Two destinies. Two Fates 2 Maneuverable Airborne Brigade
spring 1942 In 1999, the command of the North-Western Front (NWF) conducted a major landing operation in the Demyansky district of the Novgorod region in the rear of the encircled 16th Wehrmacht Army. Its purpose was to disrupt the rear infrastructure of the encircled group of Germans and cut off the communications through which the German units were supplied.
This hero page The history of the Great Patriotic War has practically not been studied by domestic historians. Here is how the American historian David M. Glantz said about it: "It is surprising that, despite big number military research done by Soviet historians since the end of the war, and the abundance of archival materials published in last years, in fact, there is not a single work describing these operations or listing Soviet soldiers who died here."
One of the special forces that participated in the Demyansk military operation was the 1st maneuverable airborne landing brigade, which was formed in December 1941 in the city of Zuevka Kirov region.
The brigade consisted of 2600 people, organized into 4 battalions of 600-620 people each, not counting the support of special forces. The brigade was armed with a very high percentage of automatic weapons. The mortar division consisted of three batteries, each of which had four 52 mm mortars, and two 82 mm mortars. Each battalion included a mortar company of 6 52 mm mortars each. The brigade had 12 anti-tank rifles.
The Soviet command, knowing that the Germans were preparing to conduct a deblocking military operation, sought to quickly defeat the encircled fascist troops, but all attempts by the North-Western Front were unsuccessful and ended in heavy losses of personnel. Then it was proposed to carry out this task by inflicting blows on the enemy from the outside by the forces of the front itself and blows from the rear by forces landing units.
Lieutenant Colonel N.E. Tarasov was appointed commander of the brigade. The basis of the command staff were officers 204 and 211 VDB, and the rank and file of the brigade consisted of young guys 18-19 years old, mostly residents of the Kirov region, as well as, in a small number, residents
Udmurtia and Perm region
Performance landing operation was assigned to the 1st and 2nd maneuverable airborne brigades (MVDBR) and the 204th airborne brigade (VDBr). 1 MVDBR and 204 VBR, acting together, were to achieve the following goals:
1) destroy the airfields built by the Germans in the area of the village of Glebovshchina, which would lead to a disruption in the supply of weapons, ammunition and life support;
2) to destroy the headquarters of the encircled German troops, located in the village of Dobrosli, which would lead to the disorganization of the interaction of all encircled units.
Further, both brigades, destroying the German garrisons, were to move south to the area of the village of Bel, and then break through the German positions to their troops.
03/10/1942 204 vdbr
For the purpose of reconnaissance, preparing a base for the main landing forces and preparing runways, on February 15-18, 1942, the landing unit of the 204th Airborne Brigade was airborne behind enemy lines inside the Demyansk "boiler". This operation was noticed by the enemy: already on February 18, a special unit was formed from the soldiers of the SS "Totenkopf" division to fight paratroopers under the command of Major General Simon (Simon's group). The group is armed with armored vehicles, one of the main tasks of the group is to cover the most important objects, including airfields. In our opinion, it would not be superfluous to note that the SS "Totenkopf" division was considered elite for a reason. The level of her training is already evidenced by the fact that her soldiers almost never evaded hand-to-hand combat with our troops, which was the exception rather than the rule among the German divisions.
The Germans were aware of the movement. In post-war publications, the situation on the German side is described as follows: "... about 2000 soldiers of the 204th Soviet airborne brigade are marching on Demyansk. west of Maly and Bolshoi Opuev to join forces with the 1st Parachute Brigade.
The brigade had to pass the front line through the German units that were alerted. The Germans opened harassing fire, which slowed the brigade's night movement, forced it to crawl and disperse the battalions. Having suffered losses south of the village of Pustyn, the battalions of the 204th brigade came under artillery fire from the German positions in ur. Dedno. Force the river Only one battalion managed to break, in which the brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Grinev, was also located. The remaining battalions, including the headquarters, were forced to return to their original positions and did not participate in further hostilities inside the "boiler". Grinev's battalion did not have time to connect with the 1st MVDBr by the scheduled date.
The 1st Ministry of Internal Affairs Brigade, located in the Neviy Mokh swamp, was starving. The question was already simply about the survival of people, as the text of the ciphergrams eloquently speaks of: March 11 - "give food, hungry"; March 12 - "we went to the area of cargo drop, there is no food"; March 13 - "I am specifying the point of food dropping .... southwest of M. Opuyevo", "coordinates for dropping food - a forest clearing south-west of M. Opuyevo"; March 14, - "Give me some food, we're dying, coordinates ...". Things got to the point that the soldiers dug horses out from under the snow that died in the fall of 1941 during the bombing of one of the retreating cavalry units and ate their meat. The brigade commander Tarasov understands that if you do not make a supply of food for at least five days, then further fighting the brigade will not be able to perform - it is impossible to establish supplies on the march and during battles. March 14 (according to German data, March 13) 1 MVDBr attacked the village of Maloye Opuyevo and occupied it. It is possible to capture a small amount of food, but this does not solve the issue of food. The command of the NWF strengthens aviation supplies and within 4 days the situation begins to improve.
1st MVDBr 03/15/1942
1st MVDBr from 3 to 16 March 1942
Another big problem was severe frostbite. Daytime thaws led to the fact that the uniforms got wet, at night the temperature dropped to -25 degrees. As of March 17, the number of people killed and wounded was 248, and the number of frostbite - 349, of which a high percentage were severe, leading to gangrene, frostbite.
Despite all the difficulties, the battalions of the brigade carried on combat work: they attacked German columns, mined roads, blew up bridges, and destroyed enemy patrol groups. As a result, the German 30th Infantry Division was almost completely cut off from all supply routes. The delivery of food and ammunition from the Demyansk airfield became impossible.
The Germans realized that they had a large special unit in the rear, and did everything to protect strategic objects. They equipped bunkers, dug tanks into the ground, set up minefields, ambushes were set up on the paths of the possible movement of paratroopers, following the example of the Finns, snipers were on duty in the trees. German planes constantly flew in the air, which, if paratroopers were detected, bombed and corrected the fire of artillery batteries. Thus, one of the main significant factors of airborne units was lost - the factor of surprise.
On March 19, the battalions attacked the airfields in the village of Glebovshchina. It was not possible to capture them, although the runways were damaged. Despite all the efforts of our paratroopers, the German defense held out, the battalions were forced to retreat. In addition, at the coordinates indicated by the paratroopers, a powerful airstrike was delivered to the airfield. On March 22, brigade commander Tarasov orders to attack the village of Dobrosli - the second main goal raid. In this village, located near Demyansk, was the headquarters of the 2nd Army Corps of the Wehrmacht. Naturally, the enemy did everything to secure such an important object. Documentary evidence that the Germans became aware of the impending attack on the village of Dobrosli, about the direction of the strike of the Soviet special forces, was not found. But they obviously had such information. Most likely, the radio interception service worked. Expecting an attack by paratroopers, on March 21, the German command hastily transferred units of the 12th and 32nd Infantry Divisions to Dobrosli. During the attack on the village of Dobrosli, the landing battalions fell into a fire bag. According to the participants in that battle, the Germans fired from all directions - in front, on the right, on the left, from the trees. All this points to a well-prepared ambush. Breaking out of this firestorm, our units withdrew to the north and made a stop for rest, evacuation of the wounded to the base camp and counting losses. Realizing that it would not be possible to take the village of Dobrosli, Tarasov gives the order to cross the Demyansk road and move in a southerly direction, to the area of the village of Igozhevo. I must say that it was extremely difficult to fulfill this order, because. The Germans paid special attention to the protection of the Demyansk road. Such attention was due to the fact that it was the only road leading to the west, to the area of the village of Ramushevo, and it was from that side that von Seydlitz's troops were supposed to come. Ambushes were set up along the road, observation posts on towers, along the edges of the road snow banks were arranged, which, to make it difficult to overcome, were watered and had icy slopes. The road was patrolled by maneuverable armored groups. In order to cross the road with the least losses, the brigade commander ordered Captain Zhuk's 1st battalion to launch a distracting attack on the village of Penno.
When advancing to the road, the paratroopers destroyed the discovered German camp near the village of Pekakhino and the officer camp a little to the east, near the Volochya River. On March 23, the brigade broke through the road between the villages of Paseki and Bobkovo. The 1st battalion of Captain Zhuk, having moved away from Penno, could no longer break through the road - the Germans blocked it tightly. By order of the commissar of the brigade A.I. Machekhin, the battalion went to the old base, to the Neviy Mokh swamp.
From that moment on, the forces of the brigade were divided into the southern part, the actual brigade, and the northern part, consisting of the battalion of Captain Zhuk and left on old base wounded and frostbite soldiers.
03/24/1942
25.03.1942
Despite heavy losses, general exhaustion of people and injuries, the brigade (southern part) was still a formidable military organism. The paratroopers withdrew to the Gladky swamp. The reception of planes with ammunition and food was organized there, and the wounded were taken from there. The brigade continued its sabotage operations. On the night of March 24, on the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov, the battalion of the 204th Airborne Brigade attacked the village of Igozhevo, where the headquarters of the 12th German infantry division was located. The fight lasted all night. The enemy suffered very heavy losses, the commander of the German division was wounded, the chief of staff of this division was killed. The paratroopers withdrew at dawn, when tanks approached to help the enemy.
Apparently, this exceeded the patience of the German command, especially since on March 25, von Seydlitz made his way to the encircled German troops, creating the so-called "Ramushevsky corridor". Fresh German units began to enter the Demyansk cauldron. Special shock battalions, reconnaissance groups and jaeger teams were thrown against the southern group of paratroopers. According to the memoirs of the paratroopers, Finnish ski groups also fought against them, who were excellent specialists in warfare in conditions winter forest, and in addition, they were distinguished by great cruelty towards the prisoners.
After the battle, the brigade withdrew west to a pre-planned assembly point near Hill 80.1, where it joined up with the remnants of the 204th Airborne Brigade Battalion. The brigade was burdened with a large number of wounded, it was not possible to break through the front line with them. All the wounded, unable to move independently, were sent to the Gladkoye swamp, where an airstrip was arranged. They were planned to be gradually evacuated. Thus, in the dense forest, on the outskirts of the swamp, a camp of the wounded and frostbitten was formed, numbering about two hundred people. He was never evacuated. The Germans describe the state of the airborne units at that time in this way: "... the battles of recent weeks have significantly reduced the combat power of the Soviet elite units. They retreat to the swamp area, where our fighter squads split them into scattered groups and arrange a real hunt for them.
1st MVDBr April 4, 1942
Northern group 04/07/1942
Radio exchange of the 1st MVDBR and the command of the North-Western Front
Foundation 1774
Description 1
Case 5
Incoming cipher telegrams of the 1st Ministry of Internal Affairs brigade January 17-March 29 Until March 13, there are no cipher messages with coordinates and location. On March 13, food was dropped into the square ... Vatutin On March 14, indicate the landing site of the plane, mark fires Vatutin On March 14, your telegrams are distorted, where to drop them, give the coordinates, give a signal to Kurochkin on March 17 in view of the discovery of you in the area ... by the enemy, leave the area, carry out the task - dobrosli, demyansk Kurochkin Radio operator, due to distortion, do not allow work on March 18, products were dropped in abundance in ..., where your team is located. Kurochkin On March 18, food, as you indicated, was dropped 1 km east of the mark ... there is also a platform for aircraft to take out the wounded, organize an urgent removal, set up guards. Kurochkin March 20 Grinev with 2 battalions mark ..., get in touch, give food. Kurochkin Fund 1774 Inventory 1 File 4 Outgoing cipher telegrams of the 1st Ministry of Internal Affairs Brigades January 17-March 29 March 6 42. to supply food on March 11 at the coordinates ... the Polomet River took battle coordinates ... March 9, 1 battalion at the coordinates ... the main forces .. got in touch with Polkhman's partisan detachment, continue to move along the route on March 11, give food coordinates ..., hungry on March 12, went to the area ... no food on March 14, the lack of food forced B. and M. Opuyevo to attack on March 14 or 15, without dates Give us some food, we are dying, coordinates..., a glade southwest of the mark... March 15, we are dying, hunger, we are in the zone of the central fortifications. Further actions are meaningless. Aviation does not allow to rise. Allow departure by the old route. March 16, from the area ... Due to the strong influence of aviation, they retreated to the area ... Drop the products into ... where the U-2 landed On March 16, the products were delivered, distributed, but this is clearly not enough. March 17 Received about half a day, the brigade remains hungry. We can't speak today. It is urgently necessary to evacuate the wounded and frostbite in the number of 250 people. March 18 Grinshpup reports to the special department of the NKVD 15 attacked M. Opuevo. The operation was carried out without preparation and tactically illiterate. There are many victims. The brigade commander made the wrong decision - he left the village without picking up the wounded, killed, incl. battalion commander and full Krylov March 18 The position of the unit is unchanged, we collect food in coordinates ..., a platform for dropping cargo coordinates ..., where b. signal is posted. On March 19, on the night of 19-20, I ask you to drop food to the same points and allow you to complete the task (Dobrosli) after receiving food - hungry, exhausted. On March 20, Latypov and Stepanchikov arrived. They confirm that there are those to be evacuated and about the start of the operation on 20 at 19, then in a telegram dated March 21, that at 6-00., Then at 11 o'clock on March 21, that the attack was at 21 o'clock on dobrosli. On March 20, Latypov reports 509 wounded and frostbite, of which 237 require evacuation. He moved 2.5 km north of Dobrosli, Grinev went to the area with a mark ... On March 23, Chief of Staff Shishkin reports by 10-00 1 and 204 went to the area ..., the letters are crossed out. March 23 We went to the area 3.5 km south of Arkadovo. We attacked Igozhevo at 21-00 March 24 March 23 Latypov reports There are wounded, send a communications aircraft, signals are laid out 3.5 km south of Arkadovo. On March 24 or 25, without a date, the 1:50000 map reached the mark ... km southwest of Igozhevo March 24, the food drop site on the night of March 24-25, coordinates ... forest clearing 2.25 km southwest of Meglino March 24 at 9-00 we set out for the assembly area ... March 25 Landing site U-2 - Gladkoe swamp, signals laid out. Need - food, ammunition, 50 pairs of skis, 20 pairs of boots. I have wounded. Fund 1774 Inventory 1 Case 6 Incoming and Outgoing cipher telegrams of the 1st Ministry of Internal Affairs Brigades From March 10 to April 7, March 25, Mavrichev - 34th army on the night of 26 attacks Meglino and Star Tarasovo, in case of failure I retreat to a height ... north of black - western. I have wounded, I ask for transport for evacuation. Tarasov No date to Kurochkina He fought for Meglino, Star Tarasovo, Tarasovo, Igozhevo on the Igozhevo-Ermakovo road. I went to the mark area ... km north of the black - western. No date We set out at 20-00 in the direction between Lunevo-Kornevo, many seriously wounded Tarasov Kurochkin No date Drop food until 24-00 on March 28 at the site 1 km northeast of Root, land ambulance aircraft to evacuate Grinev, Machikhin. Kurochkina - Tarasov, Latypov On March 31, a reshetnyak-tree crossing the Igozhevo-Yermakovo road was fired upon by submachine gunners without a date Kurochkina Tarasov The attempt to break through the Demyanskaya road was not successful, he retreated to the forest area 3 km (3.3) northwest of Igozhev, asks to drop food and air ambulance without specifying coordinates. On April 5, Tarasov Neviy moss mark ... there is a battalion of Zhuk. 327 healthy, 234 lightly frostbitten, requiring evacuation 150. Provided with food and medicine for 5 days. Evacuation from him by planes, please contact Zhuk, ensure the removal of the wounded, food and medicine to throw them . Head of Sanitary Department Shanashinkin. March 30 Tarasov Kurochkin After an unsuccessful breakthrough to the South, with losses, in small groups concentrated at the elev. .., on the night of March 31, I move to the area of the southern edge of the Gladkoe swamp. There are wounded, send planes. On March 27, Machikhin to Kurochkin, after a breakthrough of the moon-black, retreated to the mark ... March 31, Tarasov to Kurochkin 31 aircraft landings are needed in the area of the southern edge of the Gladkoye swamp for evacuation. Urgent stepmother. April 5, the place is the same. I ask for the landing of air ambulances for the removal of the wounded. April 6-7 Mavrichev On the night of April 7, I am trying to break through between Dubetsky Bor and Andreevskoye in the direction of the barn ... Tarasov Vatutin received food, do not leave it any more On the night of 7 to 8, I am in the southeastern outskirts of Diven Mokh. April 7 Tarasov-Vatutin I am in the area south-east of the outskirts of the Diven Mokh swamp. The situation is very - 2 times - difficult. Help is needed for the withdrawal. I protect only the wounded on my own. Please help me get out. Daily delay brings dozens of victims. I propose the transition of the front on the night of April 8 at the Nikolaevskoye-Andreevskaya sector. I ask you to support in every possible way. Vatutin-Tarasov April 5 Machekhin delivered. April 7 Vatutin-Tarasov Repeatedly sent you an order to leave, avoiding battle, bypassing settlements. Cross the front at the Pogorelitsy-Nikolskoye section.
http://zhurnal.lib.ru/i/iwakin_a_g/desant.shtml
After the battle for Igozhevo.
The dead paratroopers of the 1st Mvdbr and 204th Vdbr.
photograph found in the possession of a German officer
Materials based on the results of the work of the 2nd Mvdbr
Report on the combat activities of the 2nd Mvdbr behind enemy lines in the period from 12 to 21.3.1942.
Personnel of the 2nd Mvdbr
In the fall of 2016, search engines of the Veteran (Kirov), Krechet (Kirovo-Chepetsk) and Nakhodka (Demyansky District) detachments found combat burial with the remains of 25 Soviet soldiers.
During the exhumation, the buttonholes of the captain of the Red Army were found on two of the dead. According to the lists of irretrievable losses, the following were killed in this area during shelling: Captain Sukhorukikh Ivan Fedorovich, born in 1907, commander of the artillery battalion of the 1st MVDBr and Captain Andrey Dmitrievich Vdovin, born in 1907, commander of the 4th battalion of the 1st MVDBr. The search engines suggested that, judging by the location and contents of the burial, the remains found may belong to the officers of the headquarters of the 1st MVDbr who died during the shelling.
http://poisk-dolina.ru/news/news_detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=51111
Surname Sukhorukih
Name Ivan
The project of a monument to the paratroopers who fell in the battles near Demyansk, went missing, tortured in captivity, died of hunger, wounds, froze to death and miraculously survived. To all those who honestly and to the end fulfilled their duty to the Motherland in the "icy hell of the Demyansk cauldron"
In the spring of 1942, in the Demyansk region, in the German rear, a landing operation was carried out by the forces of the 1st and 2nd maneuverable airborne brigades (MVDBR) and the 204th airborne brigade (VDBr), as well as separate ski battalions attached to them. The goals set by the airborne brigades by the command were not achieved. Most of the paratroopers, both hardened and fired upon, and very young volunteer soldiers, died (the paratroopers fought truly in inhuman, hellish conditions) or went missing (which is the same thing). Most of the dead and missing have not yet been found or buried. There are no results of the operation in the official "broad" historiography. There is still no worthy monument to the soldiers-paratroopers, who honestly and to the end fulfilled their duty to the Motherland. I would like to fix this situation myself. The monument will be given special attention.
Below - short review events that unfolded in February-May 1942 in the Novgorod region, near the "Demyansk fortress", written by a comrade rote_capelle . In addition to the text, below are photographs of the dead and surviving paratroopers. Photos provided Alexey Pankratov, and the pictures came to him from the archive of Mikhail Yakovlevich Tolkach, who for a long time was engaged in the history of this gloomy story and wrote several books about the Demyansk operation. One of them was recently republished in a small edition, I recommend that those who are interested read. About what the paratroopers from the 204th Airborne Brigade were like, who fought as part of the airborne brigade at the beginning of the war.
Introduction
In early January 1942, as a result of the offensive of the Red Army by the troops of the North-Western and Kalinin fronts, south of the lake Ilmen and east of the city of Staraya Russa, were partially surrounded by 6 divisions of the Wehrmacht, SS and units attached to them, as well as rear units the second army corps - more than 70 thousand Germans in total (some sources both in Germany and in other countries speak of the initially surrounded units as 96-100-105 thousand people).
This offensive was part of the "great counter-offensive near Moscow" and part of the Toropetsko-Kholmskaya operation. Warriors of the Red Army went to the Hill, Staraya Russa. As a result of the development of this and some other private operations, later, in mid-February, the so-called "Demyansky Cauldron" was formed - the encirclement of a group of Germans wedged into our defenses, initially aimed at Bologoye with the task of "saddling" the Oktyabrskaya railway (Moscow-Leningrad road) .
At first, the "cauldron" was not continuous, only the main communications of the Germans were cut, but the internal and external fronts of the encirclement were not created. Our troops had the task of taking and holding the cities of Kholm and Staraya Russa, developing the offensive further to the west, to encircle and destroy the army group "Center" in the region of Smolensk and Vitebsk. The “cauldron” was finally “closed” in mid-February 1942, when the internal and partially external fronts of the encirclement were formed. Colonel-General Pavel Alekseevich Kurochkin (commander of the North-Western Front) reported to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that he intended to focus on the destruction of the encircled group of Germans. The Stavka supported this decision and increased the number of troops participating in the operation, giving the front several rifle corps and divisions from the Stavka reserve.
This was the first major encirclement of the Germans by enemy troops since the beginning of the Second World War. For the first time, German troops in such numbers were surrounded and completely cut off from the main forces. For the first time, the Red Army conducted a deep private operation to encircle German troops with the explicit task of destroying the encircled (although the encirclement of this group was not the ultimate and central goal of the Toropetsko-Kholm operation).
Soon the Headquarters noted the low coordination of the troops of the North-Western Front (11th, 34th, 1st Shock armies, 1st and 2nd Guards Rifle corps) and the 3rd Shock Army of the Kalinin Front for continuous coverage, compression of the ring and the destruction of the German group. In order to create a unified command and solve the task set by the Headquarters, the “Ksenofontov group” was separated from the troops of the 3rd Shock Army of the Kalinin Front and transferred to the control of the North-Western Front (initially one rifle division, four rifle brigades and six separate ski battalions), which formed the coverage of the southern part of the boiler perimeter. Before the combined forces of the two fronts, the task was set - "to finish with the Demian group within 4-5 days." But it was February 1942 in the yard - frosts under -40 and snow one and a half meters in the fields ...
Subsequently, P.A. Kurochkin noted: “We did not have enough strength. The lack of movable joints did not allow inflicting deep cutting blows. Dominating the air, the enemy extremely hampered our offensive. In addition to this, having no correct information about the number and composition of the encircled group, the Headquarters and the command of the NWF believed that there were no more than 50 thousand Germans in the boiler. At the same time, German sources (those that should be trusted) speak of 70-75 thousand actually surrounded (5 Wehrmacht infantry divisions, one SS division, partly one security division and many smaller reinforcement units, including individual tank units and Luftwaffe units) . As a result of underestimation: the number of the enemy; the established severe and snowy winter; and also in the conditions of a lack of supplies and the absence of any passable roads - the combined troops of the NWF and KF objectively could not destroy the "cauldron" within the time frame set by the Headquarters. On February 22, the German command declared the “cauldron” the “Demyansk Fortress” (Festung Demjansk) and ordered it to be held as a springboard for a future offensive against Moscow and Kalinin, while at the same time establishing an effective supply of those surrounded by air, using the built airfield in the village of Glebovshchina, not far from Demyansk.
The surrounded German troops in the "cauldron" fiercely defended themselves and "burrowed into the ground" - in the manner of veterans of the First World War. The Germans carried out an effective regrouping of forces to create mobile reserves and immediately tuned in to long-term defense, based on the then-known tactics of creating a "pearl necklace" of strongholds instead of a continuous front in "difficult" terrain. The Germans preferred to hold fortified points instead of the continuous defense of roads and other supply routes (frozen rivers). As time has shown, this was a well-chosen tactic. Some German strongholds along the perimeter of the "cauldron" were in full or partial encirclement for several months, supplied from aircraft with containers of supplies - and successfully withstood.
Such was the situation inside and around the Demyansk Cauldron at the end of February 1942, when the first in the history of the Great Patriotic War(and "carefully" then "buried" in the archives) a large-scale operation to cut and destroy the encircled German units.
Vatutin (NWF chief of staff at that moment) and Kurochkin intended to carry out an operation to cut and disorganize the encircled Germans by the forces of the landing units of the Red Army by throwing them into the rear of the "cauldron". Its purpose was to disrupt the rear infrastructure of the encircled group of Germans and cut off the communications through which the German units were supplied. But it turned out differently.
This "twilight" page in the history of the Great Patriotic War has been practically not studied by Russian historians. Here is how the American historian David Glantz put it: “It is surprising that, despite the large number of military studies done by Soviet historians since the end of the war, and the abundance of archival materials published in recent years, there is actually not a single work describing these operations or listing the Soviet soldiers who died here. Yes, this operation was classified after its completion. And it remained so until recently. There were reasons for this and there were certain reasons - we will give them later.
Paratroopers. Start
The landing operation was entrusted to the 1st and 2nd maneuverable airborne brigades (MVDBR) and the 204th airborne brigade (VDBr), as well as separate ski battalions attached to them. The initial plan of the operation was to parachute all the personnel of the brigades into the "cauldron" from the aircraft. Later, the plan was changed in favor of a small group of fighters landing from the air to equip temporary runways and bases. Then, using the large gaps in the German defenses between the strongholds, the remaining forces of the brigades were to enter the "cauldron" - having ammunition and food for 3 days. At the same time, further supply and evacuation of the wounded were to be carried out by U-2 aircraft and TB-3 bombers from temporary lanes or using airborne containers. The strips were supposed to be equipped in the north-west of the frozen swamp Neviy Mokh, north-west of Demyansk, not far from the villages of Bolshoe and Maloye Opuevo.
During the operation, the 1st MVDbr and 204th Airborne Brigade, acting together, were to achieve the following goals:
to destroy the airfield built by the Germans in the village of Glebovshchina, which would have led to a disruption in the supply of weapons, ammunition and life support, as well as to a disruption in the evacuation of the wounded;
destroy the headquarters of the 2nd Army Corps, located in the village of Dobrosli, which would lead to the disorganization of the interaction of all encircled units;
move to the area south of the village of Bel and to Vatolino, destroying the rear communications of the enemy along the way, acting to break through the perimeter of the boiler to connect with the “Ksenofontov group”.
The 2nd MVDbr, reinforced by the 54th separate ski battalion, entering the boiler along with two other brigades, was supposed to:
clear the area around the Knevitsy-Lychkovo railway in the north of the pocket from the enemy and hold it, which would allow the road to be used without hindrance for supplying and maneuvering the NWF troops in the north of the pocket.
Based on the assumption that the rear security units of the Germans in the boiler could not exceed 5,000 people, and the rest of the units would be held down by the struggle for the perimeter, the command determined the number of troops needed for the operation as "no more than 10,000 fighters." In fact, about 9.5 thousand fighters took part in the operation.
Here it is necessary to note a significant difference between the brigades. The 204th Airborne Brigade was well trained, consisted of experienced, "fired" fighters who took part in the "Winter War" in Finland, the defense of Kyiv, and in many landing sabotage operations during 1941 behind the front line. In fact, the 204th brigade consisted of fighters who had already passed through the "crucible of the front and rear of the enemy."
Both MVDbr, on the contrary, were recently formed near Kirov (Vyatka) and consisted mainly of young, unfired fighters aged 18-20. Only an insignificant part of the commanders of these brigades had real front-line experience. The key to the success of the operation were: "stealth, surprise and maneuver" - which determined the marching, light equipment of the brigades.
There were no anti-tank weapons in the arsenal of the brigades, except for a small number of anti-tank grenades (as further actions showed, this was a huge mistake); but all the fighters were armed with automatic weapons (PPSh, PPD, SVT-38, SVT-40, DP-27). The paratroopers did not have heavy weapons at all, with the exception of 37mm mortars and a small number of 50mm company mortars. The uniform was winter, on the legs - felt boots. From all transport - skis on legs and drags on straps behind the back. Volokushi were intended for transporting supplies and the wounded.
The operation began in mid-February with an air drop of the 4th battalion of the 204th Airborne Brigade into the "cauldron" in the area of the Neviy Mokh swamp. This part of the paratroopers was thrown out to prepare bases and conduct reconnaissance. Then, formation after formation, the brigades were brought into the "cauldron" on skis in the following order: 1st MVDbr - from March 6 to 8; 204th Airborne Brigade - March 11-15; 2nd MVDbr - March 13-16.
At the same time, the initial airborne landing was noticed by the Germans and they immediately began to take retaliatory measures: units of the SS division "Dead Head" from the so-called. “Simon’s Groups” (1st regiment of the “Dead Head” division and attached units that “held” the perimeter in the northeast of the boiler); mobile patrol groups were formed from rear units; reinforced garrisons of strongholds; Patrols of forest roads between strong points were organized.
The result was not long in coming - already at the stage of bringing brigades into the rear of the Germans, the paratroopers were discovered and began to suffer losses from the fire of strongholds. The pace of movement of the 204th Airborne Brigade and the 2nd MVDBrig slowed down significantly, the first wounded and killed appeared. The paratroopers began to suffer especially heavy losses at the entrance to the rear of the "cauldron" on March 14-15, when the Germans had already approximately determined the area where the brigades were concentrated and subjected it to night bombing and harassing artillery fire.
At the same time, German reconnaissance correctly identified the location of temporary runways and cargo drop. Systematic artillery and mortar shelling of both the base area and the airstrip area began (the areas were separated on the ground by about 2 km). On March 10, 1942, the brigade concentration area was first marked on the map of the situation on the Eastern Front at Hitler's headquarters. So far - like a cluster of unknown parts of the Red Army.
Part of the 204th Airborne Brigade (as a result of "difficulties" in bypassing the garrison in the village of Pustynya), on the orders of its commander Grinev, returned back, and in the amount of two companies, joining the 2nd Ministry of Internal Affairs Brigade, then moved towards the village of Lychkovo, bypassing the enemy garrison in the village of Dedno. By the evening of March 13, this part of the paratroopers (2 companies of the 204th Airborne Brigade and the 2nd MVDBr together) concentrated near the village of Zabolotye (in which the rear units of the German 30th Infantry Division and the headquarters of one of its infantry regiments were located). The 4th battalion remained in place in the Polomet River valley with the task of providing assistance to the wounded and guarding them at the place of concentration. The rest of the battalions prepared to attack Zabolotye and, then, the village of Burnt Berezno, aiming at railway between Lychkovo and Knevitsy stations.
Combat phase of the operation
On the evening of March 14, the commander of the 1st MVDbr, Major Tarasov, without waiting for the approach of the remaining companies of the 204th brigade, ordered the 4th battalion of the 1st MVDbr to attack the village of Maloye Opuyevo (the rear stronghold of the Germans west of Demyansk), and the rest of the battalions move through the village of Koza and Podsosenye to Demyansk.
As a result of this poorly prepared attack (if not worse), the 4th battalion suffered huge (up to 200 people) losses in killed and seriously wounded, and the remnants of the garrison of the village of Maly Opuyevo successfully retreated to the village of Bolshoe Opuyevo.
In general, in the current humble opinion, it was this attack that greatly influenced the success of the ENTIRE operation. Huge losses killed and wounded and as a result - loss of morale; and most importantly, some of the attacking paratroopers were taken prisoner by the wounded, and many told during interrogations about the goals of the operation.
The Germans made sure that Demyansk and airfields would be the direction of the strike. The number and armament of the group became known. In fact, the Germans completely mastered the information about this operation. Wasting no time, they began to concentrate mobile reserves on possible brigade routes. A large number of even lightly wounded immediately reduced the mobility of the brigades and further led to the appearance of a camp with the wounded ("infirmary") on the southern outskirts of the Neviy Mokh swamp.
On the morning of March 16, a radiogram arrived from the headquarters of the NWF with new instructions for the 204th and 1st brigades:
1. The 1st MVDbr is transferred to the operational subordination of Grinev (commander of the 204th VDbr).
2. Combined forces attack simultaneously Demyansk, Dobrosli and Glebovshchina on March 18 and destroy their garrisons. After completing the task of the 1st MVDbr, withdraw to Staroe Tarasovo and Bel, and the 204th VDB - to Shishkovo.
The brigades were in dire need of food and ammunition. Hunger began, the sick and frostbitten appeared, there were many wounded. There was an acute shortage of ammunition. The surviving paratroopers of the 1st MVDbr after the war noted in their memoirs that no one followed the filling of the duffel bags before the operation, and the fighters, pushed by patriotism, stuffed the duffel bags with cartridges, and not with a balanced food ration.
As a result, since it was forbidden to make fires behind enemy lines so as not to attract the attention of the enemy - they ate bacon, canned food and concentrates “dry”. In the cold, in wet clothes, in the forest, under fire - the stocks of food brought in disappeared very quickly. People were tired for three or four days, they were hungry; the mobility of the groups has fallen sharply; "On the psyche" was pressed by constant shelling and bombing from aircraft and the actions of enemy ski patrols. In the conditions of unfrozen swamps, felt boots fell apart and became unusable.
The Grinev and Tarasov group created a field hospital (“infirmary”) on the southern edge of the Neviy Mokh swamp in the area of \u200b\u200bheight 60.4 around March 18, placing it at the brigade assembly site, about 2 km from Maly Opuyevo. There, in huts made of spruce branches, the wounded, sick and frostbitten were left in the care of doctors and orderlies. The wounded and sick lay on bedding made of spruce paws in the snow, without heating, almost without food, in wet uniforms, at a fairly “minus” temperature, with a minimum of medicines and with a ghostly hope of evacuation by air. The number of people left behind (without combat-ready guards) was already close to 500 then. Further, the events “wound” on each other almost like “a wet snowball at the end of March.”
Air supply of brigades began by dropping containers and bags of supplies from TB-3 aircraft and landing U-2 aircraft in the Neviy Mokh swamp. On March 19, an operation was scheduled to destroy the village of Dobrosli with the headquarters of the encircled group of Germans (the headquarters of the 2nd Army Corps), and, if successful, an attack on Demyansk. The 2nd and 4th battalions of the 1st MVDbr launched an attack on the airfield in Glebovshchina at night, and the 1st and 3rd battalions of the same brigade, together with units of the 204th (a total of about 3,000 people), launched a raid on Dobrosli. The Germans successfully repelled the attack on Dobrosli, reporting more than 500 paratroopers killed. At the same time, the Germans fired on part of the paratroopers west of Dobrosli (at the place of concentration) with artillery. The Grinev and Tarasov group split up.
On March 22, Grinev sent the wounded with an escort to the "infirmary" in the Neviy Mokh swamp and moved south, intending to find weak spots in the protection of roads west of Demyansk, with the goal of attacking the headquarters of the 12th German infantry division in the village of Igozhevo. He managed to lead his forces to the swamp northwest of Igozhevo and prepare for the attack. About 500 exhausted and tired paratroopers remained in the ranks of the battle group. At the same time, Tarasov (having replenished supplies from the supply base in the swamp) with about 2,000 paratroopers of the 1st MVDBr concentrated on the Gladkoe swamp, preparing for an attack on Tarasovo on March 24-25. This was the last desperate attempt to destroy the internal supply routes and the lines of defense coordination of the "cauldron" ...
End of action 2nd MVDbr
At the same time, in the north of the "cauldron", the 2nd MVDbr, together with units of the 204th airborne brigade, being south of Zabolotye, began preparations for an attack along the valley of the Polomet River with a front on Lychkovo on the morning of March 18. Unexpectedly for the paratroopers, the Germans fired artillery at the location of the paratroopers on March 17 in the evening. The losses were great - only officially about 100 people died.
On March 18, at 18:45, an attack by paratroopers began on the area west of Lychkovo, the blow fell on the Lychkovo-Knevitsy railway. At the same time, units of the 34th Army launched an attack through the "perimeter" towards the paratroopers. Both attacks were repulsed. The loss of only paratroopers near the village of Zabolotye amounted (according to German reports) to at least 200 people. Our archives confirm these figures.
After 5 days, the 2nd Ministry of Internal Affairs Brigade resumed the attack, redirecting to the village of Lychkovo itself. Partially, Lychkovo was captured as a result of a hard, stubborn, twelve-hour battle. By the end of the day on March 23, the 2nd battalion of the 1st MVDbr had lost about 400 out of 580 men, the losses of the rest of the battalions were comparable. Nevertheless, thanks to the newly tightened mobile reserves, the Germans managed to drive the paratroopers to the outskirts of the village and hold the station.
By the 25th, the Germans stated that only about 300 people remained from this part of the paratroopers, partially slightly wounded, located crowded south of Lychkovo. The 3rd battalion of the brigade did not participate in the attacks and was located near the village of Goreloye Berezno "at the base" in the protection of the wounded.
The third attack began on the night of March 26-27. She was also unsuccessful, the 2nd MVDBr began to be disorganized, in small groups to seep through the front of the Germans. The core of the remaining paratroopers with the 3rd battalion (which did not participate in the attacks on Lychkovo) launched a desperate attack "for a breakthrough" in the direction of the village of Lonna (north of Lychkovo, behind the railway) on the night of March 28-29. Many managed to go to their own, beyond the "cauldron". Even more paratroopers laid down their lives in this breakthrough. The mission of the 2nd MVDbr was over. The task set by the command was not completed.
"Piquet" operation. Protracted actions and the end of the 1st MVDbr and 204th VDB
South of Demyansk, the 1st and 204th brigades began desperate attempts to destroy the garrisons of Igozhevo and Stary Tarasovo. On March 24, units of the 204th moved from the outskirts of the Gladkoye swamp to Igozhevo under German artillery fire, reaching Igozhevo around midnight. After a seven-hour battle, the Germans held Igozhevo and the remnants of the brigade infiltrated south of the village to a height of 70.1. This cost Grinev 181 killed, including the commander of the 1st battalion of the 204th Airborne Brigade, 16 prisoners and the loss of 4 radio stations. German losses amounted to 33 killed, 37 wounded (including the commander of the 12th Infantry Division, who was wounded!).
Grinev's group began to move towards connecting with Tarasov's group, for a joint breakthrough through the perimeter to the west, to the "exit" to parts of the "Ksenofontov group". Tarasov's group, meanwhile, losing some of the emaciated and wounded people as prisoners, prepared areas for receiving light aircraft and dropping supplies in the Gladkoye swamp.
Immediately after sunset on March 26, the Tarasov group attacked the German positions near Stary Tarasovo and the village of Meglino towards the fighters of the “Ksenofontov group”, who hit Bel from the south. Both attacks failed. The Germans report 170 confirmed paratroopers killed, while numerous captured paratroopers reported 436 killed, including the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 1st MVDbr. The brigade commander Tarasov was also wounded.
Only the 3rd battalion managed to break through to its own, which went across the front line with more than 100 wounded. The remnants of the united brigades, weighed down by more than 300 wounded, retreated to the edge of the Gladkoe swamp, where at night the commanders of the brigades and a small part of the wounded were evacuated by U-2 aircraft.
Brigade commander Tarasov, despite being wounded, remained with the brigade. The remnants of the brigades split up, replenishing the meager supplies from what was delivered by "air". "Ksenofontov's group" transmitted over the radio the procedure for alerting artillery outside the "cauldron" to cover the groups of paratroopers who were going to bypass the enemy garrisons in the village. Maslovo, Ikandovo, Old and New Lubomirs, Kornevo, Lunevo.
The Germans were already aware of these plans (because they easily “read” radio interception and used interrogations of prisoners in a timely manner), therefore, when at 3 o’clock in the morning on March 28 the paratroopers went on a breakthrough, they met fierce resistance from the SS-sheep of the “group” pulled up here Simone". The battle continued until dawn.
At the same time, south of Maslovo, units of the 123rd Infantry Division scattered the Germans large group paratroopers into several small, unrelated groups. According to German estimates, about 130 paratroopers were killed. The orders that followed over the radio from the "Ksenofontov group" changed the intended direction of the breakthrough, forcing the paratroopers to break into small groups and rush between possible exit routes "to their own." After a short respite, having gathered in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Gladkoe swamp, the paratroopers on March 29 at night again attempted to break through to the south. Again unsuccessful. Losses amounted to about 100 people.
On March 29, in the morning, parts of the "Simon group" hit the paratrooper camps near Maly Opuyevo and in the swamp near the village. As a result of a two-hour battle, the SS-sheep managed to knock out the paratroopers from Maly Opuyevo, destroying about 180 fighters, capturing 27 prisoners and about 50 local civilians. Captured 3 machine guns and a large number of cartridges. At the same time, another part of the SS-sheep, using air reconnaissance data, destroyed the second base camp of paratroopers west of Bolshoy Opuyevo. Now most of paratrooper support infrastructure disappeared without a trace.
"Tarasov's group", consisting of the remnants of the 1st MVDbr and 204th airborne brigades, made another attempt to get out of the "cauldron". On the evening of March 30, the group began to make its way to the south, losing wounded, sick and exhausted comrades along the way (the 123rd Infantry Division reported 17 captured paratroopers south of the Lyubno-Maslovo road, the 12th Infantry Division also captured prisoners). The 123rd Infantry Division reported numerous attempts by small groups of paratroopers to break through the German lines also on 1 April.
At 17:15 on April 1, the NWF headquarters radioed an order:
“The front commander orders Tarasov to break through the front with minimal losses. If the execution of the order is impossible due to the large distance from Kornevo to Chernaya, then break through the front between Pogorelitsy and Nikolaevsky. Conduct reconnaissance immediately! Vatutin "...
For three days from April 1 to April 4, the remnants of the two brigades were desperately looking for gaps in the German defenses, preparing for breakthroughs. Then 3 attempts were made to break through: on the night of April 4-5 near Novy Novosel, the next night - near Nikolaevsky, and on the night of April 7-8 - near Volbovichi. The Germans actively patrolled the roads with tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as armored vehicles, causing great damage to the paratroopers. During the night breakthrough on the night of April 8, brigade commander Tarasov was captured, about 80 paratroopers were killed. The next night, while trying another breakthrough, a new brigade commander of the 1st brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Ustinov, was killed ... The fate of the commander of the 204th brigade, Grinev, remained unknown (some prisoners indicated that he disappeared during the attack on Igozhevo on March 25) - command was taken by the commissar of the 204th brigade, Nikitin.
... From the map of the situation at the front (which was discussed at Hitler's headquarters), the areas inside the "boiler" controlled by the soldiers of the 1st and 204th brigades disappeared only on May 3, 1942. This means that for almost a month the unequal struggle of exhausted, hungry and sick paratroopers inside the "cauldron" continued. From the map and "chronicles" of the history of the Great Patriotic War (according to official Soviet historians), this operation, as well as the death of thousands of people who did it, disappeared forever.
Operation results
The result of the operation can be called only in one word - "rout". None of the tasks set by the command of the brigades was carried out. Moreover, the elite landing units intended for reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind enemy lines were destroyed.
The trophies of the Germans only on March 29 in the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the 1st and 204th brigades amounted to: 73 machine guns, 18 mortars, 174 submachine guns, 210 self-loading rifles, countless cartridges and six radio stations. Losses of the 1st MVDbr amounted to more than 2,600 people out of 3,000. These losses included captured, killed and "missing". The 204th brigade lost more than 1,800 out of 2,000. In general, out of 5,000 people of two brigades, no more than 432 people were able to break through to their own (in the period up to April 10, of which 87 people from the 204th brigade). About 150 more people were evacuated by aircraft (wounded and command and rear personnel). Separate groups of the wounded went out to their own, sometimes having more than 2 weeks behind them without food, without ammunition, moving through forests and swamps at night, avoiding roads. These are the ones who are "lucky". And most of the wounded, frostbitten, emaciated (not eating for 7-9, or even 20 days), sick paratroopers - remained in the ground just 2-4 km from "their own".
About 500 people left the formation of the 2nd MVDbr and part of the 204th brigade (in the north of the pocket) across the front line. For a long time, until mid-May, single paratroopers and their small groups went out across the front line to their own. A small part of the surviving paratroopers managed to join partisan detachments in the rear of the boiler (these were units).
An additional "aggravating factor" for the results of the operation was that the brigade commander of the 1st MVDbr Tarasov, in captivity, went to cooperate with the Germans (data from the German protocol of interrogation). In general, considering the results of this operation, a (apparently unspoken) decision was made - not to mention this two-month struggle of almost 7,000 people behind enemy lines in official historiography. Monuments to these warriors who selflessly fulfilled their duty are absent today. There are no mentions in the "official historical literature" of "high flight".
We just need to change the attitude towards those who died for us. Take a small step from which the road begins.
Remember them.
Interrogation protocol
a prisoner of war captured on April 08, 1942 in the village of Nikolaevskoye near Demyansk
The interrogation was conducted by an intelligence officer of the 123rd Infantry Division, Lieutenant Jürgen von Waldersee
Personal data:
Last name: Tarasov
Name: Nicholas
Middle name: Efimovich
Rank: lieutenant colonel
Position: Commander of the 1st Airborne Brigade
Tarasov was born on 0905 1904 in Chelyabinsk region in the family of a priest. He's below
medium height, very mobile and sociable. At the request of the parents had to become
priest and attended seminary. In 1919, he volunteered to join Kolchak's army. After the defeat of the army, he returned home and continued his studies. In 1921 he entered military school in Kirov (Vyatka), which in knowledge junior lieutenant graduated with honors in 1924. He was sent to serve as a platoon commander in the 14th Moscow division in Vladimir.
From 1926 to 1932 he was a company commander at an officer's advanced training course in Moscow.
In 1932 - 35 years. was an adjutant to the commander of the Baikal group of the Far Eastern Army with Colonel Gobachev until the moment when he was removed from this position Gobachev worked before in a military mission in Germany, and like most of the officers who were in Germany was in opposition to Stalin. Tarasov also belonged to this opposition group, headed by Tukhachevsky. For this reason, Gobachev promoted Tarasov. Before Tarasov received into his subordination paratrooper regiment, he was subordinate to Major Fedko - a Ukrainian in the Baikal group Gobachev was arrested in 1937. The former military attache in Berlin, Putna, was shot because of his connection with an opposition group, and Tarasov was arrested. During the trial of Tukhachevsky, about which Tarasov spoke in detail, he was sentenced to three years in prison. At the same time, he was tortured. He was serving a prison sentence in Voroshilov in solitary confinement, where he was also tortured. After his release from prison in 1940, he worked as a parachute specialist. He himself made 170 jumps. He also lectured on aviation, which was his livelihood. In lectures, he covered the issues of parachute jumps and the tactics of using airborne units.
06/24/1941 he was again, as a major, drafted into the army. Immediately after the start of the war, his wife, a German woman, nee Keller, was arrested, whom he met in Moscow and married in 1926. She was arrested because she was considered politically unreliable. daughter. Tarasov suspects that her wife was shot. He claims that with the outbreak of the war, all Germans living in Moscow were expelled from the city or arrested.
On June 24, he was assigned to the reserve airborne brigade near Melitopol. From there he was sent to Bolnichnogorsk to the reserve group, and then transferred to Kalinin. The average age of soldiers in the landing troops was 19-23 years.
Mostly they were members of the Komsomol and party members.
Then Tarasov was entrusted with the formation of a new reserve airborne brigade in Zuevka near Kirov, which was later transformed into 1 airborne brigade. She, like then 2 vdbr, was an independent unit, not part of any corps. The soldiers of the brigade were mainly from Udmurtia, Kirov (Vyatka) and Molotov (Perm).
Initially, the brigade had a lack of weapons. Only in Monino, where the brigade was transferred in early February 1942, did it receive weapons. By this time, all airborne brigades were concentrated near Moscow. Monino has a large airfield with 200 aircraft of various types. There are also special workshops for the repair of foreign aircraft. Tarasov characterizes this airfield as a good object for an air raid.
In February, Tarasov was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel.
Tarasov characterizes the training of the brigade due to the lack of guns and the necessary aircraft as extremely insufficient. Preparation lasts 60 days. Headcount brigades of 3000 people. His brigade, however, numbered only 2,600 men. During training, each skydiver made only one jump. First, the paratroopers studied the rifle, then the semi-automatic carbine, and finally the machine guns. Unlike the accepted general training The principle of single training according to the German model was taken as a basis. Training took place single, as part of a squad, and then as part of a platoon. Only in some cases the former system of education was used.
At the end of February, the brigade was sent from Monino to Vylposovo. Only here
Tarasov became aware that he should be sent to the North-Western Front. Upon arrival, he, along with Commissar Machikhin, had to introduce himself to the Commander of the Front, Major General Kurochkin, who at one time was subjected to political repression.
Tasks and planning
At the army headquarters, he was given a task that changed several times. Initially, it was planned to land the brigade in the Dno area. However, due to the lack of aircraft, it was decided to transfer the brigade to the Dno on foot in the area between Staraya Russa and Holm. In early March, Tarasov was again called to headquarters, where he was ordered to parachute in the Glebovshchina region near Demyansk. For this action, he was to be provided with 30 aircraft. 4 "TB 3" and 26 "Douglas DC 3". But due to their absence, the plan was changed.
After these plans were cancelled, Tarasov was given the task of breaking through with his brigade into the Demyansk cauldron and cutting it from north to south. At that time, he did not yet know that the 204th airborne brigade was supposed to take part in this operation. It was planned to cut the Demyansk cauldron into four parts. According to this plan, it was first necessary to capture Dobrosli in order to capture the headquarters of the 16th Army. This order was greeted with laughter by the commanders, as they knew that a reinforced II German Corps was in the boiler. During these operations, Demyansk was to be surrounded. Tarasov was given the right to make his own decision: first surround Demyansk or immediately capture it.
He was to receive the rest of the orders later in a radio session. Later he received
an order to surround also the settlements of Bel 1 and 2.
The composition and armament of the 1st airborne brigade:
The brigade consists of 2600 people.
Compound:
4 battalions of 600 men each
communications company 70 people.
sapper company 80 people.
mortar division 120 people.
Tarasov could not give exact figures. There is a very high percentage of automatic weapons in service. The mortar division consists of three batteries of four 52 mm mortars each. In addition, the division has two 82 mm mortars. Each battalion has a mortar company of 6 mortars of 52 mm caliber each. The brigade has 12 anti-tank rifles. During the fighting, most of them, as well as mortars, were lost.
The brigade was not equipped with gas masks
The course of hostilities
The brigade was sent from Vylposovo first to Valdai and then to Grivki. From there, on skis and snowshoes, it was transported between March 3 and 6 at the section mark 79.0 - Pustynka across the front line. When crossing the front line, there was a slight fire contact with the enemy. After the march, the brigade settled in the forest 4 km northwest of Opuyevo. After 8 - 9 days, it was followed by the 204th brigade, numbering only 1000 people, since most of it could not break through the front line. Major Grinev commanded the brigade. Tarasov learned about the existence of the 204th brigade in this area during his meeting with Grinev. The statements of the prisoners that the 2nd battalion of the 204th brigade had already been parachuted from the air before, according to Tarasov, are not true. He also did not know at that time that the 2nd airborne brigade also penetrated the boiler and was supposed to attack Lychkovo from the south. At the beginning of the operation, the overall command of both brigades was entrusted to Major Grinev. The fact that the major commanded the lieutenant colonel makes Tarasov's claims about his unreliability plausible. Only later Lieutenant Colonel Latipov, a specialist in operations in the German rear, took command of the 1st and 204th brigades. He was behind the front line with a ski battalion. It is noteworthy that Tarasov could not give exact dates. Therefore, it is difficult to accurately trace the time course of the operation.
Tarasov did not participate in the attack on Maloye Opuyevo, since it was led by Latipov. After the brigade was forced to leave Maloye Opuyevo again, Tarusoy was surprised that the German units did not continue the pursuit. In his opinion, automatic weapons would be enough to put the retreating half of the brigade into disorderly flight. He also stated such "oversights" of the German troops in other cases
At Small Opuyevo, the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Airborne Brigade was almost completely destroyed. According to him, the number of those killed there amounted to 300 people. 204 brigade also participated in this battle.
After the brigades again withdrew to the forest camp near Maloye Opuyevo, "sufficient" amounts of food were delivered to them by planes. Planes landed on a specially created forest airfield to also pick up the wounded.
Other operations of the 204th and 1st brigades were carried out together. It was envisaged at first that the 1st brigade would attack Dobrosli, while the 204th brigade was to take Olzi. But since the 204th brigade got lost in the forest, it could not complete its task. The attack on Dobrosli was carried out in the amount of about 2000 people. After the battle, both brigades met again in the Maloye Opuyevo area. While Maloye Opuyevo suffered heavy losses, Dobroslya suffered much less losses. For tactical reasons, Tarasov abandoned the plan to encircle Demyansk, which Commissar Michikhin insisted on. The friction that arose led Latipov to the final decision to take command of the 1st brigade. For unexplained reasons, Latipov also abandoned the attack on Demyansk. Both brigades marched from the forests in the Opuyevo area in three columns at a distance of 150 meters from each other in a southerly direction, crossing the Demyansk-Bobkovo road, specifically between Bobkovo and Kornevo. While the 1st brigade had almost no losses when crossing the road, since the units of the 1st battalion, having met fierce resistance from the enemy, immediately withdrew to Maloye Opuyevo, the 204th brigade again lost its landmark, got lost and went straight to Bobkovo, where The battle suffered heavy losses. By that time, 300 more wounded and frostbite paratroopers had gathered at the location of the 1st battalion of the 1st brigade, which, according to the radiogram of 07.04, was still at Maloye Opuyevo. After crossing the road, a new camp was set up three kilometers to the south. The exact place is not named, but according to other prisoners, it is located on the eastern outskirts of the Galoevsky swamp.
On the night of March 24, the 204th brigade attacked Igozhevo. The order to this effect came directly from the headquarters of the North-Western Front. The attack was commanded by a battalion commander with the rank of major. His last name is unknown. The battle plan was developed personally by Latipov.
According to Tarasov, Latipov personally made plans for all operations. However, the units became aware only on April 5 about the existence of Latipov and his functions as a brigade commander.
Tarasov could not indicate the exact number of losses. According to his estimates, at Igozhevo, the losses amounted to about 400 people killed, wounded and missing. After the battle, from the initial number of 800 people, they again found:
150 people under the command of Major
300 people Arrived in an organized manner to the designated collection point at Gladkoye Bog 100 people. groups and singly approached later.
Tarasov claims that on the same night he withdrew to the south with the 1st brigade. To the objection that this contradicts the time parameters, he admitted that he could have made a mistake with the dates, since he had a bad memory for them. There was a fundamental order: to march only at night. Despite the ban, units of the 1st brigade crossed the section of the Ermikovo-Igozhevo road in the daytime. Tarasov could not give exact data about this period of time. According to some of his statements, it can be concluded that at that moment he was in a state of alcoholic intoxication, which prevented him from also taking part in the battle at Staroe Tarasovo. The march of the 1st brigade from Igozhevo to Staroe Tarasovo was to be completed and within two days In the operation in the area of St. Tarasovo, 1000 people were supposed to participate, although the available forces were 1800 people. During the attack, in particular, the 1st company of the 1st battalion, the 3rd and 4th battalions were involved, which, however, were significantly weakened due to losses. According to Tarasov, the operation was again led by Latipov. After the battle, the brigades gathered at the 80.1 mark and remained there the next night as well. The remnants of the 204th brigade, which were again replenished due to the approach of the lost groups, were ordered to attack Meglino. But since in again units lost their bearings, the attack was thwarted. The remnants of the 204th brigade returned to point 80.1. Both brigades received a radio message from the army that the settlement of Chernaya was already occupied by Russian troops, which was not true. Since the initial task was to take St. Tarasovo and make its way between Lunevo and Kornevo, the remnants of both brigades moved south, but were stopped on the front line. Only one company under the command of senior lieutenant Rozhkov numbering 100 people. managed to break through. Tarasov learned about this from a message delivered by the plane. The company managed to break through only because the surrounding area was covered with bushes, which they managed to overcome almost imperceptibly. After this unsuccessful breakthrough, the brigade concentrated in the forest north of Kornevo. Here the brigade suffered heavy losses from artillery fire. Tarasov put it verbatim: “This artillery fire was classic. They fired from two directions. The fire from the Maslovo side was very intense, while from the Chernaya side it was less intense. Losses amounted to about 200 people, while a lot of When asked whether the U-2 aircraft was hit by artillery fire, Tarasov answered in the negative.
The car could not take off again, as it got stuck in the swamp and was burned by the pilot. The plane delivered four bags of crackers and was supposed to pick up the wounded commissar Machikhin.
Latipov gave the order to withdraw again to the Maloye Opuyevo area. By that time, there were about 1,000 personnel. They hoped to receive reinforcements from the air at Maloye Opuyevo. During the return march, a group of paratroopers from 201 brigades in the amount of 70 people separated and tried to independently reach the Maslovsky swamp.
Making their way to the north, the brigades twice received provisions from the air in the Gladkoe swamp and in the Ermakovo area. The contents of the food ration; crackers, fats, dry concentrates, salt, vitamin C. Along the way, they came across lost paratroopers who joined them, Tarasov could not give exact data.
Tarasov, in any case, was to be delivered alive to Moscow. More precise details are unknown to him.
retreated 1 km to the north. Due to heavy machine-gun fire, attempts to cross the Bobkovo-Arkadovo road to the north turned out to be unsuccessful. According to Tarasov, the losses amounted to 30 people. From the headquarters of the army, Latipov was instructed to march in a southerly direction and try to break through in the area between Nikolaevskoye and Pogorelitsy. To this end, an attack was to be made from the west in the interests of the brigades with the task of cutting the road to Lola. This order came directly from the headquarters of the North-Western Front, after Latipov reported on the unsuccessful attempt and asked for further instructions.
According to Tarasov, the total number of both brigades before overcoming the section of the Zalesye - Annino road again amounted to about 1000 people. And in this case, the march began with three columns. Losses after the battle amounted to about 125 people killed. After the recount, the data was confirmed. 180 people were unable to cross the road due to artillery fire and retreated. The remaining 180 paratroopers concentrated again at the Diven Moh swamp. German air raids on the camp in the Diven Mokh swamp area and during the Zalesye-Annino march, he assessed as effective. In this area, the brigades received a radiogram from the 34th Army, in which the breakthrough site was determined between Nikolaevskoye and Volbovichi. A counterattack from the west was scheduled for 2:00 am on April 8. The brigades began marching to the breakthrough site and 9:00 pm on April 7.
Their number was 700 people, of which 400 were incapacitated. In the ensuing
there, an NKVD worker assigned to Tarasov was killed in battle after he wounded Tarasov with a shot in the arm. The second bullet fired by Lieutenant Colonel Latipov only hit Tarasov. Latipov also died in this battle. At the Diven Moh swamp, they received sufficient food for two nights. The airfield is located in the northeastern part of this swamp.
Two new radios with spare batteries were delivered by planes, since only one radio was left for both brigades. These planes took away the wounded commissar Machikhin and the commander of the 204th brigade Grnev. When asked what the brigades could do after an unsuccessful attempt to break through, Tarasov said that they would return to the Diven Mokh swamp and, after receiving food in accordance with the old plan, would again break through to Maloye Opuevo, if , of course, no new order will follow from the army.
Tarasov confirms that as a result of the thaw, while maintaining night frosts physical state the personnel of the brigades is even more weakened than during severe frosts. Felt boots get wet through, this explains the high percentage of frostbite. Even night fires do not save you from frostbite.
Translated by: Yu Lebedev
Demyansk battle. "Stalin's missed triumph" or "Hitler's Pyrrhic victory"? Simakov Alexander Petrovich
1st MVDBr
The 1st mobile airborne brigade was formed in the city of Zuevka near Kirov. Major N.E. formed it, and then became its commander. Tarasov. Military rank lieutenant colonel he will be awarded in February 1942. Brigades were recruited from young people of the Kirov, Molotov regions and the Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The rank and file was called up from the youth born in 1922, who did not serve in the Red Army. There was a part of volunteers since 1923. The brigade was Komsomol - up to 80 percent of the members of the Komsomol. Only three in the brigade had a milestone of 35 years - the commander, his deputy for logistics and the chief financial officer. Sergeants and foremen were called up from the reserve. Command staff, as a rule, fired.
A few days after taking the oath, a general arrived in Zuevka, Hero Soviet Union, the famous pilot A.V. Belyakov. On behalf of the High Command, he checked the readiness of the brigade to fight ...
On December 22, 1941, the 1st Maneuverable Airborne Brigade began counting kilometers to the west. Three echelons along the "green street" were driven by railway workers to Moscow.
The paratroopers were eager to fight, they believed that they had passed good school. If the training of infantry units in 1941 took one to two weeks, or even less, then the paratroopers were trained for two months. The regular strength of the brigade is 3 thousand people, but the 1st MVDB numbered only 2600. All paratroopers made parachute jumps. The rifle was studied first, then the semi-automatic carbine, and finally the machine gun. In contrast to the accepted general training, the principle of single training according to the German model was taken as a basis. Training took place single as part of the squad, and then as part of a platoon. Only in some cases the former system of education was used. The training was intensive. Ski marching throws were regularly performed. Much attention was also paid to the construction of huts and the study of enemy weapons.
In memories German soldiers, published after war time, there is such a description of the paratroopers operating inside the "cauldron": "The best armed and trained soldiers of the Red Army consisted of fanatical young communists."
At the end of January 1942, the 1st mobile airborne brigade entered the reserve of the headquarters of the troops of the North-Western Front and moved to the town of Vypolzovo, Kalinin Region. There, the intense preparation of the brigade for combat operations continued. There were also losses...
From the memoirs of the former paratrooper L.I. Morozov:
“On the night of February 23, 1942, a group of 21 fighters stood out from the 1st maneuverable airborne brigade ... And the call signs were given “Twenty-first” ... They landed on the Neviy Mokh swamp without incident.
The front command sent scouts to the rear in advance. Sites were chosen for landing aircraft, bases were organized, the area of deployment of the brigade, battalions was determined. The reconnaissance group "Twenty-one" was supposed to meet with scouts from the "Eagle" group. Everything turned out as planned in Valdai. Having completed the task, we went on a breakthrough to the railway line Lychkovo - Staraya Russa. And then the paratroopers were convinced that the enemy was not ordered to enter the forest. Skirmish after skirmish. The Germans sent Finns into the forest - they themselves did not climb under the bullets of the partisans ... They made their way to their own through the enemy’s battle formations in the area railway station Paul. Only six people got through. It’s bitter to think about it even after many years.” .
Even earlier, on February 15-18, for the same purpose, a unit of the 204th Airborne Brigade (the Oryol group) was airlifted into the Demyansk Cauldron for the same purpose. This operation was noticed by the enemy, and already on February 18, a special unit was formed from the soldiers of the SS division "Dead Head" (Simon's group), one of the tasks of which is to cover the most important objects, primarily airfields. It would not be superfluous to note that the "Dead Head" was not in vain considered elite. Her soldiers practically did not shy away from hand-to-hand combat, which was the exception rather than the rule for the Germans.
The 1st mobile, 204th airborne and 2nd mobile brigades were concentrated in the Valdai area. Tarasov and brigade commissar Machikhin were summoned to the headquarters of the Northwestern Front. From there they returned with a battle order:
"one. The commander of the 1st maneuverable airborne brigade, Major Comrade Tarasov and the commissar, art. battalion commissar Comrade Machikhin, consisting of four separate battalions, artillery division, separate reconnaissance-scooter, sapper-subversive, communications, anti-aircraft machine-gun companies on the night of March 3 of this year. from the starting position, the village of Vypolzovo, go behind enemy lines ...
2. Cross the front line between the points of Knevitsy - Beglovo, and then concentrate the forces of the brigade in the area of marks 60 and 64 to the west and southwest of the Neviy Mokh swamp.
…four. The combat mission of the MVDB is to set:
First. Do not reveal yourself by premature military operations, attack the headquarters of the 2nd AK of the enemy in Dobrosli, defeat it and the garrison, seize headquarters documents ... Attack and destroy the airfield near Demyansk ...
Second. Having completed the first task, proceed to disrupt communications, communications of the enemy, moving in the direction of Igozhevo - Meglino - Tarasovo - Bel to join with their units, smash garrisons, warehouses along the way, destroy enemy manpower and equipment.
... Seventh. For the time of the raid behind enemy lines, take food supplies for 10 days and ammunition with you in duffel bags, on drags and horses.
Eighth. Keep in touch with the help of a radio station according to a special schedule ... ".
Almost all fighters were armed with automatic weapons (PPSh, PPD, SVT-38, SVT-40, DP-27). The mortar division consisted of three batteries, each of which had four 50 mm mortars and two 80 mm mortars. Each battalion included a mortar company of 6 50 mm mortars each ... The brigade had 12 anti-tank rifles. According to the memoirs of the paratroopers, they did not take heavy 80-mm mortars behind enemy lines, but replaced them with 50-mm mortars.
The front command was looking for the best options for using paratroopers. Initially, Tarasov was ordered to parachute in the Glebov region near Demyansk. For this, 30 aircraft were to be provided: 4 TB-3 and 26 Douglas DC-3. But due to their absence, the plan was cancelled. The former head of the political department of the 1st maneuverable airborne brigade, General F.P. Dranishchev writes that the paratroopers were ready to be thrown behind enemy lines. A reinforced battalion of paratroopers was preparing to take over the sites. One night, the forward detachments even took out to the Vypolzovo airfield with full combat equipment. They waited for the planes almost until dawn.
The command of the front was at great risk. The experience of the combat use of airborne troops in the Red Army was practically absent. The real possibilities of paratroopers to capture and hold strongholds behind enemy lines were still unknown. The main problem was the lack of transport aircraft for the delivery and supply of troops behind enemy lines. Landing gliders, developed in Germany before the war with the USSR, were absent in the required quantities for the winter campaign of 1942. Domestic gliders A-7 and G-11 were brought only to the stage of prototypes. In essence, the landing was provided by several dozen aircraft civil aviation and a small number of TB-3 heavy bombers.
In addition, the winter of 1941/42 was not only frosty, but also extremely snowy. There was a danger that after the drop, the paratroopers would not have time to quickly reach the collection point and would be destroyed by the enemy in parts. Therefore, the option of entering the "cauldron" on skis was chosen. We had to hurry. This strategic operation must be carried out before the beginning of the spring thaw. The thawed swamps, to which the spring thaw would have been added, made almost impossible any offensive operation. Therefore, the liquidation of the Demyansk Fortress was to be completed within a couple of weeks, before the end of March 1942.
70 years have passed since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. And war sometimes invades your life, reminds you of itself. Was it a long time ago? When I was in the first grades of the school, the fathers of some of my classmates came to our training camp and told how they fought. Of my closest relatives and my wife, three people fought. My grandfather, who died in Berlin or near Berlin on April 14, 1945, senior sergeant, artillery reconnaissance observer of the artillery regiment of the High Command Reserve, and two uncles - mine and my wife. These are the ones I want to remember.
About the uncle of his wife, Ivanov Ivan Nikiforovich, they always said only one thing: he went out of the village with a friend and disappeared. A paper came to a friend from the Vyazovsky district military commissariat of the Saratov region, as a missing person, but nothing to Ivan himself. He did not appear in any lists, appealing to any archives did not give any results. They only knew that they called him into the air - landing troops, which were formed, in particular, on the territory of the Saratov region.
After the appearance of electronic databases, the wife began an active search for his traces, once again interviewed relatives. Two sisters of the missing person are alive, who were 5 and 8 years old in 1941, the wife's aunt and mother, respectively. The aunt, who was 5 years old, remembered several episodes, which helped to roughly trace his fate.
Ivan was called up in September 1941. Not everything is clear with the call either, whether it was necessary to send a person from the family, him or his father, or they simply cleaned up all the youth. He was not subject to conscription this year, because. was born in 1924, but was put in the documents in 1923, and relatives were told to keep quiet. And Ivan went to serve without any heroism.
The aunt recalls that in the autumn the mothers of Ivan and his friend went to visit their sons in the city of Zelman, or rather, the colony of Zelman, Saratov Region. In 1942, many cities and towns, formerly part of the Autonomous Republic of the German Volga region, were renamed. Now it is an urban-type settlement of Rovnoye, Saratov Region. Interestingly, the population of Zelman in 1912 was 12 thousand people, and now it is 5 thousand people. They crossed the Volga on something, which means that it was October - November, the Volga had not yet risen. It was at this time that the 2nd maneuverable airborne brigade (2nd MVDBR) was formed in Zelman. We arrived, found them with a friend, both were terribly torn, in holey shoes, hungry. Everything that was brought edible was eaten immediately. The father, who as a boy was evacuated with his mother and sister from Ukraine to the left bank of the Volga in the Saratov region, also said that the soldiers were fed very poorly. When the units being formed passed through the village, they often asked for something to eat. One day, a couple of soldiers drank salty soup, which they themselves, despite the war, could not eat. And at the same time, the discipline was very tough, God forbid the sergeant sees ...
We went to visit them again, when there was already ice on the Volga, but they did not find them. They were told in part that some lieutenant "bought them both with a friend and took them somewhere." What that means, no one will ever know. Apparently, they served in the same platoon, at least in one company. It is unlikely that "bought" meant that the soldiers were used for some other purpose. These are signs of the present tense, and then airborne troops were under special control. The special officer always spoke with each of the fighters, for they were subordinate to the Airborne Forces directly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
All further information is taken from the network, there are many contradictions in details, dates, but in the main everything is the same. At the same time, the 1st Ministry of Internal Affairs Brigade was being formed in the Kirov region.
There is very little information about the 2nd brigade, perhaps because of its difficult fate, or maybe more about the 1st brigade, because it entered the operation first and fought along with the 204th Airborne Brigade, a well-known formation that went through the Finnish war. So all the data is mainly taken from the description of the 1st MVDbr.
In short, 2600 people. personnel, mostly young people aged 18-20. Very high percentage of automatic small arms, 12 anti-tank rifles, about 50 mortars with more than 2/3 caliber 52 mm, the rest - 85 mm. In short, only light weapons, emphasis on maneuverability.
In the winter of 1942, the troops of the North-Western Front surrounded the 16th Wehrmacht Army near Novgorod the Great, near the city of Demyansk. There is a so-called. Demyansk cauldron, and then - as in a joke.
- I caught the bear!
- So get it over here!
- But he won't let me!
Unable to solve the problem from the front, the Soviet command decides to throw 204 and 1 brigades behind German lines in order to destroy the airfields created by the Germans to supply the encircled, destroy roads, disrupt communications, etc. And this operation becomes a black page in the history of the Second World War. On one of the sites, I found information that the results of the operation were classified and they still have not been declassified. I don’t know how true this is, but you can understand in general terms what happened there. Even foreign historians have repeatedly noted the silence of the Soviet historical science about the Demyansk boiler.
On February 15 - 18, 1942, the deployment to the rear of the 204th Airborne Brigade and 1st Ministry of the Interior Brigade begins. Already on February 18, a special group was allocated from the SS division "Totenkopf" ("Dead Head") to counter the landing. I met on Russian websites repeated references to the fact that the soldiers of this division never shied away from hand-to-hand skirmishes with Soviet troops, which was rather an exception for the Germans. The landing force falls under artillery, armored vehicles, well-trained troops. "Dead Head", then still actually a motorized infantry division, by October 42 will lose up to 80% of its personnel, but now it's still February.
The objectives of the operation were not achieved. In March 42, famine rages among the paratroopers. Soldiers dig up the carcasses of horses that fell in 41 and feed on them. In March 42, there were thaws during the day, the uniforms got wet, and at night frosts down to -25 degrees. The number of frostbitten is growing, up to the onset of gangrene. As of March 17, there were 248 killed and wounded and 349 frostbite in the 1st MVDbr. Supply Soviet troops food and ammunition is sometimes successful, but more often not.
At this time, the 2nd Ministry of Internal Affairs Brigade is thrown to the rear for support, ski battalions are sent from the front. So, according to the documents, it was established that from 2.03 to 5.05, the 2nd Ministry of Internal Affairs Brigade was fighting near locality Lychkovo, 30 - 31 km north of Demyansk.
On March 20, 1942, a ski battalion of more than 200 Soviet troops, sent to support the paratroopers, was completely destroyed.
But, nevertheless, the Soviet brigades continue to attack the Germans. By spring, the Germans break through and hold the corridor connecting the 16th Wehrmacht Army with the main troops, special shock battalions, reconnaissance groups, and jaeger teams are piled on the paratroopers. According to the memoirs of veterans, Finnish ski groups, which were particularly cruel towards prisoners of war, take part in the armed operations. The destruction of the landing begins.
By May 42, the remnants of the landing brigades break out of the encirclement, but thousands of dead remain. For example, in one of the swamps there was a camp for the wounded, more than 200 people. It was supposed that they would return for them, but this did not happen.
In this operation, a huge number of soldiers disappeared without a trace. Well, Ivan Ivanov, apparently, in the same place. On his friend, Peter, comes a piece of paper with a message that he was missing. Whether the place and date were indicated in the message cannot now be established. All airborne brigades participating in the operation were subsequently disbanded, and one of the airborne divisions was created on their basis.
My uncle, Lyashchuk Mikhail Fedorovich, is my father's brother on my mother's side. Completely different fate. He lived before the war in Ukraine, as they say now. I managed to graduate from the Mining College. In those days, it's like now with a university education, or even a degree. Apparently, that's why they called him into aviation.
I remember well how I asked him: Are you a pilot? He said that officers were flying, and he was a gunner-radio operator on a heavy bomber. But he ended the war as a major. Perhaps they gave him a major before demobilization? During the flight, three fingers on his hand were torn off by a shell, and so they were demobilized. But still, the career is kind of crazy: from private to major or captain. I spoke with the pilots, such a rank corresponds to the position of the chief shooter of the division.
There are special one or two crews in each regiment or division that fly even to hell to visit. Another woman who served with him in the same regiment is alive. He says that they had two such crews that flew at any time of the day, in any weather, anywhere, he flew in one of these. And upon returning, if not again to the sky, the entire crew was drunk to death. This woman almost did not marry him during the war years, but she was afraid, she drank too much.
And then, until his death in the 70s, he lived on a military pension in Kerch. He drank and caught gobies.
These are the two destinies.
The icon shows the dead paratroopers after the battle in the Demyansk cauldron. Photo found by a German officer.
=== === === === ===
Almost five years have passed since the publication of this essay...
Of the new, there is only one small touch, a small new detail from a letter from an employee of the military archive. In the distribution sheets of the 2nd Ministry of Internal Affairs for December 1941, Ivanov Ivan Aleksandrovich is listed. I got my money, including for skydiving. And in the statements for February 1942, he is no longer there. As an archive employee wrote, it was almost 100% Ivanov Ivan Nikiforovich. The change of name or patronymic (the latter was done more often) occurred in order to avoid questions about the attributed years.
So, after all, the Demyansk cauldron ...
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