against our common enemies. I want you to make this decision immediately." It was essentially an ultimatum, in fact, supported by all the Wuhan generals. After that, the leaders of the Wuhan Kuomintang led organizational and political preparations for the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang. The meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on July 15 decided to convene a plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang to consider this problem, which can be considered the actual beginning of the "peaceful" expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang. On July 26, the Political Council of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang invited all Communists who wished to retain their posts in the Kuomintang to dissociate themselves from the CPC. The tactics of a gradual break were dictated by the great influence enjoyed by the CPC in the workers' and peasants' movement and which the left Kuomintang had to reckon with. At the same time, the Wuhan Kuomintang tried not to aggravate its relations with the Soviet Union and the Comintern, still counting on their support. So, the Soviet advisers in July still remained at their posts, and M.M. Borodin, who left Hankow on July 27, was escorted with honor by all the Wuhan leaders.
The logic of the struggle for power and the pressure of the NRA led the Wuhan Kuomintang to break the united front. A similar logic led the CCP to the same decision.
The inability to fulfill the political tasks outlined by the Fifth Congress of the CPC led to confusion and weakening of the leadership of the CPC Central Committee, to the loss of political orientation. In fact, in the summer of 1927 the CPC was left without a firm and purposeful leadership. In early July, an enlarged plenum of the CPC Central Committee spoke in favor of retreat tactics. This decision, which took into account the extremely unfavorable balance of forces, was designed to withdraw the workers' and peasants' revolutionary vanguard from under the blows of political opponents and to preserve revolutionary personnel for a new offensive, and also represented the last attempt to avoid a split in the united front. Under the circumstances, this was probably the only possible solution.
Almost at the same time, the Executive Committee of the Comintern, having little knowledge of the real situation in Wuhan and proceeding from the fact that the Wuhan government "... is now becoming a counter-revolutionary force", in its directive of July 10 ordered the CPC to withdraw from the Wuhan government, remaining, however, , in the Kuomintang in order to try to keep its banner for the continuation of the revolution. The Executive Committee of the Comintern demanded that the CPC simultaneously launch an agrarian revolution, develop the labor movement, and create an illegal party apparatus. In pursuance of these directives, the CPC Central Committee adopted a "Declaration on the Political Situation", which proclaimed a course to fight the Kuomintang authorities, but at the same time proclaimed the desire of the CPC to carry out revolutionary work "...together with the masses of the Kuomintang party, with all truly revolutionary elements. Therefore, the Communists have no reason to withdraw from the Kuomintang and even abandon the policy of cooperation with the Kuomintang." Communist ministers Tan Pingshan and Su Zhaozheng announced their withdrawal from the government. The leadership of the CCP began to go underground.
In the second half of July, there is a change in the leadership of the CPC. The beginning was laid by the resignation of Chen Duxiu. The removal of Chen Duxiu from the post of general secretary was also confirmed at the illegal meeting of CCP leaders in Hankou, at which the Standing Committee of the Provisional Politburo of the CPC Central Committee was formed, consisting of five people: Qu Qiubo (head), Zhang Guotao, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Tailei and Li Lisan .
The new leadership of the CCP abandoned the tactics of political retreat and launched a desperate counteroffensive against the Kuomintang. This approach was largely due to the assessment of the military-political situation in the country and the level of the workers' and peasants' movement as favorable for a revolutionary offensive.
The struggle between the Kuomintang groupings and between the Kuomintang and the northern militarists was seen as an acute "crisis of the top". Indeed, the general anti-communist mood of the Kuomintang leaders and the Kuomintang generals turned out to be an insufficient basis for genuine political unity. And after the events of July 1927 in Wuhan, the struggle of Wang Jingwei's group against Nanjing continued, which did not stop even with the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek on August 12. Kuomintang generals and leaders in Guangdong, Guangxi, Shanxi and other places showed "independence". All these Kuomintang groupings had a fairly common and rather amorphous social base, but some political differences and no less personal ambitions led to a sharp intergroup struggle. Considering that the Kuomintang was trying to continue the Northern Expedition and was waging war with the northern militarists, the situation of "war of all against all" really developed in the country.
The scope and sharpness of the workers' and especially the peasants' uprisings in the spring of 1927 in the Wuhan region, the memories of the Shanghai uprisings, the traditions of the workers' movement in Guangzhou, etc. could be interpreted under certain conditions as the readiness of the broad masses for armed action. This condition turned out to be the mentality of the new leaders of the CPC, most of whom had suffered from "revolutionary impatience" before.
The first step in such a revolutionary offensive was the decision to revolt on August 1 in Nanchang by parts of the NRA under the influence of the Communists. The Nanchang uprising became a symbol of the new policy of the communists, a frontier in the relationship between the CCP and the Kuomintang. After the outbreak of the Nanchang uprising, the Wuhan Kuomintang on August 5 decided to break with the CCP and began to repress the communists.
On August 7, an emergency meeting of the CPC Central Committee was held in Hankow, at which the "right opportunists" Chen Duxiu and his supporters were officially removed from leadership and a course for an armed uprising was developed. The general Chinese political situation was regarded as favorable for a revolutionary offensive. The task of fighting not only against feudalism and imperialism, but also against the entire Chinese bourgeoisie, which was qualified as counter-revolutionary, was proclaimed. The Chinese revolution itself was seen as "directly developing into a socialist revolution in the near future." And although organized uprisings were still proposed to be carried out under the slogans of the left Kuomintang, the slogan of the Soviets was already recommended for propaganda. The conference set the immediate task of organizing uprisings under the leadership of the CCP in all the provinces, in which, it seemed, the prerequisites were ripe for the overthrow of the old regime and the establishment of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. It was supposed to start primarily in those provinces where in the previous period the level of the peasant and labor movement was high (Hunan, Jiangxi, Hubei, Henan and Guangdong), timing the start of the uprising at the time of paying taxes and rent after the autumn harvest (hence - "autumn harvest uprisings "). At the meeting, the Provisional Politburo was elected, and Qu Qiubo became General Secretary.
In September 1927, the Provisional Politburo decided to move from propaganda of the idea of the Soviets to the slogan of a direct struggle for the Soviets and to supplement the plan for uprisings in rural areas with a plan for armed uprisings in the main industrial centers of China. These ideas were further developed at the expanded meeting of the Provisional Politburo of the CPC Central Committee in November 1927 in Shanghai, which defined the Chinese revolution as "permanent" and outlined a number of measures designed to accelerate the rate of outgrowth of the revolution. In addition to decisions on the problems of organizing uprisings and creating Soviets great place in the documents of the meeting took the agrarian question. It was decided to switch to a policy of gratuitous confiscation of all lands of large landowners, the nationalization of all privately owned lands and the transfer of land to peasants for use on an equalizing basis. At the same time, it was already about the liquidation of the kulaks as a class. In the light of all these decisions, the course “to expose the reactionary essence of Sun Yat-senism” already looked quite logical.
This leftist political line determined the practical activity of the CPC in the summer and autumn of 1927 and had a great deal to do with the work of the CPC in the subsequent period.
As already noted, the first uprising was raised in Nanchang. The decision on this speech was made on July 26 at a meeting in Hankow of members of the CPC leadership with the participation of V.K. Blucher and some others Soviet comrades. It was supposed to start this performance after a series of peasant uprisings in neighboring provinces, but a change in the situation required an acceleration of the performance, which now came to be regarded as a prologue to the "autumn harvest uprisings." The uprising began on the night of July 31 to August 1, 1927. The main force was the parts of the NRA, which were under the influence of the CCP and led by the Communists. For the political leadership of the uprising, the Communists formed the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang in accordance with the ideas about the need to still act under the banner of the left Kuomintang, but none of the prominent Kuomintang members who were supposed to be involved in this committee supported the rebels and this idea did not receive a real embodiment. In fact, the committee included the communists Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao, Li Lisan, Lin Boqu, Tan Pingshan, Wu Yuzhang, Zhu De, YunDaiying, Guo Moruo. He Long, who became a communist during the uprising, was appointed commander-in-chief, and Liu Bocheng was appointed chief of staff. The main force of the uprising was the units led by He Long, Ye Ting and Zhu De. Later prominent military figures Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yi, Lin Biao also took part in the uprising.
The rebels proclaimed loyalty to the revolutionary precepts of Sun Yat-sen and the desire to return to Guangdong, revive the revolutionary base and prepare a new Northern Expedition. At the same time, they put forward the slogans of an agrarian revolution and the creation of organs of peasant power, practically providing for the confiscation of the lands of large landowners. Under these slogans, it was supposed to raise peasant uprisings along the route to Guangdong and come to Guangzhou on the wave of the peasant movement, on the wave of the agrarian revolution. However, events did not develop as the initiators of the uprising had planned. And the main miscalculation turned out to be in assessing the readiness of the peasantry for an agrarian revolution, not to mention the miscalculation in assessing the general situation in the country.
On August 5, the rebel army, numbering about 20,000 fighters, left Nanchang and, after successful battles in southern Jiangxi, entered western Fujian in early September. However, neither in Jiangxi, nor in Fujian, nor somewhat later in Guangdong
the rebels failed to raise the peasantry. “The calculation on the support of the peasants did not materialize,” notes L.P. Delusin. - They, as the participants of the campaign later wrote about it, scattered when they heard about the approach of the rebel troops, and there was no one to put up leaflets and propagate the ideas of the agrarian revolution. Both the peasants and the landowners fled, and as a result, there was no one to fight against and no one to fight. At the same time, in Guangdong, the rebels ran into fierce resistance from superior enemy forces and were defeated in heavy and bloody battles in the area of the city of Shantou.
After this defeat, one group of rebels (about 1 thousand people), led by Zhu De and Chen Yi, made their way through southern Jiangxi to Guangdong, from there, as early as the beginning of the next year, went to southern Hunan. Another group of rebels entered the area of Haifeng and Lufeng counties in Guangdong province, where the peasant movement led by the communist Peng Bai achieved significant success in previous years and where the rebels (finally!) received support.
From August to December 1927, under the slogans of the Soviets and the agrarian revolution, the communists tried to raise peasant uprisings in the provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Guangdong. However, these actions did not receive the broad and mass support of the peasantry that the leaders of the CPC were counting on. The uprisings were of a disparate nature, flared up, as a rule, only in those few places where the communists had strong positions in peasant unions, and did not turn into a general war under agrarian slogans. The rebels achieved the greatest success in the counties of Haifeng and Lufeng. On the basis of the peasant armed detachments and the Nanchang rebels who came here, the communists created a division of the Workers 'and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, which managed to capture the county centers. Here, in November 1927, Soviet power was proclaimed and a Soviet government was formed. The rebels destroyed large landowners, divided their land, canceled peasant debts, and reduced taxes. Soviet power held out here all winter.
At the same time, in accordance with the September decision of the Provisional Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, the Communists made an attempt to raise uprisings in the cities of Hankou, Wuxi, Changsha, Kaifeng and in some county centers. The uprising of December 11-13, 1927 in Guangzhou ("Canton Commune") had the greatest political resonance - the last attempt of the CPC to recreate the southern revolutionary base and start the revolution anew.
If in the course of some uprisings in the countryside it was possible to create revolutionary bases, then all urban uprisings were immediately crushed by superior enemy forces. All these uprisings, considered by their organizers as the beginning of a new broad revolutionary offensive, actually became the rearguard battles of the National Revolution of 1925-1927, however, determining in many respects the further route of the revolution.
The end of the rearguard action by December 1927 meant the end of the National Revolution of 1925-1927. as one "wave", one stage of the national liberation revolution. It was during these years that the first, and therefore the most difficult, steps were taken to overcome China's semi-colonial dependence. The main result of the National Revolution of 1925-1927. - restoration of national statehood as the most important lever for completing the national liberation revolution. For all its weakness and internal inconsistency, the Kuomintang statehood, whose formation became possible only as a result of the gains of the National Revolution of 1925-1927, was ultimately capable of solving a number of national problems. All this makes us refuse to consider the results of the political battles of these years as the defeat of the revolutionary movement. Of course, this revolution, this "wave" did not end in complete victory, but the Chinese people took a decisive step towards their national liberation, which largely predetermined the nature of the subsequent liberation movement.
The attempt of the communists to win hegemony in the liberation struggle in the united front and accelerate its outgrowth, i.e. resolutely go beyond the national liberation revolution, ended in defeat. The rearguard battles of the revolution revealed the reasons for this defeat. However, the failure of this attempt is not tantamount to the complete defeat of the communist movement in China during this revolutionary "wave". After all, one of the results of the National Revolution of 1925-1927. was the emergence of the CPC as a significant and independent political force, which even then proved capable of throwing a political challenge to the Kuomintang. It was in the crucible of heavy political battles of that time that the prerequisites for the creation of a mass CCP, a powerful party army, and liberated revolutionary regions were laid.
At the same time, the sad result of the National Revolution of 1925-1927. There was a deep split in the national liberation movement. It was during these years that two irreconcilable ideological and political currents emerged - "nationalist" and "communist", the mortal struggle between which actually relegated to the background the tasks of completing the national liberation and renewal of China. The struggle between the Kuomintang and the CPC, despite their ideological closeness, has since become the determining factor in China's political development.
8. Socio-economic shifts in China 1918-1927
Completion of the National Revolution of 1925-1927 also meant the completion of a certain stage in the socio-economic development of China, begun by the Xinhai Revolution. The turbulent political events of the first post-war decade “highlighted” with particular clarity the profound socio-economic shifts, which were primarily characterized by China’s accelerated and deepening involvement in the world capitalist economy and the world division of labor, in which China remained a semi-colony and economic periphery of the world economy.
The strengthening of China's economic involvement in the world market was manifested in a significant increase in the export of capital to China, in an increase in the role of foreign capital in the socio-economic development of the country. If during the years of the World War foreign investment in China almost did not increase and in 1918 amounted to 1691 million US dollars. dollars, then in the post-war decade they jumped to a gigantic amount - 3016 million. This is an increase in imports! foreign capital took place in the context of an intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry, which was characterized primarily by the active offensive of Japan, whose capital investments increased by about five times compared to 1914 and reached 1043 million, almost catching up with the main rival and main investor - England, although its investments for this time have doubled and reached 1168 million.
These two main investors and rivals accounted for the bulk of foreign business investment, and the geographic and sectoral focus of these investments was different. Japan invested its capital primarily in Manchuria, trying to create a kind of colonial economic structure there with a very diversified investment of funds. Significant Japanese capital was invested in the mining industry of northern China and in the manufacturing industry of other regions. England, on the other hand, directed its investments mainly to the Shanghai economic region and counted on strengthening its positions in the country's money and commodity market and on expanding ties with Chinese capital through the financing of compradors. Significant differences in the nature of capital investments of these two powers also reflected significant differences in approaches to the exploitation of China in general. While Japan was striving for colonial conquests at the expense of China and for ousting Chinese capital and the capital of its competitors, England preferred to deal with dependent China as a whole and with some cooperation with Chinese capital. The position of the United States was also close to the position of England, whose capital investments in China grew rapidly, although they still lagged behind Japan and England. In the context of the aggravation of Japanese-American contradictions in the postwar years, all this led to the formation of imperialist groups, the enmity of which subsequently significantly influenced the historical fate of China.
Fluctuations in world market conditions and turbulent political events in China made the flow of foreign capital into China very uneven. The highest (average 96.9 million US dollars) capital inflow occurred in 1920-1923. The same years saw a record level of imports of machinery and equipment. Then in 1925-1926. the influx of capital falls to 8 million a year, which clearly indicates that investors are afraid of the upsurge of the anti-imperialist struggle. Half of the increase in foreign investment accounted for the reinvestment of profits, which indicated a certain efficiency of the functioning of foreign capital in China and its expanding relationship with the Chinese and world markets.
China's increased and deepened involvement in the world economy led at the same time to further development and Chinese capitalism. The capitalist restructuring of the Chinese national economy, which accelerated in principle after the victory of the Xinhai Revolution, continued during these years on a fairly broad front. The most generalized indicator of this restructuring is data on the impressive growth of national capital from about 2 billion yuan in 1918 to 4.7 billion in 1928. Moreover, industrial capital increased most intensively: from 375 million yuan to 1225 million. imperfect statistics, which are unable to take into account the development of the lower forms of capital, these figures certainly testify to the great quantitative growth of Chinese capital, to the increase in its economic role. The faster growth of precisely industrial capital reflected the progressive trend of the somewhat accelerated "modernization" of national capital, although a significant predominance of capital in the sphere of circulation still remained (approximately 3:1, against 5:1 in 1918). In real economic reality, which statistics were unable to fix, this predominance could probably be even greater.
The acceleration of capitalist evolution was also manifested in agriculture, where it was determined by the uniqueness of the production and socio-economic processes of the agrarian sector.
In the decade under review, the country's gross agricultural production grew by about 0.89% per year, barely outpacing the population growth rate (0.8%). The trend of progressive development of agriculture was ensured primarily through the expansion of the production of basic industrial crops (soybeans, cotton, flax crops, tobacco), as well as the development of animal husbandry, which testified to the further diversification of Chinese agriculture under the influence of the development of commodity-money relations. The total production of the five main grain crops also increased, however, in general, the increase in grain production lagged behind population growth, and at the time under review, China was forced to import cereals.
The specialization of certain areas of agricultural production continues to develop, and areas of commercial agriculture are being singled out. This specialization was associated primarily with the growth in the production of industrial crops. A factor in the growth of agricultural production was the expansion of arable land due to the rise of virgin land in the outskirts (mainly in Manchuria) by about 7 million hectares, although in China proper there was some reduction in arable land per capita. The area of irrigated land has expanded by about 3 million hectares. The application of organic fertilizers increased somewhat, and the import of mineral fertilizers to China began. The most important factor in the growth of agricultural production remained the increase in the labor force, provided by the growth of the rural population.
All the processes of growth and development of Chinese agriculture in the decade under consideration are directly linked to the further drawing of the rural economy into market relations, with the specialization of production, and the allocation of areas for commercial agriculture.
On average, more than half of the total agricultural output in the period under review took the form of a commodity, and in specialized areas of commercial agriculture, it even reached 60-70%. A very significant increase in the marketability of agriculture was, however, not the result of an increase in labor productivity, but primarily the result of increased exploitation of the peasantry by traditional methods.
The development of all these tendencies stimulated capitalist processes in the bowels of the Chinese countryside, but did not change, and could not change, the main features of this agrarian-capitalist evolution: the insignificant development of large-scale capitalist production in the agrarian sector, both at the initiative of the traditional exploiter (“the Prussian path of development”), and on the initiative of a wealthy peasant (“American way of development”), on the one hand, and the gradual bourgeoisization of the traditional multi-faceted rural exploiter (landlord, usurer, merchant), who continues to exploit the peasant by traditional methods, but already in conditions of involvement in capitalist market relations - with another.
The process of primitive accumulation in the countryside, the process of turning the traditional rural rich man into a bourgeois, was painful and slow and could not have been different in the conditions of the very gradual destruction of the traditional "Asian" social system. The initial accumulation in the countryside was held back "from above" by tax pressure from the side of administrative and power structures, and "from below" - by a complex of community-clan relations. The collapse of the empire and the republican political reality to a certain extent undermined the legal system of regulation of land relations (state codified and communal, based on "common law"), largely contributed to the release of the landowner from obligations to the tenant, stimulated new steps towards the maturation of bourgeois land ownership. This was facilitated by the civil legislation of the Republic of China.
The acceleration of capitalist development and the intensification of the political struggle, especially during the National Revolution of 1925-1927, contributed to the intensification of the processes of stratification and the identification of class shifts. However, it would be erroneous to exaggerate the extent of the quantitative and qualitative changes that took place.
The working class grew in numbers in the post-war decade, but its cadre core did not expand significantly, because it was it that was the main victim of repressions, it was it that suffered the greatest losses during the failed uprisings. At the same time, the active participation of the working class in political battles, especially its participation in anti-imperialist actions, contributed to a fundamental increase in its social role in the country. It was precisely at this time that the working class turned into a noticeable socio-political force, which even the ruling circles were forced to reckon with.
The Chinese bourgeoisie, having strengthened its economic positions, tried to play a greater political role as well. She took a step towards her socio-political consolidation. In the course of the unfolding revolution, the bourgeoisie tried to defend its class interests both in the struggle against imperialism and the militarists, on the one hand, and in the struggle against the workers' and peasants' movement, on the other. But the fragmentation of the bourgeoisie, caused by the diversity, made its position weak. Only the Shanghai bourgeoisie - the most socio-politically developed part of this class - was able to play a significant role in political battles and influence the character of the emerging Kuomintang power.
The peculiarity of the political clashes of the National Revolution, the class breadth of the socio-political coalition that had taken shape, which became the guiding force of the revolution, the militaristic-bourgeois nature of the Kuomintang government that came to power, which sought to preserve the breadth of the coalition and rely on it in the new conditions, testified both to the incompleteness of the class-forming processes in China, and about the incompleteness of the national liberation revolution
After the end of the First World War, China was not in the best position, largely due to the Treaty of Versailles. Despite the participation of China in the war against the troops of Germany, the conditions for concluding world peace did not contribute to the development of China and even led to some degradation.
A single government, as such, no longer existed, and military groups formed in different regions of the country, which were under the care of other states. These militaristic gangs have become, in fact, the full owners of their territories, having full power over all the people who are on their lands.
The Chinese government decided to improve its position through negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference, which took place in January 1919. The main demands were: autonomy in terms of customs, the abolition of some clauses of the peace treaty and, most importantly, the return of the lands of the province of Shandong, which was captured by Germany during the war. However, the allies did not show loyalty and decided to give the province liberated from the German troops to the power of Japan.
This outcome did not suit the people of China. On May 4, 1919, a demonstration was held in Beijing, in which several thousand students took part. This was the beginning of a popular movement that turned into a full-fledged revolution. The participants in the new movement not only demanded independence from other states, but also improved general folk culture, updating literature and spoken language, raising the standard of living among the common population and the universal right to a good education.
In 1921, China was still in a state of political fragmentation. In Beijing in the north of the country, power was in the hands of the militarists, and in Guangzhou in the south, Sun Yat-sen ruled. At the same time, a new political force was born - the Communist Party, which quickly became popular among all social classes.
After a couple of years, Sun Yat-sen decided to unite with the communists and began to intensively create an army for the revolution, in which he was helped by several military specialists from the USSR. Despite the fact that Sun Yat-sen died in early 1925, the preparations were successfully completed.
The official reason for the revolution was May 30, 1925, when the British police shot down a crowd of demonstrators in Shanghai. Many people were injured or killed, and many more were arrested. Shortly thereafter, a mass strike among Shanghai workers began, in which more than a hundred thousand people took part.
On July 1 of the same year, the Guangzhou authorities declared themselves the official government of China. Within the new political structure, there was a constant struggle for power between the disciples and allies of Sun Yat-sen, each of whom pursued his own interests and had his own view of China's politics and future. After some time, the leader of the revolutionary army, the commander-in-chief Chiang Kai-shek, acquired the greatest influence in the new government. It was he who began to conduct active actions, the result of which was a revolution.
Beginning of revolutionary actions
In mid-1926, the New Government Revolutionary Army, numbering about a hundred thousand soldiers, began to move to northern China. Although the Beijing militarists had more troops, many people in their provinces were favorable to the revolution and the New Chinese Government, so that the revolutionary army advanced inexorably.
As a result of the military campaign to the north, the power of the New National Government extended to cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan and some provinces. Chiang Kai-shek decided to take all power into his own hands, because of which he met with misunderstanding and resistance from the former communist allies. Deciding to act tough, he ordered the assassination of many high-ranking communists in the government. After months of hard fighting, Chiang Kai-shek gained full power over the New Government. He was supported by all political parties except the communist one. Thus ended the revolution.
Further, laws were adopted on the new structure of the state, which, however, had little effect on the situation in the country and the lives of citizens. As a result, the communists did not give up. Having dug in in rural areas, they gradually recovered their strength after long persecution by the new authorities.
In 1931, the invasion of Japanese troops began in the northeast of the country. Having decided to start a liberation movement in China against the Japanese invaders, the communists, with the support of all regions of the country loyal to them, created their own government, which was headed by Mao Zedong. The Communists quickly expanded their influence, acquiring a large army of more than three hundred thousand men.
Tasks of the liberation movement in China
The main tasks of the revolutionaries were: the national independence of China from foreign states, the establishment of a unified government, the improvement and dissemination of folk culture, universal education and the establishment of equality among different social classes, the preservation of the integrity of the state and the unity of its people.
Results
It wasn't until Japan began serious action to take over China that the representatives of the National Government entered into a peace agreement with the Communists. Having united, the people of China began to jointly resist the imperialists of Japan, which became known in history as the Sino-Japanese war, which ended only in 1945 with the defeat of Japan.
At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a revolutionary-democratic movement was formed. Its participants had the goal of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty by means of an armed uprising and proclaiming a republic. In this way, in their opinion, it was possible to revive a powerful and independent China. The recognized leader of the Chinese revolutionary democrats was Sun Yat-sen, who had been in exile for a long time and was well acquainted with the political experience of the West. He believed that the only correct way out of the crisis was to combine the traditions of Chinese civilization with the innovations that came from the West, and he had high hopes for support from Japan and Western states. In 1905, Sun Yat-sen and his supporters founded the United Union revolutionary organization in Japan. His program ("Three People's Principles") was developed by Sun Yat-sen. The first principle sounded like "nationalism" and provided for the overthrow of the power of the Manchu dynasty and the return of power to the Chinese government. The second principle was called "democracy" and meant the establishment of a bourgeois-democratic republic in the country after the overthrow of the monarchy. The third principle - "people's welfare" - had in mind a fair solution to China's main issue - agrarian. The "United Union" began preparations for an anti-Manchu uprising in southern China.
xinhai revolution
On October 10, 1911, an armed uprising began in one of major centers southern China - Wuchang. This uprising marked the beginning of a new stage in the national liberation struggle, which historians often call the Xinhai Revolution (1911 was called "Xinhai" according to the old Chinese calendar). The rebels expelled the Manchu officials and created a revolutionary government, which demanded the renunciation of the Qing dynasty from power and proclaimed the Republic of China. The revolutionaries appealed to their fellow citizens to rise up against Manchu rule. Time to avoid the intervention of foreigners, the revolutionary government promised to fulfill obligations under all treaties that were signed by the imperial government. Western countries also went forward and declared their neutrality as the conflict deepened.
The whole of China responded to the call of the Chang revolutionaries. At the beginning of December, the power of the Manchus was abolished in 15 provinces. Beijing controlled only three northern provinces of China. In the context of the aggravation of the political crisis, a surge of nationalist extremism was observed among the Chinese population, which sometimes took the form of genocide against the Manchus as a nationality. The imperial government, having lost the ability to control the situation, turned to the well-known general Yuan Shikai, a Chinese by birth, for help. He was appointed commander-in-chief of all troops, and also received the post of prime minister. In order to avoid further deepening of the political crisis and preserve the institution of imperial power, a constitution was adopted on November 2, 1911, which turned the country into a constitutional monarchy.
As an experienced and moderate politician, Yuan Shikai advocated overcoming the political legacy of Qing rule, Sinicization of the highest authorities, national reconciliation of the Chinese and Manchus, and preferred political methods to overcome the conflict. Therefore, he combined methods against the revolutionary South with the search for ways for reconciliation. On his initiative, hostilities were stopped and negotiations began with the revolutionaries. These negotiations failed to agree on the preservation of the monarchy, even in a constitutional form, but Yuan Shikai was offered the post of president of the republic after the abdication of the Qing dynasty.
At the end of 1911, Sun Yat-sen returned from many years of emigration, which strengthened the positions of the radical camp. In Nanjing, which became the capital of the Republic of China, on December 29, 1911, at a conference of representatives of independent provinces, Sun Yat-sen was elected provisional president. On January 1, 1912, he took the oath and officially proclaimed the Republic of China. Its highest temporary legislative body, the National Assembly, was created, after which the fate of the Qing dynasty was predetermined.
With the mediation of Yuan Shikai, negotiations began with the imperial court on the terms of renunciation of power. On February 12, 1912, an edict of renunciation was issued on behalf of the infant emperor. The power of the Manchu Qing dynasty was overthrown.
Immediately after that, Sun Yat-sen, fulfilling the preliminary agreements of his entourage, renounces the powers of the interim president and recommends Yuan Shikai, who was unanimously elected by the National Assembly, to this post. At its core, this act of voluntary transfer of power was a historic compromise between the two key political leaders of the North and South - Yuan Shikai and Sun Yat-sen. For some time, this made it possible to avoid a bloody civil war, direct intervention of foreign states and the inevitable split of the country.
The Republican government passed a number of progressive decrees. The most important achievement of the new regime was the adoption of an interim constitution (March 10, 1912), which for the first time in the history of China proclaimed the equality of all citizens, the right to private property and freedom of enterprise, basic democratic freedoms, the distribution of power into legislative, executive and judicial, and it also provides for the creation of a permanent parliament. At the request of Sun Yat-sen, Nanjing should become the capital of the Republic of China. But Yuan Shikai refused to move there and his inauguration took place in Beijing, which was soon proclaimed the capital.
Preparing for parliamentary elections and striving to consolidate all the patriotic forces capable of defending the republican system, in August 1912 Sun Yat-sen and his associates founded a new party, the Kuomintang (National Party). In the parliamentary elections, the Kuomintang achieved significant success and demanded the establishment of a "responsible party government".
But Yuan Shikai was not going to share power and resorted to repressive actions. On his secret orders, the Kuomintang candidate for the premiership was assassinated. In order to achieve the strengthening of his armed forces, in April 1913, without the consent of the parliament, Yuan Shikai accepted a large foreign loan. This action received a great political response. The Kuomintang called on the people to armed struggle against Yuan Shikai's regime. But it was not possible to organize a mass demonstration, since the majority of the Chinese population did not respond to this call. Only a few military units loyal to the Kuomintang began a military campaign against Yuan Shikai, called the "second revolution" (July-August 1913). Having a great advantage in the armed forces and material support, the Peking government suppressed the uprising of the Kuomintang. Sun Yat-sen and other leaders of the "second revolution" were forced to emigrate. The defeat of the opposition opened the way for Yuan Shikai to dictatorship.
Thus, the Xinhai Revolution, national liberation in nature, fulfilled the main political tasks:
Eliminated the rule of the Manchu aristocracy and the monarchical regime;
Proclaimed a Western-style republic - the first in Asia at that time (even in Europe there were only three republican governments - in France, Switzerland and San Marino)
Freed slaves and serfs in the former estates of the emperor and the Manchu nobility,
Accelerated the modernization of the country.
However, the Xinhai Revolution did not eliminate despotism - the political power traditional for China - but only led to its adaptation to new historical conditions.
Revolution in Iran and Turkey
Iran
By the beginning of the 20th century, Iran remained a backward country, a semi-colony of England and Russia. The supreme power in the country belonged to the Shah, who came from the Qajar dynasty (ruled since the end of the 18th century). In the Iranian village, where more than half of the population lived, feudal relations and landlord arbitrariness dominated. Through foreign competition, a large national industry did not develop. Craftsmen were in a difficult position, whose products could not withstand the competition of cheap foreign goods of factory production.
The deep economic and political crisis experienced by Iran, the dominance of foreigners, the rotten political system, unbearable living conditions of the common people - all this contributed to the rise of the popular movement in the early twentieth century. A powerful opposition camp of the Shah's regime is being formed. Moreover, the Muslim clergy also spoke out for limiting the Shah's power. It was concerned about the Shah's encroachment on the income of the church and the penetration of Christianity into the country. Therefore, the revolutionary movement in Iran developed under the ideological influence of the Muslim clergy, under the banner of Islam.
Revolution 1905-1911
The revolutionary events of 1905, which took place in neighboring Russia, had a great influence on the political situation in Iran. In December 1905, a mass demonstration of protest against the actions of the authorities took place in Tehran, which grew into a general political strike. Its main demands were the introduction of a constitution and the convening of a Majlis (parliament). The events in Tehran are considered to be the beginning of the Iranian revolution of 1905-1911. In fact, it was a constitutional movement that became widespread.
In the future, a wave of uprisings swept other Iranian cities. Under the pressure of the popular movement, which gained momentum, the shah was forced to promise to fulfill the demands of the opposition. But this turned out to be only a maneuver of reaction. Having achieved the cessation of the mass movement in the capital, the shah began mass repressions against its participants.
In response, in the summer of 1906, a new wave of popular protest arose. The constitutional movement has taken on a large scale. Under these conditions, the Shah made concessions and announced elections to the Majlis. The opening of the Majlis took place in October 1906, and in December its deputies approved the first Iranian constitution, thereby proclaiming the country constitutional monarchy(in the spring of 1907 the constitution was supplemented with a number of important provisions). However, the adopted constitution almost immediately began to be violated by the government and its officials. Therefore, the revolutionary movement continued to grow.
Britain and Russia tried to take advantage of the difficult situation in Iran. In August 1907, an Anglo-Russian agreement was signed on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Iran. According to this agreement, Iran was divided into three parts: Northern Iran (the most populated and richest) remained in the sphere of Russian influence, Central Iran was declared neutral, and Southern was recognized as the sphere of influence of England.
Relying on the support of foreign states, Shah of Iran Mohammed Ali (succeeded the throne in 1907) in June 1908 carried out a coup d'état. Martial law was introduced in Tehran, the Mejlis was dissolved, the constitution was suspended.
However, the revolutionary struggle did not end there. In Tabriz, the administrative center of Iranian Azerbaijan, an armed anti-Shah uprising began. The revolutionaries began a campaign against Tehran and in June 1909 occupied the capital. Shah Mohammed Ali was forced to abdicate in favor of his 10-year-old son, during whose reign a regency was established. The constitution was restored, the second Majlis was convened. The new Iranian government consisted of moderate liberal figures representing the interests of the big merchant bourgeoisie and landlords.
After some waiting, foreign states decided to intervene in the Iranian events. In 1911, tsarist Russia sent its troops into the northern provinces of Iran, and England - into the south. The revolutionary movement was crushed. The Majlis was dispersed again. The reactionaries came to power to replace the moderate liberals. These events complete the Iranian revolution.
So, the revolution of 1905-1911 turned out to be incomplete. The Qajar dynasty survived. The privileges of the feudal lords remained inviolable. However, the main goal of the revolution - the introduction of constitutional restrictions on the Shah's regime - was achieved. Iran became a constitutional monarchy. During the years of the revolution, the commercial bourgeoisie and liberal landowners strengthened their political positions.
Turkey
At the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, which was large in the past, finally lost its former influence on the course of world history, turning into a semi-colony of the West. European states declared the Ottoman Empire "the sick man of Europe" and arrogated to themselves the right to decide its fate. The actual division of the Ottoman territories took place. Bosnia and Herzegovina were under Austro-Hungarian occupation, Tunisia was ruled by the French, Egypt was captured by England. Formally, these territories remained part of the Ottoman Empire, but in fact they came under the complete control of foreign states. Using all possible means, foreign capital has taken key positions in all areas of the Turkish economy. This hindered the development of national industry, where the manufactory mode of production reigned. Agriculture practically did not develop. Everywhere, peasants used a wooden plow to cultivate the land.