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05.02.2015
Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt in Yalta agreed on the principles of the "new world"
Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin
On February 4, 1945, a meeting of the heads of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition took place in Yalta. Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed on the principles of the "new world", which remained until the collapse of the USSR.
After the successful landing of the Anglo-American troops in Normandy in June 1944, the need for a tripartite conference on highest level to fix the results of the war and to determine the contours of the post-war world order. Roosevelt and Churchill proposed to hold it in Malta, which belonged to Great Britain. But Stalin, who was very sensitive to his own safety, categorically refused to go there. He insisted that the conference be held on Soviet territory, in the recently liberated Crimea from the Germans.
Each of the allies had their own goals. The USSR wanted the post-war structure of Europe to firmly guarantee its security, so it insisted on creating a buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe from neutral or friendly states. The US was not particularly interested in the future of Europe. The Americans needed a speedy victory over Japan, to the war with which they sought to involve the Soviet Union. In turn, Britain tried to maintain its international position. She was worried about the growing rise of Soviet influence in Europe, especially in Poland.
Poland, 1943
It was the future of Poland that became the most difficult topic of the negotiations at Yalta, which took place from 4 to 11 February 1945. Stalin insisted that power in the country liberated by the Red Army should pass to the pro-Soviet Polish Committee of National Liberation (“Lublin Committee”), and Churchill demanded recognition of the powers of the Polish government in exile, which had been in London since 1939. To Roosevelt, this dispute seemed of little importance; in private conversations, he called Poland "the eternal migraine of Europe." In the Polish issue, he supported Stalin, the British had to give in and agree to the Soviet version of the post-war structure of the country. The Soviet leader justified his tough position by the fact that it was strategically important for the USSR to have a friendly Poland, which from time immemorial served as a springboard for attacking Russia from the west.
Separately, the problem with the borders of the restored Polish state was solved. As you know, after the German attack on Poland in September 1939, the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, occupied its eastern territories populated mainly by Ukrainians and Belarusians. Naturally, Stalin was not going to give these lands back to the Poles. The Allies agreed to draw the eastern border of the country approximately along the "Curzon Line", proposed by the British back in 1919, "with slight deviations from it in some areas in favor of Poland." As a kind of compensation for the loss of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Stalin offered to give Poland German territories east of the Oder and Neisse, as well as Silesia, Pomerania and a significant part of East Prussia. As the Polish diplomat Jan Karski recalled many years later, “We received the border on the Oder-Neisse only by the grace of Stalin. He did not yield and insisted: the Poles are supposed to do this ... Churchill and Roosevelt protested: "It's simply absurd to give Poland a border on the Neisse!" Churchill shouted: "I am not going to feed this Polish goose, he will choke on these territories!" And Stalin repeated: "The Poles are supposed to, they suffered, they fought."
Yalta Conference
As for Germany, the parties relatively quickly agreed on its division into occupation zones. For the balance of power in post-war Europe, a separate zone was also allocated to France, recently liberated from the Nazi troops. Although the allies did not seek the dismemberment of Germany, it was their decision on the occupation zones that predetermined the subsequent division of the country into the FRG and the GDR. It was just as easy to decide the fate of the Balkan countries in Yalta. Greece remained in the zone of influence of Great Britain, and Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria, liberated by the Red Army, entered the sphere of interests Soviet Union.
In addition to the redistribution of borders and spheres of influence, an important result of the conference is the decision to create the United Nations, designed to replace the failed League of Nations. It was the UN that was to shape the post-war world order, the guarantor of which would be the victorious powers, as well as France and China. It is curious that Stalin proposed to include in the UN, in addition to the USSR, all of its union republics. When this idea was not understood by either Churchill or Roosevelt, he left only three - Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. However, in the course of further discussion, he managed to push through this status only for the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR.
On the whole, the Yalta Conference successfully coped with its tasks. Stalin was especially pleased with its results - he got almost everything he wanted. The support of the American president played a decisive role in this. Subsequently, when the Cold War broke out between the former allies, many American politicians reproached the late Roosevelt for softness. But, as the French historian Marc Ferro rightly notes, “in January 1945 ... on the one hand, the Russians were 150 kilometers from Berlin, on the other hand, the German attack on the Ardennes -“ the last die cast by Hitler ”- threatened to nullify the success of the allied landings. Stalin was in a strong position. Not a word was said about this later by those who reproached Roosevelt for the concessions he made at Yalta.
After the end of the Cold War, there was a tendency in the world to revise the results of the Yalta Conference. Its significance and results were sharply negatively assessed by the states of Eastern Europe, which after the Second World War either fell into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, or, like the Baltic countries, lost their independence altogether. Although all Eastern Europeans were liberated from Hitler's occupation by the Red Army, they now rank the agreements at Yalta with the Munich agreement of 1938 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. Moreover, after integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, they seek to impose their assessment of the outcome of the war on the Western public opinion. And they achieved some success in this: on May 7, 2005, during a speech in Riga, then US President George W. Bush called the Yalta agreements "one of the greatest injustices in history." Earlier, in November 2002, in Vilnius, he announced that "there will be no more Munich and no more Yalta."
George Bush Jr. performing in Riga, May 2005
Be that as it may, the Yalta-Potsdam system turned out to be more viable and stable than the Versailles-Washington one, which it replaced. Almost unchanged, this system existed for almost half a century - until the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. But since 1991, the process of its erosion has only increased. The collapse of Yugoslavia, the declaration of independence of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea by Russia - all this dealt a serious blow to the system international relations formed on the basis of the decisions of the Yalta Conference.
The crisis of the Yalta peace is obvious to everyone. Over the past decades, Germany and Japan, the losers in World War II, have moved into the world leaders. They demand more and more insistently that their new status be formally consolidated, for example, to be included in the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. But it is not easy to achieve this: the entire world historical experience shows that none of the beneficiaries of the former world order voluntarily gives up their positions. A change in the global rules of the game has always occurred only as a result of major military conflicts. For example, the Vienna system of international relations that arose after the Napoleonic wars ceased to exist only with the outbreak of the First World War. It was replaced by the Versailles-Washington, which led to the Second World War. What will come in return for the Yalta-Potsdam system and what processes will be accompanied by its demolition, today none of the responsible politicians will dare to answer.
“The impression was that Stalin had a better attitude towards Roosevelt than towards Churchill”
What was influenced and what could not be influenced by the personal relations that developed between the leaders of the "Big Three"? Professor, Doctor historical sciences Vladimir Pechatnov
- How do you assess the role of personal relations between the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition?
- It was extremely large, which is connected with quite objective reasons. During the war years, the concentration of power in the hands of the leadership was the highest. This concerned not only the Soviet Union and Joseph Stalin, but also the allies - the USA and Great Britain, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. No wonder Churchill said that "their order is obeyed by 25 million soldiers around the world." It would not be an exaggeration to say that the three leaders really decided the fate of the world. And the lives of millions of people depended on how their relationship developed. Despite the serious differences in the geopolitical interests of the states, and in the personalities of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill themselves, they nevertheless managed to establish relations within the coalition, and this was a great achievement. It suffices to compare this situation with the one that developed on the other side of the front: the Axis countries, although they were close in political regimes, did not learn how to interact with each other. As a result, the anti-Hitler coalition had not only a resource and political, but also an important organizational advantage over the enemy.
- If Roosevelt did not have negative baggage in relations with Russia, then Churchill had such baggage. At dawn Soviet power British politician was considered one of the main enemies of Bolshevism and one of the ideologists of the Entente intervention in the years civil war. How did this affect their relationship with Stalin?
– Indeed, since 1917 Winston Churchill has been a consistent opponent of the Soviet system. Let me remind you of his call - "to strangle Bolshevism, like a child, in the cradle." Stalin, of course, perfectly understood with whom he was dealing and had no illusions on this score. His attitude towards Churchill was largely determined by this historical background.
Photo courtesy of M.Zolotarev
But even more important, from my point of view, was Stalin's different attitude towards the two countries - Great Britain and the USA, which also determined the way he built relations with their leaders. Roosevelt was backed by a huge economy, a colossal military power, and this made him in the eyes of Stalin the main ally for most of the war. Great Britain, on the other hand, was gradually weakening, and therefore relations with Churchill did not have such crucial. Stalin, especially after Stalingrad, valued relations with the United States, with Roosevelt more than with Churchill. This was facilitated by the personal qualities of the American president - courtesy, poise, which, of course, stood out against the background of the ruffy, extremely emotional Churchill.
- What do you think, is it true that between Stalin and Roosevelt, in modern political terms, there was a "personal chemistry"? Or was it more of a game?
– Of course, it is difficult to separate political interest from personal likes or dislikes. We can confidently say only that Stalin treated Roosevelt with emphatic respect. Roosevelt kept his contacts with the Soviet leader even, but at the same time everyone who observed them emphasized that Stalin communicated with Roosevelt as a senior partner, although he was two and a half years younger than him.
At the same time, relations between Stalin and Churchill were, although uneven and complex, but in a sense even closer. Let me remind you that the Soviet leader had twice as many personal meetings with the British Prime Minister than with the American president: four against two. And we are talking about detailed meetings: in addition to Tehran and Yalta, Churchill paid visits to Moscow in August 1942 and October 1944. And the intensity of Stalin's correspondence during the war years with Churchill was higher than with Roosevelt. Perhaps this is due to the fact that on European subjects (and it was precisely this region that, for obvious reasons, occupied Stalin most of all), he much more often collaborated and argued with Churchill, and not with Roosevelt, who nevertheless kept aloof from many European themes. Therefore, it is probably wrong to say that Stalin had closer relations with Roosevelt than with Churchill. It was just that the differences between the interests of the Soviet Union and the British Empire at that time were much more serious than the differences with the United States, and, probably, in connection with this, the impression was created that Stalin had a better attitude towards Roosevelt than Churchill.
– What was the basis of the differences between the USSR and the British Empire?
- The sphere of British interests was closer to our borders - these are the Balkans, and Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean, and Turkey, and Iran, which became one of the nodes of contradictions at the beginning of the Cold War. No wonder that the British were more sensitive to the strengthening of the influence of the Soviet Union in these regions than the Americans, who looked at all this from afar. That is why, during most of the Second World War, the differences in the geopolitical interests of the USSR and the United States were less tangible than our differences with the British. As British Foreign Secretary Ernst Bevin later said: "The Soviet Union was rubbing against the edges of the British Empire."
At the Potsdam Conference, held from July 17 to August 2, 1945, the United States was represented by the new President Harry Truman (center). Photo courtesy of M. Zolotarev
- Is it possible to say that one of the leaders dominated the talks of the "Big Three"?
- Here you need to take into account each time what period in question. Tehran-43 is one thing, Yalta-45 is another. Already in Tehran, an unspoken Soviet-American tandem had formed, primarily on the issue of opening a second front. As you know, Stalin and Roosevelt put great pressure on Churchill and eventually achieved their goal: the second front was opened in June 1944.
Not without reason did Churchill compare his position at the Tehran Conference with that of a "little British donkey" sandwiched between a "Soviet bear" and an "American bison." However, there was also a kind of "optical illusion" here. As a powerful political figure and a seasoned leader, Churchill made Britain seem stronger than it actually was. But “inwardly” the British were well aware that their former power was gradually leaving, flowing over to the Americans and the Soviet Union. And at the same time, the influence of the British Prime Minister on world processes was also reduced. Churchill took it very painfully ...
In Yalta, taking into account our successes at the front, Stalin's role in the Soviet-American tandem increased even more. He was undoubtedly the leader of the Yalta Conference - both as its master and as master of the situation on the key, Eastern Front of the Second World War.
– Is it possible to trust the assessments that Churchill gave of personal and business qualities Stalin? His words are known that Stalin outplayed Roosevelt, that he was intellectually superior to all of them.
- Yes, Churchill spoke laudatoryly about "Marshal Stalin" more than once and said in his circle that he liked to deal with such a great man. Although, it seems to me, he was somewhat envious of the military successes of his Soviet counterpart.
However, there was another extreme. In personal communication, Churchill refrained from direct attacks on Stalin, but there were moments when he reacted with fury to some actions of the Soviet leader and especially to criticism from him. In such cases, the lightning rod, as a rule, became soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky.
I think Churchill was sincere both in this fury and in praising Stalin. He was generally characterized by extremes, mood swings - like any drinking person, constantly rushing from depression to euphoria. On the one hand, Stalin could bring tears of tenderness to him with compliments (Maisky recorded this in his telegrams), and on the other hand, drive him to rage and indignation with reproaches and criticism (often, by the way, quite fair). So, I repeat, in my opinion, Churchill was sincere when he paid tribute to Stalin as an outstanding politician. By the way, both during the Second World War and during the Cold War, even in his famous Fulton speech, he did not allow himself open personal attacks against Stalin, called him his comrade in arms and highly appreciated his role in the war.
- Speaking of Stalin the diplomat, they usually give a contradictory description. As a rule, they note that he managed to achieve tremendous success in creating the anti-Hitler coalition and in the post-war reorganization of the world. But at the same time, recalling his agreements with Germany in the summer and autumn of 1939, they emphasize his short-sightedness. Like, the agreements with Hitler were immoral, and besides, they did not fulfill the task that Stalin set, they did not allow them to gain time to prepare for war, etc. How do you assess Stalin the diplomat?
Both the pact with Hitler and the war, of course, taught him a lot. When Hitler ultimately turned out to be a far more treacherous and adventurous man than Stalin had imagined, it taught him a good lesson. But still, from my point of view, even in 1939, Stalin acted on the basis of the country's foreign policy interests (of course, in the form in which he understood them at that time), and this was the main thing for him.
By the way, the same Churchill, both publicly and in private conversations, generally spoke approvingly of the Stalinist conspiracy with Hitler, considering it a geopolitical imperative in the current situation. And Roosevelt never said that the pact with Hitler was Stalin's mistake. He simply saw that this pact would be short-lived, that sooner or later the USSR would clash with Germany. But in principle, they were sympathetic to this decision of the leadership of the Soviet Union.
As for the war, almost all participants in the events noted Stalin's great diplomatic skill, stressed that during the negotiations he was head and shoulders above many of his partners. We find this also in the memoirs of the British, who were by no means inclined to exaggerate the merits of Stalin. According to their reviews, he was more thoroughly prepared, reasoned more consistently than, say, Roosevelt, was a better strategist and had a greater ability to logical thinking than the impulsive Churchill.
Winston Churchill, Harry Truman and Joseph Stalin at the Potsdam Conference. Photo courtesy of M. Zolotarev
- And this despite the fact that Churchill considered himself a more sophisticated and more professional politician, he was always proud of the fact that he spent his whole life in the British Parliament - the forge of political cadres ...
- I think that in contacts with Stalin, the experience gained by Churchill in the British Parliament was rather to his detriment. After all, the parliamentary experience in the case of Churchill is, first of all, the experience of eloquence, the experience of pathos rhetoric, which was not very suitable for behind-the-scenes negotiations within the Big Three. And Churchill was often carried away at such meetings: with his eloquence, he often digressed from the topic and spoke without substance. Stalin had a different school. He spoke very concretely and in a businesslike way: the negotiators always noted this as his dignity. Yes, and Churchill himself admitted that Stalin was no weaker than him and Roosevelt. By the way, Roosevelt was also prone to rhetoric, and such a purely businesslike style of the Soviet leader seemed unusual to them, sometimes even jarring at them with his harshness and directness.
- A very significant statement by Harry Truman in 1941: it was important for the United States that either the Germans killed the Russians, or the Russians killed the Germans. Can we say that this point of view was shared by the majority of the then American establishment, or was it still marginal?
- This was said at the very beginning of the war, when the USSR had just entered it, and at that time such an opinion was quite popular. Let's remember what the Soviet Union and Germany were like in 1941 from the US point of view. Two hostile, ideologically alien regimes clashed, and America was tempted to take the position of the "third rejoicer" watching the two adversaries destroy each other.
I should note that when this phrase of Truman is quoted, its second part is very often forgotten. “For all that, I don’t want Germany to win,” he added. future president USA. That is, even such a hawk as Truman understood that Germany was a much more dangerous enemy than the Soviet Union. And Roosevelt understood this all the more. So, in general, in America, few people doubted that the USSR was still an ally, and Hitler's Germany was a mortal enemy, and that it was necessary to unite to defeat him.
Although, of course, Truman's point of view was widely held. Moreover, the capabilities of the USSR at the beginning of the war were considered very small, it seemed to many that its defeat was just a matter of time. And in that case there was no point in helping the Soviets.
– But didn’t Roosevelt’s line aimed at building constructive relations with Moscow cause discontent in the ruling circles of America?
– Here, too, there are nuances. Let us note the first period of the war, when Roosevelt made key decisions on the extension of lend-lease to the USSR, on the exclusive status of Soviet lend-lease, when they did not require any confirmation of applications from us, but simply tried to fulfill them, trusting us, as they say, at our word. It was then, especially after Pearl Harbor, when the Americans themselves needed weapons, this position of support for the Soviet Union met with resistance from the military. Roosevelt had to overcome it.
Winston Churchill in the early 1900s. Photo courtesy of M. Zolotarev
Later, when it became clear that the USSR was crushing the main forces of the Wehrmacht, it was already difficult to object to the help of the Red Army in the fight against fascism, which saved millions of American lives. Finally, after Stalingrad, at the moment of a radical turning point in the war, the attitude of the military elite, the diplomatic and intelligence communities of the United States began to change again. They became more concerned with the question of how far west the Soviet Union would advance in the process of final defeat Germany and what price he will ask for a decisive contribution to this defeat. Tips poured in to Roosevelt that it was necessary to block the victorious march of the Red Army in Europe (including the Balkans) in order to prevent a geopolitical breakthrough by the USSR. Gradually, latent resistance to Roosevelt's policies began to grow, which by the end of the war became very tangible. But while Roosevelt was alive, thanks to his authority, the fact that the main levers of power were in his hands, he often acted bypassing the state bureaucracy and was able to contain this growing resistance that arose in the US ruling circles. His death in April 1945 provoked the gradual displacement of the pro-Soviet lobby and, in this sense, seriously influenced the nature of Soviet-American relations.
- There is a version that Roosevelt's death was accelerated. How do you feel about this interpretation?
- I have not seen serious evidence of this, although it is known that Stalin had doubts about the official version of the death of the US President. We must not forget that Roosevelt was already physically worn out by the end of the war, this became noticeable from 1944, and in Yalta he was far from in the best shape at all. So Roosevelt could very well have died of a cerebral hemorrhage, it's amazing how he even lasted so long.
- And what is the nomination of Harry Truman as vice president connected with? It is believed that Roosevelt was not happy with this decision of the Democratic Party ...
“It was not an ideal decision for him, but it was the lesser of evils, since the previous vice president, Henry Wallace (in 1941-1944), had a reputation for being very strange, even radical in the eyes of business and the political establishment. Much attention was paid to the candidacy of vice president during the last election of Roosevelt in 1944 precisely because of the unimportant physical condition president. This was not said aloud, but many understood that he was unlikely to master the fourth term. The fact of who would become vice-president was of particular importance. There were others besides Truman, but Roosevelt himself, of all options chose him anyway. In my opinion, Harry Truman was the best candidate for the president because he was simple and predictable and his nomination was not subject to serious controversy. At the same time, Roosevelt apparently considered him the kind of person who would not blow away his political legacy. Foreign policy- this is a separate issue, but I do not think that in 1944 it was a decisive factor. Most important of all was the very need to find a replacement for Roosevelt - predictable, reliable, acceptable to most of the political elite. That's why Truman became vice president.
– How have relations within the Big Three changed with the change of major players?
“It was a big change. One of the American historians called Roosevelt "the main bond of the troika." Roosevelt was in better relations with Stalin and Churchill than they are with each other, and the economy of his country - the United States - was the leading one in the world. This made Roosevelt a key figure. Therefore, his sudden departure had profound consequences. First of all, he restrained the anti-Soviet trend - with his death, its development accelerated, and soon it became dominant. Although at first, Truman, out of inertia and under the influence of Roosevelt's advisers, acted very cautiously in relations with the USSR, was ready to make concessions and did not always follow Churchill's lead, inclining him to a tougher policy. But in general, Truman, unlike Roosevelt, relied much more on the bureaucracy, and in this environment strong traditions of anti-Sovietism were preserved, and therefore they quickly became dominant.
Truman had no experience with either Stalin or Churchill. In general, personal diplomacy was not his element. For example, he really did not want to go to Potsdam, then he left with pleasure, considering this meeting of the “troika” the last. It seems to me that this psychological factor is quite important.
Joseph Stalin constantly received operational information from the fronts
Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt - for all their antipathies and difficulties - got used to dealing with each other, got used to it during the war years and knew what to expect from their partners. They had an interest in maintaining this format, a situation where everything can be agreed upon. It was no coincidence that Stalin said in Yalta: "As long as we are all alive, we have nothing to fear, we will not allow dangerous disagreements between us." Maybe it was said partly for the red word, but still, I'm sure the personal factor was of great importance.
Truman had neither the experience nor the taste for personal diplomacy, which made him feel like a rookie next to such heavyweights. This did not set him up to maintain any constructive relationship with Stalin. He felt the inner superiority of the Soviet leader, especially in Potsdam, and records of this have been preserved in his diary. Therefore, I believe, the arrival of Truman accelerated the onset of cold weather in Soviet-American relations. But he was not their root cause, because by that time the divergence of interests between the two countries was becoming more and more intensified.
- That is, even if the leaders of the "Big Three" remained the same as during the war years, the accumulating contradictions between the victorious countries would still not allow the spirit of alliance that arose during World War II to be preserved?
– I think that in general this turn was inevitable. The common enemy has been defeated, and the different perceptions of the three countries both about security and about their own came to the fore. national interest. Of course, the turn could take other forms, softer, more compromising. But, in fact, this path was inevitable to the extent that inevitability exists at all in history.
– And what became the point of no return, the line after which the process of cooperation ended and the irrevocable path to cold war?
- It is difficult to find one such point, since the process was of different speeds in different areas. If we talk about military cooperation, then it is clear that with the end of hostilities against common enemies, the need for a joint strategy has disappeared. It is interesting that the US military planned that by the autumn of 1945 the Soviet Union would become the main adversary of the United States, and the British General Staff, at the direction of Churchill, already in May 1945 considered the option of war with the USSR (Operation Unthinkable). In trade and economic relations, inertia was stronger: until 1946, Stalin retained the hope of obtaining a profitable loan from the Americans for post-war reconstruction. But the United States led us by the nose on this issue. By inertia, some contacts in the sphere of culture also continued: let me remind you that jamming of Western radio stations in the USSR began only in 1947. So in different areas this process developed at different speeds and, I repeat, it is very difficult to name one point of no return.
It seems to me that the policy of the West towards the USSR has changed much more than Stalin's policy towards the West. Here, probably, the winter-spring of 1946 became a turning point, when George Kennan's "long telegram" appeared, in which he outlined the essence of the future strategy of "containment" of the USSR, when Churchill's Fulton speech was made and the military planning of the Western allies turned into a pronounced anti-Soviet course. It was probably then that this decisive shift took place in American and British politics. And after the launch of the Marshall Plan, there was no turning back ...
Opened exactly 69 years ago Yalta (Crimean) conference of the allied powers: the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, dedicated to the establishment of the post-war world order. The meeting of the leaders of the "Big Three" was held in the Livadia (White) Palace in Yalta from February 4 to February 11, 1945.
It is to this event that I dedicate this photo collection.
1. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta Conference.
2. Hanging the flags of the USSR, USA and Great Britain before the start of the Yalta Conference.
3. Saki airfield near Simferopol. V.M. Molotov and A.Ya. Vyshinsky met the plane of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
4. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who arrived at the Yalta Conference, at the gangway.
5. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who arrived at the Yalta Conference, at the airport.
6. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who arrived at the Yalta Conference, at the airport.
7. Passage on the airfield: V.M. Molotov, W. Churchill, E. Stettinius. In the background: translator V.N. Pavlov, F.T. Gusev, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov and others.
8. Livadia Palace, where the Yalta Conference was held.
9. Meeting at the airport, US President FD Roosevelt, who arrived at the Yalta Conference.
10. F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill.
11. Meeting at the airport, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who arrived at the Crimean Conference. Among those present: N.G. Kuznetsov, V.M. Molotov, A.A. Gromyko, W. Churchill and others.
12. Stettinius, V.M. Molotov, W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt at the Saki airfield.
13. Arrival of US President F. Roosevelt. V.M. Molotov talks with F. Roosevelt. Present: A.Ya. Vyshinsky, E. Stettinius, W. Churchill and others.
14. Conversation of the US Secretary of State E. Stettinius with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov.
15. Conversation V.M. Molotov with General J. Marshall. Present: translator V.N. Pavlov, F.T. Gusev, A.Ya. Vyshinsky and others.
16. Meeting at the airport, US President FD Roosevelt, who arrived at the Yalta Conference. Among those present: V.M.Molotov, W.Churchill, A.A.Gromyko (from left to right) and others.
17. Review of the guard of honor: V.M. Molotov, W. Churchill, F. Roosevelt and others.
18. Passage of the guard of honor in front of the participants of the Crimean Conference: US President F. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister W. Churchill, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Molotov, US Secretary of State E. Stettinius, Deputy. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Vyshinsky and others.
19. V. M. Molotov and E. Stettenius are sent to the meeting room.
20. Before the meeting of the Crimean Conference. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, Foreign Minister A. Eden and US Secretary of State E. Stettinius in the Livadia Palace.
21. British Prime Minister W. Churchill and US Secretary of State E. Stettinius.
22. Head of the Soviet government I.V. Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the palace during the Yalta Conference.
23. British Prime Minister W. Churchill.
24. Military advisers of the USSR at the Yalta Conference. In the center - General of the Army AI Antonov (1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army). From left to right: Admiral S.G. Kucherov (Chief of Staff of the Navy), Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov (Commander-in-Chief of the Navy), Air Marshals S.A. Khudyakov (Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force) and F.Ya. ).
25. Daughter of British Prime Minister W. Churchill, Mrs. Oliver (left) and daughter of US President F.D. Roosevelt Ms. Bettiger in the Livadia Palace during the Yalta Conference.
26. Conversation of I.V. Stalin with W. Churchill. Present: V.M.Molotov, A.Eden.
27. Yalta Conference 1945 Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Livadia Palace. Present: V.M. Molotov, A.A. Gromyko, A. Eden, E. Stettinius.
28. W. Churchill's conversation with I.V. Stalin in the gallery of the Livadia Palace.
29. Signing of the protocol of the Yalta Conference. At the table (from left to right): E. Stettinius, V. M. Molotov and A. Eden.
30. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov signs the documents of the Yalta Conference. On the left, US Secretary of State E. Stettinius.
31. Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and Chairman of the State Defense Committee of the USSR Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the negotiating table at the Yalta conference.
In the photo, he sits to the right of I.V. Stalin, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, second to the right of I.V. Stalin - USSR Ambassador to the United States Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, first left - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890-1986), second left - First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Andrei Yanuarievich Vyshinsky (1883-1954). To the right of Winston Churchill sits British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Sits on the right hand of F.D. Roosevelt (pictured to the left of Roosevelt) - US Secretary of State - Edward Reilly Stettinius. Sits second to the right of F.D. Roosevelt (pictured second to the left of Roosevelt) - Chief of Staff of the President of the United States - Admiral William Daniel Lehi (Lehi).
32. W. Churchill and E. Eden enter the Livadia Palace in Yalta.
33. US President Franklin Roosevelt (Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1882-1945) talking with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890-1986) at the Saki airfield near Yalta.In the background, third from left, Admiral of the Fleet Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov (1904-1974), People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR.
34. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta Conference.
35. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890-1986) shakes hands with US presidential adviser Harry Hopkins (Harry Lloyd Hopkins, 1890-1946) at the Saki airfield before the start of the Yalta conference.
36. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta Conference.
37. Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and Chairman of the State Defense Committee of the USSR Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (Winston Churchill, 1874-1965) and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) at a banquet during Yalta conference.
38. V.M. Molotov, W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt welcome Soviet soldiers at the Saki airport.
39. I.V. Stalin in talks with US President F. Roosevelt during the Yalta Conference.
40. I.V. Stalin leaves the Livadia Palace during the Yalta Conference. Right behind I.V. Stalin - First Deputy Head of the 6th Directorate of the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR, Lieutenant General Nikolai Sidorovich Vlasik (1896-1967).
41. V.M. Molotov, W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt are bypassing the formation of Soviet soldiers at the Saki airfield.
42. Soviet, American and British diplomats during the Yalta Conference.
In the photo, 2nd from the left is Andrei Yanuarievich Vyshinsky, First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1883-1954), 4th from the left is US Ambassador to the USSR Averell Harriman (William Averell Harriman, 1891-1986), 5th from the left is People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890-1986), 6th left - British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden (Robert Anthony Eden, 1897-1977), 7th left - US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius (Edward Reilly Stettinius, 1900-1949 ), 8th from left - British Deputy Foreign Secretary Alexander Cadogan (Alexander George Montagu Cadogan, 1884-1968).
In ancient times, the Germans lived on the coast of the Baltic Sea. Scandinavian and Jutland peninsulas. But then, due to the deterioration of the climate, they began to move in a southerly direction. In the first centuries of our era, the Germans occupied the lands between the rivers Rhine, Oder and Danube. From the writings of the Roman historian Tacitus, we learn about how they lived.
The Germans settled at the edges of forests and along the banks of rivers. Over time, they began to surround their villages with a rampart and a moat. The Germans raised cattle, and later mastered agriculture. They were also engaged in hunting, fishing and gathering. The Germans knew how to melt iron and forge tools and weapons from it. Craftsmen made wagons, boats and ships. Potters made dishes. The Germans have long traded with the Romans.
The Germans lived in families. Families formed a clan. Several clans united into a tribe, and tribes into tribal unions. All members of the tribe were free people, equal among themselves. During the war, all the men of the tribe, able to fight, were the people's militia.
The tribe was initially ruled by a popular assembly, which included all the adult males of the tribe. At the call of the elders, they gathered to decide whether to declare war, whether to make peace, who to choose as a military leader, how to judge a dispute between relatives. But then the Germans stood out to know - the dukes: the elders of the clans and military leaders who began to play leading role at public meetings. They lived in fortified estates, had more livestock and arable land, took away most military booty.
Noble people recruited permanent military detachments - squads. The combatants took an oath of allegiance to the leader and were obliged to fight for him without sparing their lives. Experienced and skilled warriors, the Germans often raided the Roman Empire. War booty increased the wealth of the nobility, who used the labor of captive slaves. The slave had his own piece of land, part of the harvest from which he gave to the master.
From the end of the 4th century The Great Migration began. Entire Germanic tribes were removed from their homes and set off to conquer new lands. The impetus for resettlement was the invasion of the nomadic Huns from the depths of Asia. Under the leadership of the leader Attila, the Huns in the middle of the 5th century. devastated Europe and moved to Gaul.
In 378, near the city of Adrianople, the Roman army, led by the emperor Valens himself, was completely destroyed by the Visigoths, one of the Germanic tribes. The Empire was never able to recover from this defeat.
The weakened Rome found it increasingly difficult to hold back the onslaught of the barbarians: the population of the empire was exhausted by the exactions of officials and state taxes. Craft, trade, the entire economy of the Roman Empire gradually fell into decay. To protect their borders, the Romans began to resort
to the services of mercenaries - the same Germans. But there was little hope for them. In 410, Rome was taken by the leader of the Visigoths, Alaric. True, in 451, in the battle on the Catalaunian fields, the Romans and their allies managed to defeat the army of the Hun leader Attila. However, this could no longer save the empire. In 476, as a result of a rebellion raised by the Roman commander, the barbarian Odoacer, the Western Roman Empire fell.
By the beginning of the VI century. the Germans settled throughout the Western Roman Empire: in North Africa - the Vandals, in Spain - the Visigoths, in Italy - the Ostrogoths, in Gaul - the Franks, in Britain - the Angles and Saxons and founded their states on these lands.