Japanese admirals of World War II. Admiral Yamamoto and Palmistry in the Imperial Japanese Navy
The future naval commander was born on April 4, 1884 in Nagaoka, Niigata Prefecture. He was the sixth child in the family of the impoverished samurai Takano, but later took the name of his adoptive father. In 1904, Isoroku graduated from the Naval Academy. In the Battle of Tsushima, he received several wounds. The loss of two fingers on his hand almost ended in dismissal from the service. After the war, the sailor served on various ships. In 1915, he came up with the idea of creating a fleet of floating airfields. A year later, he graduated from the Naval Staff College, studied at Harvard University in 1919-1921, then served again in Japan, visited several European ships as an observer. In 1924, the sailor became the commander of the air corps in Kasumigaura, in 1925-1929 he was a military attache in Washington, and upon his return he commanded the Akagi aircraft carrier and received the rank of rear admiral. Since then, Yamamoto has been almost exclusively involved in naval aviation. In 1936-1939 he was Deputy Minister of the Navy, from 1939 he commanded the United Fleet. Sailor advocated expansion into Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Thanks to innovation and the ability to extract significant funds from the government, by the end of the 30s, the admiral created one of the most modern fleets in a world whose core was aircraft carriers.
The military and political leaders of Japan decided by 1939 that it was necessary to defeat the US Navy in order to force the Americans to stop expansion in the Pacific. Yamamoto, who had a good idea of the possibilities of the United States, feared the defeat of the small island nation. In the summer of 1941, during a discussion with senior naval officials about the possible course of the war with the United States, Yamamoto, knowing the difficulty of increasing the number of combat aircraft and fast training experienced airmen, warned Prime Minister Konoe cautiously, “If you say that we must fight, in the first six months of the war against the United States and England, I foresee an unbroken chain of victories. But I must say that if the war drags on for two or three years, then I am not sure of our final victory.
Despite the pessimistic assessments of experienced officers, the Japanese government nevertheless decided to enter the war. The admiral prepared an operation to destroy the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. The decisive role was played by aircraft carriers, for the development of which the admiral had advocated for the past 18 years. Confident in the success of the attack, Yamamoto feared that this success would only spur the enemy to fight for dominance in the Pacific.
On November 26, 1941, Yamamoto headed the combined fleet along the northern route to Hawaii. On December 2, when the failure of diplomatic negotiations with the United States finally became clear, he informed Admiral Nagumo that the start of the war was scheduled for December 8. The attack on Pearl Harbor was supposed to take place after the official declaration of war, but diplomats transmitted the text of the ultimatum belatedly. On the morning of December 8, Japanese aircraft carriers attacked and destroyed 4 battleships and most of the aircraft at the airfields; 4 more battleships were damaged. It was not possible to sink only aircraft carriers, which were not in the base.
To a large extent, success was achieved due to the preliminary training of sailors and pilots, as well as the insistence of Yamamoto himself. In 1939-1940, Japanese horizontal bombers performed so poorly against moving targets that the idea arose in the Navy that it was more profitable to use dive bombers and torpedo bombers against ships. However, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, then Vice Admiral Yamamoto, foresaw that it was not always necessary to bomb moving targets. Apparently, already then the naval commander understood that Japan could successfully start a war only by an unexpected attack on an enemy base, as was the case in 1904 with Port Arthur, and he was preparing naval aviation for this.
Simultaneously with the beginning of the Hawaiian operation, Yamamoto ordered the search and destruction of the British fleet in Singapore or at sea. Despite great resistance, the task was completed. Initially, light aircraft carriers Ryudze, Zuiho and Kasuga-maru were prepared to attack American airfields, but they could only lift 75 aircraft, and the pilots did not have sufficient training. However, thanks to training, the pilots of the Japanese Zero fighters managed to achieve such a range that the Japanese were able to attack enemy air bases from their airfields on the island of Formosa. On the afternoon of December 8, Japanese base aircraft succeeded in destroying most of the American aircraft in the Philippines; in the following days, sorties by Japanese pilots brought new victories - by December 13, the Americans lost their air military forces on the islands. On December 10, 1941, Japanese shore-based aircraft, transferred by order of Yamamoto from Formosa to Indochina to fight the British fleet, sank the battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse; this made it possible to secure a military convoy heading for a landing in Malaya.
An unsuccessful attempt to take Wake without air support, which was defended by only 4 Wilcat fighters, forced Yamamoto to send 2 aircraft carriers from the Nagumo formation, returning from a raid on Pearl Harbor, to the island. Only with their help, albeit belatedly, was it possible to take possession of the island.
Yamamoto sent south in January Pacific Ocean the main forces of the Nagumo carrier formation. Taking advantage of the weakening of the enemy, in the East Indies in January - March 1942 and in Indian Ocean in April, the Japanese fleet made considerable progress. In fact, the Allied naval forces were destroyed, which allowed the Japanese to freely develop landing operations. The main role was played by naval and basic aviation.
Best of the day
During the operation to invade the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, for the first time, a Japanese aircraft carrier formation met with an American one. In the Coral Sea, 3 Japanese aircraft carriers were opposed by 2 American ones. In the battles of May 7-8, the Japanese managed to sink the Lexington and damage the Yorktown, having lost only one light aircraft carrier, the Seho. They considered the battle in the Coral Sea their victory, but the landing on New Guinea in Port Moresby had to be abandoned. The losses of experienced pilots turned out to be so great that it turned out to be necessary to train the reserve. After the battle, Yamamoto expressed his disappointment that the Japanese admirals left the battlefield without finishing off the enemy. He was right, for Yorktown played a big role at Midway.
At a meeting held in early May aboard the battleship Yamato, the losses of the fleets of Japan and the enemy were compared. Huge successes have been achieved at the cost of small sacrifices. This result was in line with the spirit of confidence in victory that was nurtured in the Japanese Navy. The Japanese were confident in their power. They expected that after the first victories they would be able to take the onslaught of an industrially more developed enemy on the distant approaches to Japan. Sober minds, understanding the industrial superiority of the United States, expected that the government would turn to the enemy with a proposal for negotiations. However, after a streak of continuous success, it was decided to continue fighting. To maintain a favorable position, one had to strike and win victories.
A raid on the Japanese Islands, which on April 18, 1942, was made by 16 American bombers from the Hornet aircraft carrier, Yamamoto hastened. The Japanese believed that the planes took off from Midway Atoll. By this time, the fleet had already developed an operation against Midway, and Yamamoto achieved it. The capture of Midway and the Aleutian Islands pushed the line of patrol of the Japanese fleet far to the east and did not allow the Americans to launch strikes against Japan from the islands. Yamamoto hoped that the operation would attract all the remaining forces of the American fleet and be able to destroy it in battle, for which the admiral gathered 350 ships with a crew of 100,000 people and 1,000 aircraft. The Japanese fleet also had an advantage due to the excellent training and combat experience of sailors and pilots.
In June 1942, Yamamoto led the attack on Midway Island, while sending a formation to occupy the Aleutian Islands. However, when Yamamoto's fleet approached Midway on June 4, an American carrier formation was already waiting for it. The Americans, having revealed the Japanese code, knew about the actions of the enemy, while the Japanese commander had incorrect information about the losses of enemy aircraft carriers. While the Japanese were attacking the island, enemy aircraft attacked the Japanese aircraft carriers at the moment when they were refueling the aircraft, and destroyed all 4 aircraft carriers of the strike force. The Americans lost one Yorktown.
After the defeat, the Japanese command was forced to abandon the offensive and go over to the defense of the perimeter that ran from the Aleutian to the Marshall Islands, through Rabaul to the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and Burma. For this, on June 14, 1942, the fleet was reorganized. In addition to the 1st fleet, which included battleships, all fleets from the 2nd to the 5th included aircraft carriers. The construction of battleships was stopped. The fleet ordered 15 aircraft carriers of the Hiryu type and 5 of the Taiho type, however, due to lack of resources and in connection with the bombing of Japanese shipyards, only 4 aircraft carriers of the first type were commissioned.
Meanwhile, the Americans themselves went on the offensive and landed troops on the island of Guadalcanal in the southern part of the Solomon Islands. This landing resulted in prolonged air battles over the islands. As a result, Japanese aviation suffered irreparable losses. After three attempts to expel the Americans, the Japanese evacuated the troops in February 1943.
The operations developed and prepared by Yamamoto turned out to be difficult due to the fact that the Naval General Headquarters in Tokyo and the headquarters of the Combined Fleet paid little attention to the construction of air bases and their support, as a result of which coastal aviation was forced to operate at the limit of range, and fleet aircraft fell under too much load. Immediately after many victories, the Japanese command ceded the battlefield to the Americans. Those paid special attention to the creation of a chain of air bases from which they successfully operated against the enemy. At a critical moment, all the available forces of the fleet, anchored at Truk and Rabaul and superior to the American ones, were not used. This allowed the enemy to come to his senses and launch a counterattack.
Yamamoto was convinced of the inevitable defeat of Japan. After the loss of Guadalcanal, it was only possible to repel the onslaught of the enemy, and Yamamoto, having discovered gaps in the island defensive perimeter, tried to hold back the enemy while his defense was strengthened. In April 1943, he personally led "Operation I-GO", which included a series of air attacks as part of a strategic air offensive against Guadalcanal and southeastern New Guinea.
Yamamoto had 190 basic aircraft and 160 carrier aircraft at his disposal, fewer than during the raid on Pearl Harbor. It was the aviation of the fleet of the first line. However, even among the best pilots there were many who not only had no combat experience, but who piloted the aircraft uncertainly. Many lieutenants had no more than 30 days of flying and got into accidents. Yamamoto hoped that his personal presence in Rabaul would force the instructors to train the youth in such a way that they would have a chance to survive after meeting with the enemy.
Since April 7, Japanese aviation has made 4 powerful raids on Port Moresby, Oro and Milne bays, achieved the destruction of enemy aircraft and ground structures. However, the pilots overestimated the effectiveness of the attacks. The admiral, convinced of a significant weakening of the enemy's air power, sent aircraft from aircraft carriers to Truk and ordered that they be limited to conventional base air raids.
Yamamoto enjoyed the respect and devotion of his subordinates. Neither the defeat at Midway nor the loss of Guadalcanal shook his confidence. The sailors knew that the admiral took responsibility for himself, not dumping the burden of defeat on his subordinates. A warrior to the marrow of his bones, he walked in a white uniform even in the tropical heat. This made an impression on the officers and sailors, who considered the commander in chief the personification of the fleet. Yamamoto talked to the officers of the various air corps, raising morale. He urged that the prospects for war should not be discouraged and that in the upcoming battles, victory and defeat would depend on the participants. air combat. The interlocutors fell under the spell of the admiral's sincerity.
The operation was the last for Yamamoto. The bomber, on which he flew under an escort of 12 fighters, was shot down on April 18, 1943 during a specially prepared operation by American aircraft near the island of Bougainville. On the day of his death, the Japanese government promoted the sailor to admiral of the fleet. Admiral Koga, who replaced the deceased, said "Yamamoto was alone, and no one can replace him."
The body of the naval commander was cremated in the headquarters building in Buin; a small stone was placed nearby.
Thanks to Admiral Yamamoto, the importance of aircraft carriers was fully revealed. After the war, all the great maritime powers tried to build aircraft carriers. In terms of ability and personal qualities, the creator of the aircraft carrier fleet became the most prominent Japanese naval commander after Togo.
An interesting excerpt from the biography of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (author Hiroyuki Agawa), about
the admiral's attitude to non-traditional methods for determining the abilities of naval pilots
aviation...
Brief background: in the mid-1930s, Japanese naval aviation was pursued by
high accident problem. It was believed that at least part of the problem was caused by
an inadequate system for selecting candidates for naval pilots. And then one day the head of the education department
Department of Aeronautics under Yamamoto, Captain 1st Rank Onishi Takijiro (later -
"father" of the kamikaze squadrons) called Kuwabara, the deputy commander of the Kasumigaura air corps,
giving him unusual information...
"...Various investigations into the causes of accidents were carried out; one of the delicate problems is
how to evaluate potential crew members. Before admission, cadets and cadets of the reserve carefully
sifted through tests of learning ability and physical state; after
that strictly checked their compliance with the tasks to be solved; even though many
after the first six months or so were found to be inadequate. It wouldn't matter much
if their expulsion from courses did not entail an unnecessary waste of money and disgrace for those who were expelled. But on
practice, even before their suspension, many accidents occurred due to their fault. One or two
times precious lives were lost, and the destruction of expensive aircraft equipment imposed
further burden on the already limited budget.
Experts from the Department of Psychology of the Tokyo Imperial
university. Those selected for this purpose were at first found in perfect order, but later on they often failed.
lived up to expectations. It seemed experimental psychology does little to help determine
necessary abilities, and the main problem of aviation was still the identification of appropriate
pilot candidates. Head of Education, Department of Aeronautics under Yamamoto, Captain of the 1st
rank of Onishi Takijiro (devoted supporter of Yamamoto; by the end of the war gained fame as "father"
suicide squadrons - kamikaze; an ardent apologist for war to the last soldier) once called
Kuwabara, Deputy Commander of the Kasumigaura Air Corps. Here is the gist of what he said:
- At the school of my father-in-law, the director high school Juntendo, among the graduates there are very
an unusual young man named Mizuno. He studied history at the university, and his thesis
the work dealt with ancient methods of divination. As a child, he was fond of palmistry and
physiognomy. Having once read in the newspapers that naval aviation had recently lost many aircraft,
he said it was because the navy used the wrong methods to select pilots. "Prone to
fantasies, I thought. But I personally met him, and he told me: to find out if a person is fit
into pilots, you can by the palm of your hand or by the face, and it is wrong to recruit pilots in batches.
Personally, I do not believe that pilots are recruited in batches in the fleet, but nevertheless I asked if
he himself determine the conformity of this or that. "Oh yeah!" he answered with absolute certainty.
I will send him to you in Kasumigaura with a letter of introduction - why don't you listen to this
person, if only for the sake of a joke, and not give him the opportunity to read the pattern of papillary lines on
the palms of your people.
Kuwabara, ready to grasp at any straw, agreed to meet the young man,
and on the appointed day, Mizuno Yoshito introduced himself in the corps, having with him a recommendation
Onesi's letter. It was lunchtime, from the direction of the airfield the flow of people in flight suits did not dry out.
Kuwabara proposed to invite instructors after dinner - about one hundred and twenty people: let
Mizuno will try his methods on them, dividing them into three categories - their suitability for any
work or flying. He promised to have at hand a list of all instructors with marks about their
qualifications acquired over a long period of time.
Everyone has gathered; Mizuno stared at each one in turn for five or six seconds, and then
assigned a category - A, B or C. When Kuwabara and an assistant compared these ranks with marks,
put on the list, then, to their amazement, they found that the ranks and marks coincide in 86
percentage of cases. On that day, all the cadets were gathered and subjected to the same procedure; this time
compliance was 87 percent. Kuwabara and the others were stunned: this young man,
obviously not connected with the world of aviation, in five or six seconds he drew conclusions corresponding to more
than in 80 percent of the cases to the conclusions made by themselves months or even years after
the arrival of the cadet in the unit. We intended to have some fun, but it turned out that we had to accept everything
seriously.
Learning that Mizuno still hasn't found a job and is free to come and go as he pleases.
please, the base leaders left him in Kasumigaura for the night to talk
with officers. One officer named Nanamoto was worried about his upcoming marriage;
asked Mizuno to look at the palms of this officer.
- You apparently do not have a clear decision about marriage, right? Mizuno turned to him.
You need to end up with the first option.
The “first option”—the girl Nanamoto is engaged to—contradicted the other:
the family forced a bride on him for material gain.
Mizuno also announced that he thought war would break out within a year or so.
Kuwabara objected: even if the war starts, it will not be so soon; everything happened in the summer of 1936,
that is, a year before the "Chinese Incident" broke out. Then, when Mizuno's prediction
came true, Kuwabara asked what led him to that thought.
“As a child, when I first became interested in palmistry and physiognomy,” Mizuno replied, “I
I noticed that many walk the streets of Tokyo with the stamp of death on their faces. It's not normal, I thought.
me, - I did not notice this in Osaka. And then there was a great earthquake in Kanto, and I understood everything.
Just the same now: I can't take my eyes off the many women on the streets of Tokyo - you can see from their faces
that in a year or two they will become widows. So I came to the conclusion that this time not because of the natural
cataclysm they will lose their husbands.
A well-known fact: at the beginning of the "Chinese incident" the 101st division - the majority in it were
natives of Tokyo - suffered heavy losses in the battles near Shanghai.
As soon as Mizuno left, Kuwabara called Onishi.
“You know,” he began, “there is something hidden from view in him. Think about it, is it possible somehow
use his methods in the formation of crews; I would like him to go deeper into this
got busy. How to take him on the staff, say, as an adviser to the department of aeronautics,
to facilitate his access to parts of naval aviation?
Onishi apparently had no objections, since he himself took the initiative; Kuwabara directed
a report addressed to the command of the Kasumigaura air corps: as proved by cases of manifestation of congenital
common sense and acupuncture, ancient and clearly unscientific methods are not at all necessary to discard
from accounts; immediately cited the opinion of statisticians - a coincidence in 60 percent of cases
and more should be considered a sign of reliability.
Now Onisi had to introduce the report to others and convince them of the reasonableness of the accumulated
recommendations. Introduced him to the Bureau of Personnel and the Bureau of Maritime Affairs and tried to persuade
leadership to accept Mizuno for a job as an adviser, but was met with skeptical grins everywhere.
“Listen, don’t you really think that the navy ...” they whispered around, “I want to say —
physiognomy...
Kuwabara attributed his failure to the narrow "rationalism" of the respective individuals in the two maritime bureaus.
For the bureau of maritime affairs, all this looked like proof that aviation had finally lost
reason. When it became obvious that nothing was working, Kuwabara asked Onishi if he had spoken
he's with Yamamoto. No, I didn’t say: together we went to Yamamoto’s for an appointment. First, asking him not to
laugh, began to tell the story of Mizuno in detail and turned to Yamamoto for help in
device of this person as an adviser. Yamamoto smiled as he listened to them, and when they finished, he said:
- Clear. I'll talk to him myself, but let him come alone.
We agreed to bring Mizuno here; then on the phone, while Yamamoto, for his part, was talking
with various departments of the bureau of personnel and the bureau of maritime affairs and with the department of aeronautics,
gathered about twenty different faces in the office. When Mizuno arrived, the first thing he was asked
Yamamoto - what is, in his eyes, palmistry and physiognomy.
He replied - as Kuwabara had already explained in the Kasumigaura air corps - that these were applied
statistics. Popular folk beliefs, such as the Japanese belief that people with
with long, like a rabbit, ears attentive and soft in nature, or that a square chin
means so-and-so, are based, in fact, on empirical statistical observations. These
beliefs are not necessarily true in every case, but they are not fifty-fifty. Also
intuition lends precision to individual observations.
“Very well then,” Yamamoto nodded. “There are twenty people here. Can you tell who
Are any of them pilots?
Mizuno carefully peered into each person's face in turn. Finally pointed to one:
- It's you, isn't it? and then to another: “And you too. These two were named Hoshi Kazuo and Miwa Yoshitake,
both of the best fighter pilots that naval aviation could boast of at that time.
Hoshi and Miwa smiled modestly under the surprised looks of the others.
- That's it, no more? Yamamoto hurried.
"That's all," Mizuno replied.
Here is another one of those present, Captain Second Rank Taguchi from the Naval General Staff,
said: "I'm a pilot too!"
Mizuno took his hand and studied it carefully.
— You may be a pilot, but not a very good one.
Everyone looked at each other again, then there was laughter. At Taguchi, a graduate of the Maritime College
general staff, naval pilot, excellent brains, but too slow reaction for a pilot.
He happened to damage the plane during landing; recently he was transferred to the naval general staff with
a warning: if it doesn't get all the attention, it will eventually shatter into smithereens.
Several more demonstrations of Mizuno's mysterious abilities followed. have been researched
the palms of Captain 1st Rank Kida Tatsuhiko.
Did you take someone's name for yourself? Mizuno asked.
Kida did not want to answer, but under pressure admitted with sad delight that he really
Foster-son.
Finally, Yamamoto considered that the time had come, and the assembly decided, without further ado, to adopt
Mizuno to work. Shortly thereafter, he was formally appointed advisor to the department
aeronautics. His duty in this capacity is to be present at all checks of cadets.
and reserve cadets in the Kasumigaura Air Corps and study their palms and faces.
The Navy began to use Mizuno's methods in combination with the usual written and physical checks;
the most promising of all candidates was considered the one who received good marks on these two
exams and "good" from Mizuno. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to assert (as in some places during
war) that the Naval Air Corps was ruled by prejudice.
As a result, Mizuno's employment has exceeded all limits. During the war he was assisted
two assistants and he had to travel so much around the air units that they began to prepare in advance
mimeographed fingerprints. In total, he is said to have analyzed
over 230 thousand people.
In 1941, in the presence of Kuwabara Torao, who had complete confidence in him, Mizuno predicted,
that the war will start this year.
- Well, how will it end? Kuwabara asked.
“At first everything will go well,” Mizuno replied, “but then I can’t say.
- Why?
- I don't like to look into the faces of people from the General Staff: I see them hurrying along the corridors
with documents. I'm worried about their future.
Four years later, in July 1945, Kuwabara - then vice admiral assigned to the Ministry
military supplies,” Mizuno asked how he thought the war would progress.
Everything will be over by the end of next month.
A puzzled Kuwabara asked why he thought that.
- Recently I visited several bases of kamikaze pilots and noticed that very few young
officers and civilians signs of death on their faces. I took it as a signal that the war was coming to
end.
Later in the war, Mizuno worked as an adviser to the Ministry of Justice in the Chofu hard labor prison,
studying the physiognomy of criminals; long before that he was expelled by order
superiors; he now works as a consultant for Komatsu Store in Ginza, Tokyo, giving
advice on the recruitment and placement of staff.
It seems that Mizuno noted the names of all those who fit the profession of an aviator, but are subject to
accidents, and kept the list in his safe. According to him, two-thirds of them
so they died.
It is impossible to say to what extent Mizuno's methods corresponded to pure applied statistics,
or included elements of parapsychology, or even contained elements of hypnosis or some kind of deception.
Yes, it is not so important for us. And what is interesting is the attitude towards Mizuno Yamamoto. From one
on the other hand, it testified that he cares about the condition of his subordinates; on the other hand, it reflected
a tendency to almost intuitively believe (or at least not ignore) what comes out
beyond the limits accepted in science and logic. "
Yamamoto Isoroku
(04/04/1884 - 04/18/1943) - Japanese admiral. Member of the Russian-Japanese (1904-1905) and World War II (1939-1945) wars
Isoroku Yamamoto was the commander of the combined Japanese fleet during the first phase of World War II. The skillful combination of sea and air combat, of which he was a master, allowed the Japanese to win a number of victories, and Yamamoto himself became famous as the best admiral in Japan.
Yamamoto was born in Nagaoka on April 4, 1884, the son of an impoverished samurai who became a simple school teacher. Isoroku's parents had the surname Takano, and later Isoroku took his adoptive father's surname. In 1904 Isoroku graduated naval academy and almost immediately after graduation, he took part in the famous battle of Tsushima, where the young Japanese navy almost completely destroyed the 2nd Russian Pacific squadron.
At the end of the First World War, Isoroku Yamamoto to study of English language was sent to the United States for three years at Harvard University. Then he again served in Japan and visited as an observer on some ships of European countries. Yamamoto was interested in everything, especially providing the fleet with fuel, since he understood that in a future war this issue would take a key place in planning operations. Yamamoto soon became an expert in naval aviation, a new type of naval formation that was to play a decisive role in naval battles in the Pacific.
In 1925, the government sent him back to the United States, this time as a naval attaché. During his two years in this position, Yamamoto carefully studied the state of the US Navy.
Returning to his homeland in 1929, he received the rank of rear admiral and took command of the Akagi aircraft carrier.
In 1930, Yamamoto took part in the London Naval Conference, at which Japan managed to achieve an equal rate with the United States and England in submarines and a fairly favorable ratio in destroyers and cruisers. But even this state of affairs seemed unfair to the Japanese.
Yamamoto quickly moved up the ranks. In September 1930 he was transferred to Main Headquarters naval aviation. In October 1933, Admiral Yamamoto was appointed commander of the 1st Carrier Fleet. And two years later he received the rank of vice admiral and at the same time became deputy naval minister and commander in chief of the 1st fleet.
Unlike most of his colleagues, Yamamoto believed that the future belonged to naval aviation. Thanks to his innovation and ability to receive significant funds from the government for new military programs, the admiral created one of the most powerful and powerful fleets in the world by the end of the 1930s. The core of the new Japanese fleet was aircraft carriers.
By 1939, most of Japan's military and political leaders began to realize that the only obstacle to gaining dominance in East Asia was the United States. Yamamoto did everything to prepare the Japanese Navy for the successful solution of any combat missions. But at the same time he tried to avoid war and even opposed the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Working in the United States, he was well aware that thanks to powerful industry and unlimited resources, this country would be able to defeat small Japan. Yamamoto's anti-war statements led to the fact that a conspiracy began to mature in the army to physically eliminate the admiral, which was revealed in July 1939. When Konoe, then Prime Minister, asked about Japan's chances in a war with the United States, the admiral honestly answered: “In the first six to twelve months of the war, I will demonstrate an uninterrupted chain of victories. But if the confrontation lasts two or three years, I have no confidence in the final victory. Konoe sent Yamamoto to sea, appointing him commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet. It is possible that by doing this he wanted to save the life of his admiral.
Admiral Yamamoto conducted staff exercises at sea, which showed that the Japanese had a chance to achieve an advantage only by inflicting a surprise attack on the Hawaiian base of Pearl Harbor, where the main forces of the US Pacific Fleet were based. The admiral began to develop a plan for a surprise attack on this base. Initially, the main role in the operation was assigned to submarines, the use of aviation was not planned. In August 1941, the situation changed. Yamamoto suggested using aircraft carriers to attack Hawaii. The decision to start the war was made by Emperor Hirohito of Japan on December 1, 1941.
As early as November 26, 1941, a fleet of six aircraft carriers and auxiliary ships under the command of Yamamoto sailed to Hawaii along the Northern Sea Route, which was used extremely rarely. About 400 aircraft were placed on board the aircraft carriers. This formation was tasked with launching a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor with the aim of causing the greatest possible damage to the US Pacific Fleet. The naval command assigned the code name "Operation Z" to this operation. According to intelligence, the American fleet was at its base. However, the operational plan provided for a strike against American ships even if they left the harbor. According to the operation plan, the Japanese fleet was to covertly approach the Hawaiian Islands and destroy american ships aircraft from aircraft carriers. Aviation was to operate in two echelons with an interval of one and a half hours. In the event that the enemy tries to strike or the Japanese meet a stronger grouping, a preemptive strike should have been carried out. At the end of the operation, the maneuver unit was to immediately return to Japan for repairs and replenishment of ammunition.
On the morning of December 7, Japanese aircraft carriers launched a surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. Most of the American aircraft stationed on the islands were destroyed. The Japanese also managed to sink four battleships and disable the same number more. In addition, the Americans lost a cruiser and two tankers, and many ships were seriously damaged. The first two attacks by the Japanese were so successful that the admiral abandoned his original intention to strike at the docks and oil storage facilities. In two hours, Yamamoto managed to inflict the worst defeat on the American fleet in its history.
However the main task attack - the destruction of American aircraft carriers - was not carried out. These ships were not in Pearl Harbor, as at that time they were on maneuvers. Yet the Japanese leadership took Yamamoto's nearly flawless attack as a triumph.
In January 1941, the commander of the United Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, received from the General Headquarters a directive on the main directions of the offensive of the Japanese army. Imperial Army and the Navy was to capture the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya and Singapore. In accordance with the directive, the fighting of the Combined Fleet was divided into three successive stages: the occupation of the Philippines, then British Malaya and, finally, the Dutch East Indies. To maintain dominance at sea, Yamamoto specially created the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, whose task was to destroy American and British ships in the combat zone, as well as to support the actions of ground forces. Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa became the commander of this formation.
The Malayan operation was considered by the Japanese command as the most important in the capture of the area South Seas. During its course, the Japanese met with virtually no resistance from the allies. The operation ended with the surrender of the English fortress of Singapore, after which the small East English Fleet was forced to leave this base and enter the Gulf of Thailand. During the battle that followed on December 10, the Japanese Navy, having lost only three aircraft, sank the battleship Prince of Wales and the battleship Repulse, of which basically all consisted naval forces English in this region.
In the Philippine direction, contrary to Yamamoto's expectations, the Japanese did not meet the ships of the American fleet. At the same time, large-scale preparations were launched for offensive operations in the central and southern parts of the Pacific Ocean, which were entrusted to Admiral Yamamoto.
For this, the South Seas Task Force was assigned under the command of Vice Admiral Shigiyoshi Inoue. This group was supposed to carry out sentinel service, ensure the security of sea lanes, and also capture the Wake Islands and the Rabaul base. The aircraft of the group destroyed American airfields on three islands, and then on December 10 the island of Guam was occupied, on December 22 - Wake and a day later Rabaul. Japanese aircraft that rose from aircraft carriers destroyed Allied aircraft in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea.
By March 1942, as a result of military operations at sea, the losses of the US fleet amounted to 5 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers. The English fleet, which was not numerous in this region, was almost completely destroyed. On the Japanese side, only two cruisers received minor damage. One got the impression that the danger of waging an exhausting protracted war had passed.
The Naval General Staff and the Naval Ministry, not wanting to lose the strategic initiative, insisted on starting active operations against Australia. But the army was in favor of strategic defense, refusing to seize new territories. The command of the fleet eventually had to agree with the position of the army. A compromise was reached, which consisted in conducting active operations on the communications connecting the USA and Australia in order to prevent the concentration of American troops in Australia and a subsequent attack on Japan. To do this, it was planned to capture the islands of Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia and Port Moresby.
Port Moresby, located in the southeastern part of New Guinea and which was a major air and naval base of the Allies, covered the north of Australia. Yamamoto scheduled the start of the operation to capture this base on May 10, 1942. But on May 7, Allied aircraft sank the Japanese aircraft carrier Shoho, which forced the landing to be postponed for several days. The next day, the Americans badly damaged the aircraft carrier Shokaku and again forced Inoue to postpone the invasion, this time indefinitely.
As a result of a two-day battle in the Coral Sea, the Americans won their first victory over Yamamoto. The commander of the Combined Fleet sent orders to Admiral Inoue to continue the operation, but they were never carried out.
The operation to seize Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia, developed by the naval department of the Headquarters, was called "FS". But first, Yamamoto wanted to capture Midway Island and the Aleutian Islands, which caused new disagreements between the army and navy. The Operations Directorate of the General Staff suspected that the Navy was going to land troops on Hawaii. In the plans of the command, the issue of capturing Midway was previously considered, so that later, having created a base on it, to begin capturing the Hawaiian Islands. Only after lengthy clarifications and assurances that the capture of the Hawaiian Islands was not currently in the plans of the Navy, was permission received to begin the operation to invade Midway.
By the beginning of 1942, the United States gradually made up for the losses they suffered at Pearl Harbor. Therefore, in the Japanese Navy, the opinion prevailed that a general battle with the American fleet was necessary, as a result of which the enemy fleet would either be destroyed or weakened so much that it could not interfere with operations.
By April 1942, large forces of the Japanese Navy, allocated for the upcoming operation, began to concentrate in the area near Hasira Island in the western part of the Inland Sea of Japan. The flagship battleship Yamato was also located here, on which the headquarters of Admiral Yamamoto was located. The combined fleet was preparing for a decisive battle.
The fleet of Admiral Yamamoto consisted of 8 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, 21 cruisers, 9 destroyers and 15 large submarines. Carrier-based aviation consisted of 352 Zero fighters and 277 bombers. The Japanese command decided to use all these powerful forces to capture the island. The Americans had only 3 aircraft carriers, 8 cruisers and 14 destroyers. The ratio was one to three in favor of Japan. The admiral hoped to force the American fleet to leave Pearl Harbor, move north to the Aleutian Islands, and then try to free Midway and thereby fall into the trap set by the main parts of Yamamoto north of the atoll. The admiral did not know that the American cryptographers managed to decipher the codes of the Japanese Navy and Nimitz, the commander of the US Navy, was well aware of the plans of the Japanese command. In addition, Japanese intelligence had incorrect information about the number of American aircraft carriers that survived the Battle of the Coral Sea.
On June 4, Yamamoto's fleet approached Midway, but the Japanese were met there by American aircraft carriers. Setting a trap for the Japanese, American aircraft attacked enemy ships and aircraft while they were on the decks of ships to refuel and replenish ammunition. As a result of the battle, the Americans managed to sink four of the nine Japanese aircraft carriers and put an end to Yamamoto's triumphant march across the Pacific Ocean. This was the first defeat of the Japanese fleet in 350 years of existence. The war took on a protracted character. And although the American fleet was already significantly stronger than the Japanese, Yamamoto himself remained the most dangerous enemy in the Pacific.
Having suffered a defeat near Midway Island, the Japanese command still did not give up the fight on Australian communications. On the island of Guadalcanal, which is part of the Solomon Islands, back in May 1942, the Japanese decided to build an airfield and place a garrison. But on August 8, 1942, before construction was completed, 13,000 US Marines suddenly landed on the island and captured the airbase. Nevertheless, the Japanese managed to keep western part Guadalcanal. Admiral Yamamoto, given the seriousness of the situation, decided to concentrate most their forces for a decisive blow to the enemy. On August 17, the main forces of the Combined Fleet, led by the flagship Yamato, left the Inland Sea of Japan and headed for Guadalcanal to support the ground units and recapture the entire island.
In the following months, fierce fighting unfolded around this small piece of land. The Japanese did not manage to return the airfield and knock out marines USA from the island.
In November 1942, two battles took place, during which both sides suffered heavy losses, in February 1943, the Japanese were still forced to evacuate their troops from Guadalcanal.
After the evacuation of the troops, the prevailing situation required the urgent transfer of Japanese troops to the southeastern part of the Pacific Ocean. But the convoy that accompanied the reserve units was completely destroyed by American aircraft. The danger she posed grew more and more serious. To put an end to this, Admiral Yamamoto devised a plan codenamed "Operation I". More than three hundred aircraft took part in this operation. The Commander-in-Chief arrived in Rabaul to personally direct the fighting.
On April 7, 1943, 188 Japanese bombers raided enemy ships off Guadalcanal. In the following days, the actions of Japanese aviation were very successful. But this was the last operation of Admiral Yamamoto.
The American command had been developing a plan for the liquidation of the Japanese admiral for some time. And when the codebreakers transmitted a message about the alleged trip of Yamamoto to the units located on the island, the command decided to act.
On April 18, 1943, the commander-in-chief left Rabaul for Buin. The plane Yamamoto was flying was attacked by specially trained and instructed American fighter pilots, and after a short fight he was shot down. This was the only attempt on the life of an enemy commander made by the Allies during the war, which testifies to the real fear of his name.
Skritsky Nikolay Vladimirovich
ISOROKO YAMAMOTO Yamamoto, in command imperial fleet, achieved significant success in the first stage of World War II thanks to the skillful combination of various types of Japanese navy. Naval aviation became the main force. The future naval commander was born on April 4, 1884 in
From the book World History in Sayings and Quotes author Dushenko Konstantin Vasilievich“The life and death of one person means nothing,” Yamamoto Isoroku replied to warnings about assassination attempts being prepared for him. Before the war, there were several years left, the flow of threats against Vice Admiral Yamamoto did not come from distant America, but from Japanese nationalists who had great weight in decision-making and demanded new conquests.
The last photo of Admiral Yamamoto
Yamamoto Isoroku, the son of an impoverished samurai, was born on April 4, 1884. At the Academy navy In Japan, he was seventh best in his class. Enlisting in the Navy, Yamamoto took part in the Russo-Japanese War. During the Battle of Tsushima, the future admiral was torn off by an explosion two fingers.
In 1914, Yamamoto received the rank of lieutenant and entered the Naval Staff College in Tokyo. Two years later, he goes to study in the United States, where he studies economics at Harvard University. During his stay in America, he develops a keen interest in military aviation.
After returning to Japan, Yamamoto Isoroku becomes second in command of the new Kasumigaura Air Corps (1923–25), but soon leaves for Washington. There he received the post of naval attache at the Japanese Embassy (1925-27). In 1930, Yamamoto, with the rank of Rear Admiral, took part in the London Conference on Naval Disarmament.
The militarism of Japanese society at that time was steadily growing. Yamamoto was one of the few officers who publicly expressed his disapproval of Japanese foreign policy. He denounced the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the ensuing war with China. In December 1937, Yamamoto apologized to the US ambassador after the attack by the Japanese army on the American warship Panei, which was anchored near Nanjing. The official position was that the soldiers did not notice the American flag flying over the gunboat, but in fact it was another reckless step by the Japanese towards the disaster that World War II became for them.
Yamamoto was also against the signing of the Tripartite Pact in 1940, for he feared that an alliance with Nazi Germany could lead to war with the United States. He realized that the American economy was many times superior to that of Japan. Japan was not prepared for a long, debilitating and already meager internal resources armed conflict. America, on the contrary, could build up military power over time.
The admiral's fears came true. In the early months of 1941, Yamamoto was given the task of planning an attack on the United States. Being undividedly devoted to the emperor, like everyone else military leadership Japan of that time, he developed a plan for a swift attack, for which he paid a year and a half later. Even then, the admiral understood that the Japanese fleet could conduct an offensive for six months, but would lose if the war dragged on.
Yamamoto shortly before Russo-Japanese War, 1905
The authorship of Yamamoto belongs to the plan of the attack on Pearl Harbor, which unleashed a war between Japan and the United States. The main advantage of the attacking side was surprise. On the morning of December 7, 414 aircraft took off from six Japanese aircraft carriers towards Hawaii. They attacked American airfields on the island of Oahu and ships that were at that time in the harbor of Pearl Harbor. As a result of the operation, the Japanese sank 4 American battleships and 2 destroyers, destroyed 188 aircraft, inflicted heavy damage on another four battleships, and killed more than two thousand American soldiers. The US Pacific Fleet was temporarily neutralized, allowing Japan to rapidly capture most of Southeast Asia.
Yamamoto then organized an invasion of the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. He also made raids on British colonies such as Ceylon. In the summer of 1942, Yamamoto decided to try to capture the US military base on Midway Island. He believed that armed forces Japan will be able to repeat the success of Pearl Harbor. However, these plans were not destined to come true: American intelligence cracked the cipher of Japanese radio transmissions and informed Admiral Chester Nimitz about the impending attack. As a result, Japan suffered a crushing defeat: the fleet lost 4 aircraft carriers with 248 aircraft, one cruiser and 2,500 people killed. In August 1942, American troops landed on Guadalcanal. The attempts of the Japanese to recapture the island were unsuccessful, the defeat in the naval battle of November 12-14 made it clear.
By the beginning of 1943, the Japanese fleet was significantly exhausted by the fighting, morale was rapidly falling. To cheer up the soldiers, Admiral Yamamoto decided to conduct a personal inspection military units Japan, located on the islands of Shortland and Bougainville in the South Pacific.
The American command wanted to take revenge on Admiral Yamamoto for the attack on Pearl Harbor, which forced the United States to join the Second world war ahead of schedule. Yamamoto's Pacific inspection was a good chance for this. On April 14, 1943, as part of Operation Magic, American intelligence intercepted and decoded a radio message detailing his travel plan.
Yamamoto was going to move out of Rabaul at 06:00 and land on Bougainville Island at 08:00. At 8:40 he arrived on a ship to Shortland, then at 9:45 on the same ship he returned to Balala at 10:30. From there at 11:00 he took off in a Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bomber and arrived at the Buin airfield (Kahili) at 11:10. At 14:00 he flew back from Buin and arrived in Rabaul at 15:40.
The secret plan of the American operation "Revenge" called for an attack on the Yamamoto bomber. For its implementation, 18 Lockheed P-38G Lightning fighters from the 339th Fighter Squadron of the 13th air army USA. They had to fly 700 kilometers over the sea, reaching the target from the nearest American base. This is the longest interception mission of World War II carried out by coastal aviation.
The fateful day has come. On 18 April at 6:00 am, two Japanese G4M Betty bombers took off from Wunakanau airfield near Rabaul and covered a short distance to Lakunai airfield to pick up passengers, including Admiral Yamamoto and his staff. At 6:10 am, according to the plan, they took off, accompanied by six A6M Zero fighters from the 204th Aviation Group. The formation set off towards Bougainville on schedule.
Meanwhile, American P-38G Lightnings took off from Cucum Airport on Guadalcanal. To overcome such a long journey, additional fuel tanks were installed on them. They spotted a Japanese formation south of Empress Augusta Bay on Bougainville. The P-38Gs split up to take care of the escort Zeros while the attack group attacked main goal missions - two bombers, one of which was Yamamoto.
At a distance of about one and a half kilometers, P-38G fighters were spotted by the Japanese formation. Yamamoto's bomber made a defensive maneuver by diving to a low altitude. It was followed by a second G4M. The Betty carrying Admiral Yamamoto was hit around 8:00 am and crashed into the jungle near the village of Aku in southern Bougainville. The attack was carried out by two P-38G fighters, flown by Captain Thomas Lanfier and Lieutenant Rex Barber. Subsequent research attributed the fatal shot to Barber. A second G4M bomber was attacked from behind by three fighters and crashed into the sea off Moyle Point.
The painting "The Death of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto" by Sergeant Vaughn A. Bass (Vaughn A. Bass)
The nearest Japanese post was at Aku. From there, Lieutenant Hamasuna saw smoke from the crash. At first he thought it was an American plane crash. Later, in order to identify the body of the deceased admiral, a patrol of the Japanese fleet was sent to the crash site. Yamamoto's body was taken to the former Australian outpost, Buin, and an autopsy was performed on April 20. Most published reports indicate that he died in his seat, having received two bullet wounds to the back. However, there was another medical report, according to which Yamamoto had no visible wounds other than a cut above his eye. This gave rise to a lot of speculation that the admiral could have survived the crash, and died only a few hours later. The reason, according to this version, could be damage to internal organs or shock.
Site of the Yamamoto plane crash, April 1943
After the autopsy, Yamamoto's body was cremated along with the uniform and buried on Buin. Some of his ashes were sent to Japan. First, he was taken aboard the G4M1 "Betty" to Truk Island, where he was loaded onto the battleship "Musashi", serving in Tokyo on May 3, 1943. By this time, the news of the death of Yamamoto Isoroku was officially brought to the Japanese press in a softened wording "died in battle aboard". On June 5, an honorary state funeral for the admiral was held in Tokyo. He was posthumously awarded the title of Admiral of the Fleet and awarded the Order of the Chrysanthemum of the first degree. Yamamoto's remains are buried in the Tama cemetery, a small part of which was given to his wife and rests in their family shrine in the city of Nagaoka.
The ashes of Yamamoto are lowered from the battleship Musashi, May 23, 1943.
During the war, the United States did not report news of the attack on Yamamoto's plane, so as not to reveal the fact that the Japanese ciphers had been broken. At first, the murder of Yamamoto was attributed to pilot Thomas Lanfier. Landing first, he immediately claimed that he single-handedly shot down Yamamoto's plane. Without waiting for a briefing after the mission or a poll of other pilots, the victory was credited to his account. The US Air Force has never officially denied this.
State funeral for Yamamoto, 5 June 1943
Post-war investigation revealed that Rex Barber, in his P-38G Miss Virginia, was the only pilot to shoot down the G4M "Betty" Yamamoto. This was the result of a long controversy that gave rise to several US Air Force review boards and the Yamamoto Mission Association dedicated to the study of the Revenge mission. This version has a number of strong evidence, including the testimony of the sole surviving pilot of the Zero and the study of the wreckage of the bomber. Lanfier himself claimed in a letter written to General Condon that Yamamoto's downed bomber had fallen into the sea.
Lieutenant Rex Barber
The crash site is located in the jungle near Moyla Point, a few kilometers from the Panguna-Buin road, near the village of Aku. Today, the wreckage is strictly guarded against theft and taking away for souvenirs. Since the 1960s Japanese delegations visited the crash site and installed a memorial plaque on the admiral's seat. In the 1970s the fuselage door, part of the wing, Yamamoto's seat and one of the aircraft's controls were moved from the crash site to the memorial museum.
Yamamoto's grave