Who commanded the 4th Ukrainian front. See what the "4th Ukrainian Front" is in other dictionaries
4th Ukrainian Front I formation formed in the southwestern direction of the Soviet-German front on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 30227 of 10/16/1943 by renaming the Southern Front. It included the 2nd and 3rd Guards, 5th shock, 28th, 44th, 51st armies, 8th air army. Subsequently, it included the Primorsky Army and the 4th Air Army.
In late October - early November 1943, the troops of the front completed the Melitopol operation (September 26 - November 5), during which they advanced up to 300 km, reaching the lower reaches of the Dnieper and the Perekop Isthmus of Crimea.
During the strategic offensive of 1943 - 1944. in the Right-Bank Ukraine, the armies of the right flank in January - February 1944 participated in the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog operation (January 30 - February 29). In cooperation with the 3rd Ukrainian Front, they liquidated the enemy's Nikopol bridgehead on the Dnieper.
In April - May 1944, the troops of the front and the Separate Primorsky Army, in cooperation with the forces Black Sea Fleet and Azov military flotilla carried out the Crimean strategic operation (April 8 - May 12), defeated almost 200,000 enemy grouping and liberated Crimea.
The front was abolished on May 31, 1944 on the basis of the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of May 16, 1944; its field administration, service units and rear establishments were withdrawn to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
4th Ukrainian Front II formation It was formed on August 5, 1944 on the basis of the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated July 30, 1944, as part of the 1st Guards, 18th Armies and the 8th Air Army. Subsequently, the front at different times included the 38th and 60th armies.
In September - October 1944, the troops of the front, in cooperation with the 1st Ukrainian Front, participated in the East Carpathian strategic operation (September 8 - October 28), during which Transcarpathian Ukraine and part of the territory of Czechoslovakia were liberated, assistance was provided to the Slovak national uprising.
In January - February 1945, the troops of the front, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, carried out the Western Carpathian strategic operation (January 12 - February 18), liberated the southern regions of Poland and a significant part of Czechoslovakia. The attack south of Krakow secured the offensive Soviet troops from the south on the Warsaw-Berlin direction.
In March - early May 1945, as a result of the Moravsk-Ostrava operation (March 10 - May 5), the troops of the front cleared the Moravsk-Ostrava industrial region of Czechoslovakia from German invaders and created conditions for advancing to its central part. Then they participated in the Prague strategic operation (May 6 - 11), as a result of which the territory of Czechoslovakia was completely liberated.
Commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front
The treatment of General Petrov ended as unexpectedly as it began. This was facilitated, of course, not by the state of health of Ivan Efimovich, but by the situation at the front. That's what happened. The Belarusian operation developed successfully. In the course of a quick and swift offensive, when the operation "Bagration" was still in full swing, using the favorable situation created by the offensive of the Belorussian fronts, the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. All the attention of the enemy was focused these days on holding the 1st and 3rd Belorussian fronts rushing towards each other - when these fronts were connected in the Minsk region, the threat of a large encirclement arose for the Nazi troops. Naturally, not only the attention of the Nazi command was directed here, but also the reserves that it had at its disposal.
It was at this favorable moment that the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal I.S. Konev struck. He hit in two directions: on Rava-Russkaya and on Lvov. I will not describe all the vicissitudes of this complex operation. I can only say that on July 27 Lvov was released. Continuing to develop the offensive, the troops reached the Vistula River and captured a large bridgehead on the opposite bank, expanding it over time to 75 kilometers along the front and up to 50 kilometers in depth. During the fighting for the bridgehead, the city of Sandomierz was taken. The famous Sandomierz bridgehead was named after the city, from which our armies were already aiming at Berlin, and the armies of the left wing of this front began fighting in the foothills of the Carpathians.
In the south, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky were preparing to enter Romania. These two powerful groupings of our troops were separated by a huge horseshoe of the Main Carpathian Range, up to 400 kilometers long and more than 100 kilometers deep. The convex side of this mountain horseshoe was turned towards our troops, it consists of several parallel mountain ranges, which are a powerful natural defensive line, not to mention what was created there by the enemy. All roads, passes, bottlenecks in the mountains were blocked by nodes of resistance, and along the Main Carpathian Range ran the Arpad defensive line with long-term reinforced concrete structures typical of such powerful lines. The left flank of the 1st Ukrainian and the right 2nd Ukrainian fronts ran into this mountain range. The commanders of these fronts now, of course, found it difficult to organize and direct battles in such heterogeneous - plains and mountain - theaters, each of which requires its own specifics of combat.
Given this, the Headquarters decided to create a new one - the 4th Ukrainian Front. The creation of the front is associated with enormous organizational work, the regrouping of troops, the allocation of new forces and means, the creation of new bases for supplying fuel, food, ammunition, and the development of a network of railways and highways. All the features of this work are already known to the reader from the story of Petrov's activities when he formed the 2nd Belorussian Front. But when creating the 4th Ukrainian Front, another one arose important question: the new front was to fight in the mountains. Who should be appointed commander of this front? We went through many military leaders, primarily interested in those who have experience in mountain warfare. And it turned out that General Petrov was the most experienced in leading battles in the mountains. His experience in this area began during the years of the civil war in the Pamir mountains. Already in the first months of the Great Patriotic War, Petrov led the Primorsky Army through the Crimean Mountains to Sevastopol with battles. Colossal battles in the battle for the Caucasus under the leadership of General Petrov, too for the most part passed in the mountains. It was difficult to find a better candidate.
The General Staff, despite the fact that he was well aware of all the difficult moments in the attitude of the Supreme Commander to this commander, nevertheless proposed his candidacy. And Stalin agreed without objection, obviously, taking into account the advantages and advantages of Petrov listed above.
On August 3, 1944, a Stavka directive was issued, according to which Colonel General Ivan Efimovich Petrov was appointed commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, and a member of the Military Council (I don’t know if this was done on purpose or not, but I consider it necessary to draw the attention of readers to this ) was again appointed Colonel-General L. Z. Mekhlis. The chief of staff of the front was Lieutenant-General F.K. Korzhenevich.
The troops of the front included and transferred from the 1st Ukrainian Front: the 1st Guards and 18th Armies, as well as the 8th Air Army. And also the 17th Guards rifle corps and other special parts.
Arriving at the front, General Petrov immediately, even in the process of forming his new front department, joined in the leadership of the troops that fought and did not interrupt the offensive for a minute.
August 5 1st guards army liberated the city of Stryi, and the next day, overcoming a difficult, swampy terrain, captured the regional center of Ukraine - the city of Drohobych. Continuing the advance, the troops of the front liberated Borislav and Sambir on August 7.
The front, having such small forces - only two armies - could not successfully advance for a long time. As we moved further into the foothills of the Carpathians, the offensive slowed down. And the 4th Ukrainian was created not for active offensive operations. Here is what General S. M. Shtemenko writes about this:
“The Soviet command was not going then to force the Carpathian Range with a direct blow. Head-on actions could cost us dearly. The mountains had to be bypassed. This idea was laid down in the plan for future operations in the Carpathians, where it was supposed to operate with small forces.
“The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. With the receipt of this directive, the troops of the front will go over to a rigid defense along the entire strip.
2. Create defense in depth.
3. Prepare in the front line at least three defensive lines with a total depth of 30-40 kilometers, having strong corps, army and front reserves in the main directions ... "
As can be seen from the directive of the Headquarters, the 4th Ukrainian Front was assigned a purely defensive task and was directly instructed to build a defense in depth.
This ensured the flanks of Konev’s troops on the Sandomierz bridgehead and Malinovsky’s troops in Romania, because otherwise, in the absence of defense, which Petrov was instructed to create, the enemy could pass along the Carpathian roads and hit very sensitively not only on the flanks, but even on the rear of the troops 1 th Ukrainian and 2nd Ukrainian fronts.
But before the front commander, General Petrov, had yet to make a decision to organize such a strong defense, literally three days later, that is, on September 2, 1944, a new directive from the Headquarters was received, ordering the attack.
What happened during those three days?
Here, for the first time, the activity of General Petrov comes into contact with matters already of an international scale, and in order to make it clear to readers, I am forced to make a small digression.
Of course, not only the events of these days so dramatically changed the situation and the decision of the Supreme High Command. Events have been brewing for a long time, but it was in these three days that they reached their climax. The fact is that in Czechoslovakia, beyond the Carpathian ridges, in front of which the troops of General Petrov stood, an uprising was brewing.
As early as December 12, 1943, the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation was signed. In accordance with this treaty, the Soviet government provided the Czechoslovak liberation movement with great assistance with weapons, ammunition and everything necessary to fight the Nazis. The rapidly developing partisan movement needed leadership. But the most persistent, courageous fighters against fascism, the Czechoslovak communists, when the Nazis entered Czechoslovakia in 1939, either died in dungeons, or sat in concentration camps, or hid underground and in exile outside native land. During the years 1941-1943, several attempts were made to send to Czechoslovakia some of the leading workers of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who found themselves in our country, and to recreate the Central Committee of the Party there. These attempts were unsuccessful four times, all those who were transported were arrested by the Nazis.
In the summer of 1943, they nevertheless managed (for the fifth time!) to transfer several comrades. Soon the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia was formed, headed by K. Schmidke, G. Husak and L. Novomesky. In addition, the Slovak National Council was created as; governing body national- freedom movement in Slovakia.
This council was headed by a presidium, which included representatives of various parties on an equal footing, and included communists. Communist K. Schmidke was one of the chairmen of the council.
The second force that claimed leadership of the popular and partisan movement was the Czechoslovak government in exile, located in London.
The London government pursued its policy and intended to use the Slovak army for its implementation. This army existed legally and was, as it were, an ally of Nazi Germany. The fact is that in 1939 Slovakia was declared an independent state under the "protection" Nazi Germany. Therefore, she retained her own government, headed by Tiso, and the army was also preserved. It was this army that the émigré government intended to use to quickly seize all the leading posts and establish bourgeois power even before the Red Army came to the territory of Czechoslovakia.
The command of the Slovak army was given over to the London government. It received instructions from him to delay the popular uprising, to carry out a coup by the army and police just before the Soviet troops entered Slovakia, and to establish the form of government conceived by the émigré government.
The emigrant government placed special hopes on the East Slovak corps, commanded by General A. Malar. This corps, by order of the Nazi command, was moved from Central Slovakia to the region of the Eastern Carpathians to Preshov in the spring of 1944.
At the same time, the Nazis were still afraid to bring the East Slovak corps to the front lines, fearing that during contact with the Red Army, the soldiers would not turn their weapons against Germany. Therefore, the Nazi command set the task before the Slovak Ministry of Defense - to prepare a defensive line in the Carpathians with the forces of this corps.
The East Slovak corps really equipped a powerful defensive line, especially strong in the area of the Dukla Pass and to the south.
But while the corps was building defensive lines for the Nazi troops, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia and the Slovak National Council were preparing the people for an armed uprising against the fascist regime. The fighting of the partisans intensified more and more. And when the Soviet troops advanced in the foothills of the Carpathians, this movement had already turned into a real guerrilla war.
In order to inform the command of the Red Army about the scope that the partisan movement, and coordinate the actions of the partisans with the Red Army, on August 6, 1944, a delegation of the Slovak National Council arrived in Moscow, which included the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia K. Schmidke. This delegation agreed to General Staff interaction with units of the Red Army.
The plan for the uprising was also agreed upon. Its essence was as follows. When the Germans attempted to occupy Slovakia - and it was already known that they were going to do this - the people must act with all their might, including the forces of the Slovak army, which had to be won over to their side. Then it followed: to keep as much of the Slovak territory as possible, to organize a temporary people's power on it and to wage partisan struggle on the territory still occupied by the occupiers until full release Slovakia by the Red Army.
However, events grew ahead of these plans. In those days when these negotiations were going on, that is, in August 1944, revolutionary actions of the people had already begun in Slovakia. And on the territory of Central and Northern Slovakia, partisans began to operate very actively. At the same time, an increasing number of military units of the Slovak army began to get out of the influence and control of the puppet Slovak government. The soldiers sent to the mountains for punitive operations fraternized with the partisans. Many simply went to them, handed them weapons and ammunition.
The high wave of the liberation movement was already threatening to sweep away the Tiso puppet government. Frightened by this threat, the government took a treacherous step: it turned to Hitler with a request to immediately send troops to Slovakia.
On August 29, Minister of Defense of the Tiso government announced by radio the country about the entry of German troops into Slovakia "to restore order." On the same day, the Slovak National Council addressed the population by radio with an appeal to start an uprising, to go over to open armed struggle. The people supported this call. Thus began the Slovak National Uprising. By evening, the uprising had engulfed the territory of Central and partly Eastern Slovakia. The center of the uprising was the city of Banska Bystrica, liberated by Slovak partisans on the night of August 30.
On September 1, the Slovak National Council announced that it was taking over the legislative and executive powers. Local national committees, led by the Communist Party, began everywhere to eliminate the organs of the old power and organize a new life.
On August 31, Z. Fierlinger, the envoy of Czechoslovakia to the USSR, addressed the Soviet government with a request to provide military assistance to the Slovak people. On September 2, a letter called "Events in Czechoslovakia" was sent to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR by Klement Gottwald.
Our Headquarters, as you know, did not plan to overcome the Carpathians with a blow from the front. Readers are aware of the directive given to General Petrov, ordering him to create a strong layered defense in the foothills of the Carpathians in case the Nazis try to launch flank attacks from this direction on the Soviet units advancing north and south of the Carpathians. There was no direct need to overcome mountain ranges and spend many lives and means on this.
But, having received news of the Slovak uprising and in connection with the request of its leaders, our command decided to immediately launch an offensive operation with the forces of the 1st and 4th Ukrainian fronts and through the Carpathians, by the shortest route, as quickly as possible to come to the aid of the rebels.
That is why so unexpectedly, literally a few days after the directive on the organization of a strong defense in depth, General Petrov received a directive on the preparation and conduct of offensive operation through the Carpathians.
In those days when the command of the 1st Ukrainian and 4th Ukrainian fronts, overcoming enormous difficulties, urgently organized an offensive, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia tried in every possible way to intensify and expand the struggle of the people on the other side of the Carpathian Mountains. The command of the East Slovak corps at that very time did not take any measures to bring the troops to combat readiness.
The corps commander Malar, being a supporter of the London government in exile and acting on his orders, convinced his subordinates that the uprising was premature, that the army should not participate in it, and even offered to surrender weapons to the Germans. In order to disorient the personnel of the corps, he transmitted false messages to the headquarters of the formations by radio that the actions of the fascist troops entering Slovakia would not be directed against the Slovak units. Of course, this message had a corrupting effect on the work of both the corps headquarters and divisional headquarters, which actually did nothing to prepare the Slovak troops for active operations against the invaders.
On the day the uprising began, August 29, the deputy commander of the corps, Colonel V. Talsky, who, according to the plan of the uprising, was entrusted with leading the actions of the corps, announced his intention to launch an offensive. But the very next morning, Talsky gathered subordinate officers and announced that there was no interaction with the Red Army and therefore it was necessary to wait with the speech until the organizational issues were agreed with the Soviet command. On August 30, the corps was still inactive, and on August 31, Talsky boarded a plane and, leaving the troops, without informing the corps headquarters, unexpectedly flew off to the location of the Soviet troops. On September 1, Talsky was received by the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal I.S. Konev. In a conversation with Marshal Talsky said that in the event of an offensive by Soviet troops in a westerly direction, the Slovak 1st and 2nd divisions, which are located along the border line, could advance in an easterly direction in order to join the Red Army.
Marshal Konev stated all this in a report to Stalin, expressing a proposal: to conduct a joint operation with the left flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front and the right flank of the 4th Ukrainian Front and strike in the direction of Krosno - Duklja - Tylyava to enter Slovak territory in the area of Stropkov - Medzilaborce. Konev also expressed a desire to use the 1st Czechoslovak Corps, which acted together with the Soviet units. Konev considered it necessary to allocate 7 days for the preparation of operations.
This report was sent on September 2 at 3:20 am. On the morning of the same September 2, the Headquarters issued a directive to the 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts: to prepare and, no later than September 8, launch an offensive at the junction of fronts in order to reach the Czechoslovak border with strikes from the Krosno-Sanok area in the general direction to Presov and unite with the rebels. It was allowed to involve the 1st Czechoslovak Corps in the operation. At the same time, an order was given to organize interaction with the Slovak troops.
One can easily imagine what difficulties arose before General Petrov, who, within just 6 days, had to organize an extremely laborious operation to overcome the Carpathians with battles. As you know, the organization of a front-line operation usually took months or at least several weeks, and Petrov had only 6 days at his disposal! In addition, the troops that should take part in the offensive are exhausted, tired, they have just completed very difficult fighting in the foothills and during the liberation of Western Ukraine.
But in war, it is the impossible that most often happens. In order to fulfill our international duty, to help the insurgent Slovak people, it was necessary to do this impossible, to help the brothers in Czechoslovakia at all costs.
Petrov and his headquarters, without sleep and rest, in the most direct, literal sense of these words, began to carry out the necessary regrouping, the supply of ammunition, fuel, food, everything necessary to overcome not only the powerful defense of the enemy, but also mountain ranges, which in themselves represented a difficult obstacle .
The Carpathian mountain arc, as if by nature itself, was created for defense, because it lies across the flat part of Central Europe and covers the Hungarian lowland from the north, east, southeast. Moreover, this is not one kind of ridge, but a series of mountain ranges, rising one after another, sequentially, with heights of 1000-1300 meters.
The main Carpathian range can be overcome through several passes. The road network in the Carpathians is poorly developed, there are no side roads here. Mountains with very steep ascents, overgrown with forest and shrubs. In rainy weather, even the few available roads became impassable due to loamy soils. And it was September - it was already autumn, the time of slush and rains, which eroded, made the roads completely unusable. And all this must be overcome, and even in a short time, with battles. Only well-trained athletes with special equipment can easily pass these hundreds of kilometers on impassable roads and steep slopes. And the enemy was waiting for the soldier on every ridge, and he was always on top, he just hit at his choice, because you couldn’t run up to him quickly with a shout of “hurrah” along the mountain steepness.
In the valleys of the Carpathians, a lot of rivers, streams and streams flowed, which dissected the mountains in various directions. These rivers are shallow in summer, but in the fall, when it rained heavily, they all became stormy and full of water. In addition, thick, heavy fogs stood in the valleys, making it difficult to observe. And on the tops of the mountains, snow had already fallen, blizzards were sweeping. Again, nature, as if on purpose, complicated the fighting and the possibility of moving troops.
General Petrov understood that all these additional difficulties of the upcoming operation required especially careful preparation. Therefore, dealing with organizational matters with his headquarters, regrouping troops, advancing artillery, engineering work to prepare the starting position for the offensive, Petrov continuously and persistently demanded that the unit commanders train troops for operations in the mountains. This was carried out every day, despite the rains and the fighting, which these days were not interrupted.
At the direction of the Military Council of the front, a special instruction was developed on the actions of troops in conditions of mountainous and wooded terrain and a description of the Eastern Carpathians was prepared, which set out in detail the features of each pass, roads, rivers and mountain ranges. Ivan Efimovich himself edited this instruction, made many very important additions to it.
In his memoirs “Overcoming the resistance of the enemy”, the former head of the operational department of the 4th Ukrainian Front, retired lieutenant general V. A. Korovikov writes:
“The soul of all this work was the commander of the troops of the front, Colonel-General I. E. Petrov. With his inexhaustible energy and personal example, he inspired the entire staff of the field administration, as well as generals and officers in the troops, to carry out the assigned tasks both in the preparation and implementation of the operation. General I. E. Petrov had extensive military knowledge. A man of high culture and a big heart, he was always fair and demanding of himself and others. With a sensitive attitude and constant concern for his subordinates, regardless of their rank and position, he won the love of generals, officers and soldiers. In the troops he was affectionately called "our Ivan Efimovich".
The officers read reports on the military-political situation in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Discussions were held about Suvorov's Alpine campaign, about forcing water barriers in the mountains, about fighting to encircle and destroy the enemy. In companies and battalions there were meetings with participants in the battles in the mountains, they shared their experience, talked about combat episodes, about all kinds of devices that they used in previous mountain battles.
Former member of the Military Council of the 18th Army, retired Major General N.V. Lyapin, in his work “In the Name of People's Happiness” recalls:
“... the nearest rear of the army looked like a huge training ground. For 11-12 hours a day, the units worked out types of combat in the mountains. Alternating parts of the front line with units that were in reserve, the entire army marched on practical exercises good preparation."
The former deputy for political affairs of the commander of the 8th Air Army, Colonel-General of Aviation A. G. Rytov writes in the article “In the sky over the Carpathians”:
“During the preparatory period of the Carpathian operation, mass political work did not stop for a single day. The commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Colonel-General I.E. Petrov, in a conversation with V.N. Zhdanov (commander of the 8th Air Army. - V.K.) and me advised to remind the pilots of the famous campaign of the Russian miracle heroes through the Alps , about a breakthrough German defense in the Carpathians and entering the Hungarian Valley in 1916.
“Of course,” he said, “the current defense of the Germans cannot be compared with the one that was in the past. They created here a powerful reinforced concrete belt, abundantly saturated with firing points. So artillery and tanks cannot pass at once. For you, the pilots, there are no such barriers ...
The commander untied the ribbon of the roll lying on the table, unfolded a large-scale map of the Carpathians and the regions adjacent to them.
“The Carpathians are not a simple mountain,” he said. “It’s a chain of ridges that extends over a hundred kilometers in depth. You see how many valleys and mountain rivers. The Carpathians are a serious obstacle! This is where aviation has a big role to play.
Petrov understood a lot about aviation and appreciated it. For example, he himself personally assigned tasks to air reconnaissance aircraft and listened to their reports. Once we submitted to him for approval the plan of one of the private operations. Petrov looked it over carefully, underlined something and gave very good advice.
- Wow! Zhdanov later remarked approvingly. “The scope of the front is huge, the commander has more worries than ours, but he still found time to calmly sort out our affairs.”
But not only did General Petrov have difficulties these days, he also experienced peculiar military leadership joys. The 18th Army, which had done so much in the Caucasus, became part of the front. Now it was commanded by Lieutenant General E.P. Zhuravlev. The 1st Guards Army was new for Petrov, but its commander, Colonel-General A. A. Grechko, was a comrade-in-arms proven in many battles.
It is not difficult for the reader to imagine what feelings Ivan Yefimovich embraced when he met with some units and commanders here, on the new front. Here is what retired lieutenant general A. Ya. Vedenin, the former commander of the 3rd mountain rifle Carpathian corps, writes in his memoirs “In the offensive - mountain shooters”:
“On August 7, 1944, I was handed an order from the Commander of the Separate seaside army surrender the defense of the coast from Evpatoria to Sudak to other formations and immediately begin loading into echelons. The loading rate is 12 echelons per day. Direction - Ternopol - Stanislav.
The next day, the corps consisting of the 128th Guards Mountain Rifle Turkestan Red Banner Division, the 242nd Mountain Rifle Taman Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division, the 318th Mountain Rifle Novorossiysk Order of Suvorov Division and the 93rd Guards Kerch Corps Artillery Regiment began redeployment from the Crimea. Parts left on combat alert.
This enumeration is very characteristic - even in some honorary names of the divisions of this corps, almost the entire combat path of Ivan Efimovich Petrov was reflected. Mountain rifle Turkestan - while, of course, remember the years of Petrov's service in Central Asia during the period of the struggle against Basmachism. Novorossiysk division - this name she received under the command of Petrov, participating in the brilliantly conducted Novorossiysk operation. Taman division - the memory of the liberation of the Taman Peninsula. The Kerch artillery regiment is the crossing of a wide water barrier, the Kerch Strait, by the forces of an entire army, and the entry of Soviet troops into the Crimea.
I will continue the quote from the memoirs of General A. Ya. Vedenin:
“The front commander, General of the Army I.E. Petrov, immediately received me. We recalled with him the joint struggle against the Basmachi in Central Asia (the 128th Guards Mountain Rifle Turkestan Red Banner Division, which was part of our corps, was once the 1st Turkestan Rifle Division, which Ivan Efimovich commanded in 1922-1926).
The commander carefully read our plan for preparing personnel for an offensive in the Carpathians and basically approved it, advising us to practice night exercises more often in the mountains using various means of communication. The corps was soon transferred to full staff mountain rifle formation. The units were fully equipped with military equipment, horses and even donkeys - indispensable in mountainous and wooded areas.
To improve communication in such difficult combat conditions, each company was provided with light radio stations.
And here is another pleasant meeting, about which retired colonel M. G. Shulga, the former commander of the 327th Guards Sevastopol Mountain Rifle Order of the Bogdan Khmelnitsky Regiment, tells about in the article “With Faith in Victory”:
“Shortly before the offensive ... the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Colonel-General I.E. Petrov, arrived in the division, who, in a solemn ceremony, presented the division with the Order of the Red Banner, and all of its units received combat guards banners. Speaking at a rally in honor of this significant event for us, soldiers and officers vowed to defeat the enemy in the Carpathians and provide international assistance to the peoples of Western Europe in liberation from fascism.
A lot of preparatory work was carried out in parts of the division for the upcoming offensive. The troops were trained to overcome heights day and night, orient themselves in mountainous and wooded areas. A training ground was organized in the division, where all military equipment and pack facilities for operations in the Carpathians were presented.
General Petrov also met with the fighters of the remarkable 318th Infantry Division and its commander, a member of the legendary Eltigen landing, Hero Soviet Union General Gladkov. He visited the tankers of the 5th Guards Novorossiysk Tank Brigade.
How these meetings took place and how Petrov used them for the good of the cause can be judged from the memoirs of “Artillerymen in battles” of the former commander of the 299th Guards Red Banner Artillery Regiment, reserve colonel P.P. Kashchuk:
“The 299th regiment of the 129th Guards Red Banner Rifle Division had glorious military traditions. He fought in the mountains of the Caucasus, was the only artillery regiment in the amphibious assault on Malaya Zemlya, near the walls of Novorossiysk, where he was the first of all the units that fought there to receive the rank of guards ...
In early August, the division was visited by the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Colonel-General I. E. Petrov. He heartily congratulated his old acquaintances who fought under his command on Malaya Zemlya and the Taman Peninsula on the military successes, and aimed the division at the fastest possible liberation of Drohobych.
The conversations of the commander, his authority, his not only orders, but also requests, undoubtedly, played their great mobilizing role. On the night of August 6, the division went to Drohobych and freed him. The morale of the soldiers was so high that by the end of that day the guards had liberated the city of Sambir.
And now I would like to tell the readers at least briefly about that operation in the First World War, the experience of which Ivan Efimovich advised his commanders to use. He had in mind the operation of the Southwestern Front, in which General A. A. Brusilov especially distinguished himself at that time. Pay attention to the names settlements: the cities that will be discussed in the battles of 1915 are the same cities that were now part of the combat zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front of General Petrov.
In December 1914, taking into account the successful actions of neighboring armies in the Krakow direction and the 4th Army on the left bank of the Vistula, as well as access to the foothills of the Main Carpathian Range in the Uzhok and Mukachevo directions of the 8th Army of General A. A. Brusilov, the commander of the South With the Western Front, N.I. Ivanov decided to start preparing an operation to break through the Carpathians, into the very plain that stretches beyond the Carpathians (and which the 4th Ukrainian Front was now striving for).
The main task in this case was assigned to the 8th army of Brusilov, which constituted the left wing of the front. This army was supposed to strike in the direction of Medzilaborce - Humenne.
This plan became known to the Austro-German command, and, preempting the Russians, concentrating a new army here, the Austro-German troops themselves went on the offensive on January 10, trying to liberate Przemysl, blocked by the Russians. In Przemysl there were Austro-German troops, and between Przemysl and the advancing troops striving for them to the rescue was Brusilov's army.
It so happened that Brusilov's 8th Army, having completed preparations by the same day, also went on the offensive. There were heavy, stubborn, bloody oncoming battles. Nevertheless, Brusilov's army slowly moved forward. On the left flank of the front, in Bukovina, Russian troops were forced to retreat under the pressure of the Austro-Hungarians and retreat to the rivers Dniester and Prut. And Brusilov kept his site and even moved forward. In his memoirs, Brusilov wrote about these days:
“It must be remembered that these troops in the mountains in winter, up to their necks in snow, in severe frosts, fought fiercely continuously day after day, and even on the condition that they had to save in every possible way both rifle cartridges and, in particular, artillery shells. We had to fight back with bayonets, counterattacks were carried out almost exclusively at night, without artillery preparation and with the least expenditure of rifle cartridges ... "
Here one involuntarily wants to draw the attention of readers to Petrov's urgent advice to commanders: to teach the troops night operations and decisive counterattacks. This is clear evidence that Petrov was well aware of all Brusilov's operations and took into account his experience in fighting in the mountains.
The 8th army of Brusilov withstood the fierce pressure of the enemy and did not allow him to break through to Przemysl. This led to great success for the Russian troops. Finally convinced that they would not come to his aid, and already feeling a lack of food (and there would be enough ammunition for many more days of fighting!), the commandant of the Przemysl fortress capitulated. The victory was brilliant! The armies of the Entente did not yet know such successes in the fighting of the First World War. In Przemysl, 9 generals, two and a half thousand officers, 120 thousand soldiers, more than 900 guns were taken prisoner.
However, in general, in that long-standing Carpathian operation, none of the parties involved in these battles achieved their goals. The Austro-German command was unable to broadly cover the left wing of the Russian army and unblock Przemysl. And the Russian army was not able to overcome the Carpathians, because they did not have enough strength, they did not have the necessary reserves, the troops were not provided with artillery, ammunition and everything necessary for such a major operation. The fighting here resulted in bloody head-on clashes along a 200-kilometer front. Both sides lost about a million people, and about 800 thousand of this million were lost by the enemy. Here, it becomes especially clear military art one of the most talented Russian military leaders - Brusilov.
And now Soviet soldiers and their commanders had to show even higher heroism and even more skillful military skills: to prepare and overcome the Carpathians in the shortest possible time, that is, to accomplish what the Russian army failed in the First World War.
And the events on the eve of this operation developed rapidly, and the conditions became even more unfavorable - now not only due to natural, but also due to the main - military and political - circumstances.
In the days when the 4th Ukrainian Front was preparing to urgently go on the offensive, the following happened beyond the Carpathians. The fascist German command, fearing the loss of the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region, almost the only one that now supplied the Nazi army, decided to act very decisively to save it. It removed the divisions from the front and transferred them here. The Nazis acted quickly and brutally - despite the fact that the command of the East Slovak Corps did not show any resistance. The corps was never put on alert and did not receive an order to repel the Nazi troops. The soldiers did not know what to do, what to do. Within two days - September 1 and 2 - the corps was disarmed by the Nazis. Many soldiers and officers were arrested and sent by the Nazis to camps, some went to the partisans. The East Slovak Corps ceased to exist as a result of a clear betrayal. But it was this corps that had to perform an important task - to capture the passes in the Carpathians and thereby ensure the advancement of our troops to help the rebels. From the book June 22. Anatomy of a disaster author Solonin Mark Semyonovich
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Ukrainian Front (First, Second, Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts) had great importance to liberate the territory of the Soviet Union from invaders. It was the troops of these fronts that liberated most of Ukraine. And after that, the Soviet troops with a victorious march liberated most countries from occupation of Eastern Europe. The troops of the Ukrainian fronts also took part in the capture of the capital of the Reich, Berlin.
First Ukrainian Front
On October 20, 1943, the Voronezh Front became known as the First Ukrainian Front. The front took part in several important offensive operations of World War II.
The soldiers of this particular front, having carried out the Kyiv offensive operation, were able to liberate Kyiv. Later, in 1943-1944, the troops of the front carried out Zhytomyr-Berdychiv, Lvov-Sandomierz and other operations to liberate the territory of Ukraine.
After that, the front continued its offensive on the territory of occupied Poland. In May 1945, the front took part in operations to capture Berlin and liberate Paris.
Commanded the front:
- General
Second Ukrainian Front
The Second Ukrainian Front was created from parts of the Steppe Front in the autumn (20.10.) 1943. The troops of the front successfully carried out an operation to create an offensive bridgehead on the banks of the Dnieper (1943), controlled by the Germans.
Later, the front carried out the Kirovograd operation, and also took part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. Since the autumn of 1944, the front has been engaged in the liberation of the countries of Europe.
He carried out the Debrecen and Budapest operations. In 1945, the troops of the front completely liberated the territory of Hungary, most of Czechoslovakia, some regions of Austria, and its capital, Vienna.
The front commanders were:
- General, and later Marshal I. Konev
- General, and later Marshal R. Malinovsky.
Third Ukrainian Front
It was renamed to the Third Ukrainian Front Southwestern Front 10/20/1943. His soldiers took part in the liberation of the territory of Ukraine from the Nazi invaders.
The troops of the front carried out the Dnepropetrovsk (1943), Odessa (1944), Nikopol-Krivoy Rog (1944), Yasso-Kishenevskaya (1944) and other offensive operations.
Also, the soldiers of this front took part in the liberation from the Nazis and their allies of European countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary.
Commanded the front:
- General and later Marshal R. Malinovsky
- General, and later Marshal F. Tolbukhin.
Fourth Ukrainian Front
The Fourth Ukrainian Front was created on October 20, 1943. It was renamed the Southern Front. Parts of the front carried out several operations. They finished the Melitopol operation (1943), and successfully carried out the operation to liberate the Crimea (1944).
At the end of spring (16.05.) 1944, the front was disbanded. However, on August 6, the same year, it was re-formed.
The front carried out strategic operations in the Carpathian region (1944), and took part in the liberation of Prague (1945).
Commanded the front:
- General F. Tolbukhin
- Colonel General, and later General I. Petrov
- General A. Eremenko.
Thanks to the successful offensive operations of all Ukrainian fronts, Soviet army was able to defeat a strong and experienced enemy, liberate her land in the Great Patriotic War from the invaders and help the captured peoples of Europe in liberation from the Nazis.
On July 30, 1944, an order was signed by the Headquarters on the creation of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which would complete the hostilities by participating in the Prague strategic operation in the victorious May 1945.
During the Lvov-Sandomierz strategic operation that began in mid-July 1944, our troops reached the foothills of the Carpathians by the end of the month. The offensive in the Carpathian mountains required special training of troops, their equipment and weapons. Therefore, on July 30, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to form a separate front for the offensive in the Carpathians, which received the name of the 4th Ukrainian.
Previously, a front with that name already existed - in the fall of 1943, the Southern Front was renamed that way. And in the spring of 1944, the 4th Ukrainian Front of the first formation participated in the liberation from the German invaders of the Crimea. After the liberation of the peninsula, the 4th Ukrainian Front was disbanded, its units were transferred to the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. According to the order of the Headquarters of July 30, 1944, the new 4th Ukrainian Front was created from August 5. Thus, it was this front that became the last front created during the Great Patriotic War. The front was headed by Colonel General Ivan Efimovich Petrov, who at the beginning of the war commanded the defense of Odessa and one of the leaders of the heroic defense of Sevastopol. Parts of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front were transferred to the new front - the 1st Guards and 18th Armies, the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, the 8th Air Army and other formations and units of various military branches. The Stavka directive to the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front dated July 30, 1944, signed by Stalin, read: “The troops of the front to continue the offensive with the task of capturing and firmly holding the passes through the Carpathian ridge and then entering the Hungarian valley.” Already on the next day of its existence, the 4th Ukrainian Front achieved noticeable success - the Western Ukrainian city of Drohobych was liberated, important knot communications and a stronghold of the enemy's defense, covering the approaches to the passes through the Carpathians. The occupation of Drohobych by our troops deprived Hitler of a significant part of the Carpathian oil. Therefore, by order of the Headquarters of August 6, 1944, the commander of the front, Ivan Petrov, was announced: “Today, August 6, at 10 p.m., the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, salutes the valiant troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which captured the city of Drogobych, with twenty artillery volleys from two hundred and twenty-four guns. For excellent military operations, I express gratitude to the troops led by you who participated in the battles for the liberation of the city of Drohobych. Due to the peculiarities of the geography of Central and Eastern Europe, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front until the end of the Great Patriotic War had to operate mainly in mountainous areas on the territory of Western Ukraine and Slovakia. First of all, the troops of the front had to fight through the huge mountain range of the Eastern Carpathians, to operate in unusually difficult conditions of mountainous and wooded terrain. Therefore, the front command took a set of measures to prepare troops for such battles. All previous experience of operating in similar conditions was studied and "Organizational instructions for preparing troops for operations in the mountains" were issued, as well as "Instructions for troops operating in mountainous wooded areas." In all headquarters and formations of the front, exercises were conducted on relevant topics, for example: “Breakthrough of the enemy’s defense in the mountains of reinforced rifle division"," The offensive of reinforced rifle regiment with the aim of capturing the pass", "Capturing heights in conditions of limited visibility using coverage and detour", "Attack of a reinforced rifle company on the top of a mountain in conditions of limited visibility". The divisions of the 4th Ukrainian Front were withdrawn one by one to the rear for training and equipment. The troops withdrawn to the second echelons continuously, 10-12 hours a day, were engaged in combat training. Significant work was done to train fighters and commanders for actions in the mountains. The troops were taught to walk on steep slopes, storm bunkers, make long marches in mountainous areas along paths and without roads, along wooded gorges, slopes and ridges of mountains, overcoming steep climbs and mountain rivers. Since it was difficult to organize a centralized supply of food from camp kitchens in the mountains, for the purposes of training, a procedure was established according to which the troops on the exercises were removed from the centralized “boiler allowance” every other day and transferred to self-cooking food in pots and buckets. Particular attention was paid to the training of climbing instructors. The command of the 4th Ukrainian Front organized training camps, which were led by masters of sports in mountaineering. As a result, it was possible to prepare hundreds of instructor officers for the front, capable of organizing mountaineering training for soldiers directly in their units. Prepared for battles in the mountains and artillery. Exercises were organized to raise the guns to a height. Calculations of 76-mm guns trained without technical means to raise their guns along the slope of a mountain with a steepness of up to 40 degrees to a height of up to 200 meters. They did not forget to find and use to transfer the experience of older soldiers who participated in the battles in the Carpathians back in the First World War. The rear of the 4th Ukrainian Front was also prepared for an offensive in the mountains, without roads, only along mountain paths. Rifle companies received 3-4 pack horses, one pack kitchen, or several thermoses and buckets for cooking in the mountains. In a word, the 4th Ukrainian Front was well prepared for its offensive to the West through the Carpathians. In the autumn of 1944, the front carried out the East Carpathian strategic operation, during which the Transcarpathian Ukraine and part of the territory of Czechoslovakia were liberated, and assistance was provided to the anti-German uprising in Slovakia. In January-February 1945, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, carried out a successful Western Carpathian strategic operation, liberating the southern regions of Poland and a significant part of Czechoslovakia. With a strike south of Krakow, the 4th Ukrainian Front secured the offensive of Soviet troops in the Warsaw and Berlin direction from the south. In the spring of 1945, the troops of the front during the Moravian-Ostrava offensive operation cleared the entire territory of Slovakia from the Nazis. Then, in the victorious May 1945, the 4th Ukrainian Front, created on July 30, 1944, took part in the Prague strategic operation, the last offensive of the Great Patriotic War.
The Ukrainian Front is the name of the operational strategic formations of the armed forces. Ukrainian Front (First World War) (December 1917 March 1918) operational strategic association of the armed forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic. ... ... Wikipedia
The Ukrainian Front is the name of several fronts of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. 1st Ukrainian Front 2nd Ukrainian Front 3rd Ukrainian Front 4th Ukrainian Front ... Wikipedia
This term has other meanings, see Ukrainian front. Ukrainian Front Ukr.F Emblem of the Revolutionary Military Council of the RSFSR, 1918 (g.). Years of existence January 4, 1919 (g.) June 15, 1919 ... Wikipedia
See also: Ukrainian front (values) Ukrainian front 1939 Emblem of the Armed Forces Years of existence 1939 Country of the USSR Entry ... Wikipedia
Ukrainian Front 4th- UKRAINIAN FRONT 4th, created. Oct 20 1943 (as a result of renaming South French) as part of the 2nd and 3rd Guards, 5th Shock, 28th, 44th, 51st combined arms A and 8th VA. Later, Primorskaya A and 4th VA were included at different times. In con. oct. - ... Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Encyclopedia
See also: Ukrainian Front (values) 2nd Ukrainian Front 2Ukr.F Emblem of the Armed Forces Years of existence October 20, 1943 June 10, 1945 Country ... Wikipedia
See also: Ukrainian Front (values) 3rd Ukrainian Front 3Ukr.F Emblem of the Armed Forces Years of existence October 20, 1943 June 15, 1945 ... Wikipedia
See also: Ukrainian front (values) 1st Ukrainian front 1Ukr.F Armed Forces emblem Years of existence October 20, 1943 June 10, 1945 ... Wikipedia
See also: Ukrainian Front (disambiguation) The 4th Ukrainian Front was an operational strategic formation of Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War. Formed in the southwestern direction on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 16 ... ... Wikipedia
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