An unfinished revolution. Abstract: Putsch - unfinished revolution
Introduction
... Politically, the range of assessments of both the coup and the development after it is exceptionally wide. On the one hand, "a great revolution, equal in significance to October 1917." On the other hand, the “revolution of missed opportunities”. On the third, “a betrayed revolution. Fourth, "there was no revolution at all."
From G. Popov's article "August 1991" (1992).
In my opinion, every self-respecting person should know history, should be able to learn its lessons, because without knowing it, it is impossible to form a normal future. People often do not even remember their own mistakes, let alone analyze the mistakes of others. This becomes all the more catastrophic when such mistakes are made at the state level, and then it turns out that something similar has already happened and many troubles could have been avoided if state officials sometimes looked into the past and tried to correlate the events of past years with the present.
However, it should be noted that we do not mean ancient history, whose civilizations have already completed their existence, but the present, modern and recent history. That is why I believe that more attention should be paid to recent events. That is why I decided to write my exam paper about the failed revolution that took place a little over eight years ago and became a kind of end to the rule of the socialist system and the establishment of democratic power in Russia.
Moreover, this topic is more attractive to me, since it is of particular interest for me to analyze the events that occurred when I was already at a relatively conscious age.
The events of August 1991 were known and thoroughly studied by the entire world community, but the Russians soon forgot the heroes and forgave the perpetrators of that coup.
In my essay, I want to objectively assess the causes, consequences and outcomes of these events. I do not aim to find right and wrong in what happened. The events described had a great influence not only on the further history of the Russian Federation, but also on the further development of events in the former Soviet Republics, I will also reveal this issue.
In addition, for greater objectivity, in my abstract, I will include official documents of both representatives of the Gekachepists and the democrats standing on the other side of the barricades.
The reasons
In my opinion, its direct organizers will be able to tell about the true reasons more truthfully and fully: Dmitry Yazov, Vladimir Kryuchkov, Valentin Pavlov, so I will only quote them.
Yazov:
“... There must be very serious reasons why I spoke out against the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces... I explain this by the fact that the standard of living of our people fell, the economy collapsed, national conflicts, conflicts between republics became more and more aggravated... In Discussions began in well-known circles of our Party leadership. The idea gradually matured that Gorbachev had actually exhausted himself as an active statesman ... His economic policy was expressed in the fact that he begged for loans, made debts and did very little for the domestic economy ... He and his government practically did not engage in problems within the country... Our economic mechanism is completely worn out. And the country was on the verge of collapse. The Union Treaty was to be signed on August 20... It suddenly became clear to me personally and to many other comrades with whom I spoke that the disintegration of the union was inexorably approaching us. Everyone was in favor of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and suddenly a draft Union Treaty arrives, in which we are talking about sovereign states!
Kryuchkov:
“..After Gorbachev left for vacation, we [the future composition of the GKChP] came to the conclusion that the country was paralyzed. For example, there is no harvest. And sugar beets. Complete irresponsibility, no supplies, and if no immediate measures had been taken to stabilize our state, then we should have expected that the state would have collapsed ... These were tough measures that we wanted to propose, but we did not see another way. We wanted to do everything to keep the workers busy, so that fewer enterprises were closed.
Thus, they tried to give completely objective reasons for the putsch, which are characteristic of any ongoing revolution, and they quite clearly consider themselves the so-called plenipotentiary representatives of the people, which they really were not. Therefore, it seems to me that although this was their main mistake, if they had the support of the people, they would have become national heroes.
And one of the main organizers of the coup Valentin Pavlov in general, he considers an absolutely innocent person, he even believes that “there was no conspiracy”, and the conspirators only tried to replace the President of the USSR, who was not able to govern the country, physically and simply as a politician.
Also of the events that undoubtedly stimulated the coup attempt, the following should be noted:
1) The nationalization of Russia (and, also contrary to it, Tatarstan) of the oil and gas industry and the increase in domestic prices for oil and oil products promised by Yeltsin in Tyumen, which, according to Pavlov, would blow up the entire economy of the country.
2) The proposed introduction of national currencies in some republics.
3) Nationalization of the gold mining industry by Yakutia and Kazakhstan.
4) Non-fulfillment of plans for state deliveries of new crop grain and the closure of economic spaces by grain-producing union republics.
5) A 50% reduction in defense orders and the coming paralysis of the defense industry, the social consequences of an ill-conceived conversion of defense industries.
6) An avalanche-like commercialization of relations between the heads of large enterprises and sub-sectors of the national economy, leading to the loss of the planned components of their management.
7) The phenomenon of personal financial independence of the heads of enterprises and organizations and the resulting last levers of their management.
8) Yeltsin's decree on departization, removing the apparatus of the CPSU from the sphere of making any decisions on the management of the economy and social life.
9) Creation of republican security systems, including militarized own formations and national guards, the beginning of the transition of the republican KGB to the jurisdiction of the republics.
Occasion
The fact that the main impetus for the events of August 19-21 was the forthcoming signing of the union treaty on August 20 is evidenced by the documents adopted by the State Emergency Committee. The "Appeal to the Soviet People" spoke directly about "extremist forces that have set a course for the liquidation of the Soviet Union", trampled "the results of a nationwide referendum on the unity of the Fatherland." At the same time, citizens were given a promise "to hold a broad national discussion of the new Union Treaty." Together with the simultaneously published statement by A.I. Lukyanov dated August 16 - all this directly indicated the mark of the planned action for August 20. Thus, the GKChP maneuvered its speech with the need to protect the USSR and its Constitution, seeing in the prepared draft treaty a threat to the integrity of the union state.
The Russian government, headed by President B.N., entered into a decisive battle with the State Emergency Committee. Yeltsin. A series of documents of the State Committee for the State of Emergency was followed by a "return salvo" of the Russian leadership: appeals to the people, decrees, resolutions of the President of the RSFSR. An unprecedented situation was created: the two highest authorities in the country came together in an uncompromising fight equally, and, it would seem, with equal grounds, appealing to the Constitution, law and law.
In the address "To the citizens of Russia" President B.N. Yeltsin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers I.S. Silaev and Acting Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR R.I. Khasbulatov characterized the actions of the "Soviet leadership" as a reactionary, unconstitutional coup with the forcible removal of the legally elected President of the country from power. Emphasizing the special role of Russia in the preparation of the draft treaty, they accused the GKChP of trying to solve complex political and economic problems by force and declared the “so-called committee” and all its decisions illegal (the main legal argument in this case is based on the fact that the created body is the GKChP - unconstitutional).
It all resulted in sharp contradictions. Not one of the opposing sides not only did not want to concede, but even tried to compromise and destroy their opponents as politicians.
The conspirators saw that their time was running out quickly and they decided to choose this very moment for their adventure. And so, on August 19, 1991, the coup broke out. Which by no means came as a surprise to the majority of top state politicians. But, basically, the putsch was a reaction to the Novoogarevo process and its most important outcome - the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States.
background
Documents testify: since December 1990, the party leadership, which has gone over to the opposition to the General Secretary and is a supporter of reforms in the leadership of the CPSU, enters into a secret agreement, begins conspiratorial actions to prepare a coup d'état. A course is being taken for the elimination of democratic authorities, the establishment of presidential rule, the introduction of a state of emergency in the country by the army and the KGB, and a return to a totalitarian system. In an effort to give the future coup a constitutional look. The organizers of the putsch tried in every possible way to involve the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev, using his political hesitation and hoping to compromise him in the eyes of the Democrats. So it was in January 1991, on the eve of the bloody events in the Baltics. So it was on March 28, when troops were brought into Moscow, allegedly to protect some of the deputies of the Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR. So it was in June, when the head of the Cabinet of Ministers, V. Pavlov, with the support of D. Yazov and V. Kryuchkov, tried to wrest emergency powers from the Supreme Congress of the USSR. So it was on the day of August 18, 1991, when the putschists who appeared in Foros wanted to persuade the President to joint actions with us. However, the President did not change his oath.
August 17, 1991, in the evening, the conspirators last time secretly gathered at a suburban "object" of the KGB, where, presumably, they once again discussed a specific plan of action, examined the prepared documents of the "Soviet leadership", which in a day and a half were to become the property of the people of the country and the whole world, distributed duties among the members of the actually begun act the GKChP.
On August 18, at about 5 p.m., a group of conspirators consisting of Boldin, Balkanov, Shenin, Varennikov and Plekhanov arrived at the President's dacha in Foros. At the same time, all types of communication between the President and the outside world and the media were cut off. The speech on the part of the arrivals was that people had already united, and only a decree of the President was needed. The question before Gorbachev was posed in a similar way: "Either you issue a decree and stay here, or transfer powers to Vice-President Yanaev." Balkanov said that Yeltsin had been arrested, but then he corrected himself: "He will be arrested ...". Having failed to achieve what they wanted, the conspirators flew to Moscow, leaving the President under arrest.
On the same day, Lukyanov was urgently summoned from the rest home and taken to the capital by a military helicopter. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was present at the meeting of the “Gekachepists” held in the Kremlin on the night of August 18-19. He took part in editing the documents of the State Emergency Committee and later drew up a personal statement of disagreement with the content of the Union Treaty, which was to be signed in Moscow on August 20.
Lukyanov's statement began to be broadcast on radio and television from the morning of August 19 to the documents of the State Emergency Committee itself. Following him, the “Decree” of Vice-President Yanaev was transmitted, on the assumption of the duties of the president in connection with the “illness” of M.S. Gorbachev.
Who are the "Gekachepists"
All the conspirators were not only major statesmen of the USSR, but also members of the Communist Party, senior officials of its apparatus and members of its main elected bodies. All members of the so-called G8 held major posts. And I want to show what power each of them individually had.
Baklanov. From February 1988 to April 1991 - Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Supervised the work of the military-industrial complex. In April 1991, he became the first deputy chairman of the USSR Defense Council.
Back in April 1991, Baklanov spoke about the possibility of a transfer of power to the army in the context of perestroika.
Kryuchkov. Since 1988 - Chairman of the Committee of the KGB of the USSR. At the same time, since 1990, he has been a member of the Presidential Council of the USSR. General of the Army since 1988. He also previously expressed his opinion on the need to introduce a state of emergency in the country.
Pavlov. In 1989 he was appointed Minister of Finance. Soon he became Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR. Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since July 1990.
On June 17, 1990, Pavlov demanded emergency powers from the USSR Armed Forces for the Cabinet of Ministers. Having not received the necessary powers, he decided, apparently, to act by unconstitutional methods.
Pugo. Since 1988, he became the chairman of the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU; from there he soon moved to the post of Minister of the Interior.
Starodubtsev. In April 1990, V. Starodubtsev was elected chairman of the Union of Agrarians of the RSFSR. In June 1990, a new one was created - the Peasants' Union of the USSR. Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since July 1990.
Tizyakov. In the State Emergency Committee, he represented a complex of enterprises and associations of the military-industrial complex.
Yanaev. He was secretary and chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In 1990 he became a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Ball was elected, by the way, at the suggestion of Gorbachev, vice-president of the USSR.
Yazov. Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU since 1987. Candidate member of the Politburo - from July 1987 to July 1990.
In June 1991, he became one of three ministers who demanded that the Supreme Soviet of the USSR introduce a state of emergency.
It should be noted that all members of the GKChP, with the exception of Tizyakov, were not just communists - at different times they held key positions in the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Chronicle of events
the first day:
On August 19, by decision of the State Emergency Committee, troops were brought into Moscow. At the same time, the organizers of the coup did not dare to arrest Yeltsin, as well as other leaders of Russia. Telephones and international communications were not switched off. The White House, where the Russian government is located, was able to immediately start organizing resistance to the putsch.
At 0400, the Sevastopol regiment of the KGB troops blocked M.S. Gorbachev in Foros, in the Crimea.
The most active Russian cities, where events unfolded most violently, were: Moscow, Leningrad, Vladivostok, Pskov, Syktyvkar, Ryazan, Khabarovsk, Sverdlovsk, Rostov-on-Don, Volgograd, Tomsk, and the coastal cities, and the rest of the cities silently obeyed the requirements of the State Emergency Committee.
In Leningrad, military convoys on Tikhoretsky Prospekt and tanks along Kievskoye Highway are moving towards the city center. Soldiers occupy the radio center.
In Nizhny Novgorod, a meeting is being held in accordance with Gorbachev's "winter" Decree of the "narrowed meeting."
Military units are moving along the streets in Voronezh.
Lots of military trucks in Grozny.
In the morning, at 4.30 Moscow time, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, the commander-in-chief of the troops of the Far East directions, the commander of groups of troops, military districts and fleets, the heads of the main and central departments of the USSR Ministry of Defense received secret information No. 8825 signed by Yazov, calling for the troops to be put on alert . And by 6.00 television and radio are in the hands of the putschists. There is one all-Russian channel. Transmit:
1) Statement by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. Lukyanov.
2) Decree of the Vice-President of the RSFSR I. Yanaev.
3) Statement of the "Soviet leadership" signed by G. Yanaev, V. Pavlov, O. Baklanov.
4) "Appeal to the Soviet people": ... the results of the national referendum on the unity of the Fatherland have been trampled ... in the very near future, a new round of impoverishment is inevitable.
5) Appeal to the heads of state and government and the UN Secretary General.
6) Decree No. 1 of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR.
Early in the morning, military equipment is being brought to Moscow.
In the morning, the newspapers that went on sale did not say a word about what was happening.
At 9.00 B. Yeltsin, I. Silaev, R.Yu. Khasbulatov appeal to the citizens of Russia: “We are dealing with a bloody coup. We call for a general indefinite strike."
By 12:30 p.m., a decree of the President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin was signed: all decisions of the State Emergency Committee were to be recognized as invalid on the territory of the RRFSR.
The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR appoints an extraordinary session for August 21. People's deputies of the USSR are attacking A. Lukyanov. He announces that he intends to convene an extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Council on 26 August.
Moscow is gradually beginning to recover from the shock. The first posters appeared: "Create resistance groups!".
Tanks and armored personnel carriers enter the capital from 11.00 to 13.00. People roll buses by hand to block their way.
A decree of the illegal president of the USSR (G. Yanaeva) appears. In connection with the facts of incitement to unrest in Moscow, a state of emergency is introduced in the city. Colonel-General N. Kalinin, commander of the troops of the Moscow military district, was appointed commandant, who is vested with the right to issue orders.
The reaction of the world community to the coup is filtered through the censorship sieve of the junta.
But from the broadcasts of Svoboda and other foreign radio stations, the position of the leaders of the leading countries of the world becomes known: from expectant it turns into a sharply negative one.
Outlawed the decree of the President of the RSFSR: G. Yanaev, V. Pavlov, V. Kryuchkov, B. Pugo, D. Yazov, V. Starodubtsev, V. Baklanov, A. Tizyakov.
At 17.30 Moscow time B. Yeltsin signed the creation of an operational control group. In fact, the reserve team of the Russian government. It included Deputy Prime Minister O. Lobov, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR S. Kravchenko, and member of the State Council of the RSFSR A, Yablokov. The double government flew to Sverdlovsk, where a special base was located seventy kilometers from the city.
Signed by the Acting Prosecutor General of the USSR Vasiliev, a telegram went to the places, the meaning of which boils down to the fact that all decisions of the State Emergency Committee must be implemented. And soon at 18.00 at its meeting, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers supported the decisions of the State Emergency Committee.
From 21.00 to 00.00 barricades grow around the White House. 10 tanks arrived to protect the Russian parliament. So far, nothing is known about the fate of the President of the USSR.
It becomes known that the Leningrad TV interrupted the showing of the film, and A. Sobchak, vice-mayor V. Shcherbakov, chairman of the Lenoblsoviet Yu. Yarov appeared on the screens. They called on all St. Petersburg residents (including military personnel) to remain loyal to the legitimate authorities.
Second day:
From 00.00 to 06.00, at least 10,000 defenders accumulate near the White House. Journalists from Radio Russia and Vzglyad are broadcasting.
At a meeting held at 01:48 Moscow business circles condemned the State Emergency Committee and expressed their full support for the legitimately elected government. They also demanded the immediate convening of an emergency Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.
By 09.00 there are more and more military equipment on the streets of the capital. Contacts between the military and the population are growing.
At 10.00 A. Rutskoi, I. Silaev, R. Khasbulatov go to the Kremlin to Lukyanov and pass an ultimatum to Yanaev through him. Lukyanov is confused, but promises to deliver an ultimatum to the Russian leadership. At the same time out:
1) Decree of the Acting President of the USSR on Decrees of the President of the RSFSR.
2) Resolution No. 3 of the State Emergency Committee.
On the radio of the "White House" there are calls for the population to gather on Independence Square near the parliament building.
And an hour later, a 200,000-strong rally gathers in front of the parliament building. On it, Rutskoi declares that the putschists have been given 24 hours to fulfill the requirements of the Russian authorities. Yeltsin, Shevardnadze, Yevtushenko, Bonner, Fedorov and Shagalin also speak...
The ciphergram of the Chief of the General Staff, General M. Moiseev, is "sent to the field." The bottom line: to persuade the army to recognize the State Emergency Committee.
Around 16.00, the White House is expected to be stormed. At about the same time, Sergei Stankevich announced that the President of the USSR (M.S. Gorbachev) was alive and well, but blocked in a dacha in Foros.
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU is keeping quiet. The Party left its General Secretary in trouble.
Rumors are spreading that the Pskov plant of automatic telephone exchanges received an urgent order from Moscow - to issue 250 thousand handcuffs. Guaranteed income - 12 million. They do not agree. The rumor was later confirmed.
The State Bank of the USSR announces that from 21.08.91 the sale of foreign currency to citizens traveling abroad on personal business will cease.
By 18.00, all military equipment is concentrated in the center near the Kirovskoye metro station, on Leningradsky Prospekt in Kuntsevo.
Women are being asked to leave the Russian parliament building as they are being trained in the use of Molotov cocktails.
There is anxiety in the city. Anxiety is growing.
At 20.53 there was a message that the Republic of Karelia did not recognize the State Emergency Committee. Karelian radio and television broadcast all the decrees and messages of the President of Russia.
Then S. Blinnikov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Karelian USSR, spoke and said that Karelia would live according to Russian laws.
At 21.20, General Kalinin decided to introduce a curfew in Moscow from 23.00 to 05.00, as reported by the Vremya program.
From 22.00 to 00.00, the Minister of Defense of the RSFSR tries to warn the defenders: blocking the House of Soviets by special forces is scheduled for one in the morning, it is possible to use psychotropic generators. There are many people, few gas masks.
Burbulis appealed to all the defenders of the "White House" with a request: do not throw yourself under cars, give way to vehicles: "We must win morally."
Day three:
August 21 - automatic bursts are heard near the American embassy. There, a convoy of airborne combat vehicles approached the barricade near the House of the Unions from the side of the US Embassy. The way for tanks and armored personnel carriers is blocked by barricades, including "live" ones. 20 armored vehicles broke through the first barricades on Novy Arbat and moved towards the Government House of the RSFSR.
Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the RSFSR N. Stolyarov contacted A. Lukyanov:
“Do your best to keep people from getting hurt. They are armed and will stand to the end, a lot depends on you. The situation is critical."
A. Lukyanov's answer:
I can’t do anything, Yeltsin himself provoked the situation, besides, we need to figure out where people get weapons from.
At the intersection of Novoorbatsky and Sadovoe rings - victims. Died D.A. Komar, I.M. Klyuchevsky, V.A. Usov.
The BTEs still do not stop trying to break through the barricades. Molotov cocktails were used.
At 0200 hours, a message was received that the Taman and Kontimirovskaya divisions were withdrawing from Moscow. And already at 03.00 a message was transmitted on the radio that the OMON was leaving the Moscow City Council.
There are constant warnings about the possibility of a breakthrough by special KGB units dressed in civilian clothes.
Moscow rivermen brought in barges, blocking the approaches to the parliament from the Moskva River.
Patriarch of All Russia Alexy II demanded that Gorbachev be given the opportunity to address the country.
By 0400, the Vitebsk division (White House radio) approaches Moscow, but does not enter the city.
From 05.00 to 07.00 GKChP headed by Yanaev holds a meeting at the Oktyabrskaya Hotel.
At the Lubyanka, there are continuous meetings of top management - departments, divisions, etc. refuse to follow orders or remain neutral.
At 0800, the meeting of the board of the USSR Ministry of Defense began. But only a few hours later, military equipment began to leave the streets of the capital to the applause of Muscovites.
The Moscow government announced the illegality of the curfew in the capital.
The message of the commandant of the city of Moscow: "on the night of August 20-21, there were major provocations of extremist elements with tragic consequences ..." - He's lying. There were no provocations, and everyone knew that.
Yazov signs the decree. On August 21 of this year, the return of troops to the points of permanent deployment began.
At 10.00, the session of the Russian Armed Forces opens. A decree on Russia's economic sovereignty was signed there. Speaker B. Yeltsin.
At 13.00 the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU woke up. There, finally, a reasonable question was asked to Yanaev: “Where is our general? ..”.
The leadership of Russia agreed with Kryuchkov to fly together to Foros. Yeltsin's session did not let go. And Kryuchkov disappeared. I preferred another company - Yazov, Balkanov and Tizyakov. They took off from Vnukovo in an unknown direction. Ivashko and Lukyanov followed them. Following Rutskoy, Silaev, deputies, journalists.
At 14.30 Russian radio goes on the air again. Only they are now broadcasting from another studio.
At 16.00, the evening edition of Izvestia was released. "The reaction failed!" - Full house of the first page. Shortly thereafter, the USSR Supreme Court declares the creation of the State Emergency Committee illegal.
At 18.00 The direction of the KGB chief's flight was determined. Gorbachev informs Yeltsin: "They are in Foros...". Lukyanov and Ivashko are also there.
- 00.00. - Moscow. TASS is authorized to announce that restrictions on the publication of newspapers have been lifted, and the White House still expects an attack. They are talking about some secret order, which Kryuchkov forgot in Moscow before flying to Foros. The country went to sleep, still not knowing how this action-packed detective story would end. But people are still worried. Moscow is not sleeping, but is waiting for new media reports about what happened.
Development of the situation: a few days after the coup
By 0600 Gorbachev returns to Moscow. He made a statement on Soviet television: "... What happened is a coup d'état." His decree on the decrees of the acting president is issued. Cancel.
At a meeting of the USSR Supreme Council, consent was given to the arrest of deputies O. Balkanov, V. Boldin, V. Varennikov, V. Starodubtsev, V. Shenin. A little earlier, Kryuchkov and Yazov were arrested.
At 12.00 at the "White House" a rally of winners, and the tricolor Russian flag finally acquired the status of Russian state symbols.
Director General of TASS L. Spiridonov was dismissed from his post. The property of the agency becomes the property of Russia. The Moscow mayor's office ordered to seal the premises of the city committees and district committees of the CPSU. And one of the coup organizers, B. Pugo, shot himself in his own apartment.
A decree is issued to suspend the publication of communist publications: Pravda, Soviet Russia, Moskovskaya Pravda ...
Released from their posts: Chairman of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company L. Kravchenko, editor-in-chief of "Soviet Russia" V. Chikin. A. Vasiliev was fired from the USSR Prosecutor's Office for "unscrupulousness and cowardice." His colleague I. Abramov for poor oversight of investigations in the bodies of the KGB of the USSR.
The Cabinet of Ministers is changing before our eyes. B. Bakatin was appointed chairman of the KGB, E. Shapashnikov - minister of internal affairs. Gorbachev held meetings with the leaders of ten republics. Solution: "We need to sign a contract."
A mourning rally is taking place on Manezhnaya Square. They are seeing off on their last journey, elevated to the rank of heroes, the dead defenders of the "White House": D.A. Komar, I.M. Krichevsky and V.A. Usova.
Gorbachev voluntarily resigns from the post of General Secretary. The property of the CPSU (until the final decision) is taken under the protection of local authorities. Before leaving, Gorbachev issues a decree on the depoliticization of the army, state security agencies, internal affairs and the state apparatus.
It also became known that the Soviet military adviser Marshal Akhromeev hanged himself in the Kremlin the day before.
The State Bank resumes the sale of foreign currency to citizens.
The building of the Central Committee of the CPSU in Moscow and the headquarters of the October Smolny in Leningrad were sealed. And B. Yeltsin suspends the activities of the Russian Communist Party and prohibits the activities of the party in the Armed Forces of the USSR on the territory of the RSFSR.
It became known that on the evening of August 24, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree appointing his representatives to the territories and regions of the RSFSR.
Republics during the putsch
The situation in the republic developed according to three options, which I have rather conditionally outlined below:
1) Chronicle of resistance: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova.
The republic is characterized by a single logic of ongoing events, including the similar behavior of local separatist-republics: the State Emergency Committee recognized union structures (both party and leaders of union enterprises), separatist territories (Pridnestrovie, Gagauzia - on the evening of August 20) and strike committees of international movements . The most dynamic in the first days after the coup was the situation in the Baltic republics and Moldova, whose parliaments almost immediately supported the position of the Russian leadership and began to form their own emergency administration bodies (there is no government institution in the Baltic republics; the formation of security cabinets from among the heads of the representative, executive authorities is a structure integrating all functions in an emergency). The actions of the leadership of the Baltic republics, although they were situational, were distinguished by unity and clarity: from organizing the protection of state institutions to the decision of the Council of the Baltic States to entrust the formation of governments in exile to the foreign ministers of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
But, despite the “local riot police worked out during the hostilities” measures to protect state institutions, by the evening of August 20, the army units had already completely taken control of communications, television and radio in the Baltic republics. However, such activity of the Baltic Military District is explained by a pronounced confrontation in the republics between the troops of the Org and the parliaments of the republics: according to reports from various news agencies, it seems that on the first day the leaders of the repressive bodies in the regions did not receive an order from the State Emergency Committee. Moreover, the army as a whole preferred an undeclared neutrality for three days in August.
Of course, at the same time, each republic pursued its own interests. For example, the leadership of Moldova expected, in the event of an unfavorable development of the situation in the USSR, to use its geopolitical position and proclaim the reunification of Moldova and Romania (which the Popular Front of Moldova had long called for). In addition, after the publication of the draft union agreement, Moldova took a very loyal position towards the union center and more and more often declared the eastern market as the only one for Moldova - and therefore was interested in stabilizing and reconstructing the legitimate government in Moscow.
2) Chronicle of waiting: Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asian center Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia.
These republics acted on the principle: "We have sovereignty - and everything else is your Moscow fiction." However, by the evening of August 20, the statements of the leaders of Kazakhstan and Ukraine - the republics whose support could be decisive for both the Russian leadership and the GKChP - become more harsh towards the GKChP and its actions. But Nazarbayev and Kravchuk (leaders of official structures in the republics) spoke only against the anti-constitutionality of the State Emergency Committee and for convening an extraordinary session of the Supreme Court and the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. In fact, if the GKChP had carried out a purely symbolic and bloodless seizure of the Russian parliament on the first day of the putsch, or managed to isolate Yeltsin, and then fulfilled the demand of the republics to convene an extraordinary session of the USSR Armed Forces, then the GKChP would have managed to get rid of the label of unconstitutionality in the eyes of most of the official leaders of the waiting republics.
The reaction of the official leaders of the political organizations of Armenia was also based on the principle common to the expectant republics.
The position of consistent waiting was taken by the Belarusian leadership and the leaders of a number of republics of the Central Asian Union, which did not make any statements at all. True, an analysis of the speeches of the republican media shows that the Belarusian leadership was ready to recognize the State Emergency Committee. The small opposition of the Belarusian parliament, despite the demands to the Presidium of the Armed Forces, having created an extraordinary session and condemned the coup of the State Emergency Committee, did not achieve success. Polarization took place at the level of political and public organizations: the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus and the presidium of the federations of trade unions of Belarus expressed full support for the GKChP (though, subject to the acquisition of the “Constitutional status” by the GKChP). Democratic organizations and the Minsk strike committee declared their support for the position of the Russian leadership and began preparations for a general strike.
There were more similarities than differences in the reactions of the Central Asian republics. Perhaps this is due to the fact that on June 23 last year in Alma-Ata, the Central Asian Union of Republics was announced, and on the eve of the putsch (August 13-14) was formalized.
In addition to the confessional community, these republics have a common regional mechanism for the transition to the market.
In addition, the current political elite of Central Asia, formed according to the feudal-bai type, has always considered the union center as a guarantor of its own stability (primarily military and subsidized), which is why the reaction of these republics to the actions of the State Emergency Committee was very restrained.
As a result, Asian presidents, at best, only emphasized their determination to defend republican sovereignty.
More definite was the reaction of the opposition democratic organizations and parties, who called for disobeying the decrees of the State Emergency Committee. However, with the exception of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the political organizations of Central Asia are rather weak and not very popular among the population. The national parties and movements of the republics of Central Asia were primarily interested in questions of republican sovereignty, and not in the problems of Russia and its coups.
3) Chronicle of conciliation: Georgia and Azerbaijan.
Support for the GKChP as a new union leadership was expressed in one form or another only by Azerbaijan and Georgia: but if the position of Azerbaijan is quite understandable and geopolitically logical, then Georgia has become, first of all, a hostage to the political style and character of its president.
For the anti-communist leadership of Georgia, the Gorbachev center was the bogeyman with which they frightened the population and wrote off their own miscalculations in the economy and politics; it never occurred to anyone to risk anything for his protection.
Eviad Gamsakhurdia (President of Georgia) said in his address: “The most important thing is that the West should support only the government elected by the people in the USSR... who fight for independence and have parliaments and presidents elected by the people. They face an immediate threat of military aggression... To "recognize the independence of these republics, including Georgia...".
Law and politics in the days of the coup
Both sides of the conflict, conditionally representing the "old" - the Allied leadership and the "new" - the leadership of Russia, defending their political interests, equally appealed to law, to legality, to the Constitution of the USSR, while defending their model of law and their understanding of legality 1 .
It is extremely important that the process of introducing into politics, if not legal consciousness, then at least already legal rhetoric and argumentation, which began in the early eighties, during the crisis, appeared in opposition to normative acts - the “war of laws”. If earlier opposing political groups, in search of arguments for their legitimacy, referred to the “interests of the people” for their exclusive, true and most complete embodiment, now the motivation political activity inevitably supplemented by a ruling or a defense of genuine legality.
The importance of this fact lies in the fact that everyone is free to understand the “interests of the people” in his own way, and this criterion loses all meaning. While the protection of law and legality have a completely objectified criterion - the text of the law.
To a certain extent, it is the legal acticulation of the positions of the political forces participating in the conflict through their normative acts -----
1. The appendices show the main documents put forward by both warring parties, in which they equally appeal to the Constitution, and the GKChP, in addition, makes its initial demands.
made it possible to quickly inform their political rating in the public mind, speeding up the resolution of the conflict.
So, the State Committee for the State of Emergency, on the one hand, and the Russian leadership, strongly supported by the government and the Moscow Mayor's Office, on the other, during the four days of their short and stormy confrontation, issued a significant number of regulations, motivating this by the need to protect the Constitution, legality and law enforcement.
From the point of view of a functionary brought up on the lessons of Khrushchev's elimination, the new republican government in Russia did not and could not have the legitimacy of legitimate power. Especially in the eyes of the former nomenclature of the CPSU - administrators, business executives, officer corps. Therefore, any instruction from Yeltsin will be perceived by the latter, at best, as an appeal from the leader of "Democratic Russia". Accordingly, the only thing that the Russian leadership could count on was a series of rallies and strikes. But no more than that.
Only the signing of the union treaty on August 20 created (in the eyes of the conspirators) institutions of power capable of competing with the State Emergency Committee in terms of all legitimacy.
An erroneous tactic followed from this political calculation: an orientation toward a peaceful or "almost peaceful" seizure of power. This suited the conspirators all the more because it opened up the possibility of presenting an unconstitutional coup in the eyes of the world community as a “change of leadership” traditional for the USSR. The GKChP was absolutely unprepared for conducting real hostilities with a professionally trained enemy and, it seems, was not preparing. Judging by the information about the plans to capture the "White House", the operations of the Vilnius and Riga riot police were taken as a model.
Another major miscalculation of the putschists consisted in a clear reassessment of the power of the center over the union republics. Most of the latter have already achieved that degree of sovereignty, which, of course, ruled out the legitimacy of the actions of the State Emergency Committee.
Hence the paradox: the State Emergency Committee is holding a press conference under conditions when its main enemy is not only not defeated, but, on the contrary, is definitely beginning to strengthen its position!
For a military (or paramilitary) coup to succeed, three conditions are necessary:
– technical security;
- readiness of the population to obey;
- the ability of the conspirators to form a collective activity;
The strategic-tactical complex underlying the coup plans led the GKChP to a dead end: when the fallacy of the strategy became obvious on August 20, it was too late to change tactics. Already not too decisive, the GKChP began to rapidly lose the remnants of decisiveness, and instead of rallying its supporters around itself, it began to find ever greater isolation.
The GKChP was surprised to find that the country recognized Yeltsin as the President, and not just informal leader"so-called democrats".
Confessed for the second time. On June 12, the people had their say. On August 19-21, the choice of the people was, so to speak, ratified by its "Upper Chamber" - the majority of the former nomenklatura. Of course, this ratification is under the protest pressure of the "Lower Chamber" and in view of the barricades. But the fact remains: the ratification took place. And at that moment, the GKChP turned from an all-powerful fist of state institutions into a circle of eight putschists-losers (the eight most important people were the organizers of the putsch).
Who has won?
There has never been any possibility for the formation of an elite (democratic, political, economic, administrative, military) independent of the “party-state”, which could change the party nomenclature, in our country. There were not even those "semi-legal" conditions for this that existed in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia in the last 20-30 years. Our new democratic elite is only 3-4 years old - and it has all the characteristic features of this little respectable age.
Having won political power in Russia, in many of its large cities, having created the embryos of democratic parties and organizations, the new ruling elite will become ruling not in words, but in deeds only to the extent that it is able to win over to its side the personnel bureaucrat of the old nomenklatura.
The events of August 19-21 showed something that cannot be calculated by any socialist polls, by any theoretical analysis: the personnel bureaucrat, in the mass, went after the new government, ceasing to see in it a party of non-formal rallies-inter-regional workers. And this conquest is difficult to overestimate. However, it is even more important to soberly assess not only the strength of this support, but also its specificity.
Firstly, an extremely small part of the directors of enterprises, military commanders, heads of local authorities immediately and without hesitation took the side of the democratically elected legitimate government.
Secondly, a significant part of the same nomenklatura decided on this only after certain hesitation, reflection, reflection on the consequences of this or that step. The fate of the putsch was decided by the waverers who made their choice. First of all, democracy owes them.
Thirdly, a significant part of civil servants - directors, employees of local authorities and especially military personnel began not only to follow the instructions of the legitimate authorities, but to sabotage the instructions of the putschists. In other words, the balance of power has changed in favor of the republican power in Russia, not only due to its own strengthening, but due to the rapid weakening of the GKChP.
Fourthly, the personnel bureaucrat, both military and civilian, recognized in Yeltsin, first of all, power as such, recognized the level of his legitimacy corresponding to the level of the "royal house", and not at all his market and democratic programs.
It was not democracy (thinking to move to a market economy) that won, but dictatorship (aspiring to return to a state-distributive economy) - a strong young government defeated the old government. A new dynasty displaced the first.
The social base of Yeltsin's victory consists of two parts: the element of revolutionary revolt against the hated old regime and the personnel bureaucracy of the old regime, which has come over to the service of the new one.
Reasons for the failure of the coup
From my point of view, the main reason for the failure of the coup is the inconsistency between the actions of the State Emergency Committee and those bodies that should have implicitly carried out their orders. The top military leaders were not informed in advance about the upcoming actions and were not psychologically prepared for tough decisions and the need to use weapons on the territory of the RSFSR, Moscow and Leningrad. The heads of the operational and territorial units of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, judging by some reports, had no information about what they had to do starting from the night of August 19th. There was no system for coordinating actions not only between the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but also between units different kinds army troops. Special units of the KGB troops failed to fulfill their tasks of neutralizing the opponents of the coup. The rigid control over the army, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs by the department of administrative bodies of the Central Committee of the CPSU turned out to be a myth.
I especially want to note that during the coup, the contradictions between the branches of the armed forces, judging by individual reports, escalated into an armed confrontation. In particular, the Air Force refused to carry out the orders of the State Emergency Committee and, apparently, were going to launch assault operations against the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB in the event of a fire contact near the White House. It can be assumed that it was the lack of air support and the threat of an air attack that forced the members of the GKChP to play for time and, ultimately, capitulate.
A special circumstance that made it difficult to control the troops of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was that these units were transferred to the repressive department and therefore neither the soldiers nor the officers were morally prepared for actions against their own people. Moreover, there was not a single person in the GKChP who would psychologically correspond to the role of the leader of the coup. All participants in the GKChP had a stable negative image among the larger population of the country.
The real leader of the coup, Oleg Baklanov, could not act as the official leader, because of his position as the former secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the corresponding negative attitude of the population towards the highest functionaries of the CPSU.
The reaction of the world community turned out to be so quick and tough that it left its leaders no room for maneuver. In addition, Yanaev's appeal to Yasser Arafat quite unequivocally determined the attitude of the State Emergency Committee towards terrorist organizations and regimes, making it impossible for any positive contacts between the State Committee for the State of Emergency and the leaders of the leading states of the world community.
Disagreements among the members of the GKChP regarding the neutralization of the President of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin and the Russian parliament gave Yeltsin the opportunity to escalate the situation to the level of an armed conflict, for which the leaders of the GKChP were obviously not ready. Horizontal ties between the heads of local regional authorities, on the one hand, and the commanders of the troops deployed on their territories, the heads of the territorial bodies of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, on the other, turned out to be somewhat stronger than the vertical ties of military subordination. Therefore, the wait-and-see attitude of the leaders of the union republics and regions of the RSFSR and the State Emergency Committee sharply limited the possibility of maneuvering and the use of force by the leaders of the coup.
Effects
There is no doubt that the Center in its former status ceased to exist. Now the scope and content of the power of the President of the USSR and those bodies that will replace the Cabinet of Ministers, the Security Council, the Federation Council, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, will be determined by the Presidents of those republics that will sign new version Union agreement. As a result of the coup, the President of the RSFSR received a special status, placing him in an exceptional position of "first among equals." The republics that did not intend to sign the Union Treaty will secede from the new Union and will strive to take shape in some kind of “cordon sanitaire” between the European society, into which the border former allied socialist countries, on the one hand, will be integrated one way or another, and the states united by the new Union treaty on the other.
The former autonomous republics of the RSFSR, claiming the status of union republics, will be sharply limited in their capabilities due to the strengthening of the power and authority of the President of the RSFSR.
The defense potential of the USSR will sharply decrease as a result of conversion, curtailment of production and dismissal of qualified personnel. Massive unemployment and enormous social tension among workers in the defense industry are becoming quite real.
Along with the secession of the republics from the USSR, the aspirations for the redistribution of inter-republican, inter-regional, inter-district borders, as well as the borders between cities and their rural environments, will be legalized.
Conclusion
The unconstitutional coup and its defeat complete the initial period of perestroika, when, initiated from above and far from immediately and not supported by everyone from below, it hardly moved forward in the face of the ever-intensifying confrontation between the forces of communism and democracy. And behind the scenes of this struggle, the revolutionary explosion that had already occurred in other European countries socialism in the form of so-called "velvet" or "non-velvet" revolutions against Stalinism and post-Stalinist forms of pseudo-Stalinism and totalitarianism.
In the Soviet press, in scientific literature, it was repeatedly said that the path of liberation from Stalinist and post-Stalinist totalitarianism common to the countries of socialism in each country passed in its own way. Due to the peculiarities of Soviet history and the long existence of the rule of the Bolshevik Party here, the Soviet anti-totalitarian revolution had to take its own special path here, very different from what took place in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Life has confirmed this prediction.
Despite the fact that it was in the Soviet Union, at the initiative of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev, that perestroika began as a revolution from above, which became the epicenter of all upheavals in the “Socialist world”, in itself such a revolution only undermined the totalitarian structures, but failed to destroy them, which caused growing discontent among the masses. Resisting revolutionary changes, the party-state democracy had extensive experience here, which allowed it to slow down perestroika for six years, either frustrating its reforms, or making an attempt to overthrow its initiator, make it its hostage and prisoner, and surround it on all sides with its people. At a certain point, when it became obvious that the party-state democracy was finally losing the reins of government, it went for a direct anti-constitutional coup d'état.
The first and most important lesson is that, despite all the critics of perestroika, its six years that had passed at that time, flowing in fierce confrontation, in the advances and retreats of long overdue transformations, were by no means in vain.
These years of the destruction of communism and perestroika, the consciousness associated with the development of democracy and glasnost, although they did not rebuild the whole country, nevertheless changed its people, the Soviet people, who in August 1991 could rightfully write on their posters: “We are not slaves slaves are not us!”, therefore, despite the important role of leaders and heroes who defended freedom on the barricades near the “White House”, it is indisputable that the main hero was the entire Soviet people, and not individual personalities who are everywhere (in factories and fields, in the army and institutions, in universities and schools) has become different over the years. It was he who was the main, decisive force that in advance doomed the conspiracy of party-state democracy to failure, led to the relatively bloodless suppression of the rather formidable forces of the putschists.
By mid-1991, the ideas of freedom, democracy, and glasnost had already penetrated deeply into all strata of Soviet society. For all the dissimilarities in the behavior of different social and age groups, two points seem especially important. Firstly, in recent years, a new youth of 18-23 years old has appeared, and this is about 30 million new citizens, whose consciousness was no longer formed under the conditions of totalitarianism, but in the six years of freedom that came with perestroika. It was these young people who became one of the most fighting forces on the barricades, it was their victims who turned out to be the greatest on the way to victory. Secondly, despite the specific conditions of the country, where totalitarianism dominated for many decades and conformist consciousness was brought up, there was still no significant confrontation between generations: the active participation of the "sixties" and part of the front-line soldiers on the side of the democratic forces showed that even the years of "Khrushchev's thaw" were not in vain.
The second important lesson is that with all the growth of consciousness and activity of Soviet citizens, the huge degree of politicization and significant democratization of society main weakness Awakened to the action of the popular forces, which the putschists took advantage of, there were inconsistencies in actions and even a split in the democratic forces. After all, the anti-constitutional coup happened after a long disunity of the democratic forces, grouped, on the one hand, around the initiator of perestroika, M. Gorbachev, and on the other, around the oppositionist B. Yeltsin. This long period of disunity and mutual struggle led to negative consequences. Intolerance, growing into mutual hostility, not only testified to a very low level of political culture, but also was an indicator of the leaders' poor understanding of their political vocation, their duties to the people, which made their personal ambitions and antipathies the most important reserve of the putschists.
The actions of the democrats, grouped by B. Yeltsin and aiming their actions at undermining the positions of M. Gorbachev, made their very significant contribution in early 1991 to undermining the authority of the constitutional government, to destroying the management of the allied economy, which, as you know, was widely used by the putschists. The actions of the democrats, supported by M. Gorbachev and seeking to weaken the positions of B. Yeltsin, significantly undermined their own authority and significantly reduced the overall potential of the democratic forces, which also stimulated the conspirators. Even after the start of the anti-constitutional coup, when every sane person's game of the putschists on the split of the democratic forces became extremely clear, there were hidden servants of the putschists who, rejoicing, spread the rumor about the alleged collusion of the President of the USSR with the politicians who carried out the coup.
Today it seems indisputable that the conspirators were prompted by the possibility of signing the announced Union Treaty, already in the agreement on the rapprochement of all the democratic forces of the country. This could lead to the escalation of the rapprochement of democratic forces to their cooperation, which was extremely dangerous for non-democratic forces, the party-state bureaucracy and the ambitions of all extremists.
And this means that we should talk again and again about the importance and necessity of the unity of democratic forces as the main lesson of the completed period, about the inadmissibility of their disunity, and even more so a split. Therefore, the main result can only be the following: the interaction and cooperation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, between democrats of all trends and shades, that has objectively developed - contrary to personal likes and dislikes - in the course of the fight against the unconstitutional coup d'état should not only be preserved, but also strengthened through the transformation into conscious interaction and coordinated cooperation, because without this it is impossible to consolidate the victory, but most importantly, it is impossible to successfully solve the key task of committing an anti-constitutional coup, being scattered democratic forces.
Bibliography:
1) G.A. Belousova, V.A. Lebedev. Partocracy and putsch. - M .: "Republic", 1992.
2) Putsch. Chronicle of troubled days. - M .: "Process", 1991.
4) M.S. Gorbachev. August coup. - M .: "News", 1991.
5) Yu.S. Sidorenko. Three days that overturned Bolshevism. - Rostov-on-Don, 1991.
6) V. Zhuravleva. History of modern Russia. 1985 - 1994. - M, 1995.
7) V.V. Sholokhov. Political history of Russia in parties and persons. - M, 1993.
Applications
Decree No. 1 of the State Document
In order to protect the vital interests of the peoples and citizens of the USSR, independence and territorial integrity country, restoring law and order, stabilizing the situation, overcoming the most difficult crisis, preventing chaos, anarchy and fratricidal civil war, the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR decides:
1) All authorities and administrations of the USSR, union and autonomous territories, regions, cities, districts, towns and villages to ensure strict observance of the state of emergency in accordance with the law of the USSR "On the legal regime of the state of emergency" and the decisions of the State Emergency Committee of the USSR. In case of failure to ensure this regime, the powers of the relevant authorities and administrations are suspended, and the implementation of their functions is entrusted to persons specially authorized by the USSR State Emergency Committee.
2) Immediately disband the structures of power and control, paramilitary formations acting contrary to the Constitution of the USSR and the laws of the USSR.
4) Suspend the activities of political parties, public organizations and mass movements that impede the normalization of the situation.
5) Due to the fact that the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR temporarily assumes the functions of the USSR Security Council, the activities of the latter are suspended.
6) Citizens, institutions and organizations to immediately surrender all types of firearms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment and equipment. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR ensure the strict implementation of this requirement. In case of refusal - to seize them forcibly with the involvement of violators to strictly criminal and administrative responsibility.
7) The Procurator, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense of the USSR organize effective interaction law enforcement agencies and the Armed Forces to ensure the protection of public order and the security of the state, society and citizens in accordance with the USSR Law "On the legal regime of emergency
Rallies, street marches, demonstrations, and strikes are not allowed.
In necessary cases, impose a curfew, patrol the territories, carry out inspections, take measures to strengthen the customs and border regime.
Take control and, if necessary, protect the most important state and economic facilities, as well as life support systems.
Resolutely suppress the spread of inflammatory rumors, actions that provoke violations of law and order and incite ethnic hatred and disobedience to officials who enforce the state of emergency.
8) Establish control over the media, entrust its implementation to a specially created body under the State Emergency Committee of the USSR.
9) Government authorities, heads of institutions and enterprises to take measures to improve organization, restore order and discipline in all spheres of society. To ensure the normal functioning of enterprises in all branches of the national economy, the strict implementation of measures to preserve and restore vertical and horizontal ties between economic entities throughout the USSR for the period of stabilization, and the strict fulfillment of the established volumes of production, supplies of raw materials, materials and complete products.
Establish and maintain a regime of austerity in material, technical and monetary resources, develop and implement specific measures to combat mismanagement and squandering of people's property.
11) The Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR, within a week's time, carry out an inventory of all available food resources and industrial materials of prime necessity, report to the people what the country has, and take under the strictest control their safety and distribution.
To cancel any restrictions that prevent the movement of food and consumer goods, as well as material resources for their production, through the territory of the USSR, to strictly control the observance of such an order.
Pay special attention to the priority supply of preschool children's institutions, orphanages, schools, secondary and higher educational institutions, as well as pensioners and the disabled.
Within a week, submit a proposal to streamline, freeze and reduce prices for certain types of industrial and food products, primarily for children, services to the population and public catering, as well as to increase wages, pensions, benefits and compensation payments to various categories of citizens.
Within a two-week period, develop measures to streamline the wages of heads of all levels of state, public, cooperative and other institutions, organizations and enterprises.
12) Considering the critical situation with harvesting and the threat of famine, take urgent measures to organize the procurement, storage and processing of agricultural products. To provide rural workers with the maximum possible assistance with equipment, spare parts, fuels and lubricants, etc. Immediately organize the dispatch of workers and employees of enterprises and organizations, students and military personnel to the countryside in the quantities necessary to save the harvest.
13) The Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR within a week to develop a resolution providing for the provision in 1991-1992 of all desiring urban residents with land plots for horticultural work in the amount of 0.15 hectares.
14) The Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR within two weeks to complete the planning of urgent measures to bring the country's fuel and energy complex out of the crisis and prepare for winter.
15) In a month's time, prepare and report to the people real measures for 1992 to radically improve housing construction and provide the population with housing.
Within six months, develop a specific program for the accelerated development of state, cooperative and individual housing construction for a five-year period.
16) To oblige the authorities and administrations in the center and in the localities to give priority attention to the social needs of the population. Find ways to substantially improve free medical care and public education.
Decree No. 2
State Committee
on the state of emergency in the USSR
On the issue of central, Moscow city and regional newspapers
In connection with the introduction of a state of emergency on August 19, 1991 in Moscow and in some other territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article 4 of the USSR Law "On the legal regime of a state of emergency, the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR decides:
Temporarily limit the list of published central, Moscow city and regional socio-political publications to the following newspapers: Trud, Rabochaya Tribuna, Izvestia, Pravda, Krasnaya Zvezda, Soviet Russia, Moskovskaya Pravda, Lenin banner”, Rural life”.
The resumption of publication of other central, Moscow city and regional newspapers and socio-political publications will be decided by a specially created body of the State Emergency Committee of the USSR.
State Committee
on the state of emergency in the USSR
Decree No. 3
State Committee
on the state of emergency in the USSR
In connection with the introduction of a state of emergency on August 19, 1991 in Moscow and in some other territories of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article 4 of the USSR Law "On the Legal Regime of the State of Emergency", the State Committee on the State of Emergency in the USSR decides:
The All-Union State Television and Radio Company, republican, regional, regional television and radio organizations shall be strictly guided in their work by the decisions of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR.
To entrust the leadership of the All-Union Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting in the USSR and the All-Union Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (Gosteleradio) with the coordination of the activities of television and radio broadcasting organizations throughout the country. Temporarily empower the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, if necessary, to suspend or cancel the instructions of local authorities that contradict the tasks and principles of broadcasting in a state of emergency.
Temporarily limit the list of programs broadcast from Moscow to the entire territory of the country with the following programs:
on television - the first, second and third programs of the central television;
on radio broadcasting - the first, second, third programs of the central All-Union radio broadcasting;
Temporarily limit the use of Union radio stations for broadcasting by a number of Union republics of their radio programs to foreign countries.
Programs of the republican television and radio broadcasting shall be broadcast on the territory of the corresponding republic only through channels and transmission facilities allocated for these purposes.
Suspend the activities of television and radio in Russia, as well as the radio station "Echo of Moscow", as not contributing to the process of stabilizing the situation in the country.
The transmission of television and radio broadcasting programs of public, commercial and other broadcasting bodies that are not included in the broadcasting structure specified in the paragraphs of this resolution is temporarily suspended.
The Ministry of Communications of the USSR and the Ministry of Communications of the Union Republics shall ensure the suspension of broadcasting and the transmission of programs by non-state broadcasting bodies over cable networks.
Previously issued registration certificates for television and radio broadcasting are terminated. The procedure and terms for re-registration of television and radio broadcasting bodies will be announced later.
Instruct the USSR Ministry of Communications to take control of all existing and reserve centers and communication channels and broadcasting on the territory of the country (including those of republican subordination).
Gosteleradio and the Ministry of Communications of the USSR, in cooperation with the leadership of the All-Union Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, create a temporary coordinating group to regulate television and radio broadcasting in the country, including in matters of allocation of frequencies, provision of broadcasting time and technical means.
The KGB of the USSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and their local authorities to take additional measures to ensure the implementation of this resolution.
State Committee
on the state of emergency in the USSR
Decree of the President of the RSFSR
In connection with the action of a group of persons who declared themselves state committee under the state of emergency, I decree:
2) All decisions taken on behalf of the so-called committee on the state of emergency are considered illegal and not valid on the territory of the RSFSR. On the territory of the Federation, there is a legally elected authority represented by the President, the Supreme Council and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, all state and local authorities and administrations of the RSFSR.
3) The actions of officials executing the decisions of this committee are subject to the provisions of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and are subject to legal prosecution.
This Decree shall enter into force from the time of its signing.
President of the RSFSR B. Yeltsin.
Was the "Tulip Revolution" a distraction revolution?
Despite the overthrow of President Akayev, the history of this small Central Asian country has not yet been turned. A population that has a taste for shaping the fate of the country on the street does not want to stop there, and the orientation of the future regime remains unclear.
In Kochkor, a place whose name means "ram", southeast of Bishkek, there is a monument to Lenin. Shining like the zinc dome of a mosque, it remains on its plinth. The mountains of the Celestial Empire - "Ala-Too" in Kyrgyz, "Tien Shan" - in Chinese, calmly look at this picture - the leader has lost his Soviet arrogance; this is an ordinary politician in a redingote, frozen with a speech on his lips. In this strategic area, at an altitude dominating the Torugart Pass (3,752 meters), there are checkpoints - the border with China. It was in Kochkor after the February 27 parliamentary elections that the "Tulip Revolution" began, which led to the fall of the regime of Askar Akayev, who had ruled Kyrgyzstan since 1990.
An election billboard still stands outside the market, praising the merits and aspirations of Akylbek Zhaparov, "leader, deputy, president," depicted against a backdrop of sparkling mountains. Zhaparov is one of the candidates who were disqualified from running because of two or three complaints from unknown individuals who accused him of trying to buy their votes. . . The same thing happened to Roza Otunbayeva, today the interim head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - she also held this post under Akaev, along with other positions in various embassies: her name was also deleted from the voting lists due to the fact that she lived outside of Kyrgyzstan for the last five years. But in fact - because she put forward her candidacy in the same constituency as the president's daughter, Bermet Akayeva. "Many people's eyes were opened," says 22-year-old Dilshod Berbaev, "even those who were not hostile to the authorities. People understood what methods the authorities are using."
This fragile-looking young man is a part-time student, a future specialist in hydraulics. He voluntarily became a member of the United Nations Development Program, in addition, he is a member of the Democratic Free Youth Club, a non-governmental organization founded in 2003. "There are 500 of us in the Kochkor region, 11 group leaders, 3 of which are girls." On that day, with the participation of the elders - in high traditional white felt headdresses - a meeting was held at the Information Center for Democracy. Hanging on the walls is a schedule of "educational seminars" that have been held three or four times a month since 2003, organized with the help of foreign non-governmental organizations, most of them American. Citizens' rights, women's rights, meeting with muftis, getting to know civil society. . . Hard work is going on. "In a democratic society, the most important thing is the equality of people and power," Dilshod says, "that's what I want, and also to be happy and kind. Islam deals with all problems. A real Muslim cannot wallow in corruption and deceive others. Akaev and his family "These are the atheists."
"I want to help the people"
An unexpected creed for the fighter of the "Tulip Revolution". A revolution unlike either the Georgian Rose Revolution or the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. This revolution must be brought to an end. If "democracy" does not come, the young man will completely go to Islam. Today he has nothing in common with radical Islamist activists, nor with representatives of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Liberation Party, banned in all states of Central Asia - where this party seeks to establish a caliphate - the number of supporters of this party in southern Kyrgyzstan is 3,000 human.
The young man is proud of his father who died early, and especially his mother - the granddaughter of the country's first professor, the creator of the Cyrillic transcription of the Kyrgyz language and new alphabetic characters - at the beginning of the 20th century, the Kyrgyz used Arabic letters. An ardent young man says: "I want to help the people." He tells how part of the inhabitants of Kochkor, "outraged" by the manipulations of the authorities, blocked the Bishkek-Kashgar (China) road, how it was decided to vote against all candidates. . . More than 60% of voters followed the call, especially since no one ran from the village itself.
With new elections coming up on May 5, Dilshod hopes that Akylbek Japarov, a native of Kochkor and now acting finance minister, will run for office. The actions of the favorite do not bother him very much. Upon taking office, Zhaparov dismissed one of his assistants, who had worked under the previous regime - sometimes worthy people were appointed under the previous government - a 34-year-old economist whose competence was recognized by foreign representatives. At the same time, Japarov has already appointed one of his brothers to the post of head of the tax office in Bishkek, his nephew - head of the customs service in Manas, the capital's airport. . . "That's right, but for the first time, before the presidential elections on July 10," Dilshod defends his candidate, "his brothers are in business, but he - he helped us get in touch with international non-governmental organizations."
Dilshod arrived in the capital on March 21. "2000 people came from Kochkor, we mixed with people from Osh and other places." Three days later, Dilshod was among the first to enter the White House, a government building guarded by a single tank and a company of frightened cadets. "Water flowed there. Everything was empty: officials and secretaries fled. Only the technical staff remained." Together with other "revolutionaries" he spent the night on the spot. Then a warehouse of weapons was found - "hundreds of Kalashnikov assault rifles" - guards were posted at the warehouse. Pogroms have already begun in the street. "I hoped there would be no violence," Dilshod regrets. And he is not alone in this.
In fact, next to him that day was Edil Baisalov, president of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society. "We wanted to set up tents in the central square and stay there as long as necessary," he says. He was an observer at the presidential elections in Ukraine and thought to act according to the same scenario - a tent city was set up in the center of Kyiv. "The idea was to negotiate Akaev's resignation, with the help of the international community," says Alisher Mamasaliev, a law student and coordinator of the country's most active youth movement, Kel-Kel, the regime formed an eponymous organization to disperse the movement. . In vain. Alisher ran for the local elections in October 2004. "Then I realized that young people are too passive."
All three feel that the revolution has been stolen from them. The opposition leaders themselves, led by 55-year-old Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a former prime minister under Akaev, and Roza Otunbayeva, who was for some time the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Georgia, where she could directly observe the development of the "Rose Revolution", opposition leaders show signs of hesitation. "We were waiting for measures against robberies, but they were discussing which of the parliaments, the old one or the new one, should be considered legal! - exclaims Alisher Mamasaliev - they had to be returned from heaven to earth."
Introduce a state of emergency?
The provocateurs arrived the day before, they were seen by foreign observers, "they were armed with chains covered with plastic. Among them were policemen. I am convinced that the violence was provoked by the environment of the authorities." Goals? Turkish and Chinese supermarkets, firms and shopping malls such as Silk Road or the Narodny chain of stores, said to belong to the Akaev clan. "A day earlier, from the network of stores owned by Aidar, the son of the former president, they took out everything of value on unmarked trucks," says Alisher Mamasaliev. His words are also confirmed by the new Prosecutor General, Azimbek Beknazarov, who does not confine himself to comments alone: "70 criminal cases have been opened on the fact of robberies. The investigation team is working." In addition, he is going to shed light on cases related to corruption: "A sequestration has been imposed on the property of the family."
Was it an attempt to discredit the opposition? Was it necessary to sow panic among the population in order to introduce a state of emergency? Was it a cover for the entry of "peacekeeping forces" under the auspices of Russia? Moscow constantly referred to the collective security treaty signed in 1992 when talking about partnership with Bishkek. All versions are in progress.
One of the country's most powerful politicians, 56-year-old Felix Kulov, former minister of national security under Akayev and later mayor of Bishkek, has been in prison since 2001. His father, a top KGB official, named his son after Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Cheka, the first Soviet political police. Felix Kulov was released by demonstrators on 24 March. He was charged with restoring order. To then resign and return to the cell while the Supreme Court reviews his case. The Supreme Court ruled to close the case with three articles of charges under which Kulov was held under Akaev. He was arrested in 2000 shortly after running for president. Kulov is now one of the favorites in the July 10 elections, according to a recent public opinion poll conducted by a local agency with the help of the Foundation Friedrich Ebert. 52% of voters are going to vote for him against 18.3% - for Bakiyev, who is now acting president and prime minister. Bakiyev was once suspected of wanting to block Kulov's path, but Kulov replies that he "has never been a supporter of these political games, but prefers fair elections." Between themselves they have already agreed. If one is elected president, the other will take over as head of government. . .
In the meantime, whether because of the too rapid fall of the Akayev regime, or because the new government was established only for a short time, the population, to get a taste for deciding the fate of the country on the streets, is trying to retain this power for as long as possible. For example, in one of the districts of Jalal-Abad, residents are divided into four parties, each of which is trying to bring its own person to power. In early April, Japarov arrived in Kochkor, accompanied by a dozen armed men, to appoint one of his supporters to a leadership position. Some residents objected. There were clashes.
Finally, former rectors universities refuse to give way to new ones. Almost every day, in Bishkek, rallies are held in front of the White House or in front of the Supreme Court building in support of one or another deputy whose victory in the parliamentary elections is contested by his rivals, or a deputy whose supporters believe that he should be elected. . . But that's not the only problem the new leadership faces. Thousands of homeless people from the poor southern districts - joined by discontents of all sorts - are demanding plots of land around Bishkek.
According to official figures, 750,000 people live in the capital, but in reality this number exceeds "1 million, even 1.5 million," according to Roman Mogilevsky, director of the Kyrgyz Center for Social and Economic Research. Immigrants sometimes manage to get a job "in the black." "If we don't get the land before the elections, we will lose confidence in the authorities," said Baktibek, a native of Naryn, near the Chinese border. According to the laws of Kyrgyzstan, every citizen has the right to a land plot. At the time of independence, there were more than 700 collective farms and collective farms in the country, whose lands "were distributed among 770,000 owners in the course of land and agrarian reform," said Kurmanbek Bakiyev.
Bakiyev, who comes from the south, is suspected of making promises to his compatriots. The authorities reminded the people who arrived in the capital of respect for the laws, and most of them were sent to their native provinces. On April 10, Usen Kudaibergenov, Kulov's "right hand", was killed. He organized detachments of volunteers to resist the robberies and wanted to put an end to the wild land grab.
Robberies and murders have sowed panic among the Russian minority, which is widely represented in Bishkek, these people fear for their property. Natasha, an accountant working in the capital, says that she will leave the country if the robberies touch her native village. . . Tens of thousands of Russians have already left the country since independence.
In Kyrgyzstan, regionalism is a factor to be reckoned with. Since ancient times, the north was more developed than the south, more Russians lived in the north. "There is an unwritten law here," emphasizes Edil Baisalov, "that is the division of power between the two geographical centers. A native of the north, Akaev brought representatives of his clan to power. He was defeated. Instead of striving for the consolidation of the nation, he further worsened the situation in the regions." In turn, Bakiyev, in response to criticism, says that out of 17 posts in his government, "11 are occupied by representatives of the north, and only 6 by southerners." According to him, "professionalism is the only criterion for evaluation."
Let it be. But NGOs estimate that he and his allies like Japarov are repeating the mistakes of the former regime. "It's true," Bakiyev notes, "my two brothers hold high posts in Jalal-Abad. Janysh was appointed to the post of head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but he was not appointed by me, and this is temporary. Dzhusupbek was appointed, after March 24, as deputy county governor. But he no longer holds that position." The majority of Kyrgyzstanis have been brought up in the tradition of clan ties and will not reproach Bakiyev on the condition that he maintains a balance in the regions. But Ramazan Dyryldaev, head of the Kyrgyz Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, thinks otherwise: "I hoped that the opposition would be united and would fight for the idea, but I only see the struggle of the clans. Kulov is a northerner, but, fortunately, he does not have "There are too many brothers. Bakiyev has seven. Otunbayeva has seven sisters, not counting one who lives in Austria, and they have husbands... Everyone pulls the blanket over themselves."
Bishkek is far from Kyiv, the outcome of the revolution is by no means clear. The US, which is accused of "pulling the strings," wants to secure its interests today. So Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Kyrgyzstan to make sure the agreement on the US base at Gansi, near Manas airport, remains in place. Meanwhile, the new team, in the person of Roza Otunbayeva, wants to reassure Russia by talking about "indestructible friendship." Even before the fall of Akaev's regime, the then-presidential Vecherniy Bishkek newspaper recalled, not without mockery, that Otunbayeva's dissertation, which she defended at Moscow State University in the 1970s, was "Criticism of the Frankfurt School's Distortion of the Dialectic of Marxism-Leninism." Nothing special, this is not the "stigma" of the Soviet era. The same applies to the official position of Kulov and Bakiyev during the Soviet era.
"Organize fair elections"
The task facing the former oppositionists is extremely difficult. Poverty is rampant in the country, and "the population is waiting for a significant improvement in living standards," emphasizes Roza Otunbayeva, "the former regime took loans without any responsibility, the country is mired in debt, corruption has reached critical point. . . ". Many destitute in Bishkek are demanding that Askar Akaev "return what he took from the people."
Above all, "we must prove that we are capable of organizing fair elections," insists the foreign minister. In addition, the norms of civil society require this, and the chairman of the Constitutional Court, Cholpon Baekova, considers it necessary to revise the Constitution, "because the current Constitution protects the interests of the authorities, not citizens." Should we go back to the 1993 text, democratic in content and only later "corrupted" by the many changes made under the previous regime, or should we perhaps establish a "parliamentary republic", as proposed by some parties and non-governmental organizations, in order to end the authoritarian past?
Recently, a round table was held on this topic, but it is obvious that there will not be enough time to pass the relevant laws before July 10. "At the very least, it is necessary that the candidates make appropriate commitments to their programs," calls Alisher Mamasaliev, "and let the one who promises to limit his powers more strongly be elected!" First of all, "it is necessary to stabilize the situation" - such is the leitmotif of all discussions. "And property rights need to be secured," adds Roman Mogilevsky.
But who benefits from chaos? “Who is interested in manipulation, in destabilizing Kyrgyzstan? I can only give one answer,” writes Rene Cagnat, a writer and essayist (1) working in Central Asia, “drug traffickers. Because they felt about a year ago that the fight against the spread of drugs is becoming effective. Why is their interest in creating "gray zones" where it will be difficult to fight them." Was the "Tulip Revolution" a distraction revolution?
P.S
Askar Akaev's eldest daughter, 32-year-old Bermet Akaeva, who initially joined the family and left the country, returned to Bishkek to take her seat in parliament. Hundreds of demonstrators protested against her return, for them it was a sign that the former regime remained in power. Her husband, a Kazakh businessman who controls entire sectors of the country's economy, did not follow her.
(1) "Jildyz, or the song of the mountains of the skies" (ed. Flammarion)
Kyrgyzstan
Area: 199,900 square kilometers, the smallest country in Central Asia, 41% of the territory is at an altitude of 3000 meters and above.
Population: 5.2 million people: Kyrgyz (65.7%), Uzbeks (13%, 9), Russians (11.7%), as well as a minority - representatives of the peoples deported under Stalin, Muslim Uighurs, and Dungans, immigrants from China.
State language: Kyrgyz. Russian language is official language since 2001.
GNP per capita: $330.
External debt: $1.8 billion (2003), i.e. 98% of GNP.
Natural resources: gold deposits, rare metals, bauxite, iron, etc. An abundance of water resources.
The materials of InoSMI contain only assessments of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the editors of InoSMI.
Bourgeois thought is moving forward little by little. She recognizes the successes of the USSR, with the exception of one, which is discussed below. She is ready to admit the inevitability of the October Revolution. She already knows about investment cycles in the USSR in the 1930s. She comes to the idea of the repressions of 1937-1938 as a struggle within the ruling class. She is "worried, though not overly surprised, by how stubbornly everything Russian problems and the proposed solutions are built along a scale where the ideological values and cultural practices of a certain generalized West are taken as the top level. This historical timeline is commonly referred to as modernization. But a one-dimensional perspective distorts both real political goals and the means available to Russia." By the way, the authors of the quote in their article again and again switch to the same one-dimensional scale. In almost all articles of the journal from which this quote is taken, the idea of that despite the achievements of the USSR, its development was supposed to return it to the capitalist path.It would be possible to sort out the misconceptions in each article of this magazine, but for this it would be necessary to write too much bukaff, and this would not explain the most controversial issues: Why did USSR? Was it possible to prevent the collapse? The point is not only that bourgeois thought is forced to use false concepts, and the disclosure of its falsity does not yet explain the essence of the phenomenon. The point is that these questions themselves are false.
I do not understand the current lamentation for the Soviet education that has died in Bose. We, Soviet educated people, were unable to resist the false propaganda of the era of perestroika and glasnost. We were told that Marx was obsolete, and we only nodded hesitantly in response, and only a few - with doubt. Despite our "the best education in the world", in 1983 the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU noted: "To be frank, we still do not adequately know the society in which we live and work, we have not fully revealed its inherent patterns, especially economic. Therefore, we are forced to act, so to speak, empirically, in a very irrational way of trial and error. Now evaluate his words, given the diplomatic language he was forced to use in 1983. “We don’t know properly”, “not completely”, “so to speak” - this now sounds very cautious, but then it was like a bucket cold water on the head of every member of the Central Committee. “We don’t know enough” means that we don’t know enough to act rationally, we don’t know enough to plan, our life is no better than capitalist anarchy, about the shortcomings of which agitprop repeats. And why then were all these efforts, without which the countries of "a certain generalized West" did? This is the main claim to the revolution on the part of the Soviet society of the 80s. We will not say how false these claims were. Let's talk about the revolution.
In 1967, Isaac Deutscher gave several lectures, published under the title "Unfinished Revolution". When I talk about flaws Soviet education, I'm talking about the fact that such work did not appear in the USSR. She could not appear in the USSR, and this ruined him, among other things.
These are lectures, not a detailed book, so the presentation is thesis, with a small number of illustrations, almost no references. Her theses are difficult to convey in a compressed form, you just have to quote them.
Almost any Marxist or bourgeois thinker who flaunts a knowledge of Marxism can be summed up in two words about the Russian Revolution: "illegal revolution." She violated the laws of Marxism. Deutscher writes: “Karl Marx and his disciples hoped that the proletarian revolution would be free from the feverish turns, false consciousness and irrational decisions characteristic of the bourgeois revolution. Of course, they had in mind the socialist revolution in its “pure form”; they assumed that it will occur in industrialized countries that are at a high level of economic and cultural development". Here it would be nice to place references to similar hopes of Marx. If I have a well-read reader, perhaps he will point me to these links. I noticed that, speaking of social development, Marx emphasized that its laws take place in the form of a trend, a certain general direction that emerges in the bustle of people. The consciousness of individual people reflects the state of society, the level of its development. If the level of development of society is such that its consciousness is true, then why else is a revolution needed? If the decisions are rational, then the active masses already have a communist consciousness. Now, the actions of the authorities to support capitalism are irrational, insane, and just as insane are the actions of the masses supporting the authorities. Moreover, this madness is most pronounced in the most developed countries. And with all this, how to make a rational revolution? Revolution is not only a transformation of the mode of production, it is also the development of social consciousness, from capitalist madness to communist reason. But this is not an instant matter. It takes time, action, the masses learn communism, and there is no such thing as learning without mistakes. Later, in hindsight, people will understand that it was true, reasonably Deutscher explains the irrationalism of Soviet history by the contradictions between the two Russian revolutions - the bourgeois and the socialist - but I repeat, many actions of the revolutionaries in the most "pure" socialist revolution will inevitably be irrational.
We are so accustomed to talking about bourgeois revolutions that we lose the idea of the views of the actors themselves on those events. Deutscher correctly notes that for the main revolutionary subject - the insurgent masses - "there is no bourgeois revolution. They fight for freedom and equality or for brotherhood and public welfare." Even the leaders of these masses are not bourgeois, and the leaders do not think that their actions are in fact a bourgeois revolution. The bourgeois do not lead the revolution, they protect and increase their capital. But in the end, the uprising of the masses and their leadership destroy the conditions for the existence of the previous ruling class and create conditions for the development of the bourgeoisie, the development of the capitalist mode of production. The working masses receive a new yoke around their necks, revolutionary leaders perish or degenerate.
Deutscher reiterates, as do many other historians and publicists, that in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, workers were a small minority in a few large cities. The absolute majority of the population were peasants who, fifty years before, had received limited legal freedom, but had not received the main thing - the means of peasant production - land. Here Deutscher, like many others, is a little disingenuous. The Russian peasantry did not constitute a monolithic class. Those interested can open Lenin's study "The Development of Capitalism in Russia" and find out that by the end of the 19th century, up to half of the rural population was the proletariat (For memory. It is significant that the household had a voice in the community, but the households of the poor were smaller. If my memory serves me right , the study showed that half of the households are proletarian, without horses (in terms of the number of people, this is less than half.). To feed themselves, these people were forced to work for their wealthy neighbors or in rural industrial enterprises, which were quite numerous. Thus, the proportion of the proletariat in the Russian population was quite large. But activity is determined not only by the economic situation, but also by consciousness, by the goals set by the masses. The misfortune of the Russian countryside was the land famine. A certain amount of land is required to feed one person. In order to simply feed themselves, the peasants were forced to rent land from the landlords, and they produced products not for sale. To pay rent and taxes, they often had to earn extra money by handicraft. Thus, it must be taken into account that the village was not economically monolithic, but was united in its desire to divide the landlords' land.
The events associated with February 1917 are habitually called the bourgeois revolution, but it should be emphasized that this was a very limited revolution. The cowardly Petrograd Soviet handed power to the bourgeois government on a silver platter, and this government in the political field could only confirm what the people had done and could not do anything in the economic field. Here is a typical example for you, when the bourgeoisie undertakes to lead the bourgeois revolution. The only parties that supported the black redistribution were the Bolsheviks and the left S-R. The socialist transformations taking place in the cities, the establishment of workers' control over production, again went beyond the decisions of the bourgeois government. But the story is known to my reader.
Deutscher emphasizes the fundamental contradiction of the Russian revolution: "The people throughout vast peasant Russia rushed to acquire property, while the workers of both capitals sought to abolish it." The fact is that the rural proletariat also believed deliverance from their troubles in the redistribution of land. Like, just to get a land plot, and it will be easier there. That the division of land into peasant farms creates the conditions for the development of capitalist relations in the countryside, with all the consequences that follow from this, such as the ruin of the majority of the peasants, the peasants themselves simply could not understand, no matter who explained it to them. "Only life teaches," and this study was yet to come.
A few years after the start of the proletarian revolution, the industrial proletariat was left without. Part of the workers died in the civil war, part of the workers went over to state bodies, part simply left the ruined factories in order to survive on small farms. In Russia, according to Deutscher, a state of dictatorship of a non-existent proletariat arose. This was another contradiction of the revolution, irrationality, and one had to live with it somehow.
The world revolution has not yet taken place. And we had to live with that too.
What was the Bolsheviks to do? What would you do in their place, even with today's afterknowledge? Loudly announce that "the experiment failed, come, bourgeois, and own"?
Although the village supplied its sons to the armies of all the warring parties, its damage was insignificant compared to the city. The peasants had enough strength to plow and sow the land they received, while the city did not have the strength to start the factories right away. Yesterday's rural proletarians had land, and they were determined to cultivate it. Separate rural communes broke up, they were also knocked out during the war. The Bolsheviks could only hope for the restoration and development of industry, but for now they retreated in the countryside. The small rural proprietor could not manage without a market.
In general, a small owner is present in any segment human history, starting from the time of the formation of the neighboring community. The struggle of the community members against their fortunate neighbors, against the enslavement of the less fortunate community members by their neighbors, the struggle of the demos against the aristocracy, led to the formation of classical slavery. The aristocracy turned to the capture of slaves outside the community, and in this it was helped by the demos, supplying warriors.
The small owner turned out to be more productive than the slaves, and this led to a new form of exploitation. The mass of small proprietors turned out to be the soil on which the capitalist mode of production germinated. But despite the trend noted by Marx in the Communist Manifesto, the trend towards the growth of the industrial proletariat, the class of small proprietors does not disappear under capitalism. Rosa Luxemburg called these strata "pre-capitalist" and believed that they would be gradually exhausted by the capitalist mode of production, that at the limit of the development of capitalism they would be swallowed up by two main classes: capitalists and industrial workers. We have to admit that this was a mistake, the capitalist mode of production, as it is, not only cannot exist without non-capitalist layers, but it also supports their existence. These layers should not be called "pre-capitalist", but "para-capitalist", if one wants to somehow define them. Capitalist society is approaching the frontier of the socialist revolution with a broad tail of small-ownership strata. (As an illustration, we can cite the flagship country of capitalism. Tens of thousands of small entrepreneurs go bankrupt there every year. But this means that tens of thousands of small enterprises are formed every year. And at the same time, no one will deny that the conditions for the activities of the bourgeoisie have long been created and are developing in the USA .)
Deutscher's words that "Russia is ripe and at the same time not ripe for a socialist revolution" can be applied to any country, at any level of development of capitalism, starting from a certain minimum. But at the same time, it will not be possible to say about a single country, even with the highest level of development of capitalism, that it is "fully ripe for a socialist revolution." There is a contradiction in this very statement. If it has matured "completely", then why is capitalism still there?
Further in the history of Soviet Russia comes what both Deutscher and the bourgeois ideologists from "Expert" unanimously talk about - the so-called collectivization, which is not called anything other than "violent". There is a lot of leaf in the story of the bourgeois ideologists about the times of the so-called new economic policy. Like, the peasant managed, fed the country, the urban industry grew at a high pace, and suddenly the evil Stalin, for an insignificant reason (well, the owners did not want to sell grain to the state at a low price), attacked the unfortunate. Moreover, the Bolsheviks ruined the most hardworking, productive, and drove the rest of the poor into collective farms. Then there was horror, like serfdom, etc.
Stalin was not a gift. He arranged everything. For example, at the Fourteenth Congress he declared that despite the Party's policy of reducing social stratification in the countryside, statistics indicate an increase in this stratification. "So the statistics lie!" This is the middle of the NEP, a blessed time. The Party seeks to support the rural poor and to limit the rural rich. But despite this, the share of both of them in the rural population is increasing. More precisely, the latter with might and main increase the number of the former, feed at their expense. And how did you want? This is business. In the market element, some small proprietors grow into large ones, while the rest go into the proletariat. Large owners are drawn to power. The example of Father Pavlik Morozov is typical. What is the dictatorship of the proletariat to do? Now the proletariat already exists. Industry in the cities revives. There was a mistake or betrayal of Stalin and his team. As the proletariat grew, it was necessary to give control to it, so to speak, to fill the dictatorship of the proletariat with the emerging class. If you believe the research of Yuri Zhukov, Stalin had some thoughts in this direction, but then the party bosses opposed. In this matter, Deutscher could not be competent, since Zhukov managed to look into the archives, and Deutscher looked at all this from a distant side.
It is often said that collectivization was necessary for industrialization. But the NEP would have been canceled without it. The new capitalist did not want to be civilized, as Lenin said. Lenin, for example, in his work "On the Food Tax" said that one should "not try to prohibit or lock up the development of capitalism, but direct it into the channel of state capitalism." State capitalism in this Leninist work is state control of capitalist enterprises. But the capitalist who suffers control over himself is bad. On the contrary, a good capitalist dreams of establishing control over the state. And Nepmen tried with their fists.
Both Deutscher and bourgeois ideologists speak of "forced" collectivization. But who raped whom? In the well-known illustration for collectivization called "Virgin Soil Upturned" on the Gremyachiy Log farm, there is only one person who came from the city - Davydov, twenty-five thousand. All the rest are local. Do you think Sholokhov was lying? In fact, was there some kind of dark force that swooped down on the villages and drove the peasants to the collective farms? Or was collectivization done by part of the village against another part? I believe that the decade of the New Economic Policy taught the rural poor that under market conditions most of the independent owners will be ruined by the kulaks. Therefore, I believe that the slogan of dispossession was welcomed by most of the village.
They say that collectivization was needed for industrialization as a source of resources, funds that were pumped out of the countryside. Like, the peasants were robbed. But at the same time, the peasants in a reduced number fed the city, the number of which increased. Contradiction? Yes, by contradicting the facts in the speeches of bourgeois critics. All over the world, agriculture is being transformed from smallholders to large enterprises. It doesn't matter what the name of this large enterprise is: a farm, a firm, a collective farm or a state farm. Deutscher wrote: “The old primitive system of smallholding was in any case too archaic to survive in the era of industrialization. It could not survive either in the USSR or in the USA. Even in France, which was a classic example of such farming, in recent years the number of peasants In Russia, smallholding became an obstacle to progress: small farms were unable to feed the growing urban population, they could not even feed the children in overpopulated rural areas. - He immediately adds: "The only sound alternative to forced collectivization was some form of collectivization or cooperation based on the consent of the peasantry." - But it is possible to talk about a sound alternative for a sound society that develops on a rational basis, rationally assesses its capabilities and compares them with its goals. In Russia in the 1920s there was a little bit of rationality, there was an influential layer of NEPmen and kulaks who themselves did not disdain violence and could only submit to violence, but not to sound reasoning. Deutscher should be given his due, speaking about the desirable form of collectivization or cooperation, he noted: "It is impossible to say with a certain degree of certainty how real this alternative was in the USSR."
It should be emphasized that from the Soviet village of the 1920s it was not yet possible to take enough resources for industrialization. Actually, the process of dispossession also did not give anything, except that it helped to overcome the crisis of grain procurement. A certain surplus product and labor resources could be provided by the unification of peasant farms on the same technical basis, just as the unification of artisans in manufacture provided an additional product. The freed hands have already been directed to the construction of factories, which gave the village much-needed machines. We must not forget that all this was accompanied by the development of education and health care. The peasant saw with his own eyes the choice: either the chaos of the NEP with the ruin of the poor, or the transformation into a worker with significant state support.
Speaking of Soviet history, one cannot avoid bureaucracy, if only because many comrades pay excessive attention to it, and the so-called Trotskyists put bureaucracy at the forefront of the Soviet corner. Deutscher noted that the emergence of a powerful state apparatus in a revolutionary country was inevitable as a result of the destruction of the revolutionary class. The state of the dictatorship of a non-existent class could not be otherwise. Deutscher refused to put any label on the Soviet managerial stratum: “The privileged groups are something like a hybrid: on the one hand, they are, as it were, a class, on the other, they are not. They have some common features with the exploiting classes of other societies and in at the same time, they are deprived of their main features. They enjoy material and other privileges, defend them stubbornly and fiercely. However, here we must avoid large generalizations ... What the representatives of this so-called new class do not have is property. There are neither means of production nor land. Their material privileges are limited to the sphere of consumption... They cannot pass on their wealth to their heirs, in other words, they cannot establish themselves as a class." - It cannot be emphasized that the last thing Deutscher was ready to do was label the bureaucracy as a class: The privileged groups did not coalesce into a new class. They could not make people forget about the revolutionary transformations, as a result of which they received their power; they could not convince the masses - and even themselves - that they used this power in accordance with the tasks of revolutionary transformations. In other words, the "new class" failed to win public recognition of its legitimacy. He is forced to constantly hide his face, which neither the landlords nor the bourgeoisie have ever had to do. He seems to recognize himself as the illegitimate son of history."
Soviet managers were distinguished by an essential feature, they tried to downplay their difference from the working masses. Moreover, they carefully emphasized in propaganda that they were only the managers of the enterprise, the owner of which was the working masses. Deutscher emphasized that 50 years after the start of the revolution, the leaders of the country still swore allegiance to this revolution. We, in turn, observed this phenomenon 20 years after Deutscher. Anyone who objects that the bureaucrats only lied can be asked why the lie is about this, and why for so long? In order not to create new entities, shouldn't it be recognized that even 70 years after the start of the socialist revolution, it continued?
In this sense, one dialogue from the old film "The Great Citizen" is indicative. Two heroes personify the two sides of the party struggle of the 20-30s: Pyotr Shakhov - the Stalinists, and Alexei Kartashov - some generalized Trotskyists-Zinovievites-Bukharinites. The dialogue time in the film refers to recent years NEP:
K: ...I'm scared. Terrible for the country, for the party, for you and me! We have always been able to face the truth. Look at the numbers, look at the summaries! The country is in a fever. One hundred million men are sharpening axes. There is unemployment in the city. Nepman rushing from all signs, from every corner. We are standing at a terrible frontier, Peter! History changes its course, it breaks all our hopes. After all, our whole strategy was born on the basis of a world revolution, and we are busy with trifles, chatting about the offensive, about the rise of industry, about technical progress in this Russia, in this fat-assed, clumsy country. We also want to convince ourselves and others that we are building socialism!
S: What are we building?
K: It's not Marx! This is Shchedrin! It was with Shchedrin that the pompadour arranged liberalism in one county. And it can't go on like this. Or civil war, or... or Thermidor... rebirth... death...
Sh: Terrible thoughts.
K: Peter! I believe you Peter! I want you to understand all my doubts, and if I'm right, let's look for a way out together, like the Bolsheviks. We will propose to the party, to the congress...
Sh: Alexey, did you tell anyone about this?
K: No, no...
Sh: You said terrible things, and I became scared. Only not for the party, not for the country, Alexei, but for you. So-so ... One hundred million fists, civil war, Thermidor, rebirth, death. So the revolution is over, Alexey Dmitritch? Can't we build socialism?
K: I didn't say that!
Sh: But it turns out, you probably thought about it. Can you tell me what we are building? Tell us what we are building: socialism, which cannot be built, bourgeois democracy, or are we preparing the ground for restoration? Understand, if you say that we are not building socialism, everything loses its meaning: the party, the Soviet government, thousands of people who died for this - everything flies into the abyss. Do you understand what you rewarded? For the sake of this, entire generations went to the gallows, to hard labor, to Akatui exile. Lenin burned down in the name of this. Millions of people believed and carried it through famine, through typhus, through civil war. People turn rocks with their bare hands and believe. And they believe that they are building socialism! And you say you can't build it!
K: I didn't say it couldn't be built!
Sh: But you didn't say that it could be built!
Sh: ... the question is this: should Russia be, as you said, a fat-assed clumsy country, or a socialist Russia!
Sh: ... with such thoughts, with such a mood, with such disbelief, it is impossible to work and lead!
Deutscher considered in some detail not the question that we now call "The Question of the Nature of the USSR", he did not doubt the nature of the USSR. He examined in some detail the view of the nature of the USSR both from within the country and from outside.
Humanity is one. Without recognizing this, there is no point in further study of it. I would very much like to think of this single humanity, but we have to think of it in parts, since our thinking is limited by our speech. We also have to speak of the development of mankind as the development of its individual parts. Therefore, we say "the English bourgeois revolution", "the great French revolution", we talk about them as about something as a whole, although these are nothing more than parts of a single world bourgeois revolution, which in turn is one of the stages of human development.
One of the reflections of the unity of humanity and the limitations of our thinking about it is that events do not occur where we expect them to. Speaking of the stage of the socialist revolution, Lenin expressed this phenomenon in the concept of a "weak link" in the world capitalist system and in the concept of the uneven development of countries. The straightforward thinking of some Marxists leads them to the conclusion that each part of humanity must go through a certain cycle of development, the same for all parts: slavery-feudalism-capitalism. This direct thinking, for example, led to the stupidity of the Mensheviks in 1917, and later to their betrayal of the cause of the revolution at a time when they thought they were expressing its development. The fact is that each part of humanity goes through all the stages of development, but as part of a single humanity. For example, slavery in the form of large groups of slave owners and opposing slaves existed in several centers, but each such center influenced the life of the periphery, which still seemed to remain at the level of barbarism. But this was no longer the barbarism of the times of the absence of slavery, a classic example is the wars of Rome against European barbarians.
Serfdom in Russia in the 17th-19th centuries was called a relic of feudalism, but there are some doubts about this even if the establishment of this "secondary serfdom" falls on the period when Russia entered the European grain market. No one doubts that slavery in some areas North America was a direct consequence of the development of capitalism, and so on.
The dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia is also, neither in origin nor in influence, an internal Russian affair. We are compelled to speak of the "Russian revolution", "Chinese revolution", but all these are parts of a single stream of the world revolution, and the unity is such that, only due to the limitedness of our speech, we consider these parts separately and separately consider their connections with other parts.
Deutscher considered the nation-state an achievement. I consider this a dubious achievement. The reality is that the proletariat carries out the world revolution, being divided into separate national detachments, and its dictatorship acquires national features. Of the numerous dictatorships of the proletariat that arose on the ruins of empires after the World War, only the dictatorship of a union of republics on the territory of the former Russian Empire. Hence the concept of "building socialism in one country" was born. Deutscher does not consider this concept wrong, it was forced, he argues that it was a mistake to develop this concept to "the final construction of socialism." Deutscher says that it was necessary from the very beginning to explain to people both inside and outside the country that the USSR is following the path of building socialism, but without revolutions in other countries it cannot reach the complete victory of socialism, that complete victory is possible only on a world scale and it was necessary to strive to the expansion of the revolution.
By the way, the creators of the film "The Great Citizen" reflected this mood. In the part of the film that tells about the first successes of industrialization, Pyotr Shakhov, referring to the youth, says: "Oh, twenty years after a good war, go out and look at the Soviet Union, republics, so, out of thirty or forty! The devil knows, how good!" (Stormy, prolonged applause. I'm not kidding, as shown in the film.) Back in 1939, the Bolshevik magazine expressed an opinion about the coming world revolution as a result of the world war.
The forced concept of "building socialism in one country" turned into the concept of "finally building socialism in one country." This, as it were, removed responsibility from the most advanced detachments of the proletariat in the developed countries of the West, turning them into sympathetic observers. At the same time, as Deutscher says, they were not aware of all the difficulties on the path of socialist transformations in Russia, therefore they exaggerated failures and mistakes, since bourgeois propaganda, creating the appearance of freedom of speech, in every possible way contributed to downplaying the achievements and exaggerating the shortcomings of the USSR. As a result, "millions of workers in the West over the years have come to the conclusion that socialism gives nothing, and the revolution leads to nothing" (I remind you that this was said in 1967).
The class struggle has come to a standstill. It would be wrong to completely blame the Stalinists for this. The advanced detachments of the Western proletariat could also show their advanced qualities. Deutscher analyzes in detail the development of the Chinese revolution, its independence from the Stalinist bureaucracy, independence from the concept of "building socialism in the USSR." Deutscher recalled the words of Engels: "The emancipation of the proletariat can only be an international affair. If you try to turn it into a French affair, you will make it impossible. That the leadership of the bourgeois revolution belonged exclusively to France - although this was inevitable due to the stupidity and cowardice of other nations - led, you know where? - to Napoleon, to the conquest, to the invasion of the Holy Alliance. To wish that France in the future should have the same role is to want the perversion of the international proletarian movement ... "(Collected Works, vol. 39, p. 76) - and underlined the words "although it was inevitable due to the stupidity and cowardice of other nations."
Having reassured the masses with a false statement about the construction of socialism in one country and dragging this construction (and it could not have been otherwise), the Stalinists finally came to the conclusion that "during these 50 years the revolution has almost completely discredited itself in the eyes of the people, and no Romanovs can't rehabilitate her." We remember this public opinion, which manifested itself during perestroika. Deutscher mentioned the Romanovs in connection with this reasoning: "And although the restoration has always been a huge step backward for the nation, even a tragedy, it also had a positive side, since it demonstrated to the disappointed people the unacceptability of the reactionary alternative." - The current situation, the restoration of not the Romanov regime, but a return to the bosom of capitalism, is such that it is not the regime of some king that has been discredited, but His Majesty capitalism itself.
Summing up some results of the development of the USSR, is it possible to speak unambiguously about the prematureness of the revolution? Certainly not, and this shows the irrationalism of the revolution, which Deutscher was so dissatisfied with. He repeated Marx's wish that the socialist revolution would be free from the irrationalism that the bourgeois revolution displayed, but contradicted what he wanted, saying: fate of struggle. In this sense, the revolution is insane, because no mind, even the most brilliant one, will calculate success before the battle. Of course, at other moments, the advantage of one side or the other is clearly visible, but these are not turning points. At a turning point, the balance is very precarious and uncertain. And the most important thing is that history is made by people. So, those people who are now, with all their limited minds, are now making history.
But let us return to the progress of bourgeois thought. Little by little, the cause of the collapse of the USSR comes to her. In the article "Planning Phantom" it is expressed in the words: "The Soviet model of the economy collapsed under the weight of imbalances and disproportions. The reason for this is the distorted ideas of the Soviet leadership about planning." Deutscher did not pay much attention in his lectures to the planning of production in the USSR, noting only its greater efficiency in comparison with the efficiency of capitalist production. Indeed, if we exclude the years of wars and the reconstruction of the destroyed economy from fifty years, the Soviet economy became what Deutscher still found it in about twenty-five years. No wonder he is credited with the words about Stalin, plow and atomic bomb so impressive success. The author of this article carefully hushed up the successes, exaggerating the shortcomings. It gives a very vague outline of the history of Soviet planning, pointing out only one contradiction: between the business executives who carried out the plan and the leadership who dictated the plan. But this contradiction is trivial, it is clear that it will exist in any planned system. It is not even clear how the author came to such a correct conclusion from such a vague, non-specific study: with the rejection of central planning and the execution of the plan, "a unified socio-economic, credit and financial policy in the USSR ceased to exist."
In the last twenty years of the existence of the Commonwealth, when it was constantly threatened, elements of reform in the spirit of the Enlightenment and elements of the old order continued to compete in political life. This era can be divided into the following periods: the years of the Permanent Council (1775–1788), the period of the Four Years' Diet (1788–1792), and the sections of 1793 and 1795. The assertion that 1775 and 1789–1790 is correct. prepared a revolutionary turning point in Poland. With all the manifestations of weakness and decadence in the Commonwealth during this period, there were also positive changes.
The most significant changes took place in the sphere of consciousness. Not all participants in the crisis of 1772–1775 fully understood the meaning of what was happening. The connections of the nobility with the state were so weak that they did not consider it necessary to shoulder the burden of reforms. Feelings of indifference to the fate of the state could not be overcome even during the Four-Year Diet; more radical events did not help either, for example, the uprising of 1794. And only the power imposed by the invaders forced the gentry to come to terms with the need to regularly pay rather high taxes.
With this in mind, it is necessary to carefully evaluate the influence of the prevailing conservative views, as well as the popularity of reform projects. From the proclamation of state-political reforms to the readiness to take on the burden of their implementation, the path was long. The circle of people who inspired and carried out the transformation was at first very narrow, but the main part of society seemed to be ready to follow them. However, how far? Can the events of the 1990s be considered a revolution? After all, this attempt to bring about changes both in the state and in society had such a meaning.
After the first partition, the position of Poland was extremely unfavorable, but the tragic end was not yet inevitable. The Commonwealth lost 30% of its territory and 35% of its population, internal economic ties were disrupted. The blow inflicted by Prussia was especially tangible, which introduced customs duties for the transportation of Polish grain along the Vistula. As a result, grain exports through Gdansk decreased by 60% during this time, which led to a decrease in income from land holdings. Since the demand for bread from the cities was insufficient, an increasing amount of grain went into the production of vodka. Cattle breeding developed slowly, meat consumption did not increase, and the role of soil fertilization was underestimated. The positive trends emerging in the economy did not lead to significant changes. The rate of natural population growth remained high, although Poland was inferior to France and England. Increased population densities and increased crop yields enabled the rebuilding of cities that were still reeling from the disasters of the early part of the century. Warsaw expanded rapidly, Poznan developed. The capital, in which political life was concentrated, attracted people who had lost their place in society. This applied both to the gentry and to the peasantry. A new urban estate was formed, consisting of the intelligentsia, the first Polish bourgeoisie and hired workers. For many, the problem of serfdom remained important, which hindered the social development of a significant part of the population.
More than 75% of all the inhabitants of the country were employed in agriculture; of these, 85-90% were serfs. Only in Greater Poland, which was far ahead of other lands in terms of development, about 30% of the peasants paid dues instead of corvée labor; it was also here that the most intensive colonization of land by free peasants (primarily Germans) took place. The appearance of the quitrent system testifies, first of all, to the scale of the problems faced by landowners who did not find a sufficient market for their products. However, the situation was not so hopeless, otherwise the peasants would not be able to cope with the new taxes. In territories where communication with the market was traditionally weaker, the gentry felt the deterioration of the economic situation to a lesser extent: they tried to compensate for their losses by increasing peasant duties and corvée norms.
A characteristic feature of economic initiatives (especially magnate ones) was the imitation of the fashion of the Enlightenment. Economic reforms were undertaken to increase incomes, but were often simply imitation of fashion trends, which was expressed, for example, in the reconstruction of palaces and the arrangement of parks. Innovations in non-agricultural sectors turned out to be especially expensive. A large number of manufactories arose, where foreign technologies and specialists were used, and at the same time a serf labor force. The weakness of these initiatives, which usually failed after a few years, was, first of all, the lack of real economic motivation. Manufactories produced carriages, playing cards, china, weapons, and dozens of other types of items that were luxury goods. The owners of large estates tried to forcibly create an internal market through which money would be pumped out from the rural population. The economic initiatives of the magnates relied on the resources of their land holdings, which made it possible to manage by investing minimal cash, and therefore the magnates, when creating manufactories, incurred lower costs than the burghers. The manufactures of the magnates were more efficient and more centralized, and the burghers were often forced to use home workers. The lack of necessary motivation was also a source of weakness for companies in which, as, for example, the Woolen Manufactory Company, both magnate and merchant capital were invested.
Intellectual, political and economic revival in society contributed to the growth of trade. The level of credit relations did not meet the needs. New banks were created, but most of the gentry turned to traditional sources of credit (for example, to Jewish usurers) and used the funds received for consumption purposes. The strengthening of the urban element was obvious, but the bourgeoisie had not yet taken shape as an estate. As before, outside the urban and rural community, there was a virtually everywhere present Jewish community. With the growth of economic difficulties, its representatives increased their importance, using these difficulties to expand their rights.
Positive phenomena in the economy, concern for the field of education and the development of art still could not prevent the impending catastrophe. The new borders of the Commonwealth were of an artificial nature, which pushed its neighbors to further divisions. Greater and Lesser Poland was actually in a vice, the axis of development from the northwest to the southeast was under threat. For its further development, Prussia considered it necessary to absorb Gdansk and Greater Poland. Austria and Prussia, along with economic benefits, also counted on receiving recruits, which were so necessary in the wars with France. Therefore, Prussia was interested in destroying the Commonwealth, while Russia still hoped to achieve more by maintaining the protectorate system. But the protectorate system was fraught with great dangers: the very existence of the Polish state increasingly depended on the will or whim of the empress, on the personal interests or passions of influential people at her court. As far as the consistent implementation of the state interest was felt in Prussian politics, and the predominance of envy and greed in Austrian politics, the interests and policies of Russia were inconsistent, because they could change under the influence of someone's personal whim.
The policy of the Russian envoy Stackelberg was aimed at maintaining antagonism between the magnate factions and the royal court. Projects to strengthen the Commonwealth as an ally of Russia were not seriously considered. The point was that while remaining weak, Poland could not become a partner for anyone. The dependence of the king on Russia repelled his supporters from among the aristocracy. His opponents were also traditionalists. Under these conditions, Stanisław August's attempts to free himself from external dictates were very timid, and often just ostentatious. Therefore, Stackelberg was not bothered by the insignificant personal successes of the king; the Russian envoy believed that, despite all the efforts of the king and his entourage, the dependence of the Commonwealth would only increase. The international conjuncture, unfavorable for the country, also persisted. Europe hoped that the invading powers would be limited only to Polish lands, therefore they did not show any interest in Poland. In the state itself, the political forces that stood guard over the former order did not believe that violence against the Commonwealth destroys the accepted norms of life. The French Revolution, striking at the foundations of the old regime, inherited the old stereotypes and prejudices towards Poland and did not understand the meaning of the changes taking place in it. Nor did European politicians worry about the prospects that arose as a result of the exorbitant strengthening of Russia and Prussia. It is difficult, however, to make claims to Europe, since the Commonwealth itself retained variously motivated, but always unfounded optimism.
The Polish model of the old order was characterized by republicanism, which was understood as limiting the power of the monarch and weakening state intervention in the lives of citizens. At the same time, the system created to protect gentry freedoms deprived all other classes of rights and responsibility for the fate of the Commonwealth. Protecting itself from the strengthening of the authority of the monarch, the gentry failed to create effective barriers to the oligarchy and self-will of the magnates. The optimism of the reformers was based on the belief that it would be possible to rally a sufficiently large group that would support changes designed to protect freedoms and maintain the dominant position of the gentry in the state. Therefore, the greatest efforts were made in the field of education reform. But the reformers did not take into account the fact that the gentry was not able to voluntarily accept restrictions, especially those that would lead to the strengthening of the state. The pressure of social and economic reality turned out to be insufficient and too slow in comparison with the speed of events.
The reformers did everything possible to enlighten the "Sarmatians" in order to introduce the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the obligatory European models. The National Enlightenment Commission was an unusually progressive body with far-reaching goals, which were achieved despite the many difficulties that stood in the way of reform. During the partition years, there were 104 secondary schools and 10 academic colleges, where about 30,000 young people studied. The reform, carried out by such people as Andrzej Zamoyski, Ignacy Potocki, Primate Michał Poniatowski, priests Grzegorz Piramowicz and Hugo Kollontai, was to reorganize the learning process, in an effort to make its content more modern. The principle of gradation of schools was introduced: primary (elementary), three-year, secondary, main. In 1777–1783 Kollontai reformed the Krakow Academy, and the outstanding mathematician Martin Poczobut-Odlanicki carried out similar transformations at the Vilna Academy. In the new educational institutions, Latin was replaced by the Polish language, mathematics and natural sciences were introduced, and intensive training of new teachers was under way. Much more attention began to be paid to secular education, the teaching of the humanities was modernized, which was assigned a decisive role in the education of future citizens. The Society of Elementary Books, founded in 1775, also served these goals, and under the leadership of the priest Grzegorz Piramowicz, prepared a large number of modern textbooks. The reform did not affect the parish schools, the number of which reached 1600, that is, half as many as at the end of the 16th century. The movement for the revival of civic feelings played an important role already in the era of the Four-Year Sejm, but even it could not change the mentality of the gentry.
Stanislaw August, who himself did a lot for the development of education in Poland, ardently supported education reforms. But the king's political views were still at odds with those of the reformers. Russian control over the activities of the Permanent Council set the opposition against the king, although it did not lead to open confrontation. Ideas circulated quite freely, and the abundance of publications of various political orientations gave the impression of a revitalization of public life. A significant expansion of intellectual horizons was facilitated by controversy, which was constantly conducted in 1765-1784. on the pages of the Monitor magazine, which reflected the ideas of the Enlightenment and was edited by the Jesuit Bogomolets. Increasingly numerous literary works, treatises and political pamphlets created an atmosphere of intellectual revival, which also spread beyond Warsaw. Along with the royal, private patronage also developed, most a prime example which became the Załuski library: Bishop Andrzej Stanislaw of Krakow (1695–1754) and his brother, Bishop Jozef Endrzej of Kyiv (1702–1774) created a library, which since 1747 acquired the status of a public library. This book collection was one of the largest in Europe (more than 300 thousand volumes) and gathered around itself a large group of scientists. But no arguments about the need for reforms (both their own and others), no ideas that criticized the existing order of things or defended the glorious past, were able to change the current situation. On the scale of the entire gentry class, changes in consciousness could not come quickly, especially in conditions when it was necessary to give up privileges.
Society has long been talking and writing about the need to increase the prestige of economic activity and strengthen the state; recognized the profitability of creating manufactories and trading companies (for example, for exporting grain across the Black Sea). There was a growing understanding that the poverty of farmers hinders the development of cities and crafts. There were discussions about the advantages of taxes in kind and about the benefits of rational forms of farming. Arguments were expressed in favor of streamlining monetary circulation, expanding credit relations and introducing trade incentives. However, these ideas contradicted the interests of the estate owners, for whom corvée and serfdom continued to be dogmas.
The change in the positions of some of the magnates and the politically active gentry was manifested in the rejection of the principle liberum veto. But Polish politicians were still poorly oriented in the balance of power in the international arena. The anti-royal opposition in the new composition was still divided into "patriotic-hetman" and reformist ones. Republicans advocated the decentralization of power, and over time came to the idea of the need to replace the monarchy with a federation. Their opponents sought to improve the Sejm system, paying less and less attention to the problem of strengthening the central authority. The former considered themselves patriots, saw the main source of evil in the monarch, and saw only merit in the old institutions and traditions. The reformers preferred to have an enlightened monarchy, which, however, would not restrict their freedoms. There were family ties between members of both parties, and ideological differences faded into the background before personal ambitions. In their actions against Stanisław August, both anti-Russian parties collaborated with Stackelberg, while striving to maintain direct contacts with foreign courts.
In the era of the Permanent Council, the Commonwealth depended entirely on the policy of the Russian court and even on the mood of the Russian envoy, who, not without pleasure, humiliated Stanislav Augustus. The king did not see any alternative to the pro-Russian policy. He considered it necessary to strengthen his positions and appointed the most advanced and independent figures to the Permanent Council. Already during the Diet of 1776, the king established a separate office for army affairs, headed by an experienced general Jan Konazhevsky. Due to the lack of money, transformations in the army were limited mainly to the training of new personnel. At the Sejm, an important decision was made on the codification of law, and this task was entrusted to ex-Chancellor Andrzej Zamoyski. The work on codification was actively supported by journalism, in which Józef Wybicki's Patriotic Letters (1777) played an important role. The project submitted to the Seimas in 1780 turned out to be too bold, it also provided for some rights for the townspeople and peasants. The proposal to expand the freedom of movement of peasants and allow mixed marriages caused a special fury of the gentry. The clergy and nuncio rejected the right of the monarch to allow (or prohibit) the pronouncement of papal bulls in Poland. Stackelberg seized the opportunity to thwart the emancipatory efforts of the king. The code without discussion was demonstratively and sharply rejected.
The king understood the situation in which the Commonwealth found itself, and tried to gradually weaken the restrictions imposed on him. He sought to strengthen his position without breaking with Russia. Gradually, the king managed to find support among part of the supporters of the reforms. Stanisław August collaborated with them, promoting educational reform, supporting literature and the arts, patronizing artists and architects, participating in philosophical discussions and Masonic meetings. The symbol of cooperation was the membership in 1778 of the leader of the reformers, Ignacy Potocki, in the Permanent Council. At the same time, in 1783, the king and Prince Adam Czartoryski parted ways, who created a rival center of educational initiatives in Puławy. Stanislav August hoped to act as an ally of Russia, and the reformers preferred to look for other patrons. After 1776, a new foreign policy situation developed, when Russia began to seek rapprochement with Austria against Turkey. During the War of the Bavarian Succession 1778–1779 The Commonwealth did not accept the proposal of Prussia to oppose the Habsburgs. In 1780, Russian troops were withdrawn from the territory of the Commonwealth, which had been there since the election of Stanislav Augustus.
After Russia occupied the Crimea, the alignment of forces for Poland turned out to be more advantageous. Against Russia and Austria, an alliance of northern states was formed: Prussia, England and Holland. Stanislav August hoped that participation in the war with Turkey would make it possible to carry out military reform, and also, possibly, promise territorial acquisitions in Moldova. During a meeting with Catherine II in Kanev (1787), these plans were rejected. The empress also did not agree to the deposition of the king, advocated by the hetman's party, led by Severin Rzewuski, Franciszek Xavier Branicki and Szczensny-Pototsky. Patriot reformers led by Adam Czartoryski and Ignacy Potocki turned to the northern states, counting on the return of Galicia and the transformation of the Commonwealth in the English spirit. A kind of balance was maintained in the country, which was in the hands of Catherine. The Prussian king was dissatisfied, the royal favorites constantly insisted on a more aggressive policy, and all the forces in the Commonwealth were looking for a way to somehow change the situation. These changes seemed inevitable under the condition of a real revival of the state. The interested parties were faced with a dilemma: is it worth it or not, in view of the completely obvious position of St. Petersburg, to accelerate the implementation of reforms? Especially when it was pushed by Berlin, which was most interested in upsetting the political balance in the country.
In 1788, the Russian-Turkish war broke out, immediately after that Sweden attacked Russia. Stanisław August still believed that Poland could become stronger if it relied on Russia. The reform camp, with the support of Prussia, played an independent diplomatic game. Further subjugation to the Russian protectorate was impossible, it threatened at any moment with the fragmentation of the state in favor of another favorite of the empress. In the autumn of 1788, the Diet met, which went down in history as the Great, or Four-year-old. Catherine agreed to transform it into a confederation. The marshal's baton was received by the supporter of the Czartoryskis (Puławy camp) Stanisław Malakhovsky. Prussia immediately proposed an alliance and announced that it would no longer be a guarantor of the preservation of Polish traditional institutions, which created an opportunity for the reformers to free the country from Russian dependence. The first step was the law on increasing the army to 100 thousand people (October 20, 1788). The following year, due to lack of funds, the size of the army reached two-thirds of the target figure, but this was a real breakthrough. The abolition of the Permanent Council meant a refusal to recognize the leading role of Russia. Stanislav August took the side of the reformers and went to rapprochement with them. Cheers of approval came from Berlin, and the Prussian ambassador Lucchesini enjoyed unlimited influence in Warsaw. In exchange for the return of Galicia to Poland and support for the reforms, Prussia expected to receive Gdansk, Torun and part of Greater Poland. A ban was announced on the supply of the Russian army that fought with Turkey, and a demand was put forward for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Poland. The principle of the territorial indivisibility of the Commonwealth was proclaimed, a deputation (Sejm commission) was created to "improve the form of government", an emergency tax was introduced: 10% - on the income of the gentry and 20% - on the income of the clergy. During the year, the mood in the Sejm changed significantly. In an atmosphere of general revival, under the influence of new intellectual trends, as well as reflections on the real state of things, things were done, the purpose of which was to change the direction of development and the dominant political system of the Commonwealth. After Konarsky and Wybicki, Stanislav Staszic (1755–1826) and Hugo Kollontai (1750–1820) began to express the most significant ideas. In 1787 Stanisław Staszic's "Warnings to Poland" came out with a program to strengthen royal power, introduce heredity to the throne, and reform the Sejm. The author also wrote about the need to promote the development of handicrafts and trade, to recognize the rights of the burghers and to improve the situation of the peasants. The slogans of personal freedom for the peasants were also proclaimed in the writings of Kollontai - “Several letters from an anonymous author to Stanislav Malakhovsky, the crown referendary, about the future Sejm” (1787) and “The Political Right of the Polish People” (1790). In the future, Staszic will become one of the most authoritative and prominent Polish figures, but will never show political ambitions. The most brilliant mind of that era, Kollontai, had, on the contrary, excessive political ambitions. In fact, directing the activities of the camp of reformers, he failed to show the qualities necessary for a politician of a large scale. It is noteworthy that at this critical moment for the Commonwealth, progressive, noble people with a strong character came to the fore, but they lacked political maturity.
Ideas that were ahead of their time, although very important at that historical moment, were expressed by Józef Pawlikowski. In his works “On Polish Serfs” and “Political Thoughts for Poland”, he wrote about the need to restore personal freedom to the peasants, about the introduction of hereditary land ownership and taxes in kind. In the same atmosphere and in the same environment, radical positions were formed, gravitating towards the revolutionary ideas that penetrated from the banks of the Seine. Franciszek Salesius of Jezierski (1740–1791) expressed them in the Catechism on the Secrets of Polish Rule (1790). Similar views were expressed by other radical publicists, later called Polish Jacobins. Social radicalism was superficial in Poland. It is very difficult to assess how deep the influence of the Enlightenment was. The magnate courts - not only the 30 largest families, but in general the entire layer of wealthy gentlemen - had previously been influenced by the ideas of cosmopolitanism. During the reign of Poniatowski, French influence prevailed in fashion, art and customs. In Polish society, as in all of Europe, French was spoken, and French ideas were given reverent preference. However, the sphere of creativity remained predominantly Polish. Jan Potocki - traveler, writer, publisher and great original, author of the "Manuscript found in Zaragoza" - was an exception. On the mother tongue wrote one of the greatest poets of that era - Bishop Ignacy Krasicki (1735-1801), the author of comedies Franciszek Zablotsky (1752-1821), the outstanding author of epigrams Stanislav Trembiecki (1739-1812), historians Adam Narushevich (1733-1793), Julian Ursyn Nemcewicz (1758) wrote in Polish –1841) and dozens of others. The Polish language was cleansed of contaminations with Latin expressions ("macaronisms"), it was restored to its original originality, which had suffered from the overuse of Latin and French. For the needs of the school in 1780, the Polish grammar of Onufry Kopchinsky was published.
Inspired by new trends, publicists and writers sharply criticized the vices and weaknesses of Polish society, ridiculing and denying everything that they defined by the concept of “Sarmatism”. However, fashionable outfits, free morals, communication in French and a penchant for gambling could not get rid of the shortcomings. The turning point that emerged in the middle of the 18th century continued to deepen, but it could not be limited solely to the choice between “our own” and “foreign”. The mood in the small gentry estates, with their attachment to the past, was both patriotic and conservative. Fashionable metropolitan gentlemen, of course, also supported the reforms, as well as indulged self-interest and treason. However, the dividing line did not pass here, which has not yet been definitively marked. During the Four-Year Sejm, a program of modern patriotism began to take shape.
The moment was favorable, and the impatience of the Poles, dissatisfied with the constant intervention of the tsar's envoy, reached a climax. The reformers were aware of the danger of delay: on the one hand, the alignment of forces in St. Petersburg could change at any moment, and on the other hand, neither the supporters of the Puławy camp, nor the "republicans" liked the strengthening of the king's position. In 1788, these two parties took over the dominant position and sought to eliminate the imposed system of government, although for different reasons. But this state of affairs did not last long. One of the main problems was the reform of the Sejm. Supporters of the reforms advocated changing the principles of the electorate and sought to deprive the landless gentry, the traditional backbone of the hetman's party, of their voting rights. Among the ambassadors, anti-Russian sentiments and readiness to carry out the necessary changes prevailed. True, the changes in the position of the ambassadors did not go too far, as evidenced by the fate of the already too modest tax laws. (96)
A period of Sejm rule began, during which there was a rapprochement, although not completely sincere, between Stanisław August and the reformers. Prospects for the creation of a patriotic party in the modern sense of the word, that is, a party expressing the unity of goals of the king and the people, loomed. On March 29, 1790, a defensive agreement was concluded with Prussia, but the foreign policy situation had changed in the meantime. In the summer, the Austrian emperor Leopold II agreed to the Prussian terms, refusing to fight Turkey, and the Swedish king Gustav III withdrew from the war with Russia. Berlin did not need Poland and found itself in conflict with Russia. However, there were no signs of an imminent catastrophe. It seemed that relations with Vienna would be more beneficial for Poland. In the Austrian capital, they realized the advantages of strengthening the Commonwealth, which could become a counterbalance to Prussian appetites. Warsaw had little idea of the turn events were taking, but nevertheless intensified actions that strengthened the position of the patriots and outlined the position of the conservative party.
In the autumn of 1790, the Sejm extended its term of office, accepting new deputies at the same time. Thus, it was possible to strengthen the camp of supporters of reforms. An important reform of sejmiks was carried out - their number was limited and representatives of the gentry who did not have property were excluded from the number of participants. In the winter of 1790/91, work began on the Government Law, in which, along with a group of patriots, the king also took part. The disputes continued for several months. Stanisław August disagreed with the more radical ideas of Ignacy Potocki. It was recognized as necessary to limit gentry freedoms and improve the state structure. A sign of change was the law on cities passed on April 21, 1791. Back in the autumn of 1789, not without the influence of Kollontai, the president of Warsaw, Jan Deckert, suggested that representatives of the royal cities send a petition to the king and the Sejm, which would set out the condition and needs of the townspeople. The procession of the black-clad delegates made a huge impression. As news of the revolutionary events taking place there reached from France, pressure on the authorities increased in Warsaw to solve the problems of the cities. The petty bourgeois of the royal cities received personal immunity, access to positions, self-government, representation in the Sejm and in the Treasury Commission. It was decided to simplify the process of initiation into gentry dignity (nobilitation). At the same time, the ban was lifted, which prevented the gentry class from engaging in trade and handicraft activities.
The prospect of an early end to the Russian-Turkish war forced the patriots to hurry. During the Sejm Easter holidays, a coup d'état was prepared. As a result, on May 3, 1791, during a session in which only a small part of the ambassadors initiated into the conspiracy took part, the text of the law was read out, and the king swore allegiance to him, despite the protests of his few opponents.
The government law (or Constitution) was revolutionary in nature, and above all in terms of the proposed form of government. Its drafters turned to the French, English and American experience, but on the whole the Constitution was of a purely Polish character. The gentry was recognized as a privileged estate, but state guardianship was established over the peasants (the right to execute peasants was taken away from the gentry as early as 1768). Foreign colonists received guarantees of personal freedom. This should have hurt Catherine greatly, who was afraid that Russian peasants would start fleeing to Poland. The king's prerogatives were limited to the presidency of the senate and the functions of the president in the "Guardian of Laws" - the new government, which included five ministers, the primate, the marshal of the Sejm and the heir to the throne. The law provided that after the death of Sigismund Augustus, representatives of the Saxon Wettin dynasty would inherit the throne. This was the weakest point of the Constitution, evidence not only of sympathy for this dynasty, but also of a belated conviction in the superiority of hereditary royal power over elected power.
The law abandoned the presidential model of government, which exposed the Commonwealth to serious danger, since the consent of the Saxon elector had not yet been received by that time. Ministers were appointed by the king at the Diet and answered to him. Commissions for the police, army, treasury and public education were created. This decision was of a compromise nature, the king was allowed to appoint members of the "Guardians of Laws" at his discretion. And here the lack of practical experience of the authors of the Constitution made itself felt: Stanislav August concentrated power in his office and during the next year, 1792, received the powers that had previously belonged to the Sejm. According to the Constitution, the Sejm was supposed to become a body of legislative power, to be convened every two years, but to be ready to meet at any moment. Only the nobility participated in its meetings, and decisions were made by majority vote. The law on cities was confirmed, Catholicism was proclaimed the dominant religion, and tolerance towards other religions was recognized. For the lands of the Crown and Lithuania, single positions, the treasury and the army were introduced, and the metropolitan of the Uniate Church received a seat in the Senate.
After the adoption of the Constitution, political activity began to wane, the king and the patriots cherished the hope of resolving relations with neighboring powers, not noticing either the duplicitous Prussian game, or the motives for Catherine's delay, or even the chances that might have opened up for them in Vienna. Berlin quietly waited, not wanting to tie itself to an alliance with Poland. On the contrary, they rightly counted on being able to create a situation in which Prussia would be rewarded with territorial acquisitions in the Commonwealth. Leopold II and Chancellor Kaunitz assumed that a reformed Poland would help to contain Prussia, but the arguments in this regard did not find a response in St. Petersburg. The final decision of Catherine by force to achieve the repeal of the Constitution of May 3 was taken at the beginning of 1792.
Szczesny-Pototsky, Xavier Branitsky, Severin Zhevusky and Szymon Kossakovsky proclaimed on April 27, 1792, a manifesto dictated by him in St. Petersburg and created a confederation in Targovica in defense of the former state system and "Cardinal Rights". In May, the country was invaded by the Russian army, three times the size of the Polish forces. The war lasted less than three months. The organization of resistance in Lithuania was complicated by the betrayal of the commander-in-chief of the Lithuanian army, Ludwik of Wirtemberg. The king, in his role as supreme commander, also played a fatal role. Having suffered a defeat near the Mir fortress in Belarus, the troops retreated. Near Zelentsy (June 16), the retreating detachments of Prince Jozef Poniatowski were successful. It was in memory of this victory that the military cross was established. Virtuti Militari. On the Bug River, the crossing near Dubenka was heroically defended by Tadeusz Kosciuszko, but he also had to retreat to the Vistula. In the occupied territories, the Targovichians established their power, and part of the gentry succumbed to calls that in the name of faith, freedom and integrity of the Fatherland, it is necessary to humbly seek the forgiveness of the empress. The calculations were not justified. The merchants were also deceived. Catherine rejected the offer of a truce and demanded that the king join the confederation, threatening him with overthrow from the throne and a new partition of Poland. The king, supported by the majority of the Guardians of the Laws, joined the ranks of the Confederates. Demonstrative resignations were the only response of the desperate leaders of the resistance. The surrender was unconditional, although the retreating army showed that the efforts spent on its preparation were not in vain.
Contrary to the hopes of the king and the calculations of the traitors, on January 23, 1793, an agreement was signed between Russia and Prussia on the second partition of Poland. After a series of defeats in France, Prussia sought reparations at the expense of Poland, while Austria counted on better acquisitions in Bavaria. Prussia got Greater Poland, Mazovia, Gdansk and Torun - a total of 58 thousand square meters. km and about 1 million inhabitants. Russia swallowed up Belarus, Right-bank Ukraine and Podolia - a total of 280 thousand square meters. km and almost 3 million people. What remained of the Commonwealth, together with Courland, amounted to 227 thousand square meters. km and about 4 million inhabitants. Her fate was predetermined. The boundaries, to a much greater extent than after the first partition, were drawn artificially and destroyed the integrity of the state organism. Neighbors' appetites grew, Poland no longer attracted Russia as a buffer state.
From Empires to Imperialism [The State and the Emergence of Bourgeois Civilization] Kagarlitsky Boris Yulievich
UNFINISHED REVOLUTIONS
UNFINISHED REVOLUTIONS
“Obedience is dead, justice suffers, there is no right order in anything,” says the anonymous author of the treatise Reformatio Sigismundi, written in the middle of the 15th century. It was a time that could best be described by Stalin's words about another time and in other circumstances - "the era of wars and revolutions."
The English historian Thomas A. Brady calls the end of the 14th - the beginning of the 15th centuries the "golden age of the common man" (political Golden Age of the Common Man), a time that gave the masses "elements of self-government", but at the same time was "a time of stagnation, disorder and instability” (stagnant, troubled and disrupted). This characteristic can be applied to almost any revolutionary era. The popular uprisings of the late Middle Ages did not and could not lead to the formation of a democratic order, because, being (as we shall see below) an early attempt at a bourgeois revolution, they could neither create a new bourgeois society, nor satisfy the needs of the masses for real democracy. The crisis of late feudalism was eventually overcome by regimes of the "Caesarist" or even "Bonapartist" type. The new absolutist state could take control of the process of social transformation, which the society itself could not carry out. But the new monarchical system could not completely overcome the crisis until it had additional resources at its disposal to speed up the development process.
The epicenters of change were England, Bohemia and Flanders, where new social relations made their way through sharp political and ideological conflicts, undermining the old, centuries-old and seemingly natural order of things.
Although 14th-century Flanders could easily be placed on a par with Italy in terms of economic development and tradition of urban freedoms, it presented a more complex political picture. Describing the ideological evolution of Flemish society, A. Pirenne notes that the republican ideal is spreading among the townspeople, “as in almost all commercial and industrial states.” Cities, having gained considerable independence, could not completely get rid of feudal dependence here. Thus, they were involved in a much larger socio-political process, defending not only their own interests, but also acting as a force that transforms the surrounding society. And not only in Flanders and Brabant, but also in England and France, partly even in Germany.
AT early XIV centuries, the cities of Flanders experienced an acute outbreak of social conflict, culminating in the French intervention, which, however, turned into a disaster for the invading army. As Pirenne notes, the Franco-Flemish War was the result of "not only a political conflict, but also a class struggle."
The cities of Flanders become "the arena of a social movement, the seriousness of which grows stronger as we approach the 14th century." In 1280, uprisings of the city's lower classes took place throughout Flanders, accompanied by barricade battles in the streets. Fear of the masses led the patriciate to seek help from the French king, dragging Paris into local political life. Thus began a spiral of events that eventually led to the Battle of Courtrai and the Hundred Years' War.
In the Flemish army, which stood in the way of the French army in 1302, only a few leaders were by origin from feudal lords and patricians, acting in essence as military specialists in the people's army. For the most part, the privileged classes were completely on the side of the French, it was thanks to their calls that the French forces arrived in Flanders. “Everything was full of contradictions in the Flemish army, in which young princes, brought up in a French manner and speaking only French, commanded the masses of workers and peasants, whose language they barely understood.” This hastily assembled and, at first glance, not very combat-ready army inflicted a crushing defeat on the interventionists at Courtrai, destroying the flower of French chivalry. This battle proved not only to be the first decisive victory of the infantry over the cavalry, marking the beginning of a revolution in military affairs, but also the prototype of a whole series of revolutionary battles, like the battle of Valmy, during which the revolutionary masses demonstrated their superiority over the professional army.
The civil war, interspersed with French intervention, continued in Flanders for two decades, culminating in the end in the restoration of the feudal regime and the nominal sovereignty of France. The big bourgeoisie, frightened by the growing political influence of the urban lower classes, chose to yield in the name of order and stability. The uprising fizzled out. 26 years after Courtrai at the Battle of Cassel, the French knights were able to take revenge by defeating the Flemish militia. Mass repressions began, and it seemed that the rebellious spirit of Flanders was broken. However, the conflict was very soon to flare up again, already in the form of an international confrontation, in which, along with France, England was also drawn.
Of course, the concept of "international conflict" in relation to that era can only be used conditionally. Since the nation state did not yet exist, the boundaries of this or that “society” remained very vague. However, in relation to Bohemia and England, one can still speak of a society whose physical boundaries more or less coincide with the boundaries of the state. That is why the most intense political and social processes are observed here, and social and cultural changes, embracing the broad masses of the population, do not leave anyone on the sidelines, inevitably giving rise to ideological and political crises. The mutual influence of town and country is so great that the crisis of the feudal order embraces all aspects of life. The political struggle, which began with one local conflict, is growing and spreading throughout the country, involving not only different territories, but also various groups of the population. It is in these conflicts that a sense of belonging to what is happening throughout the country is formed in people, a national state is being formed.
In England and Bohemia, social conflicts are rapidly acquiring the proportions of a revolutionary crisis. Moreover, the desire for social reorganization receives in both countries a similar ideological justification in the form of the teachings of Wycliffe and Huss, who are clear predecessors and, in essence, early representatives of the religious Reformation. On the contrary, in France, the crisis of the 14th century was accompanied rather by the strengthening of the positions of the traditional feudal nobility - the subsequent turbulent changes were largely the result of external influences and challenges.
The feudal centralization carried out by the kings of England and France in the thirteenth century had the unexpected effect of changing the political structure and system of interests of the feudal class. If in former times the specific princes fought with the king for independence, defending the interests of the provinces against the capital, then at the end of the 14th-15th centuries the feudal magnates were already fighting among themselves for influence at court, striving, as Eduard Perroy writes, “to subjugate administration, keep the state under control. At the same time, they by no means lose contact with the provinces. Modernizing the system of government in their own domains, they copy the structures of the central administration there, turning their court into a "real nursery of functionaries." Now the task is not to defend political independence, but to use the royal bureaucracy and finances to redistribute national funds in their favor. For the most part financial, but often military and diplomatic (foreign policy opportunities of the state are increasingly used to support the dynastic interests of "their" aristocracy outside of it).
If in England by the beginning of the 15th century it seemed that with the victory of the Lancasters, the centralized state bureaucracy, with the support of the bourgeoisie and the petty nobility, suppressed the feudal magnates, who were initially weaker here than on the continent, then in France the magnates increasingly gained the upper hand, and the bourgeois leaders rushed between rival aristocratic parties, trying to protect their interests by entering into a bloc with one of them. To a large extent, this re-feudalization of France was the result of a previous policy of centralization. In the XIII century, almost all major vassal domains on the territory of the kingdom were liquidated or strictly subordinated to the monarchy (the exceptions were Brittany and Gascony, which belonged to the English Plantagenets). However, the royal power in the XIV century began to distribute new fiefdoms to relatives and clients of the ruling dynasty. The owners of these allotments were initially (unlike the magnates of the past era) severely limited in their rights, the inheritance of estates was not automatic, and Paris could seize or confiscate these possessions at any time. But as the economic and political crisis developed, the center's ability to control the situation weakened.
Thus, the development of the political process in different countries follows different paths. If in Bohemia we see a revolution of the masses, accompanied by civil war and foreign intervention, then in England, despite massive popular uprisings, change ultimately takes the form of a "revolution from above" or, to use Antonio Gramsci's expression, a "passive revolution", when the top, having suppressed the resistance of the lower classes, at the same time they are going to fulfill a significant part of their demands; and in France the "revolution from above" carried out half a century later by Charles VII is both a response to the defeats inflicted on him by the English and a consequence of the changes that accompanied the English penetration into the country.
The social transformation of the two countries, which centuries later will become the cultural, economic and political leaders of Europe, unfolds against the backdrop of years of armed conflict between their kings. It was kings, not countries, since a significant part of French society, until the very end of the Hundred Years War, kept the side of the English dynasty. I didn't take it as a betrayal at all. national interests, since the very concept of something like this did not yet exist.
The war, which lasted more than a hundred years (in which, ironically, the founder of the Bohemian Luxembourg dynasty, John the Blind, also took part) was retroactively presented by historians as the first interstate conflict of the modern type, which formed the basis of the later confrontation between the two powers or as an event that led to the awakening of the national consciousness. However, this reassuringly banal formulation confuses the issue rather than clarifies it. What does the "awakening of consciousness" have to do with the formation of a nation as a historical process? One of two things: either the nations in England and France already existed in reality, and thanks to the Hundred Years War, people suddenly realized this fact at once, or, on the contrary, the nations were formed in an ideal way as a result of the development of consciousness, which somehow spontaneously awakened during the war. At the same time, any manifestation of loyalty to one’s king or simply military prowess, religious affectation, or vice versa a rational choice in favor of the winner is presented to us as yet another evidence of national feelings, although mountains of similar “evidence” could have been collected a century earlier.
Édouard Perroy's research has largely shaken this notion of the Hundred Years' War. However, late Soviet and Russian historiography turns out to be the last bastion of the old French school, which describes the conflict five hundred years ago from the standpoint of national confrontation. If the newly converted barbarians tend to be more Catholic than the Pope himself, then Russian historians in repeating the myths of French patriotism sometimes manage to outdo the French themselves.
Such a view of history excludes analysis in principle, and especially class analysis. Nationalistic mythology appeals to emotions. She looks for the slightest manifestations of patriotic feelings in medieval sources, or what can be interpreted as a manifestation of such (for example, the triumphant cries of the armies and the cheers of the crowds), ignoring the huge body of evidence convincingly to the contrary. And the concept of “ours” and “them” is retroactively interpreted in the spirit of state patriotism.
Of course, the Hundred Years War was directly related to the emergence of modern nations, since it was associated with the formation of nation-states. However, in England, the new state, which began to take shape even before the war, was going through a crisis by the end of it, culminating in the collapse of the entire political edifice. Conversely, in France, the new state order began to take shape only towards the end of the confrontation, and its formation ended much later. The real history of the Hundred Years War is not only and not so much the history of the struggle between the British and the French, but the history of a series of civil wars in France itself, accompanied by a series of English interventions. The end of the French Civil War and the consolidation of the new state, in turn, resulted in the collapse of the political system and the outbreak of civil war in England.
The war began as a result of the aggravation of two smoldering conflicts at once, which arose much earlier. On the one hand, Gascony, which belonged to the English king (what was left of the Plantagenet domain in France), was a constant bone of contention between Paris and London. On the other hand, the Flemish cities, defending their independence in relation to both the local lords and the French king, sought to get the support of England. The supply of wool to Flanders was the most important factor in the English economy - the royal budget, the income of merchants, and the flow of money into agriculture depended to a large extent on them. In turn, the permanent financial crisis experienced by the French royal government pushed him to take actions that exacerbated both problems at once. On the one hand, French pressure on wealthy Flanders intensified, on the other hand, Paris once again decided to confiscate the Plantagenet domain in Gascony (Guyenne). Such attempts have already been made several times and regularly ended in agreements. However, this time the patience of the London court snapped. The matter was aggravated by the fact that Edward III, who ruled in England, had no less, and perhaps even greater rights to the French throne than the new Valois dynasty, which had recently reigned in Paris. True, while no one touched Gascony, Edward also did not show his rights, he even brought homage to the French king for this territory. But after Paris announced the confiscation, London remembered hereditary rights.
As the French historian Edouard Perrois notes, the war that broke out was "by origin a feudal conflict", and it remained so "almost until the end of the 14th century, that is, until the ascension of the Lancasters to the English throne." The Plantagenets were always ready to give up their rights, guaranteeing peace in exchange for territories. Describing the policy of Edward III on the eve of the peace in Brétigny (Br?tigny), Perrois concludes: “Dynastic claims for him are just a bargaining chip. And then it became clear what he really wanted: the return of Guienne within as wide a range as possible - as long as it was about the borders of the duchy of the times of the good King Louis Saint, but appetites would increase from the success of English weapons. Moreover, for this enlarged Guyenne, he was determined to demand full sovereignty: no more vassalage, no more interference by French officials in its affairs, no appeals to the Parlement of Paris, no threats of confiscation. If Guyenne ceased to be part of the French kingdom, the Plantagenets would finally become masters in it, and the very reason for war would disappear. It is significant that the new sovereign principality of Aquitaine, created on the basis of the old Guyenne, would also be beyond the control of the London Parliament, turning into the personal property of the dynasty.
However, if the Plantagenets defended their dynastic rights, then the merchants and artisans of Flanders, who pushed Edward III to war with France, had their own interest. In 1339, Flanders and Brabant concluded an anti-French treaty, motivating joint action by the fact that "these two countries are full of people who cannot exist without trade." Even before the alliance with England was formalized openly, Holland joined this treaty. And in 1340, Edward III, prompted by the Flemish leaders, took the oath at the Pyatnitsky market in Ghent as the new king of France, promising to respect the rights and independence of the cities of Flanders. It is easy to see from whom the initiative came. The English king hesitated, but the Flemings pushed him to take irreversible steps, seeing in the struggle between the two kingdoms the only defense against the French feudal racket.
At first, it seems that not only in Paris, but even in London itself, they did not understand that, having challenged the Plantagenets, the French kings got involved in a conflict with a state that, in the century and a half that had passed since the Magna Carta and the reforms of Simon de Montfort, radically modernized and now differed significantly from the states of the continent. The difference soon became apparent. And not just on the battlefield.
Even before the first English soldiers landed on the Continent, London demonstrated that this war would be quite unlike any previous one. It laid the foundation for the most important institution without which it is difficult to imagine a later state: mass propaganda.
Of course, a certain system of ideological domination is characteristic of any class society, but before that the leading ideological role was played by the Church. Moreover, kings and princes gave little thought to how to ensure that their subjects were informed and supported on matters of current politics, not to mention international public opinion. Now everything was different. “In addition to official letters to the pope, cardinals and secular rulers, King Edward undertook a whole series of appeals to his subjects, subjects of the French crown and other states. These appeals and proclamations were posted on the doors of temples in all major cities, and were also read aloud by royal officials and clergy in crowded places, informing people about various important events: the causes of war, enemy attacks, victories, truces, etc. ” . A significant place in these proclamations was given to attacks by French pirates on English merchants and trading cities. And some of the arguments can be astonishing in how much they resemble the political propaganda of the late 20th century. So, proving his right to inherit the French crown through the female line (due to the lack of direct male offspring), Edward, quite in the spirit of modern feminism, accuses his French rival of sowing hatred of “man for man” and “sex for semi" that Philippe of Valois "tramples the rights of women, which is a violation of the law of nature" (jus naturae).
In London they resorted not only to the methods of psychological warfare, but also to economic warfare. For the first time, a trade blockade was used as a means of struggle between states. In an effort to destabilize the situation in Flanders, Edward III banned the export of wool, which supported Flemish weaving. A side effect of this measure was the development of their own English production (especially since many Flemish weavers moved to the island). However, the main purpose of the blockade was to exacerbate the class conflict, well understood in London, between the bourgeoisie and the feudal elite in Flanders. And a successful attempt. The embargo imposed by Edward III on the supply of wool to Flanders dealt a blow to the cloth industry of this region and contributed to the development of this industry in England itself. But the most important consequence of this decision was that the mechanism of social conflict came into play again, which had been blocked for several decades by the French victory at Kassel in 1328.
The popular movements, which at the beginning of the 14th century dealt powerful blows to the feudal nobility, the dominance of the urban patricians and the power of the French king, were suppressed, albeit with great difficulty, after the battle of Kassel. Bruges and Ypres, which played a decisive role in the democratic uprisings, were exhausted by the struggle and lost their former role, but in the middle of the century Ghent came to the fore, where the local patriciate had previously kept the situation under control, avoiding democratic coups and confrontation with France. Social peace was ensured in the city through concessions and compromises, which gradually led to the strengthening of the position of the Democratic Party. Mass unemployment was accompanied by an explosion of hatred against the government, which allowed conflict with England and the halt of industry. As Henri Pirenne writes: “The patricians who have ruled the city for so long have united with the very weavers, whose attempts to rebellion they had recently mercilessly suppressed.” At the beginning of January 1338, a revolutionary government of five captains (hooftmannen) and three elders, representing respectively weavers, fullers and small guild associations, stood at the head of the city. This compromise opened the way to power for the legendary Jacob Artevelde. Having led the Democratic Party, he managed to rally the cities of Flanders around Ghent and, united with the British, deal a heavy blow to the French crown.
Artevelde, whom conservative writers portray (like every revolutionary) as a bloody tyrant, became the hero of Flemish folk songs and leftist historians of later times. In turn, Pirenne assesses him as an effective and energetic opportunist. In fact, the leader of Ghent "had the same feelings of distrust and enmity toward the workers in the cloth industry as other urban capitalists." However, being a shrewd politician, he bet on the rising tide of the democratic movement and was sensitive to the pressure and demands of the masses. He entered the government of Ghent as one of the three captains, representing precisely the interests of the privileged strata, but becoming one of the leaders of the city, he joined the democratic party. Soon, thanks to successful negotiations with the British, wool again began to arrive at the fullers of Ghent and other Flemish cities.
After the unsuccessful siege of Tournai, Artevelde's position was shaken, as was the union of Flanders with Brabant, whose patricians feared the spread of the influence of the democratic party in their lands, and in Ghent itself, clashes began between the craft workshops that supported Artevelde - weavers and fullers reached an armed clash between themselves . Soon new unrest broke out in Ghent, during which Artevelde died trying to resist the establishment of the dictatorship of the weavers. According to Pirenne, this politician was inevitably doomed to failure. At the heart of his career was a class compromise. “But the interests of these classes were too opposed for their agreement to last. Due to the contradiction of interests between the rich and the poor, merchants and workers, small workshops and wool processing workshops, then contradictions within these workshops themselves, and finally, due to the rivalry between weavers and fullers, the harmony of the first days was soon replaced by clashes and civil strife. The new social contradictions were already too developed to allow for an effective politics based on estate representation, guild agreements and dynastic combinations, but they were still too weakly developed to ensure the emergence of a new politics based on stable and consolidated interests of the leading classes. This, however, was not only the drama of Artevelde, but of his entire era, this was one of the most important reasons for the failure of the revolutionary and reformist attempts generated by the "crisis of the XIV century."
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