Message on the topic of the Caspian campaign of Peter 1. The Persian campaign of Peter I and the Muslim peoples
FOREWORD
“... So in these parts, with the help of God, we received a foot, than we congratulate you,” Peter I wrote in joy to St. Petersburg on August 30, 1722 from Derbent, which had just opened the gates to him. The campaign to the Caspian became the starting point in the Russian imperial historiography of the 19th - early 20th centuries " Caucasian wars”- a long process of joining Russia with territories from the Kuban and Terek to the borders with Turkey and Iran that had developed at that time. It is not surprising that at the same time the first historical descriptions of this enterprise began to appear, regimental histories and works of the biographical genre, sometimes containing subsequently lost or hard-to-reach sources, and which have not lost their significance until our time when documents were published.
The narrowing of the chronological boundaries of this phenomenon to 1817-1864, which followed in Soviet times, brought the campaign of Peter I and its consequences beyond the scope of the problem under study, especially since the emphasis was on searching for features of the “anti-feudal and anti-colonial movement” of the local population, on the one hand, and on establishing "voluntary" and at least unconditionally progressive nature of the entry of a particular territory into Russia. In this sense, the study of military operations (and, more broadly, the role of the army in establishing a new state order on the “newly annexed” lands) was irrelevant. Only a few publications appeared, among which the work of E.S. Zevakin, who collected material on the financial condition of Russian possessions in the Transcaucasus.
Nevertheless, in 1951, the first and at the moment the only monograph by V.P. Lystsov, dedicated to this Petrine "project". The author examined in detail the prehistory and background of this military-political action, its course, making extensive use of archival documents. However, he was immediately criticized for striving to reveal the "alleged" economic goals of the Peter's campaign, as a result of which, according to the reviewer, he demonstrated not the "progressive nature of the annexation of non-Iranian peoples" who were "under the Turkish yoke and Persian oppression", but "the desire to seizures" from Russia. Well-made, this monograph, however, far from exhausts the entire body of sources available; besides, its content does not go beyond 1722-1724. Since then in national historiography there were no separate studies on the topic, with the exception of separate digressions in the works of military history and works on foreign policy Russia XVIII centuries. AT recent times publications of some documents and a number of articles characterizing the position of the Grassroots Corps came out.
In details various aspects stay Russian troops and administrations were considered in the detailed works of historians of the former Soviet union and autonomous republics - as a rule, from the point of view of the history of a given region and people, and mainly from the standpoint of a joint struggle against Turkish or Iranian claims. Similar studies appear later, but with different estimates: the former “promotion economic development"and protection" from robberies and violence by Iranian invaders and Turkish mercenaries" are called occupation, and "treason by separatist-minded local feudal lords" - "anti-colonial actions in the Russian occupation zone." Former "help" from the same Russia is interpreted accordingly - as the implementation of their own plans or the desire to "enslave" the Transcaucasian peoples.
However, the topic does not seem to be “closed” in terms of relevance in our time. According to the sad admission of one of the largest experts, “the past of the peoples of the Caucasus has been turned into a mosaic of national histories at war with each other. They are filled with myths about “our” great cultural and territorial heritage, which is allegedly being encroached upon by neighbors - “barbarians”, “aggressors” and “aliens”. New horizons for the development of the topic are opened by the use of modern historical approaches that highlight new "dimensions" of the past: military-historical anthropology, the history of everyday life, the study social psychology and ideas of the people of that era.
Finally, a new approach to the topic is also important because the available works cover primarily the military-political side of the conflict and the campaign of 1722-1723 itself. The writings that have appeared recently are fiction or superficial reviews in which in question, for example, about plans to “conquer the South Caucasus” in the spirit of the so-called “testament” of Peter I, about the occupation of Mazanderan and Astrabad by the Russians that did not take place in reality, about “powerful clashes” with Turkish troops and the murder of the Russian ambassador. Even in scientific papers you can find errors like statements about the emperor's return to the south in 1723 and his re-occupation of Derbent (24), but also from academic works.
The purpose of the work is a documented story about the first major foreign policy action Russian Empire outside the traditional sphere of its influence - in regions that belonged to a different civilizational circle. The Persian (or, as some historians have suggested calling it, the Caspian) campaign of Peter I in 1722-1723 was a large-scale attempt to implement the imperial tasks of foreign policy in the East. We are not so much interested in this military operation(its main stages are more or less studied), how many subsequent efforts to "develop" the territories obtained as a result of military and diplomatic efforts.
By the end of the first quarter, Iran's positions in the North Caucasus were greatly shaken due to the ongoing dynastic crisis and the invasion of Afghan tribes into its territory.
In 1722-1723, Peter I decided to take advantage of this favorable moment and led the Caspian campaign to conquer Dagestan and the territories of Persia (Iran), which at the moment are the modern territory of Azerbaijan.
Peter I set himself such tasks as strengthening Russia's position in the Caspian Sea, supporting Georgian and Armenian Christians in the Transcaucasus, developing trade with Persia and the East, countering the rise of Turkey in the Caucasus.
The formal reason for the campaign was the robbery of Russian merchants during the ruin of Shamakhi during guerrilla war Dagestan feudal lords against the Iranian Shah.
Against the rebels
In his “Manifesto to the peoples of the Caucasus and Persia”, the emperor stated that “the subjects of the Shah - the Lezgi owner Daud-bek (aka Haji-Daud) and the Kazykum owner Surkhai - rebelled against their sovereign, took the city of Shemakha by storm and carried out a predatory attack on the Russians merchants. In view of the refusal of Daud-bek to give satisfaction, we are forced ... to lead an army against the predicted rebels and all-evil robbers.
True, Hadji Daoud and Surkhay committed these actions as early as 1712, but Peter I realized it only 10 years later, and even under the pretext of protecting the territories of the Persian Shah. The capture of Shamakhi was published in the manifesto of Peter I in 1712 in the following way: “In 1712, the owner of the Lezgi Daud-bek and the owner of the Kazikumukh Surkhay, rebelling against the shah, their sovereign, the city of Shemakha took the city of Shemakha by storm and the Russian people who traded there, chopped and their estates on four million rubles were stolen.
A year before the Persian campaign, Hadji-Daoud repeatedly turned for help to representatives of the Russian authorities in Astrakhan and asked to be accepted into Russian citizenship. The Lezgi ruler offered to exchange Russian iron and lead for Dagestan raw silk. Astrakhan Governor Volynsky wrote to Peter I: “It also seems to me that Daud-bek (the Lezgin owner) is not needed for anything, he answers me that of course he wants to serve Your Majesty, however, so that you deign to send him your troops and a fair number of guns , and he will take away the cities from the Persians, and which are convenient for him, he will leave for himself (namely Derbent and Shemakha), and the rest will be inferior to your majesty, which are on the other side of the Kura River to Ispahan itself, which will never be in his hands, and taco wants your work to be, and his benefit.
Peter is smarter
Hadji Daud tried to use the Russian tsar and his resources to achieve his own, while Peter I would have received "tasteless tops" or "useless roots". Naturally, no assistance was provided to Hadji Daud, especially at that time the preparation of troops for the campaign was in full swing. Reliable information also reached the Russian authorities that Haji Daud, after being denied Russian citizenship, asked for Turkish citizenship and with a similar request for help in the fight against Persia.
This information caused concern to Peter I, since the intervention of the Porte would complicate the annexation of the Caspian territories. Hadji Daoud would later become the Khan of Shirvan and never submit to the Russian Empire, choosing in fact Turkish citizenship. For his unpredictability and self-will, Haji Daoud will be captured when he arrives in Istanbul, and then exiled to Rhodes, where he will die in exile in 1728.
Kazikumikh Khan Surkhay, an ally of Hadji Daud, will accept the citizenship of the Russian Empire, realizing that the fight against the Russian emperor will cost him too much.
Asking for forgiveness
When crossing the border, the Enderevsky rulers Aydemir and Chapan-Shefkal with the Chechens dependent on them showed themselves hostile. During the hostilities, not without serious losses, on June 23, Endirey was burned, while Aydemir and Chapan fled. Relations with these characters did not work out due to the fact that they attacked the Cossack town of Terki and gravitated towards the Crimean Khan and the Turkish Sultan.
But after the defeat, the Endyrians sent envoys to Peter with a request for forgiveness and their acceptance into citizenship, as well as a request for permission to settle again on the site of the burned Endirey. The king gave permission and, in addition, generously freed the affected population of Endyrei from taxes.
The Utamysh sultan Mahmud and the Utsmiy Kaitag Ahmed Khan joined the counteraction of Russia, whose troops were defeated in the battle on the Inchkha River, which opened the way to Derbent, which was subsequently taken without a fight. As a punishment for resistance, Peter's troops burned Utamysh and nearby villages, and the lands of the Kaitag utsmiy were also damaged. Both, having no other choice, will apply for citizenship and are accepted accordingly.
For the Russian Empire
Not all Dagestan rulers were hostile to the Russian Empire. Shamkhaly Mamet-bek Alypkaevich, Abdul-Girey, Adil-Girey, Ahmet-Khan sent letters during the period of the Persian campaign asking for help, to accept them into Russian citizenship and leave them in their former ruling positions. Confirming their allegiance, shamkhals Adil-Girey and Mohammed made gifts to Peter I on July 28, 1722. Kabardian shamkhals, Prince El-Murza of Cherkasy and Aslambek Kelemetev, voluntarily appeared before the sovereign on August 6 with their people and joined the Russian army.
Later, Derbent was occupied, moreover, peacefully, the Derbent naib received the rank of general, and the local garrison transferred to the service of Peter I, began to receive salaries and perform police functions. And the Naryn-Kala fortress, the main citadel of the city, was given to the Russian garrison as a place of residence.
On July 26, Baku was taken, its population was disarmed, and the war ended formally with the signing of the Petersburg Peace on September 12, 1723. Persia ceded its Caspian territories: Dagestan, Shirvan, Gilan and Mazandaran with the cities of Derbent, Baku, Resht and Astrabad, respectively. In 1724, the Treaty of Constantinople was concluded with Turkey, according to which Turkey recognized Russia's rights to the Caspian lands, and Russia recognized Turkey's rights to Western Transcaucasia.
Peace came, but relations with the most influential Dagestan "owner" of the Tarkovsky shamkhal Adil-Girey did not develop in the best way. Even during the campaign, Adil-Giray provided important assistance to Peter I, supplying him with information about the mood of the population and the hostile Dagestan khans, and after that he provided patronage to the unfortunate resisters, bringing them under the arm of Moscow, for example, the same Aydemir of Endireevsky.
During the war, Adil Giray received part of the territories of the Utamysh Khan, precious gifts from the king and a salary. But this was not enough for the shamkhal, he asked in letters to the tsar, and then demanded that Derbent and the Cossack town of Terki with the settlements surrounding it, which were under the control of the Kabardian princes, be given control. But Peter's plans did not at all include the strengthening of Adil Giray at his own expense. Irregular Cossack and Kalmyk units, which were based in Dagestan at that time, did not differ in discipline and regularly robbed the locals, which caused discontent and requests for damages.
Fortress of Discord
But the last straw that overflowed the cup of patience was the construction of the Holy Cross fortress, which was supposed to replace the town of Terki, which was regularly flooded by the Sunzha. The Dagestan rulers were very jealous of the desire of the nearest empires to build any fortresses on their territory that threatened their sovereignty as local rulers. And during the Caspian campaign several of them appeared on the territory of Dagestan.
These contradictions between Adil Giray and the Russian government led to their clash. Adil-Giray attacked in 1725 the Holy Cross and other fortresses of the Russian army, but failed, as a result of which he began to quickly lose influence and back down. As a result, Adil-Girey was arrested in 1726 and exiled to the Arkhangelsk province, where he died in 1732, and the Tarkov shamkhalate was liquidated.
Despite the military and political successes of Peter I in annexing the Caspian territories, his successors failed to keep these acquisitions and already under Anna Ioannovna in 1732 and 1735. agreements were concluded with Iran, according to which the borders of Russia returned to the position of 1722.
Research work
on the topic:
"Oriental
Peter's campaign I ».
Done: history teacher
Chalabieva P.M.
Table of contents:
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………….3 1. Causes and goals of the Caspian campaign……………… …………………………………………………………………………5 2. Russia’s struggle for the mastery of the Caspian regions………………………………..7 3.Campaign of Peter I in 1723………………………………………………………………..12
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ………………………………………………fifteen
Introduction.
An important stage in the development of Russian-Dagestan relations is associated with the name of Peter I,who in 1722 made a campaign known in the historical literature as the Caspian, Eastern, Persian.Its result was the annexation of the city of Derbent and the coastal regions of Dagestan to Russia, and the economic and cultural development of the Dagestan peoples accelerated. From the time of the campaign of Peter I, a comprehensive survey of the region began. Participants of the Caspian campaign left important descriptions, materials related to Dagestan. F. I. Soymonov compiled the book "Description of the Caspian Sea". D. Kantemir gave a description of Derbent. I. Gerber left a description of the peoples of the western coast of the Caspian Sea, which contains valuable information about the Dagestan peoples.
During this campaign, three miles from Tarkov, Peter I spread his camp, which was surrounded on three sides by an earthen rampart and stuck a pole with the imperial standard in the ground - "where the Russian flag is once raised, it should not be lowered!" The flag has not been lowered, to this day, but on this place the petals of the quarters of the pearl of the Caspian Sea - the Dagestan Makhachkala - have blossomed today. Subsequently, this place was known as Petrovskaya Gorka.
Dagestan was saved as a people. The protection of Russia saved its culture from absorption by Turkey and Iran, hitherto for many centuries the fragmented land became united.
Relevance The theme is that this year marks the 200th anniversary of the accession of Dagestan to Russia. And this event became an important milestone in the history of development, both for our republic and for everything Russian state.
This could have happened much earlier, but the government of Peter the Great, occupied with the war with Sweden since 1700, did not have the opportunity to actively intervene in Caucasian affairs, although it constantly and closely followed them.
Target – show place and rolePeter I in the annexation of Dagestan to Russia.And trace this historical process while clarifying the main interests of Russia in relation to Dagestan.
Tasks :
search, select and analyze historical sources and literature on the chosen topic;
analyze the reasons for the Caspian campaign;
show how relations developed between Dagestan and Russia;
determine the historical role of PeterIin the accession of Dagestan to Russia;
create a computer presentation using the programpowerpoint, to illustrate the provisions of the project.
In the course of this work, I got acquainted with the works of Gadzhiev V.G. "The role of Russia in the history of Dagestan" which presents the history of relations between Russia and Dagestan and Razakov R.Ch-M. "History of Dagestan". With the works of S. M. Solovyov and I. I. Golikov, with an article in the journal “Country of Mountains, Mountain of Languages” // Our power: deeds and faces, etc.
The role of Peter I in the emergence and development of the south of Russia is very great. It is known that Peter I founded two capitals. One in the north - St. Petersburg, the second in the south, calling it Port - Petrovsk (that was the name of Makhachkala until 1921). Peter was the first to draw attention to the fact that the Caspian (the sea that does not freeze) can play a big role in the development of trade and interstate relations with Russia's southern neighbors. Also, Peter I, having built two capitals, protected the country from enemies, both from the south and in the north-west.
Reasons and goals of the Caspian campaign.
FROM early XVIII in. Russia becomes an empire. If before that the southern interests of Russia were reduced mainly to liberation from the Crimean Khanate, then Peter sharply activates Russian policy in this direction. Even then, there was a clear desire for Russia to move south, to the warm seas. At the end of the XVII - beginning. 18th century Dagestan remained a fragmented country into a number of feudal estates - shamkhalates: the possessions of Zasulak Kumykia, the Kaitag Utsmiystvo, the Derbent possession, the Tabasaran Maysumy, the Avar Khanate, etc., as well as unions of rural societies. During this period, relations between Russia and Turkey escalated due to influence in the Caucasus. At the end of the XVII century. Russian state launched military operations against the Ottoman Empire. In 1696, Russian troops took Azov and created navy in order to oust Turkey from the North Caucasus.
In the first decade of the XVIII century. the military-political expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus, including Dagestan, intensified. In 1710, Porta unleashed a war with Russia and, according to the Treaty of Prut, Russia ceded Azov. The resulting situation favored the aggressive plans of the Sultan. At the beginning of the XVIII century. part of the territory of the Eastern Caucasus, captured during the period of the power of the Persians, was still under their influence. In the areas of coastal and southwestern Dagestan, fortifications with military garrisons, erected by the Safavids during the period of their power, are still preserved. These fortresses and fortifications hindered the free movement of the population and the development of trade and economic relations between Dagestan and Transcaucasia.
Fortresses and fortifications, which were strongholds of the Safavids in the Eastern Caucasus, could be used by the Persians for new invasions. The Safavid shahs continued to consider Dagestan their territory and interfered in the internal affairs of some feudal estates. So, they repeatedly made attempts to subjugate the unions of rural communities of the Samur Valley to their power.
The governors of the Safavids and other members of the Iranian administration arbitrarily increased taxes during the collection. The exploitation of the peasants by the local owners also intensified. The increase in tax burden, arbitrariness and violence on the part of the shah and local authorities could not but cause a legitimate protest of the masses.
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1 Golikov I.I. Acts of Peter the Great, the wise reformer of Russia. M., 1938 T. IX. P.48.
Thus, Safavid Iran and at the beginning of the XVIII century. represented for the peoples of Dagestan a force that threatened national independence and contributed to the strengthening of social oppression. Sultan Turkey at the beginning of the 18th century. did everything to expel Iran from the Transcaucasus and prevent the growth of Russian influence in the Caucasus.
Well-informed in the affairs of the Caucasus, Volynsky advised Peter I to start hostilities and annex the Caspian provinces of the Caucasus to Russia. In turn, the far-sighted Peter I declared: "We will be in dire need, take care of taking possession of the Caspian Sea, better ... it is impossible for us to allow the Turks here."
In the context of the aggressive aspirations of the leading states, the feudal rulers of Dagestan, as well as the entire Caucasus, based on selfish interests, were guided by Russia, Turkey or Iran. So, the Dagestan shamkhal, which Persian sources call "wali", i.e. the ruler of all Dagestan, they say, had a seal, on one side of which he was listed as a slave of the Shahin Shah of Iran, and on the other - a serf of the Tsar of Moscow. Moscow, Isfahan, and Istanbul, respectively, were well aware of his dual position, but they treated it calmly, realizing what the position of such a "double serf" really was. Thus, at the turn of the XVII-XVIII centuries. Dagestan, which occupied a convenient geographical and military-strategic position in the Caucasus, attracted the attention of Iran, Turkey and Russia.
At the end of the XVII - beginning of the XVIII century. Russia has grown stronger in socio-economic and political terms, and its international prestige has grown.
Given the growing economic ties with the countries of the East, the Russian government showed concern for the expansion of shipping along the Volga and the Caspian. Peter I drew attention to the Caspian Sea, because here he "saw the true center or knot of the entire East." The Russian state was also seriously concerned about the threat to its interests in the Caucasus from Turkey.
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2 Gadzhiev V.G. The role of Russia in the history of Dagestan. M., 1965 P.59.
The struggle of Russia for the mastery of the Caspian regions.
The struggle of Russia for the mastery of the Caspian regions was dictated by military-political considerations, because the southeastern borders of the state were easily vulnerable in the event of an attack from outside. Access to the Caspian Sea was of great importance for Russia. From the beginning of the XVIII century. the general direction of the expansion of the Russian Empire was steadily shifting from West to East: the Baltic States, Poland, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Far East. Thus, during the reign of Peter I, the policy of the tsarist government changes and its goal becomes the real annexation of certain territories to Russia. In 1721, after the victory over Sweden and the conclusion of the Treaty of Nishtad, Peter I stepped up preparations for a campaign on the Caspian coast. The political situation in the Middle East and the Caucasus favored the preparation of military operations in the south.
Astrakhan Governor A.V. Volynsky, in a report to the tsar, spoke in favor of opening hostilities in 1722. Peter I decided to start military operations in the summer of this year in order to prevent Turkish intervention and annex the Caspian lands of the Caucasus to Russia. May 15, 1722 Peter I went to Astrakhan. Thus began the land and sea campaign of Peter, which took a year and a half (1722-1723).
On July 18, 1722, the fleet of Peter I under the command of General-Admiral Count Apraksin left Astrakhan for the Caspian Sea. Three days before the campaign, Peter I published a manifesto in local languages and sent it to Tarki, Derbent, Shemakha and Baku, to the inhabitants of the Caspian regions. The manifesto indicated that the subjects of the Shah - Daud-bek and Surkhay-khan - rebelled, took Shamakhi and carried out a predatory attack on Russian merchants, causing Russia great material losses and infringing on its dignity as a great power. In view of Daud-bek's refusal to give satisfaction, "we are forced," Peter declared, "to bring an army against the predicted rebels and all the evil robbers," and the rest of the population was guaranteed security.
After a two-day voyage, Peter I arrived with a flotilla at the mouth of the Terek. He ordered the flotilla to move closer to the mouth of the Sulak. On July 27, 1722, the fleet landed on the Agrakhan Peninsula and set about setting up a fortified camp. Moved here at the same time ground troops walking on the Astrakhan steppes. Having crossed the Sulak River, Peter I entered Dagestan. Some Dagestan rulers resisted the tsarist forces. So, the Endereevsky ruler opposed the troops of Peter I. Colonel Naumov took possession of the village of Enderi and turned it into ashes.
The owners of Kostekovsky, Aksaevsky and Shamkhal Tarkovsky expressed their loyalty to Russia. Shamkhal Adil Giray hastened to assure Russia of his benevolence.
On August 6, 1722, not far from Aksai, Peter I was greeted with gifts: Shamkhal of Tarkovsky handed over to Peter I 600 bulls harnessed to carts, and 150 for food for the troops, three Persian horses and a saddle decorated with gold. Shamkhal Adil-Giray announced that he had so far served the Russian sovereign faithfully, and now he would "serve especially faithfully" and offered Peter his troops to help.
On August 12, the advanced units of the Russian troops reached the city of Tarki, where the shamkhal met Peter with bread and salt. Three versts from Tarkov, Peter set up camp. On August 18, Peter I with his retinue visited the shamkhal in Tarki. He, accompanied by three dragoon companies, went for a walk in the Tarkov mountains, examined the ancient tower and other sights. The services rendered by the shamkhal and his faithful service were noted by Peter. Under the shamkhal, a Russian guard of honor was appointed from non-commissioned officers, a drummer and 12 privates.
AT At this time, the Georgian and Armenian rulers, aware of the arrival of Peter in Dagestan, were preparing for a meeting. The Georgian king Vakhtang with 40,000 troops went to Ganja and began to expect the arrival of Russian troops in Shirvan, where both armies were to meet for a joint fight against the Iranian-Turkish oppressors.
On August 16, the army of Peter I set out from Tarki towards Derbent, which was the most important object of the campaign of 1722. Then the Russian army, led by Peter I himself, entered the land of Sultan Mahmud Utamyshsky. However, the Cossacks sent for reconnaissance were attacked by the Sultan's detachment. Aul Utamysh, which consisted of 500 houses, was reduced to ashes, 26 prisoners were executed. Easily defeating the detachment of the Utamysh Sultan, Peter I continued his journey south.
Utsmiy of Kaitag Ahmed Khan and the ruler of Buynaksk turned to Peter I with an expression of humility. On August 23, after passing through the possessions of the utsmiya of Kaitag, the ground troops of Peter I approached Derbent. The Derbent naib Imam-Kulibek met the emperor a mile away from the fortress.
"Derbent," said Naib in welcoming speech, - received its foundation from Alexander the Great, and therefore there is nothing more decent and fair than to transfer a city founded by a great monarch to another monarch, no less great than him.
Arrival of Peter I in Tarki in August 1722.
Then one of the oldest and honored residents of the city presented Peter I with the city keys on a silver platter covered with rich Persian brocade. The Derbent naib presented the Russian Tsar with the precious manuscript "Derbent-name" (manuscript of the 16th century), which was important source on the history of Derbent, Dagestan and other separate regions of the Caucasus. The Russian army entered Derbent without a fight. The population of the city enthusiastically welcomed Peter I. On August 30, Peter reached the Rubas River, where he laid a fortress for 600 people of the garrison. This was the extreme point to which Peter I personally brought his troops. A few days later, all the surroundings of Derbent recognized the power of Peter I. He informed the Senate that "they have become a firm foot in these parts." In Derbent, Peter I examined the main fortress wall of Dag-Bari, the city and its environs, visited the citadel and the Sultan's palace. Having taken measures to improve the city and strengthen trade relations with Russia, Peter appointed Colonel Juncker as commandant of the fortress. In commemoration of the solemn meeting, the city guns saluted the Russian troops with three volleys. In a letter sent from here to the Senate, Peter I enthusiastically noted the warm welcome received in the city. “The naib of this city,” writing Peter I to the Senate, “greeted us, and brought us the key to the gate. It is true that these people accepted us with unfeigned love and were so glad to see us, as if they rescued their own from the siege.”
For the peaceful surrender of the city and the declaration of obedience, Peter I granted the Derbent naib Imam Kuli the rank of major general and established a monetary allowance at the expense of the treasury.
In Derbent, the feudal lords of Dagestan and other regions of the Caucasus began to turn to Peter. So, Tabasaran Rustem-kadi turned to Peter I with a request to send troops to occupy and strengthen Khuchni. In his letter to Peter I, Rustem-kadi reported on the historically established friendly relations of Tabasaran with Russia, on the disasters and devastation inflicted on him by Daud-bek and Surkhay-khan for refusing to oppose Persia. Further, Rustem, in his letter, asked Peter I to assist in the restoration of the capital Khuchni, destroyed by Daud-bek, and, if necessary, to indicate to the Derbent governor "to inflict his troops with his help," for his part, Rustem-kadi gave obligations to his "subjects not to leave him in need" . From Peter's letter, dated September 1, 1722, we learn that Peter I promised Rustem to satisfy his request: to restore his ruined residence, to supply him with weapons and ammunition against traitors, and to send an engineer "for the better construction of the city." Representatives of various segments of the population of Baku, Shamakhi, Salyan, Rasht, Tiflis, Yerevan came to Peter I in Derbent with a request to be accepted into Russian citizenship. King Vakhtang VI of Kartli went to Ganja. In a letter to Peter I, he said that he had arrived there to join his troops with the Azerbaijani and Armenian troops. The Ganja and Karabakh militia, consisting of Azerbaijanis and Armenians, together with the Georgians, were preparing to move towards the Russian troops in order to jointly oppose the Turkish and Iranian conquerors.
However, Peter I in the same year, for a number of reasons, had to temporarily interrupt his campaign: the Russian army, concentrated in the Caspian Sea, experienced great difficulties in supplying food and fodder. In addition, during the campaign to the south, there was a threat of a resumption of war with Sweden. That could not but disturb the Russian government. On August 29, 1722, Peter convened a military council in Derbent, at which it was decided to suspend the campaign, and ordered the return of part of the army to Russia, leaving garrisons in the conquered regions. September 7, Peter I went to Astrakhan. At the direction of Peter, the garrison in Tarki was retained, the fortress of the Holy Cross was founded on the Sulak River, the commandant of which was appointed Lieutenant Colonel Soymonov. As a result of the Caspian campaign of 1722, the Agrakhan Peninsula, the fork of the Sulak and Agrakhani rivers (the fortress of the Holy Cross) and the entire seaside Dagestan, including Derbent, were annexed to Russia. Russia has not abandoned its plans for Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. This is clearly seen from the letter in which Peter I assured supporters of the Russian orientation in Transcaucasia that "having begun this business, he will not deign to leave."
Responding to the requests of Vakhtang VI for help, Peter I wrote: “When Baki is taken, it will be, and we will strengthen ourselves on the Caspian Sea, then we will not leave our troops to help him, as much as necessary, we will not leave ... Our first interest, in order to establish on the Caspian Sea, without which nothing can be done.
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3 Razakov R.Ch-M. History of Dagestan. Makhachkala, 2011 S. 80.
Campaign of Peter I in 1723.
Russia's successes caused great concern in Turkey. To turn the highlanders against Russia, she used a variety of means: bribery, intimidation and, above all, the Muslim religion, seeking to drive a wedge between the Muslims and Christians of the Caucasus. Taking advantage of the departure of the main part of the Russian army, in the winter of 1722-1723. the Crimean Khan and the Turkish Sultan tried to revolt in Tarki and Derbent. Letters were sent to Shamkhal and the Derbent naib, in which it was reported that the sultan allegedly sent an army with artillery to help Daud-bek and suggested that the naib and shamkhal lag behind Russia and submit to Turkey. Sultan Turkey after the departure of Peter I openly declared its intention to establish a protectorate over Dagestan. The Sultan's troops, moving towards the Caspian Sea, came close to the borders of Dagestan. Crimean khans and Turkish sultans began to openly claim Shirvan, Dagestan and Kabarda. By his order to the resident Neklyuev, Peter I made it clear to Turkey that Russia's interests "do not at all allow any other power, no matter whose it is, to establish itself in the Caspian Sea." In connection with the growing real threat of Turkish seizure of the western coast of the Caspian Sea, Peter took diplomatic steps and outlined a campaign for 1723 and a plan for subsequent years. In particular, measures were taken to strengthen the Caspian Flotilla in Astrakhan and the naval base on the Caspian Sea. In Dagestan, the most important measure aimed at consolidating the conquered positions was the strengthening of the fortresses of the Holy Cross and Derbent. Two infantry battalions and 20 cast-iron cannons were sent to Derbent.
The capture of the city of Baku and the strengthening of the Baku fortress were of great importance. Thanks to the measures taken by Peter I, after the city of Baku in 1723, Gilan and Mazandaran were taken. The strengthening of Russia's positions in the Caucasus went against the interests and calculations of England and France. They intensified their actions in every possible way, aimed at inciting Turkey to launch a war against Russia. Anglo-French diplomats acted in relation to the Caucasian highlanders in the role of organizers wars of conquest in the Caucasus. England, interested in strengthening its positions in the East, itself sought to enslave the mountaineers and turn the Caucasus into its colony, using Turkey.
The British ambassador to Turkey, inciting Turkey against Russia, frightened her, declaring that if Russia strengthens, "it will be bad for both England and the Port." The ambassador tried to convince the sultan that "war with Russia is not dangerous" and that Turkey must use weapons to stop the success of the Russians in the East. In the spring, Turkish troops invaded the Caucasus and gradually began to move towards the borders of Dagestan.
"Since the settlement of Russians in those parts," admits the historiographer and minister of the Turkish court, Jevdet Pasha, "was contrary to the interests of the high government," in the spring of 1723 it hurried "to seize the capital of Gyurjistan, Tiflis, and installed its ruler in Shemakha." The armed invasion of the Turkish invaders into the Caucasus, accompanied by terrible cruelties, met with stubborn resistance from the Georgian, Azerbaijani, Armenian and Dagestan peoples. This struggle of the peoples of the Caucasus against the sultan invaders was supported by Russia, its army, parts of which were located in various regions of the Caucasus.
The invasion of Turkish troops into the Caucasus extremely aggravated Russian-Turkish relations. The Turks, threatening war, demanded that Russia abandon all possessions in the Caucasus. The attempts of the Turks to seize the Caspian regions and push back the Russian troops from here failed.
In September 1723, at the suggestion of the Shah's Iran, frightened by the Turkish invasion of the Caucasus, an agreement was signed between Russia and Persia. Under the terms of the Petersburg Treaty, concluded in1723Shah recognized the Caspian regions of the Caucasus for Russia. The Dagestan coast of the Caspian Sea and Baku passed into the possession of Russia. Thus, the Caspian campaign of Peter I ended with the annexation of the Caspian regions, including Dagestan, to Russia. This led to a sharp aggravation of relations between Russia and Turkey. The hostile attitude of the reactionary circles of Turkey towards Russia continued to be fueled by the Western European powers. England tried in every possible way to provoke a Russo-Turkish war in order to take advantage of the weakening of Russia and Turkey to strengthen its positions in the entire East. The struggle for the Caspian regions escalated. The advance of the Turkish army posed a serious threat to the interests of the Russian state. But Russia, having just ended the war with Sweden, could not enter into a new war. The Russian government considered it necessary to conclude peace with Turkey. But this was prevented by England and France, which put pressure on the Sultan, and the peace negotiations dragged on.In 1724, the Porte was concluded, according to which the Sultan recognized the acquisitions of Russia in the Caspian Sea, and Russia - the rights of the Sultan to Western Transcaucasia. Later, due to the aggravation of Russian-Turkish relations, Russian government, in order to avoid new war With Ottoman Empire and interested in an alliance with Persia,( d.) and( d.) returned all the Caspian regions of Persia.
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4 Russian-Dagestan relations in the 17th - first quarter of the 18th centuries. Makhachkala, 1958. S. 68.
Conclusion.
Thus, the annexation of part of the territory of Dagestan to the Russian Empire, although it brought a new burden to its population - the heavy colonial oppression of tsarism, nevertheless, it objectively opened up prospects for the subsequent socio-economic development of the Caspian Sea; contributed to the strengthening of Russia's military-political relations with the backward peoples of the Caucasus and the strengthening of the pro-Russian foreign policy orientation here. The military and political consequences of the Caspian campaign of Peter I both for Russia and for the peoples of the Caucasus are indisputable and obvious. As a result, the security of the southeastern outskirts of Russia was ensured and the prospect of economic and cultural development Dagestan. In matters relating to the long-term orientation of the national development of the peoples of Dagestan, one must be realistic. The alliance with the Russian people for the Dagestan peoples had in the main only positive significance.
In memory of the emperor's stay in Dagestan, in July 2005, Peter I Square appeared in Makhachkala, and in 2006 Peter I Avenue appeared, which starts from this square.BesidesOn March 6, 2006, a monument to the emperor was unveiled (“From the grateful Dagestan people to the founder of the city”). By the way, its reduced copy is available in the Museum of the History of Makhachkala, which is located in the Ak-Gol park.
The opening ceremony of the monument was attended by the leaders of Dagestan and representatives of the two capitals of Russia. The bronze monument was cast in St. Petersburg.Sculptor
.
It is interesting that the monument to Peter I in St. Petersburg faces the West, while in Makhachkala the emperor's gaze is directed to the South.Therefore, there was enough time for us to understand and realize that Russia played a huge positive role in the fate of Dagestan as an autonomous state and its multinational peoples. It should be emphasized that the vast majority of Dagestanis have realized this and are grateful to Russia. They do not represent Dagestan without Russia and outside of Russia, which is their common Motherland.
In conclusion, I want to say that Russia is our common home, without which our life is unthinkable, and all conscious Dagestanis are interested in its development and flourishing. I want to believe that all the difficulties experienced by the country will be overcome, and the life of all peoples, including Dagestanis, will become more prosperous, highly cultured and moral.
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5 Country of mountains, mountain of languages // Our power: deeds and faces. 2006 C.10.
LITERATURE
1. Golikov I.I. Acts of Peter the Great, the wise reformer of Russia. M., 1938 T. IX.
2. Gadzhiev V.G. The role of Russia in the history of Dagestan. M., 1965
3. History, geography and ethnography of Dagestan XVIII-XIX centuries. M., 1958
4. Internet resource
5. Russian-Dagestan relations in the 17th - first quarter of the 18th centuries. Makhachkala, 1958
6. Razakov R.Ch-M. History of Dagestan. Makhachkala, 2011
7. Solovyov S. M. History of Russia since ancient times. In 15 books. M., 1963
in on Peter's square.
And here is the area itself. This is a view towards Rasul Gamzatov Avenue.
Mount Tarki-tau
Prut and Caspian (Persian) campaigns
However Poltava victory and the complete defeat of Charles XII did not lead to the end of the war, it continued for another 12 years. The main reasons for this were the intervention of other countries, the forced war with Turkey, and the fact that Sweden was defeated on land, but continued to dominate the sea. Therefore, at the second stage of the war, the center of military operations was transferred to the Baltic. However, this was preceded by the events of 1711, unsuccessful for Russia.
In 1710, instigated by Charles XII and the diplomats of leading European states, the Turkish Sultan declared war on Russia, demanding the return of Azov and the liquidation of the Russian fleet. After unsuccessful attempts to reach a compromise through diplomatic means, Peter had to accept the challenge of Turkey at the end of February 1711. At the end of June 1711, the Russian army under the command of Peter entered Moldavia and, having crossed the Dniester, approached the Prut. The promised help from the Moldavian ruler Cantemir was insignificant, and the Wallachian ruler Brynkovyanu, having betrayed Russia, issued a war plan to the sultan. As a result, on July 9, 1711, the 38,000-strong Russian army was surrounded near the Prut River by a 135,000-strong Turkish army and a 50,000-strong army of the Crimean Khan.
As already mentioned, at the end of June 1711, Russian troops under the command of Peter entered Moldavia. However, the only "help" that they waited for was the arrival of the Moldavian ruler Cantemir with a handful of courtiers. There were neither detachments of thousands of rebels, nor the promised warehouses with provisions, nor water.
The Turkish Janissaries rushed to attack the Russians, but were rebuffed and retreated, losing up to 8 thousand killed. The Russians lost half as much, but their position was threatening. Peter went to peace negotiations with the Turkish vizier Mehmed Pasha.
On the morning of July 10, a truce envoy was sent from the Russian camp to the Turkish vizier. There was no answer. Then Vice-Chancellor Pyotr Pavlovich Shafirov went to the Turks. For two days in the camp of the Russian Tsar, soldiers, officers and generals did not close their eyes, waiting for further events. Finally, on July 11, after the second meeting of the military council, at which a desperate plan was adopted to get out of the encirclement, news came from Shafirov - he managed to sign peace with the vizier. Contemporaries wondered how the vice-chancellor managed to persuade the Turks to peace so quickly, and even with minimal concessions. Under the terms of the peace treaty, the Turks demanded that the fortress of Azov be returned to them in safety; to tear down the newly built Russian cities of Taganrog and Kamenny Zaton; not to interfere in the affairs of Poland; guarantee the safe passage to Sweden of Charles XII.
Several circumstances contributed to the signing of peace on the banks of the Prut. Undoubtedly, Shafirov's diplomatic talent, dexterity and insight played a big role. The diamonds and other jewels of Catherine I, which she readily offered to appease the Turkish vizier, turned out to be significant. But the main thing was that each of the parties, realizing their unenviable position, did not know what was really going on in the camp of the enemy.
The vizier, of course, could not know how difficult, almost hopeless, the position of the Russian army was, an army that in the first battle laid down 7,000 Turks on the battlefield. He did not know that Peter's instruction was in Shafirov's pocket, in which, in order to avoid captivity, he expressed readiness to return not only Azov and Taganrog, but to return to the Swedes all the cities of the Baltic coast occupied by the Russians during the Northern War. In turn, Peter was not aware of the devastation that his hungry army made in the ranks of the Turkish troops. He could not have known that on the morning of July 10, the Janissaries refused to carry out the order of the vizier to resume attacks on the Russian camp, declaring that "they cannot stand against the fire of Moscow," and demanded a speedy conclusion of peace.
At the signing of the peace treaty, the Turks demanded from the Russian side "amanats" - hostages, who were supposed to serve as a guarantee that the Russians would fulfill their obligations. As hostages, the vizier agreed to take Pyotr Pavlovich Shafirov and Mikhail Borisovich Sheremetev, the son of the field marshal, on whose behalf the negotiations were conducted.
Upon learning of the conclusion of peace with the Russians, Charles XII was furious. Jumping on a horse, he rushed to the Turkish camp. Having burst unceremoniously into the vizier's tent, he began a skirmish, demanding to allocate 20-30 thousand selected troops to his disposal and promising at the same time to bring the captive Russian tsar to the Turks. The vizier, in response to the reproaches of the Swedish king, reminded him of Poltava and firmly stated that he did not intend to violate the newly signed agreement. Then Karl tried to provoke the Crimean Khan to speak out against the Russians, but he did not dare to disobey the vizier.
According to the agreement of the parties, the Russians received food from the Turks for the road, and on July 12 the Russian army moved back. On July 22, she crossed the Prut, on August 1 she crossed the Dniester. The Danish ambassador Just Yul wrote in his diary: “As soon as the entire army crossed the Dniester, the tsar ordered a thanksgiving service to be served and his miraculous deliverance on the Prut, arranged by God, to be celebrated with salute volleys.”
In accordance with the Prut peace treaty signed on July 12, 1711, Russia undertook to return Azov to Turkey, tear down its fortresses, Taganrog and Kamenny Zaton, destroy Russian ships on the Black Sea, not interfere in Polish affairs, not keep troops in Poland, refuse to maintain a permanent embassy in Istanbul (which, by the standards of that time, was an unheard of humiliation of Russian diplomacy). But - the army and artillery were saved, peace on the southern borders was restored.
Along with the "Western" Russia showed a clear interest in the "Eastern" direction. In 1714 Buchholz's expedition south of the Irtysh founded Omsk, Semipalatinsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk and other fortresses. In 1716-1717. Peter was sent to Central Asia across the Caspian, a 6,000-strong detachment of Prince A. Bekovich-Cherkassky in order to persuade the Khiva khan to citizenship and explore the path to India (according to other sources, the detachment was supposed to find the old bed of the Amu Darya river and direct its course to the Caspian Sea). However, both the prince himself and his detachment, located in the cities of Khiva, were destroyed by order of the khan.
Other foreign policy measures of the government of Peter include the Caspian (Persian) campaign of 1722-1723. Taking advantage of the internal political crisis in Iran, Russia stepped up its foreign policy in the Transcaucasus. In the summer of 1722, Peter I personally led the Persian campaign of the Russian army in connection with the appeal to him for help from the son of the Persian Shah, Tokhmas Mirza. On July 18, a 22,000-strong Russian detachment, led by the emperor, sailed from Astrakhan across the Caspian. 9 thousand cavalry and 50 thousand Cossacks and Tatars moved along the coast. Soon Derbent was taken without a fight, and Peter returned to Astrakhan. The command of the troops was entrusted to General M.A. Matyushkin, who occupied Rasht in December, and in July 1723 an assault was landed and Baku was taken.
However, the further advance of the Russian troops was stopped by the large-scale Turkish aggression in the Caucasus, and the unequivocal support of Turkey from Britain and France. As a result, on September 12, 1723, peace was concluded with Persia in St. Petersburg, according to which the western and southern coasts of the Caspian Sea with the cities of Derbent and Baku and the provinces of Gilan, Mazenderan and Astrabad were included in the Russian Empire; Russia and Persia entered into a defensive alliance against the Porte. According to the Istanbul Treaty of June 12, 1724, Turkey recognized all the acquisitions of Russia in the Caspian Sea and renounced its claims to Persia. The Treaty of Istanbul demarcated the spheres of influence in the Caucasus. The territory of predominantly Russian influence was recognized as the coastal parts of Dagestan and Azerbaijan, Turkish - Georgia, Armenia, the hinterland of Dagestan and Azerbaijan.
The areas occupied as a result of military operations in 1722-1723, Russia could not hold on to. The local population did not stop resisting. Russian garrisons in the conquered fortresses and in the newly founded fortifications were subjected to constant attacks. The successors of Peter I on the Russian throne were not able to increase their military presence in the region, nor were they able to fight against Persia or Turkey. As a result, in 1732, a peace treaty was signed with Iran in Rasht, according to which Russia returned the provinces of Gilan, Shirvan, Mazandaran, recaptured from it, and the main apartment of the Russian troops was transferred to Baku. Only the territory between the Kura and the Terek remained behind Russia in the Caspian Sea.
However, in Dagestan, even after the Resht Treaty, the armed resistance of the population intensified. This situation was used by Turkey, transferring troops here Crimean Tatars for military operations, both against Persia and against Russia. The struggle of the Russian units with them was conducted from 1733 with varying success, requiring more and more forces and means. In 1735, the government of Anna Ioannovna considered it good to get out of the confrontation by signing the Ganja Treaty with Persia, according to which it renounced all acquisitions on the Caspian coast made under Peter I. The Russian border again moved to the Terek. The fortress of the Holy Cross, founded on Sulak during the Persian campaign, was destroyed. But instead of it, in the same 1735, the Kizlyar fortress was founded on the Terek, which marked the beginning of the future Caucasian fortified line.
Azov campaign of Peter the Great
At the end of the 17th century, active hostilities against Turkey resumed. This was determined by a number of reasons: access to the sea was required;
Interest in the southern direction was shown by Peter I as early as 1695. when the young king made a trip to Azov - a Turkish fortress at the mouth of the Don, blocking the way to the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov and the Northern Black Sea region. When preparing the first Azov campaign, the mistakes of the Crimean campaigns of Golitsyn in 1687 and 1689 were taken into account. The main attack in 1695 was aimed at the Turkish fortress of Azov at the mouth of the Don. Despite careful preparation, the first Azov campaign was not successful. There was no unified command, there was no experience of besieging strong fortresses, there was not enough artillery. And most importantly, the besiegers did not have a fleet in order to block Azov from the sea and prevent the delivery of reinforcements, ammunition and food to the besieged. After a three-month siege of Azov (spring-summer 1695), Peter was forced to retreat. Without a fleet, it was impossible to besiege the fortress both from land and from the sea. The first Azov campaign ended in failure.
In the autumn of 1695, preparations began for a new campaign. The construction of the fleet in Moscow on the Yauza River began, and 2 large ships, 23 galleys and more than a thousand barges and small ships were built in Voronezh. An army moved to Azov, twice as large as in 1695, and on July 19, 1696. Azov was taken, which was a major military and foreign policy success.
But access to the Black Sea was blocked by Kerch, which could only be captured as a result of a long and difficult war, in which allies were needed. Their search was one of the reasons for the "Great Embassy" to Western Europe (1697-1698). After the blockade from the sea on July 19, the Turkish fortress surrendered, the fleet found a convenient harbor - Taganrog, began to build a port. But still, the forces to fight Turkey and the Crimea were clearly not enough. Peter ordered the construction of new ships (52 ships in 2 years) at the expense of landowners and merchants.
As a result of the study, we can conclude that the main directions of Russia's foreign policy of this period - these are the north-western and southern ones - were determined by the struggle for access to non-freezing seas, without which it was impossible to break out of economic and cultural isolation, and, consequently, to overcome the general backwardness of the country , as well as the desire to acquire new lands, strengthen border security and improve the strategic position of Russia.
As a result of the victory in the Northern War of 1700 - 1721. Russia gained access to the Baltic Sea. Thus, the transit route from Iran (Persia) through the Caspian and Volga to the Baltic turned out to be almost entirely on the territory of Russia. Continuing the mercantilist policy of his predecessors, Tsar Peter I Alekseevich was interested in intensifying transit through Russian territory. However, trade relations with Iran, secured by the agreement concluded in 1718, did not develop properly due to the inability of the Iranian side to control its Caspian provinces. Therefore, Tsar Peter decided to annex Iranian possessions on the Caspian Sea to Russia and thereby take control of the entire transit route between Iran and Northwestern Europe.
Reason for war
The uprising of Sunni Muslims in the Caspian provinces of Shiite Iran and territories dependent on it (Dagestan) and the invasion of Iran by Afghan tribes that violated the movement along the transit route Iran - North-Western Europe.
In 1721, during the capture of Shamakhi by a Sunni army led by the Kazikumukh Khan Cholak-Surkhay, all Russian merchants died, and their warehouses with goods worth 4 million rubles were looted. Sunni rebels sought patronage from Turkey, which also showed interest in this region. In the case of a new Russian-Turkish war Russia would not only lose the most important trade route, but also get a new front of hostilities aimed at the insufficiently protected southeastern flank of the Russian border. In March 1722, the Afghans laid siege to Isfahan.
Russia's goals
The capture of Iranian provinces and territories dependent on Iran on the western and southern coasts of the Caspian Sea, the restoration of stability in them, which ensured the uninterrupted operation of the Iran-North-Western Europe transit route.
Command of the Russian army
Tsar Peter I Alekseevich, Admiral General Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin, Major General Mikhail Afanasevich Matyushkin, Brigadier Vasily Yakovlevich Levashov, Colonel Nikolai Mikhailovich Shipov.
Command of the Kartli army
King Vakhtang VI.
Command of the Iranian Forces
The commandant of Baku, colonel (yuz-bashi) Mahmud-Dargha-Kuli, naib Salyan Hussein-bek.
Sunni rebel command
Karakaytag Utsmi Ahmed Khan, Utemish Sultan Mahmud.
Territory of hostilities
Dagestan, southwestern and southern coasts of the Caspian Sea (Shirvan, Karabakh, Gilan, Mazanderan, Gilan, Astrabad (Gurgan).
Periodization of the Persian campaign 1722 - 1723
Campaign of 1722 The Russian army, in cooperation with the flotilla, having defeated the detachments of the Sunni rebels, occupied the Caspian coast of Dagestan and the city of Derbent. Russian troops captured the city of Rasht in the Iranian province of Gilan.
Campaign of 1723 The Russian army, supported by a flotilla in Shirvan, besieged and took the cities of Baku and Salyan.
The end of the Persian campaign 1722 - 1723
On September 12, 1723, a Russian-Iranian treaty was signed in St. Petersburg, according to which the cities of Derbent, Baku and Rasht, as well as the former Iranian provinces of Shirvan, Gilan, Mazanderan and Astrabad (Gurgan) were ceded to Russia.
On June 12, 1724, an agreement was concluded between Turkey and Russia in Istanbul, which divided Transcaucasia into zones of influence - Turkish (Kartli, Kakheti, Eastern Armenia, Karabakh) and Russian (Dagestan, Shirvan, Gilan, Mazanderan and Astrabad).
Due to the difficult climate and the ongoing "small war" in the territories annexed to Russia, Russian troops constantly suffered significant losses - for 1722 - 1735. up to 130,000 people.
Preparing for a war with Turkey, Empress Anna I Ioannovna decided to get rid of burdensome acquisitions during the Persian campaign of 1722-1723. According to the Resht Treaty with Iran dated February 1, 1732, Russia returned to it the provinces of Gilan, Mazanderan and Astrabad (Gurgan), gaining the right to duty-free trade. Then, according to the Ganja Treaty with Iran of March 10, 1735, Russia returned Shirvan and Dagestan to it, restoring the situation for 1722.