Peter 1 commander. Russian history in faces
Tsar Peter - the great commander
Grateful Russia will never forget the name of her great reformer, the tireless worker on the throne, the skilful helmsman who guided the state ship to greatness and glory with a strong, faithful hand. He turned Russia into a great world empire, which proudly entered the family of great powers and took an honorable place among them. How did the great royal sorcerer achieve this?
In a wide measure, brilliant all-round talents were released to him by divine providence, which he completely gave to his beloved homeland.
The personality of Peter surprisingly harmoniously combined the features of an outstanding statesman-organizer with a remarkable talent as a commander. As a king, he sought to raise the welfare of his state, sought and created the means necessary to achieve his goal; as a commander, he, using prepared means, strained his powerful efforts to achieve his plan.
Statesmanship tells the king that in order to maintain close ties with enlightened Europe, his state must first break through to the open sea. But on the way to this is a powerful formidable neighbor with whom you have to fight. The king, preparing for the great struggle, begins to create the appropriate forces and means. His all-encompassing creativity unfolds to its full extent. The tsar creates an armed force organized on new principles. The creation of a regular army, the construction of a navy cause intense work in all branches of the national and public life. The army needs to be armed, clothed, equipped, the fleet needs to be built, equipped. Creative work began to boil in the country, factories appeared, trade and industry rose. Everywhere and everywhere, Tsar Peter, like a hospitable owner, delved into affairs, established and directed them.
When the forces and means for the upcoming struggle have been prepared, the royal organizer gives way to the great commander.
Surprisingly skillfully, Peter begins to carry out a difficult combat mission. In his hands at the beginning of the Northern War was a newly formed, inexperienced army. This is a fragile, unreliable material, but you still need to test it, harden it. The first experience is unsuccessful: the army is defeated near Narva. But thanks to the organizational talent of the tsar, the country has already adapted to the new order, it is allocating new forces and means for the struggle. The energy of the commander is not undermined. "The Swedes can beat us once or twice, but we will learn from them how to defeat them." The king believes in himself, in his great people.
The enemy shows short-sightedness and for a long time leaves in peace a country that seems to him defeated and deprived of the means of resistance, and Peter takes advantage of this in order, first of all, to carry out the work because of which the struggle has begun. Having created a very skillful plan for the conquest of the Izhora land, the king quickly and skillfully puts this plan into execution and secures the conquered lands.
But the king is aware that sooner or later he will have to face the victorious army of the Swedish king in the field, and in those long years that Charles XII spent in Poland and Saxony, Peter tirelessly works to increase the power of his army and achieves in this matter amazing results. This is again an example creative work organizer king.
But now the formidable enemy again goes into the borders of Russia, and the tsar-commander creates and carries out a wonderful war plan. Taking advantage of the boundless depth of his kingdom, he lures the enemy into the interior of the country, temporarily avoiding a decisive battle, wanting first to exhaust the enemy, weaken his impulse, strain his strength. To carry out this plan, the army retreats before the Swedes, destroys supplies in the country, disturbs the enemy with constant attacks by small parties. When the set goal is achieved, the skillful leader of the Russian army delivers the final blow to the weakened, half-melted, devoid of military supplies, deceived in expectations by the allies of the Swedish army.
The great military talent of Peter in the Poltava battle looms especially sharply and convexly. The skillful approach to the battlefield, the skillful concentration of forces, the brilliant preparation of the battlefield in engineering terms, the excellent moral preparation of the army, and, finally, the inspired leadership of the battle testify to the great art of Peter, making the Poltava battle in every respect a classic example of military art.
Does the unsuccessful Prut campaign detract from the greatness of Peter as a skilled commander? It is our deep conviction that this campaign, although unsuccessful in its final result, still does not detract from the military talent of Peter the Great. Fascinated by the struggle against mighty Sweden in the north, a struggle that required enormous strenuous activity, Peter, in the unfavorable political situation for him, was forced to stop the well-established business on the northern front and hastily organize a campaign to the south, move his young army in a new direction, to a distant unknown country. The conditions for the campaign were extremely unfavorable. The insidious and timid allies of the king did not justify the hopes placed on them. The Russian army, surrounded by six times superior enemy forces, was also deprived of food supplies.
The campaign was unsuccessful in terms of immediate results, but it had a huge political significance for Russia's future aggressive policy in the south. Tsar Peter showed future generations the way to the Danube and the Balkans, pointed glorious way to victories and glory, but, having scored several tactical successes in a clash with the Turks, he could not achieve strategic success.
The Prut campaign does not obscure the halo of Peter's glory as a great commander. Failures at all times sometimes befell many great generals and were usually the result of the harmful influence of those elusive accidents that cannot be foreseen in advance. Napoleon, Frederick the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, didn't these great military leaders, recognized by all, know the dark days of military hardships that befell them, despite the careful preparation of operations.
By bringing the Great Northern War to the desired, favorable end for Russia, Peter shows his unshakable will - a precious gift of great commanders.
Assessing the totality of Peter's talents as a great commander, one must recognize in him: the extraordinary development of the creative side of the mind and, as a direct consequence of this, versatility; rare brilliant insight and the ability to quickly make decisions that are appropriate to the situation; deep faith in oneself, the ability not to get lost in all sorts of surprises and failures; deep understanding of the basic laws of military art and resourcefulness in inventing means for their implementation; persistent striving to achieve the set goal, finally, a correct assessment of the battle as a means of decisive, necessary, but at the same time as a means of extreme - "very dangerous", and therefore requiring comprehensive training - this was the art of military leadership of Peter the Great.
Concerning the organizational talents of Peter the Great, one should note his deep knowledge of military affairs. Creating a regular army according to the Western European model, Peter did not limit himself to one imitation. His regiments are not regiments of a "foreign system", these are regiments that have preserved the individuality of the Russian people, which has affected its excellent fighting qualities: patience in trouble, boundless endurance, indestructible stamina, the ability to selfless self-sacrifice, courage without enthusiasm and courage without bragging.
All accepted by Peter the beginnings of the organization, supply and general organization of the armed force are in all respects deeply practical, and the fighting methods that were the result of direct combat experience are so correct that they served solid foundation for the further improvement of the Russian army and determined its further military success.
Since in subsequent eras the Russian army adhered to the military precepts of its great creator, its actions were so successful; when deviations from these great covenants came gloomy times of failures and battle hardships.
In the person of Peter, Russia had a great genius who, according to the apt definition of G. A. Leer, “knew how to do everything, could do everything and wanted to do everything.”
PLAN
Introduction
Military reforms
Administrative reforms
Church transformations
Cultural transformations
Peter the Great as a politician and commander
Peter's reforms
Conclusion
Bibliography
Applications
Introduction.
The Petrine era invariably attracts the attention of both professional researchers and ordinary history buffs. The essay prepared by me examines the most important period in the history of Russia - the time of transformations in the first quarter of the 18th century. The significance of these transformations is determined primarily by the fact that there were no such areas in the life of society that they would not touch. The new manifested itself everywhere - in the economy and science, in cultural life and everyday life, in the structure of the state apparatus, in the creation of a new army, in foreign policy. Russia in the course of reforms has become one of the strongest European powers. Tsar Peter was at the center of the transformations.
Peter the Great is one of the brightest and at the same time the most controversial figures in our history. A great reformer and a cruel autocrat, a mighty warrior and a ruthless ruler, a man who accelerated the development of Russia along the European path, and at the same time sharply increased the tyrannical nature of state power. For three centuries, disputes about Peter have not ceased. For three centuries, historians, philosophers, and writers have been arguing about the significance of Peter's transformations. But they all agree on one thing - Peter's reforms were the most important stage in the history of Russia.
The reign of Peter I, his transformation, personal contribution to the construction of the state, the strengthening of its position, the increase in Russian glory cannot but arouse close attention. All this prompted me to choose this topic for studying. On the example of this topic, it is also possible to single out an aspect that is relevant today - the role of the individual in history.
The purpose of the abstract - consider the era of the reign of Peter the Great, characterize the personality of the emperor and the reforms carried out by him, note the existing contradictions.
The solution of the goal is facilitated by the solution of the following tasks :
to carry out the selection, study and analysis of literature on the topic of the abstract;
describe the personality of the emperor as a commander and politician;
characterize the main reforms and note the contradictions.
The transformations of Peter the Great, his activities, personality, role in the fate of Russia are questions that interest and attract the attention of researchers of our time no less than in past centuries. A lot of scientific research and works of art is devoted to the transformations associated with the name of Peter I. Many of them provided me with significant assistance in writing the essay.
PETERIAS A POLITICIAN AND COMMANDER
At the end of the 17th century, when the young Tsar Peter I was on the Russian throne, our country was going through a turning point in its history. In Russia, unlike the main Western European countries, there were almost no large industrial enterprises capable of providing the country with weapons, fabrics, and agricultural implements. She had no access to the seas - neither the Black nor the Baltic, through which she could develop foreign trade. Therefore, Russia did not have its own military fleet, which would guard its borders. The land army was built according to outdated principles and consisted mainly of noble militia. The nobles reluctantly left their estates for military campaigns, their weapons and military training lagged behind the advanced European armies.
Peter, with his energy, inquisitiveness, interest in everything new, turned out to be a person capable of solving the problems facing the country. But at first he entrusted the administration of the country to his mother and uncle, L.K. Naryshkin. The tsar rarely visited Moscow, although in 1689, at the insistence of his mother, he married E.F. Lopukhina. Peter was attracted by sea fun, and he left for Pereslavl-Zalessky and Arkhangelsk for a long time, where he participated in the construction and testing of ships. Only in 1695 did he decide to undertake a real military campaign against the Turkish fortress of Azov. The first Azov campaign ended in failure, after which a fleet was hastily built in Voronezh, and during the second campaign Azov was taken. This was the first victory of the young Peter, which significantly strengthened his authority.
Shortly after returning to the capital, the king went with the Great Embassy abroad. Peter visited Holland, England, Saxony, Austria and Venice, studied shipbuilding, working at shipyards, got acquainted with the technical achievements of the then Europe, its way of life, political structure. During his trip abroad, the foundation was laid for an alliance between Russia, Poland and Denmark against Sweden.
Having learned during his stay abroad about the uprising of the archers, he urgently returned to Russia. For one autumn day in 1698, 200 archers were executed on Red Square, and Peter insisted that dignitaries from his retinue play the role of executioners. Thus, all the companions of Peter were bound by a terrible bloody bail. Even more blood was shed during the suppression of the Cossack uprising led by Kondraty Bulavin in 1707 - early 1709.
All the contradictory nature of Peter I manifested itself during the construction of the new capital - St. Petersburg (1703). On the one hand, intending to take a firm foot in the Baltic, Russia had to get a stronghold and base for the fleet. But on the other hand, the death of thousands of people during the construction of the city shows how expensive the embodiment of the state will of the king was at times. Not sparing himself, not knowing how to take care of his health and life, he did not spare his subjects either, easily sacrificing them for the sake of great plans.
When Peter I was reminded of the senseless cruelty towards the archers, whose guilt could hardly be proved by judicial procedure, he declared: , then he would not have owned the Russian state for a long time and would never have made it what it is now. I am not dealing with people, but with animals that I want to transform into people.
Ruler by dynastic right, Peter sincerely believed that he had been sent down to Russia by Divine Providence; considered himself the ultimate truth, a man incapable of error. Measuring Russia by his own yardstick, he felt that it was necessary to begin the transformation by breaking the old Testament customs. Therefore, upon his return from Europe, Peter I categorically forbade his courtiers to wear beards, ordered the nobles to drink coffee, and ordered the soldiers to smoke - in accordance with the Military Article. Not evil by nature, he was impulsive, impressionable and distrustful. Unable to patiently explain to others what was obvious to him, Peter, meeting misunderstanding, easily fell into a state of extreme anger and often “hammered” the truth to senators and generals with his huge fists or staff. True, the king was quick-witted and after a few minutes he could already laugh at the successful joke of the offender. However, at other times, anger, annoyance and eternal haste prevented Peter from properly understanding the matter. So, for example, he believed a false accusation made against one of his most faithful associates - Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev. As a result, he spent several years under investigation and lost his high position as manager of the state-owned industry in the Urals.
The sovereign-transformer spent most of his reign in travels, business trips and military campaigns. The king rarely stayed in the capitals - Moscow and St. Petersburg. By remark Russian historian CM. Solovyov, “this should have had its harmful side: the tsar is far away ... therefore, a wide field has opened up for the arbitrariness of government officials who have not learned the habit of restraint from ancient Russia ...” 2 . Peter I ruled "on arrivals"; carrying out transformations on an all-Russian scale and sometimes not being able to delve into the essence of particular problems, he entrusted them to those close to him and by no means always could control the activities of these people. This state of affairs opened the way for numerous official abuses, quite common in Peter's time.
These shortcomings of government were partly balanced by the remarkable talent of the tsar to select gifted assistants for himself, capable of carrying with him the burden of reforms and wars, moreover, educated enough to decide on their own the toughest questions domestic politics and diplomacy. By this, Peter I resembles another great sovereign of Russian history - Ivan III, who also managed to gather brilliant governors and advisers around the throne. Like Ivan III, Peter was able to overcome personal hostility in the name of the interests of the cause. He never had warm feelings for the commander Boris Sheremetev and the diplomat Peter Tolstoy, but nevertheless they were exalted by him for their abilities and merits, having served Russia in good stead.
Peter was indifferent to outfits and did not like official receptions, at which he had to wear an ermine mantle and symbols royal power. Assemblies were his element, where those present addressed each other easily, without titles and titles, drank vodka, scooping it out of clay mugs from bath tubs, smoked, played chess and danced. The tsar did not even have his own visiting carriages: if it was necessary to organize a solemn departure of the August couple, he borrowed a carriage from famous court dandies - Menshikov or Yaguzhinsky.
Until the end of his days, Peter had to educate himself; new political and military tasks forced him to constantly look for teachers outside of Russia.
Peter I had an outstanding diplomatic talent. He skillfully mastered all the classical techniques of European politics, which he easily “forgot” at the right moment, suddenly reincarnating as a mysterious eastern king. He could unexpectedly kiss a stunned interlocutor on the forehead, he liked to use folk jokes in his speech, confusing translators, or he would suddenly stop the audience, referring to the fact that his wife was waiting for him. Outwardly sincere and benevolent, the Russian Tsar, according to European diplomats, never revealed his true intentions and therefore invariably achieved what he wanted. Peter never exaggerated his military abilities. After Narva, he preferred to command only his Preobrazhensky regiment, and entrusted the army to professional generals. Knowing perfectly the basics of shipbuilding, the tsar did not take command of the entire squadron, entrusting this to Apraksin, Golitsyn and even Menshikov. He never showed fear in battle.
In Russian history, it is difficult to find a figure equal to Peter I in terms of the scale of interests and the ability to see the main thing in the problem being solved.
PETER'S REFORMS
Many transformations of Peter I are rooted in the 17th century. In the second half of this century, the system of state administration changes, becoming more centralized. Attempts are also being made to more clearly distinguish between the spheres of activity of various orders (central government bodies). Then the first rudiments of a regular army appear - the so-called regiments of a foreign system (“Regiments of a new system”). There are important changes in culture: there is a theater, the first institution of higher education. Russian people begin to come into closer contact with representatives of other cultures, especially after joining in the middle of the 17th century. to Russia, Ukraine and - temporarily - Belarus, which were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and deeply accepted the ideas and traditions of the Western European Renaissance. It was in the 17th century. the famous German Sloboda (a place of European settlement) flourishes in Moscow, which subsequently had such a strong impact on young Peter.
Participation in wars:
Azov campaigns. 1695-1696. Northern war with Sweden 1700-1721. Russo-Turkish War 1710-1713. Persian campaign 1722-1723.
Participation in battles:
Narva battle. Poltava battle. Battle of Gangut. Battle of Gregham. Prut campaign
(Peter the Great) Russian Tsar (from 1682), Emperor (from 1721)
Tsar Peter is one of the most prominent personalities in Russian history. During his reign, changes took place in almost all areas of the life of the Russian state. He himself was a tireless worker and saw the meaning of life in strengthening the state. He did not put human life in anything and was a cruel ruler. But this allowed him to create a powerful empire and become an absolute monarch himself.
One of the first reforms he carried out were those related to the army and navy. After palace coup arranged by archers, Peter I settled with his mother in Preobrazhensky. Primary education he passed under the guidance of Nikita Zotov, who taught him the alphabet, holy scripture, arithmetic and history. Starting to visit the German Quarter, he got acquainted with geometry, fortification and a number of other sciences. At that time, he often said: "I am in the rank of those who teach and teach me." During his life, Tsar Peter mastered 14 specialties.
While in Preobrazhensky, Peter created two " amusing regiment”, which soon became the best Russian regiments of the new model - Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky. And the old boat he found in 1688 became the ancestor of the created Russian fleet. The first Russian ships began to be built on Lake Pleshcheyevo and near Arkhangelsk.
Around Peter began to form a circle of people who became his companions and friends. Among them were both foreigners - F. Ya. Lefort, and compatriots - A. D. Menshikov, F. M. Apraksin and others. Many of those with whom the young king shared his amusements later became famous generals.
In 1689, Peter becomes sovereign ruler. Concerned about the good of the state, he decides that it is necessary for Russia to have maritime borders.
In 1695, Peter began a war with Turkey, in order to provide Russia with access to the Black Sea. Military operations were supposed to be carried out on Azov. The first attempt to capture Azov ended unsuccessfully, but Peter ordered the construction of a galley fleet and in 1696 he won and achieved the fall of Azov.
These military campaigns convinced Peter even more of the need to reform the army, and after they ended, he carried out a number of military reforms regarding weapons, uniforms and the general structure of the army.
In 1697, Peter I sent the Great Embassy to Europe, consisting of 250 people, headed by the "land admiral" Lefort and General Golovin. With this embassy he goes himself as an unofficial person. In Brandenburg, he studies artillery and receives a diploma as a "gunsmith". In Amsterdam, he personally works at the shipyards, comprehending all the subtleties of building ships. In England, he gets acquainted with the arrangement of factories, workshops, arsenals, studying and adopting the latest technical achievements. Except personal experience, he leaves young Russian nobles and "children of the boyars" to study in Europe, in order to then have his own specialists in Russia in various fields. During the visit of the Grand Embassy of European countries, more than 900 specialists, including the military, were hired to serve in Russia. In addition, one of the main tasks of the embassy was the search for Russia's military allies.
Returning to Russia and preparing for the war with Sweden, in 1699 he announced the recruitment of "free people" as soldiers into the army and the collection of "private people".
After concluding a peace treaty with Turkey, as well as signing agreements with Denmark and Saxony on an alliance against Sweden, on August 19, 1700, Peter officially declared war on Sweden. This was the beginning of the Northern War of 1700-1721. Three days later, together with the army, he set out from Moscow to Narva. Russian troops were defeated near Narva, but the first failures did not stop Peter. With even greater enthusiasm, he takes on the reform of the army and the construction of the navy. His tireless energy contributed to the creation of a regular Russian army, which soon began to smash the Swedes. In 1702, Russian troops took the city of Oreshek, renamed Shlisselburg. The following year, the city of Nyenschanze was taken, which became Schlotburg. Then the Russian troops won a victory near Yam (Kingesepp), Koporye and Marienburg (Aluksne). In 1708 - victory over the Swedes at Lesnaya; 1709— Poltava battle and the complete defeat of the army Charles XII; 1714 - sea battle of Gangut and the victory of the new Russian fleet. In 1720, the Swedish fleet was again defeated in battle of gregham. This war lasted 21 years and ended with the signing of peace in the city of Nystadt. Under the terms of the peace, Russia received part of the territory of Finland and Karelia, and most importantly, access to the Baltic Sea.
In all major battles, Peter I personally took part as commander-in-chief, and if circumstances so required, he led the regiments into the attack. So, for example, during Poltava battle at the critical moment of the battle, he himself stood at the head of the Novgorod battalion infantry regiment and led him into battle. During this attack, one of the bullets hit the king in the chest, but did not even wound him, as it hit the pectoral cross.
During the Northern War in 1711, Peter I undertook Prut campaign against Turkey. This campaign was unsuccessful, but Russian diplomats managed to make peace with Turkey, and hostilities again moved to the Baltic.
After graduation Northern war Continuing the imperial policy, Peter I organized and successfully carried out in 1722-1723 Persian campaign, which resulted in the conquest of the coast of the Caspian Sea.
Having created a regular army and navy, having won wars, Russia became one of the most powerful countries in Europe, and Peter I himself received the title of emperor.
Biography
Re: 1672
7
date: 30.01.2020 / 21:40:22
Well, it’s the Romanovs who came up with him
"The historian Alexander Alekseev believed that the bloodthirsty image of Ivan 4 was created by the Romanovs in order to discredit the Rurik dynasty. In fact, Ivan 4 used life imprisonment as a capital punishment, and for minor violations of the block. There is a description of how Mikhail Romanov after class throne hired foreign historians who, using information about the period of Ivan 4, made up his bloodthirsty image, largely focusing on the image of Vlad Tepes from Romania.
A similar technique was used by the Angles during the Norman invasion of Britain. There, the Normans were attributed such executions as the "bloody eagle" and winding the guts on a pole, which the Scandinavians themselves do not mention. "
6 date: 19.01.2020 / 14:01:37
Facts about World War II
1 Stalin himself wanted to attack Germany, otherwise he would not have made a common border with Germany, he would not have destroyed the map of Europe, he would not have concluded the Molotov-Ribentrop pact. The Bolsheviks need a world revolution. Until 1941, Stalin attacked Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, along with Germany, Romania, Mongolia - 7 countries. Prior to that, in 20 years to Poland. After the war, for some reason, the liberators did not leave, but remained throughout Eastern Europe. One invader took the place of another. Under the USSR were Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Moldova, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany - 10 countries. For comparison: Germany fought with 16 countries - Poland, Norway, Sweden, France, Holland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark, USA, England, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, the USSR - 16. Under the USSR there were executions. local dissenters everywhere.
2 Stalin helped Germany even before the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact. He trained German pilots and so on.
3 The radicalism of the Germans would not have been so high in relation to the USSR if the communists from the USSR had not climbed everywhere with their crazy ideas. The whole world saw what the Holodomor and the Gulag are. The communists organized the Bavarian Socialist Republic in Germany in the 1920s. They shot local residents and destroyed cultural monuments.
4 The leadership of the Red Army dreamed of getting rid of Stalin during the entire period of the war. Zhukov went to negotiate with the Germans in the fall of 1941. The same reason the war lasted so long. The generals did not want to fight for Stalin, and his orders were simply sabotaged. Therefore, documents under Putin are closed, and maybe destroyed.
4 More Russians fought in the ROA than in the Red Army, because people remembered the actions of the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and 30s, such as repressions and the famine. Losses in the ROA were 5 times less than in the Red Army.
5 Hitler never wanted to flood Moscow. Stalin wanted to do this and indeed flooded the Moscow region in the autumn of 1941, which did not allow the Germans to leave for Moscow. But it killed about 50,000 people.
6 Hitler did not consider the Slavs less developed than the Germans. The OST plan, the Untermensch book, the photographs of the Holocaust are Soviet forgeries. The West then did not argue with the understanding of the USSR, because it did not want its further advancement. The National Socialists are the enemies of the International Socialists because they don't want to feed Africa, but only their own people. The National Socialists will always have support, because there are no fools. Therefore, the very word national socialism in the USSR was replaced by obscure fascism.
7 Stalin is to blame for the deaths of the inhabitants of Leningrad from the blockade and Stalingrad, since he forbade the civilian population to leave these cities. There was no blockade of Leningrad, since the Germans left a passage for people, and from Leningrad there was a flow of supplies for the Red Army. There was a typical conspiracy between the leadership of Army Group North and the leadership of Leningrad. There was food in the warehouses of Leningrad, Leningrad could be provided with food. Communists always blame others for their sins, as in the case of the Moscow flood.
8 All stories of heroism in the USSR are fictional. For example, such as Kosmodemyanskaya. The NKVD threw people under the threat of reprisals against the family and put it into a state of drug intoxication, as they had previously knocked out testimonies from people. It was not a voluntary move. 99% of people will do what they demand if they see a weapon at their temple - life is not a movie that scoops do not understand. This is the same technology as the Islamists forcibly make people martyrs. The same story with the so-called Panfilovites. There were many heroes, but Soviet propaganda needs those who, like cannon fodder, allegedly sacrifice themselves, and do not harm the enemy, remaining alive. After all, then you need to adopt Western methods of warfare, treat people not as slaves. Nobody wanted to fight for the USSR.
9 20 years after the war, May 9 was not celebrated at all as a holiday.
5 date: 09.10.2018 / 01:33:00
History of democracy in Russia
Ivan 4 the Wise (according to a number of versions, the Wise)
He signed the so-called "Free Truth", an analogue of the English Magna Carta, which protected the rights of the free population. Moreover, she actively introduced mechanisms for getting out of dependence, as a result of which, according to a number of estimates, the proportion of serfs decreased from 50% at the beginning of his reign to 15% at the end of his reign.
Ivan 4 the Wise also limited his power, transferring some of the powers to the Zemsky Sobors, which were convened regularly, and not as the part of the Romanovs later distorted this periodically. All estates sat in them, and not just the nobles.
Ivan 4 the Wise did not lead a single unjust war. The same Livonian war was preceded by lengthy negotiations during which he tried to convince the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to give Russia access to the Baltic. Up to 70% of Russia's exports went through this corridor.
Oprichnina was created to control the private armies of nobles who did not want to comply with the new laws. Locally, they were controlled by elected bodies of power, which in turn were elected by the peasants.
The image of Ivan the 4th the Wise, as a national liberal would be called today, was later demonized beyond recognition by a number of the Rimanovs.
Romanovs
The Romanovs should be divided into those who contributed to the prosperity of the common man, and those who did not.
Adequate Romanovs are Peter 1, Peter 3, Pavel 1, Alexander 2. Inadequate are mainly Catherine 2, Alexander 1 and Nicholas 1.
Peter 1 was not a despot, but continued the democratic traditions of Ivan 4 the Wise. Later, he was specially demonized by Anna Ivanovna and Catherine 2. Paul 1 abolished serfdom altogether, for which he was killed. In fact, his decree was hushed up. An attempt with great preparations was successful only for Alexander 2, who, as you know, was blown up. Who? Hired by the great-power-slave-owning nobles, ostensibly revolutionaries.
But Catherine, Alex 1 and Nicholas 1 only exacerbated the pressure on their own people. Then, for the first time, the term “self-colony” was born, where the Russians do not receive anything as the people of the metropolis, but bear greater costs than the colonies themselves.
It is not surprising that to this day history is not taught in schools in this vein. It does not answer the question of what is profitable at one time or another. common man, but tells us about the need to lay down one's life for the Empire. Because the revolution and civil wars Stepan Razin, who was not actually executed and he achieved his goals, and Pugachev, who was executed and, alas, he did not achieve the goals of the people, are called uprisings, riots, etc. The adequate Romanovs hated the inadequate with fierce hatred, as can be seen from their records.
4 date: 02.01.2018 / 01:06:41
An excerpt from an interview with Georgy Zhukov given to Roman Grigoriev in 1971
Fragment taken in the USA
Georgy Konstantinovich, after the lapse of years, what were the most unpleasant moments for you during the War?
Now I do not want to consider all this point by point again. As for the commander, the most unpleasant moment is Moscow. And so the entire initial period, and even wider all the moments. I will say that, for example, in the Mozhaisk direction near Moscow, there were no forces at all that could stop the Germans. This is a strategic miscalculation! If ever without fanfare approach this, in terms of military science analyze, then everything will become clear. And we have heroism, yes heroism. But this cannot explain the victories or failures of the warring parties. We have many heroes, although it would be better if they were not! It is better when the army is so ready that no heroes are needed. So that such difficult situations do not arise. What Soviet society they give out for heroes, so this is far from the truth.
It's clear. Question about losses. Could they be smaller?
You know, now many say that here I am, other generals are to blame for the heavy losses. I will say that it is tactless. Do you understand that all this depended on Stalin? All operations, be it the liberation of Kyiv, or the capture of Berlin, all final plans depended on Stalin. And if I would have acted differently, then it would be an accusation of softness. Well, I would have objected, and what would have happened? It is known why Stalin had such fundamental questions and how quickly they ended. This is a system. Another would have come to my place and it would have been the same. I tried my best to save lives. I regret the dead and should naturally ask every mother and their children for forgiveness.
They say that one of the reasons for the failure in 1941 was the so-called "army purges". Did they weaken the army?
I have a negative attitude towards these “purges”. This army weakened. As I said, Stalin did not consider himself guilty for the failure in 1941. No. He bled the country in the 30s, so they got the 41st year. But all the victories of Steel attributed to himself. For good, in 1945 it was necessary to turn the army against the party and arrest Stalin.
Georgy Konstantinovich, you mentioned that the Germans themselves proposed this in 1941. Is it really so?
In 1941, many considered the possibility of peace with Germany, especially in October. Especially, remembering the 30s. And such proposals were received from the German leadership. I, like many others, considered various possibilities.
What were these proposals?
With us Stalin's arrest, then they went back. If we remove the political regime, then the Germans leave the territory of the USSR.
Now do you think that it could pass? Would they leave?
Yes, that could be a good option. Especially in light of what we are seeing right now. The Germans had already experienced problems with holding territories at that time. We haven't gotten anything good in twenty years of these experiments. What did the Russian people get? Within the framework of the USSR, other peoples have their own republics. Ukrainians have it, Belarusians have it, Armenians have it. And when will the Russian people feel good about themselves? Under the tsars, there was serfdom, that is, the Russian people did not live well. And the same thing happened under Stalin.
That is, do you agree with the justifications of the Germans in some way?
I talked after the victory with the Germans. These are not stupid people and not everyone there was crazy, as they show us. I can tell you that they had sound ideas. But Hitler spoiled everything with his fanaticism. If they did not climb everywhere, they would live well. They could not cope with the conquered territories. They had such a Straser, whom Hitler killed, was Rem. They offered good solutions. And the Russians must constantly ensure someone's future, then clean Europe of the Germans, now we are helping someone. The common man gets nothing out of this. My native Maloyaroslavets, as he lived badly, lives on. On the other hand, the German generals are wrong when they say that they defended themselves.
What do you have in mind?
Stalin could have attacked Germany himself.
But this is from the theory of probability!
There are facts. There are documents. There was Finland, and Poland, and the Baltic states. And then did we leave those fears that we freed from fascism? No.
Georgy Konstantinovich, many accuse you of suppressing the uprising in Hungary. Your reward again.
I don't have a star for that. It's all nonsense. And Konev led everything. I think that it was necessary to negotiate with these people.
How are you now?
Constantly under surveillance. I go for a walk, someone is watching you. You go to the toilet too. Even under Stalin, this was not the case for me! I have not asked for anything since 1957. True, Nikita Sergeevich also got it, but he did the same with me.
What about your interviews? Were they heavily censored?
Well, how! Lacquered so that you are amazed. German generals write more truthfully, although they, of course, have their own vision. And allies mean nothing. But we received 300,000 vehicles from the Americans alone.
Georgy Konstantinovich, but what can be done about it. All the same, you are a marshal of the Soviet Union!
You can't do anything here. I'm out. Two bulls come up to you and say, Georgy Konstantinovich, let's not be so-and-so. And then a lot of things can happen to Masha, but we cannot prevent everything and always. Galina somehow went to the store, she was sprayed with something chemical. Then a man comes to me again and says, you understand that we cannot contain all the hooligans ...
It's clear. Let me ask a question that may not seem entirely appropriate to you, perhaps as a continuation of the previous one. What do you say about the fact that some accuse you of not quite legal enrichment in 1945?
They are spreading these rumors. All these are the same. I wrote a letter of apology, which I was then forced to write! I have a family, relatives. And they do not know the limit in their methods. My assistant Syomochkin was beaten half to death, Rybalchenko was shot. You know that in the cinema everyone is holding on, but life is different. Here Abakumov denied that he was the initiator ...
Peter's foreign policy, as noted in the "History of the Russian Army", except for the rejection of Turkish proposals in the Prut campaign, is impeccable. The advantage of Russia is the only criterion that guided the first Russian emperor in his relations with foreign powers.
Peter shows himself throughout the war as a loyal ally. He does not like to bind himself in advance with promises and agreements, but once he has given his word, he keeps it holy.
The allies were rescued by the Russians more than once during various periods of the war, however, as soon as the tsar saw that they did not reciprocate at all and really only wanted to exploit Russia, he immediately broke off all relations with them and subsequently waged war completely separately.
The genius of Peter was fully reflected in military affairs, in the organization of the armed forces and in their leadership. A brilliant organizer and a major commander, according to Kersnovsky, Peter was far ahead of his era in all respects.
In the reorganization of the army, Peter gave the main place to the element of quality, which he achieved by the greatest involvement in the guards of the estate that best preserved military traditions and was destined for military service from ancient times.
This applies to the Petrine decree, which introduces compulsory, personal and lifelong service for the nobles. Having established personal military service for the nobility, Peter I gave the recruitment service of other classes a communal character. Each community, rural or petty-bourgeois, was obliged to appoint one recruit from a certain number of yards, deciding by their sentence who to go to the service.
The recruit had to be between 20 and 35 years old, nothing else was required of him: military receivers had to accept "whom the payers would announce and put in return."
The community collected money for the recruit, usually 50-200 rubles, which at that time was a large amount, five times more than the bonuses of Western European mercenaries.
The service delivered from slavery, and under Peter there were many hunters to serve from fugitive serfs. Under Queen Elizabeth, the fugitives were no longer accepted, and those who appeared were flogged and sent back to the landowners, which, according to the author of the History of the Russian Army, was a huge psychological mistake.
So, Peter retained the basic principle of the structure of the Russian armed force - the compulsory nature of compulsory military service, which sharply differed at all times from the mercenary-recruitment system of Western countries. Moreover, this principle was even more clearly shaded by Peter: the service was declared lifelong and permanent (whereas in Moscow Russia it was only temporary).
The recruitment system was definitely territorial in nature. In 1711, the regiments were assigned to the provinces and maintained at the expense of these provinces. Each regiment had its own recruiting district - a province that gave the regiment its name. The Pskovites served in the Pskov regiment, and the soldiers' children of the Butyrskaya Sloboda served in the Butyrsky regiment. In Ingermanlapdsky - residents of the northern Novgorod possessions.
Peter appreciated the importance of the sense of fellowship developed in the Russian people. Unfortunately, after the death of Peter, due attention was not paid to the preservation of the territorial system. The regiments constantly changed their quarters and their recruitment districts, going from one end of Russia to the other.
By the middle of the 18th century, this system had completely died out, and as a result, Russia was the only country that had early XVIII century territorial system, in the XX century was the only country that did not have this system.
The advantages of Peter I, as the organizer of the Russian armed forces, Anton Kersnovsky refers to the fact that the ground forces in the Peter's army were divided into the active army and local troops - garrison troops, land militia and Cossacks.
Landmilitsia was formed from the remnants of the former military estates (gunners, soldiers, reiters) in 1709 and settled in Ukraine to protect the southern borders. After the rebellion of Bulavin, Peter did not particularly trust the Cossacks, but, understanding great importance Cossacks in the life of the state, settled the Cossacks on the outskirts.
Buchholz's unsuccessful campaign Central Asia resulted in the establishment of the Siberian Cossack army, and the result Persian campaign was the resettlement of the Don Cossacks to the Terek, where the Terek army was subsequently formed.
General Leer claimed that Peter was "a great commander who knew how to do everything, could do everything and wanted to do everything." Peter's military talent was only one of the sides of his multifaceted genius.
Anton Kersnovsky does not question the presence of Peter's mind on a national scale. The tsar, in his opinion, combined in himself a politician, a strategist and a tactician - a great politician, a great strategist, a great tactician. This combination, rare in history, was found after him only by two great commanders - Frederick II and Napoleon.
Charles XII was in this respect the exact opposite of Peter. Karl was a brilliant tactician, a leader who dragged his subordinates with him, but he was neither a strategist nor a politician. The Swedish king waged war only out of love for war, and this "physical" love for war, due to the complete lack of a statesman's mind, eventually led his army to death, and his country to decline.
In 1706, Karl had every opportunity to end the war with an honorable peace for Sweden, but did not want to use it, and eight years later, after Poltava, when the situation in Sweden became desperate, its unbridled
stubbornness set against himself a new enemy - Prussia.
Analyzing the policy of the Swedish king, A. Kersnovsky finds that he lacks a strategic eye.
For four consecutive years, the Swedish king wandered in Poland, driving Augustus II from place to place (and giving a valuable rest to the Russian army, which in the meantime was learning to fight at the expense of the ill-fated Schlippenbach), instead of immediately disarming his enemy with a blow to Saxony.
The young king had no organizational skills, the concept of an organized base was absent. He did not know how to keep the conquered territory for himself, and therefore all his victories turned out to be fruitless.
As soon as he leaves any locality in Poland, the enemy immediately occupies it, or rather, it again plunges into anarchy, the elements of which immediately begin outside the Swedish camp.
Having received from his father a small but wonderfully organized and trained army of veterans, Charles XII brilliantly uses it, but does not spare it at all.
In the winter of 1707-1708. with a poorly dressed and poorly supplied army, Karl rushes into the dense Lithuanian forests and starts a completely senseless guerrilla war with the population, solely to satisfy their thirst for adventure and absolutely not sparing the army.
At the beginning of the war, Karl was 19 years old, he was an ardent young man, stubborn and unrestrained, possessing extraordinary abilities and not accepting advice from anyone. The role model for the young Swedish king was Alexander the Great.
However, Voltaire noted that Charles "was not Alexander, but was worthy to be the first soldier of Alexander."
If Charles wages war "for the sake of war", then with Peter the conduct of war is entirely subordinated to his policy. He does nothing for nothing, always guided only by the interests of "the state entrusted to Peter."
Charles XII received his army ready-made from his father, Peter I created his own. Knowing how to demand from the troops, when necessary, superhuman efforts (up to the transfer of ships on his hands for hundreds of miles), Peter never wastes their strength in vain. The aspirations of the commander, in his own words, should be directed towards winning a victory "with little bloodshed."
As a talented tactician, Peter is far ahead of his time. He starts horse artillery 100 years before Napoleon and half a century before Frederick. In all his instructions to the troops, the idea of mutual assistance and support of units - “seconding the one to the other” - and the coordination of the actions of various types of weapons are a red thread.
During the first period of the war, Peter acted with the utmost discretion. The quality of the Swedish army was still too high, and Peter understood the main reason for the tactical superiority of the Swedes over the Russians - their "closeness". Peter, not without success, opposes the Swedes with his field fortification, which ensured the success of the Poltava battle.
Anton Kersnovsky also draws attention to the device of Peter's cavalry. Under Peter, all of it was exclusively of the dragoon type and superbly trained both on horseback and on foot. Dragoons were the favorite branch of Peter's troops. In general, the element of active defense prevailed in Peter's tactics, which corresponded to the circumstances of that era. A purely offensive principle was introduced into Russian tactics only in Seven Years' War Rumyantsev.