Airborne troops in Afghanistan. Mikhail Skrynnikov special forces airborne sabotage and reconnaissance operations in Afghanistan
Participation of the Airborne Forces in the Afghan War ... In the Afghan war, one airborne division (103 Guards Airborne Division), one detachment took part from the airborne and airborne assault formations of the USSR Armed Forces. air assault brigade (56ogdshbr), one separate parachute paratrooper regiment(345gv.opdp) and two air assault battalions as part of separate motorized rifle brigades (in the 66th brigade and in the 70th brigade). In total, for 1987, these were 18 "linear" battalions (13 parachute and 5 air assault), which amounted to a fifth of total number all "linear" OKSVA battalions (which included another 18 tank and 43 motorized rifle battalions). In virtually the entire history of the Afghan war, not a single situation has arisen that would justify the use of parachute landing for the transfer of personnel. The main reasons here were the complexity of the mountainous terrain, as well as the unjustified material costs in using such methods in the counter-guerrilla war. The delivery of personnel of the parachute and airborne assault units to the mountainous areas of hostilities, impassable for armored vehicles, was carried out only by landing method using helicopters. Therefore, the separation of linear airborne battalions in OKSVA for air assault and airborne assault should be considered conditional. Both types of battalions operated in the same way. As in all motorized rifle, tank and artillery units as part of the OKSVA, up to half of all units of the airborne and airborne assault formations were assigned to guard outposts, which made it possible to control roads, mountain passes and the vast territory of the country, significantly restricting the the very actions of the enemy. For example, battalions of the 350th Guards RAP were often based in various parts of Afghanistan (in Kunar, Girishka, Surubi), controlling the situation in these areas. The 2nd Airborne Battalion from the 345th Guards Opdp was distributed to 20 outposts in the Panjshir Gorge near the village of Anava. By this very 2pdb 345opdp (together with the 682nd motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division stationed in the village of Rukha) completely blocked the western exit from the gorge, which was the main transport artery of the enemy from Pakistan to the strategically important Charikar Valley. The most massive combat airborne operation in the USSR Armed Forces, in the period after the Great Patriotic War, must be considered the 5th Panjshir Operation in May-June 1982, during which the first mass landing of the 103rd Guards Airborne Forces in Afghanistan was carried out: only during the first three days, more than 4 thousand people were parachuted from helicopters. In total, about 12 thousand military personnel participated in this operation. different kinds troops. The operation took place simultaneously for all 120 km deep into the gorge. As a result of the operation most of Panjshir Gorge was taken under control. In the period from 1982 to 1986, in all airborne divisions of OKSVA, a systematic replacement of regular airborne armored vehicles (BMD-1, BTR-D) with armored vehicles, standard for motorized rifle units (BMP-2D, BTR-70) was carried out. First of all, this was due to the rather low security and low motor resource of the structurally lightweight armored vehicles of the Airborne Forces, as well as the nature of the hostilities, where combat missions performed by paratroopers will not differ much from the tasks assigned to motorized rifles. Also to increase firepower landing units, they will include additional artillery and tank units. For example, 345opdp according to the model motorized rifle regiment will be supplemented with an artillery howitzer battalion and a tank company, in the 56th brigade the artillery battalion was deployed up to 5 fire batteries (instead of the prescribed 3 batteries), and the 103rd Guards Airborne Division will be given to reinforce the 62nd separate tank battalion, which was unusual for the organizational and staff structure parts of the Airborne Forces on the territory of the USSR.
Air- landing troops played a huge role during the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan. First airborne units appeared on Afghan soil even before the official entry of troops and remained there until their withdrawal.
The first units of the USSR Airborne Forces appeared in Afghanistan in July 1979. Battalion 111 of the parachute regiment of the disbanded 105 airborne division was deployed to guard the airfield in Bagram. Subsequently, the unit was included in the 345 parachute regiment. Battalion 345 RAP was transferred to Afghanistan on December 14, 1979 to ensure the entry of troops. The paratroopers of the 345th regiment took part in the operation to take control of Kabul, including the assault on Amin's palace. In general, the joint operation of the special forces of the KGB and the GRU with the support of the Airborne Forces was successful.
On December 25, Soviet troops officially entered Afghanistan. So, the 103rd airborne division was transferred to Kabul by landing. Intelligence units of the 103rd Airborne Division also took part in combat operations to seize key facilities in Kabul. The transfer of the division was not without incident. In particular, when landing at the airfield, an Il-76M crashed with fighters of 350 RAPs on board. 37 passengers and 10 crew members were killed. The 56th air assault brigade entered Afghanistan from Termez, and two battalions were transferred to Kunduz by helicopters.
Initially, the units of the Airborne Forces carried out the tasks of protecting especially important objects, but already in the beginning of 1980, the “winged infantry” was sent to suppress rebellions in local military units. Over time, the Soviet Army was increasingly drawn into the war.
Airborne units in Afghanistan were represented by 345 parachute regiments, 56 air assault brigade and 103 airborne division. Airborne companies and battalions were not introduced into the DRA, due to the lack of parachute landings. Part of the units was transferred from the formations, reinforcing motorized rifle units in key points of the country. So, one of the battalions of the 56th ODShBr was included in the 70th stationed in Kandahar. motorized rifle brigade. Airborne units took part in landing operations throughout the entire period of the war, landing from helicopters. However, mainly, they performed the tasks of combined arms formations. Here the problems of standard military equipment, consisting of armament of the Airborne Forces. So, for example, airborne combat vehicles (BMD) were inferior in armor protection to infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, the airborne self-propelled gun ASU-85 was unable to provide the necessary support to units on the battlefield.
The leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense rather quickly drew conclusions from these problems. Since 1982, airborne units in Afghanistan received BMP-2 and armored personnel carriers instead of BMD-1. The gunners of the airborne units were armed with self-propelled guns 2S1 "Gvozdika", which significantly increased their firepower. At the end of the year, tank units on T-62 vehicles were included in the composition of the Airborne Forces. The 103rd Airborne Division included the 62nd tank battalion, which included 15 tanks and 7 ASU-85 self-propelled guns, a tank company of 10 vehicles also received 345 RAPs, and a tank platoon from the 191st motorized rifle regiment was included in the 56th Airborne Division. The appearance of tanks significantly expanded the capabilities of paratroopers in carrying out combat missions.
In addition, the designers began, based on the experience of the Afghan war, to create new types of weapons and military equipment. Among the first, new samples fell into the units of the Airborne Forces. In particular, during the war, a new airborne combat vehicle BMD-2 was created, armed with an automatic gun with a caliber of 30 millimeters. A real breakthrough for our artillery was the creation of the 2S9 Nona self-propelled guns, which was tested in the Afghan war. As part of the 103rd Airborne Forces, the Non division was included, the parachute regiments received a battery, which replaced the mortars. In mountainous conditions, ACS proved to be the best.
Nonetheless, fighting airborne units in Afghanistan were radically different from the doctrine of their use as a type of troops. The nature of the terrain did not allow parachute landing. Of course, paratroopers often took part in airmobile operations, landing from helicopters, but they were mainly used as assault squads. Thus, the Airborne Forces performed the tasks of combined arms formations. Moreover, paratroopers were often involved in the tasks of protecting key facilities and escorting columns on the march, which did not fit into the doctrine of their use at all. The Airborne Forces units were entrusted with the task of protecting key communications in the DRA. Often, “winged infantry” served at outposts deployed in especially important areas, such as units of 345 RAP in the Panjshir region. In the same gorge, paratroopers took an active part in large-scale landings from helicopters throughout the entire period of the war. At the final stage of the war, airborne units also actively survived helicopter landings, they became especially widespread during the operation “Magistral”.
During the period of the withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the tasks of covering the outgoing columns from the attacks of the Mujahideen fell on the shoulders of the paratroopers. The Airborne Forces were among the last to leave the DRA. Serviceman 345 RAP Igor Lyakhovich, who was killed on February 7, 1989, is considered the last dead soldier of the Afghan war.
The use of airborne units in Afghanistan revealed many problems in their organization, structure and armament. More high level combat training in comparison with combined arms formations led to the fact that they were often thrown into battle as assault detachments in the most dangerous areas, as well as to protect the country's key facilities. The paratroopers during the war, as a rule, performed the tasks of the infantry. The equipment in service with the Airborne Forces was also not effective enough in the conditions of this war. So, lightly armored infantry fighting vehicles, of course, had undeniable advantages, due to the possibility of airborne landings, but in the conditions of the Afghan war, where paratroopers were not used, the vehicles were not in demand for their intended purpose. Moreover, their booking left much to be desired, which led to the need to replace them with infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. The nature of the tasks performed even then made it necessary to include tank units in the formations of the Airborne Forces. The appearance of tanks greatly expanded the capabilities of the paratroopers, but after the end of the war in Afghanistan, this experience was forgotten. . It was also necessary to strengthen the artillery of the airborne formations operating in the DRA.
14.09.2014
From 1982 to 1984 served urgently in Afghanistan in the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division in various positions. From October 1982 to June 1984 - squad leader, machine gunner and machine gunner in the 5th paratrooper company of the 2nd paratrooper battalion (with a break of 4 months - from May to August 1983). In 1983 he was twice demoted to the ranks.
He took part in the combat operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Has wounds in battles - in the shoulder and multiple shrapnel in the head.
In 1988-1989 participated in special peacekeeping operations in the Caucasus.
For military service and wounds in Afghanistan, he was awarded two medals "For Courage". In 1988 and later he was awarded other state and departmental orders and medals.
Currently a poet, writer, artist, entrepreneur. Officially nominated for Nobel Prize in literature, twice nominated for the national literary award "Poet of the Year" and once for the literary award "Heritage". He has literary prizes, diplomas and awards.
"Nobody except us". This is the motto of the Airborne Forces.
No one except us could perform many military tasks.
No one but us can tell the whole truth.
As before, in the war, he is ready to take the whole blow on himself. For all the soldiers and officers who were called cannon fodder in Afghanistan. For all, undeservedly forgotten, for all, crippled morally and physically. For the real truth about the Afghan war.
But there are and will be blows, including from former “friends” and even from those whose protection and rehabilitation this story is aimed at. They have already begun and are coming in an endless wave, but for now I am holding this front, practically alone.
This is still our Afghan war. It, unfortunately, continues. They are very afraid of the truth, they hate the truth, the truth puts everything in its place, that's why it is true.
Everything that is written below is also a very bitter truth.
There are no guilty and right in this story, there is my and someone else's personal life, time and realities that make us then be exactly like that.
It is time for veterans, society, and the state to reconsider their attitude towards the Afghan war, repent to each other, forgive each other, pay off debts and start living in a new way for both front-line soldiers, and the state, and society, and not to repeat such mistakes with ... .y cruelty towards each other.
Each of us, even those who want truth and justice, including me, wants to look the purest and best, believing that it is he who is the very truth-seeker who can impress anyone with his accusatory word.
But the truth is also that of all the many hundreds of thousands of soldiers, officers, generals and officials who went through the Afghan war Soviet Union and one way or another involved in it, only a few units did not get dirty in one or another disgusting and vile dirt of this terrible, deceitful, filthy and shameless still ongoing massacre.
The war that, first of all, was and is being waged by us against each other and against any normal and moral principles of love, sympathy, equality, humanity, conscience and morality.
We died not only there, we continue to die until now. To die not of old age, to die of indifference and sometimes even hatred for each other.
We closed ourselves in a hellish circle of lies, callousness and window dressing.
This war not only claimed tens of thousands of the best boys' lives (and it was really almost always the purest and best who died), it inflicted an incommensurable moral trauma on all the survivors, all the exalted, all the glorified and caressed, all the known, all the forgotten, all the survivors, to all the fallen, all the wounded and crippled. To all the Russian people, for many generations to come.
This double war not only devoured us, it continues to devour our children and grandchildren with false heroism and false patriotism and will devour our great-grandchildren if we do not restore all the truth and justice about it and do not try to teach future soldiers, officers, generals and officials not to repeat our direct and indirect crimes against each other, both in the war and now.
25 years ago they trumpeted the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
As a memento of this country, I have 2 wounds, one in the arm and 14 fragments in the head, 3 hernias on the spine, 2 medals "For Courage", the blue one is taken by the Airborne Forces with a vest in the closet, several photographs and sergeant's shoulder straps in a box under the bed.
Some things I remember well, others I have already forgotten. Time has passed. I managed to graduate from a special higher educational institution, to go to another war in the former Caucasian Soviet republic and again in an embrace with a machine gun.
These are the memoirs of an individual soldier from a separate unit of the Airborne Forces, and I write exactly as I saw everything with my eyes and heard with my ears. Do not take this as the ultimate truth.
Very strongly rooted in us, veterans of the Afghans, and in society as a whole, "fairy tales" about the Afghan war of the Soviet Union. So much so that the veterans themselves and the society sincerely believe in this and do not want other legends and, probably, never will.
We embellished everything that seemed unsightly to us, created legendary idols of commanders, almost drew virtual icons from them, lied to ourselves and led society by the nose with heroic stories, hiding any inconsistencies and dirt.
We then forgave everyone and everything, quickly forgot the bad, multiplied the good a hundredfold. We, hungry for honesty in the communist swindler and false pioneer-Komsomol space of our childhood and youth, the then Soviet Union, having seen enough of patriotic films about the Great Patriotic war, wanted us to have our own piece of the great justice of life and "heroic everyday life."
Naive in our military youth, we carried to our gray hair precisely this youthful and naive perception of real combat reality throughout our lives, passing this popular print to all subsequent generations.
Our platoon and company commanders were not far from us either. Not far away and in age, and in consciousness, and in perception.
I can say honestly and sincerely: the KURKA paratroopers of my time of service never retreated without an order, even under fear of total destruction, this unspoken rule was observed sacredly, without grumbling and threats.
Also, the paratroopers tried not to throw the killed, wounded and weapons to the enemy's profit. It was possible to lie down with the whole company because of one wounded or killed. Although, shameful exceptions did occur, but only by order of higher commanders, the soldiers did not abandon their own.
Leaving a killed or wounded colleague to the enemy, leaving part of the weapons to the enemy, seeing the enemy and not killing him at any cost - this was considered during my service in the DRA ( Democratic Republic Afghanistan) an indelible shame.
It was even impossible to imagine that a company or platoon commander would negotiate with the Mujahideen about the possibility of passing unhindered or about not attacking each other. It was a disgrace and was equated with betrayal. I saw the enemy, you know where the enemy is - destroy him, that's why you are a paratrooper. No deals with the enemy. So we were then brought up in 350 airborne regiment. They were not brought up by political officers. Demobilized and platoon commanders were brought up.
Those who deviated from these rules were awaited by universal contempt both in Afghanistan and in civilian life in the Union. There would be no life for such a moral freak until death.
But these are only 2 postulates that are steadily being fulfilled precisely in the 350th regiment of the Airborne Forces, by the so-called "triggers" (from the word automatic trigger), soldiers military service and junior officers commanding them (platoon and company commanders), directly involved in hostilities and continuously, all one and a half years of service, climbing mountains in search of gangs of Mujahideen, lice, explosions, injuries, illnesses and terrible fatigue.
Then, after my service, from the middle of the war to the end it was often different. With the Mujahideen, Soviet officers and unit commanders often negotiated peace, negotiated non-aggression with them, and asked them not to touch our soldiers when they passed through certain territories.
When we were told this by officers and soldiers from Limited contingent Soviet Troops in Afghanistan (OKSVA), we were shocked. For us, it was tantamount to shame. We met our fighting guys, slapped them on the shoulder, drank vodka for the meeting, helped them adapt in society, but a sediment was deposited in our souls. They did not do like we did, they already had a different vision of battle and war, which we, who served earlier, unconsciously condemned inside as weakness and even a manifestation of cowardice.
Even now, two conflicting feelings struggle within me. On the one hand, of course, I want as many guys as possible to stay alive. On the other hand, we took an oath: "... and to the last breath be devoted to his People, his Soviet Motherland and the Soviet Government."
“I am always ready, on the orders of the Soviet Government, to defend my Motherland - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, as a warrior of the Armed Forces, I swear to defend it courageously, skillfully, with dignity and honor, not sparing my blood and life itself in order to achieve complete victory over enemies.
If I break this solemn oath of mine, then let me suffer the severe punishment of the Soviet law, the general hatred and contempt of the Soviet people ... "
Exactly:
But this is when they believed the oath, they gave it with all their hearts and with a pure soul.
In fact, it was like this: a person was born in the USSR, without asking him they defined him as a resident of a communist country, they put nationality in his passport (sometimes such that not everyone wanted to show his passport), they drove him into the Octobrists, pioneers and Komsomol members, without asking, they took him to Army, and without asking they put the text of the oath into their hands and hung a machine gun around their necks.
Later, after the oath, a person was thrown to the Afghan front and was not given a choice.
If you do not want to be a citizen of the USSR, you will be a dissident with placement in a psychiatric hospital or in prison.
If you don’t want to be an October child, a pioneer or a Komsomol member, you will be an outcast of society.
If you don't want to join the Red Army, take an oath and stomp to the front, go kid to prison.
Not everyone had enough darling against such a background, and even sacrifice their lives for the "cruel" Motherland.
By the age of 18, not everyone had enough brains to understand the intricacies of the Soviet government.
So they went, either from under the stick, or having seen enough of patriotic films, or with boyish enthusiasm to run a real war game, or with a yard fighting spirit of the ability to get out of any trouble in life, or with the worker-peasant doom of a laborer - a citizen of the USSR.
The Afghan greeted everyone with food gruel, everyday and moral dirt, the indifference of commanders, the corpses of colleagues and a fist in the face. So they broke down in tens of thousands, ran away, adapted, evaded, shot, exploded, fought, pissed, injected, drugged, stole.
There were those who did not know how to topple and those who considered themselves strong. They made up the front-line backbone of combat wolves, which in the 350th Airborne Regiment were called the capacious word "trigger".
The rest, in the bulk, poured themselves into the servants and the clerk. Although there were unique exceptions to the rules, but more on that below ...
Now many historians are arguing how poorly and hastily trained in Soviet military training, eighteen-year-old boys in the Airborne Forces successfully opposed the seasoned and well-trained Mujahideen and elite special units, special forces, mercenaries, the USA, France and other countries. They resisted, having in their hands worse weapons, food, worse generals ...
How in old fairy tale about Malchish Kibalchish, foreign historians are still looking for the terrible secret of the strength of Soviet snotty soldiers.
There was no particular secret. The triggers of the Airborne Forces for the most part consisted of courtyard kings, hooligans and strong street boys, capable of fighting for their principles and territories until complete victory, without retreating even a half step.
School, GPTU, army. This was our main biography.
These were not flimsy nerds and balabols pampered by intelligent quirks. In many respects it was the elite of courtyards, gateways and streets, the elite of schools and GPTU. And this street elite put on blue berets and vests and received a machine gun in their hands. Everyone who was close to this elite broke under her, and under her, with the crunch of facial bones, the gnashing of naked meat, the crackling of broken teeth and the smell of real personal blood.
If these boys were assigned a combat mission, they carried it out, no matter what. They knew from the cradle how to solve formidable cases and at the same time stay alive. And they knew how to give themselves to the real boys' honor completely, without whining, requests, bargaining and pleas. Honor was and is always dearer to them than their own lives.
The trigger of the Airborne Forces - this title could only be obtained by honor.
The paratroopers also did not like to crawl in front of the Mujahideen on their belly during my service, and where possible, they tried to walk to their full height. It may not have been everywhere, but a couple of times we proudly attacked the spirits directly, to the envy of the rest of the armed forces sitting behind the stones (usually they were motorized riflemen), rolling up our sleeves and sticking out our sternum in a vest. Probably, this is how the legends about the paratroopers who never bowed to the enemy or, in a spiritual way - “STRIPED”, were composed.
Last time such courage was shown by us on the Panjshir. They squeezed the guys there tightly. They were not cowards, but a psychological change was needed. And we were dashing and bending down to move broke, and we were very tired. Well, the thirty-second speech of the commander on the radio, that the only hope is for us. They walked in vests, taking off their jackets and lowering overalls to the waist, without taxiways, with machine guns for overweight. They looked at us with hope and delight. The landing party is coming. The Mujahideen draped like hares, except that they did not squeal. And how we drunk ourselves. Airborne in one word. The Airborne Forces are not afraid of death. We go to full height, we shoot. Well, they helped the motorized riflemen, and scratched a piece of Panjshir. The heat, the sun, the mountain river boils, the greenery climbs and we, the handsome men, are blowing.
When they drew before my face,
In the distant sky, the devil's boot
Which blinded the shadow of horror,
Of souls bowed to a vain dream.
I saw the wind, I saw through the silence.
And so I wanted to see you above her.
I drank my fill of the damned war.
I learned to wait and hate.
Newborn funnel, child of war.
To the bottom fell, gritting his teeth, the floor of the foreman.
And spreading red from the meat, the snow was tearing,
Someone with a fragment, someone with a high-explosive one, half a company is gone.
And I kept rushing over my boots, and I flew.
And tearing himself to the whole neighborhood, Ura sang to them.
We have so much to do in this world.
I wanted to howl, but from pain I dreamed of singing to you.
Heaven, open up for me
Me through the cracks, teeth - clouds.
You will hatch me there today,
For countless udders of centuries.
In general, I have my own ideas about the “bravest” troops of Ahmad Shah Massoud, who controlled the Panjshir Gorge.
On Pagman, at the beginning of the summer of 1984, two incomplete platoons of the 5th company of the second battalion of the 350th parachute regiment, our 103rd airborne division, covering the withdrawal of the main troops, stood to death for a day against several thousand Masudovites driven out by Soviet troops from Panjshir. They occupied the hill, which, like a cork in a bottle, kept the Mujahideen in a small gorge. Well, the meat grinder went. Artillery fire and bombing called upon themselves. The Masudovites have large-caliber DShKs, thousands of bayonets, and mortars. The boys have only machine guns, three grenade launchers and one company machine gun. The guys complied with the order completely, the forces of the Masudovites fettered themselves for almost a day, they didn’t surrender the mountain, they didn’t abandon their weapons, the wounded and the dead, and then, after fulfilling the order, another dozen and a half kilometers themselves, carrying the dead and wounded, with the Masudovites on their tail, went to the nearest armor.
They walked, the helicopters did not take the company, the helicopter pilots refused to fly, they said that because of the high density of shelling. The main troops were able to withdraw without losses, the Masudovites were immobilized by a daily battle. Not many people were awarded. The battle was a noble, rare battle, even for an Afghan. Victorious. But somehow forgotten, and never really discussed. I know the guys who fought on that hill. Ordinary Russian boys. There was an order, there was a task. Death, not death, Motherland said.
At that time, the soldiers knew one task: they must constantly scratch the mountains in search of bandit formations and, having found them, destroy them at any cost ( "... not sparing their blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over enemies ...").
We knew and believed that it was for this that we, the paratroopers of the 350th Airborne Regiment, 103rd Airborne Division, were in Afghanistan.
Some must find enemies and destroy enemies, others must provide for these finders and destroyers.
The main part of the paratroopers was engaged in this. Whether it was bad or good, it depended on our personal training. And I bow with great respect to everyone who did this (no matter how he did it, he did what he had enough strength for) and despise those who were supposed to fight and provide for those who fought, but fled from the war and from helping the triggers, like hell from incense ( "... not sparing their blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over enemies ...").
That is why, almost all the old-timers of the triggers went on our last military operation, without trying to sneak home from it with the first sides ( "... not sparing their blood and life itself to achieve complete victory over enemies ..."). Almost all.
And the opportunity to fade was, which, nevertheless, some old-timers took advantage of the trigger.
Let's not judge strictly those who have already taken a sip of the war to the fullest, and are simply tired of it, and cunningly took the opportunity to finish their personal Afghanistan before their company brothers. They will be judged by their dead and living comrades in the war.
The cowardice and betrayal of his fighting friends and brother-soldiers overtakes a weak-smelling soldier in any place and at any time of service. Even on demo.
Someone broke down from the youth of the service, and then got up, someone broke down at the end, and this crossed out all their previous merits. The young broke down with the help of bullying colleagues and with the help of the indifference of the commanders. The old-timers were cowardly precisely and only because of personal cowardice.
But back to the Fifth Company.
There is some mystery or mystery in this great and heroic battle, as you wish.
Why was the 5th company sent so far from the armor on the very last day of combat?
Why did no one come to the aid of a company that fought with such an armada of the Mujahideen for almost a day?
Why did not a single helicopter fly in for fire support?
REFERENCE No. 1 (from the book "The Dangerous Sky of Afghanistan. Experience in the Combat Use of Soviet Aviation in a Local War. 1979-1989" by M.A. Zhirokhov):
June 5, 1984, combat loss of a Mi-24 helicopter. Attacking the target near the village of Pishgor, the helicopter of Captain E. Sukhov was fired upon by the enemy, the pilot-operator was wounded. When escaping from the object of attack, he came under fire from air defense systems again and was shot down. The crew died.
Maybe this played a role, and they decided not to risk the turntables anymore? Or was this helicopter flying towards the fifth company?
Why did the company itself drag the dead and wounded after a daily battle to the armor?
Why did the turntables refuse to fly in to pick up at least the dead and wounded of the 5th company after the battle?
REFERENCE No. 2 (from the book "The Dangerous Sky of Afghanistan. Experience in the Combat Use of Soviet Aviation in a Local War. 1979-1989" by M.A. Zhirokhov):
June 6, 1984, combat loss of a Mi-24 50 osap helicopter (Kabul). The helicopter of Captain V. Skoblikov, as a wingman in a pair, performed a strike on guidance from the ground. At the exit from the attack, the detonation of ammunition on board occurred, probably due to ground fire. When an explosion occurred in the cockpit, the pilot-operator senior lieutenant V.Put, realizing that there was nothing to be done, dropped the lantern and jumped from a height of 150m. The parachute opened close to the ground. Neither the commander nor the flight engineer senior lieutenant A. Chumak managed to escape.
And again, the helicopters regretted? Have you already regretted for the dead and wounded? Are these 2 factors in the death of turntables that influence the fatal refusal to support the fifth company? Or maybe these guys, the helicopter pilots, died flying to the fifth company to help?
REFERENCE No. 3 (from the memoirs of Major General Evgeny Grigorievich NIKITENKO):
“... passivity on the roads led to impunity for the actions of the rebels, especially when insufficient forces were allocated to escort the columns. So, on June 5, 1984, a column of 150 vehicles was attacked in the Shindand area and suffered heavy losses, since only two BRDMs and two anti-aircraft mountain installations were allocated to protect this column ... "
Another fact of sloppiness?
All these "frantic" losses of the Soviet troops in a short period from May to early June 1984 could easily lead to an elementary career panic among senior officers and generals, as a result of which companies and battalions were thrown anywhere and anyhow. Perhaps the fifth company could have been so irresponsibly thrown away.
Why was the fifth company denied fire support for the first few hours of the battle, when the company stubbornly called fire on itself by radio?
Calling artillery fire on yourself at that dashing time was not something out of the ordinary. Paratroopers in Afghanistan, squeezed by the Mujahideen, often resorted to this type of assistance, and higher commanders never refused such "help" to anyone.
In this battle, such fire support should have been provided on demand, but they were not provided for several hours, as if someone wanted the company to simply be destroyed.
Only after repeated hours of requests was a small artillery strike and air bombing carried out.
Obligatory in such battles was the incoming help from other units. In this case, no one came to the aid of the 5th company.
For all the questions about this fight, I came across either a deaf silence, or throwing the handset in a conversation, or an unwillingness to talk about this topic.
On my own behalf, I can give the following soldier facts:
1. The fifth company was already sitting on the armor to go to the regiment, when the soldiers were told that the Mujahideen had clamped down on the first battalion and they urgently needed to come to the rescue.
2. When the 5th company passed by the positions of the 1st battalion, the soldiers of the 1st battalion said that no one had pinched them, and they absolutely did not need any help to cover. Moreover, some soldiers of the 1st battalion said that it was just their battalion commander who made the 1st battalion leave for the regiment before the second battalion.
Did the soldiers of the 1st battalion have other information? There was no point in lying and inventing them. With their own eyes, the fighters of the fifth company saw that the first battalion was not squeezed by anyone and the companies of the first battalion were resting freely.
3. Before this battle, the battalion commander of the first battalion flew to Kabul from the Bagram airport. The combat operation is not over yet, the battalion commander leaves the battalion and flies to Kabul. Why? To whom was the first battalion left? Who released the battalion commander of the first battalion from combat until the end of the operation and the arrival of his battalion to the regiment?
4. The soldiers of the 5th company heard their officers and the company commander arguing that the company commander made a mistake on the map and led the company several kilometers further than expected, right to the rear of the Mujahideen. Was there really a mistake on the map or not?
When the company was moving, it passed by numerous fires, near which the Mujahideen were sitting.
Why didn't the company officers and the company commander radio the regiment commander and tell him that the 5th company was moving behind the lines of a large bandit formation? Or contacted, but received an order to move forward after all.
And indeed, to advance at 19:00 on June 4, 1984 to "help" the first battalion and arrive at the position only at 4:00 in the morning on June 5, 1984. Too big a transition to simply cover the retreat of the regiment and division to the places of permanent deployment.
The fifth company passed by the positions of the first battalion at 20:00 on June 4. Why didn't they just change the first battalion in position? Why else did it take 8 hours and a bunch of kilometers further? Where really, by whom and why was the 5th company sent?
5. Why did intelligence not know that such a large army of the Mujahideen was, in fact, almost at hand at the location of the division and regiment? Why did intelligence not know that such forces of Ahmad Shah were not destroyed on Panjshir, but simply secretly went out and quietly waited for the main Russian forces to leave Panjshir?
Or they knew, but kept silent. Or maybe they were not silent, and they talked, but none of the generals wanted to listen.
6. No one helped the fifth company, which fought for days with superior enemy forces. There was no help from artillery for several hours, despite numerous, many hours of pleading requests under heavy fire. A Mujahideen company was simply shot from numerous DShKs at point-blank range (for your information, the DShK is a very heavy machine gun, capable of destroying the turret of a light tank with three bullets). The company was not just shot from the DShK, they were beaten with explosive bullets for many hours without ceasing.
There were no helicopters. Before the armor, after the battle, the triggers stomped themselves. They fought themselves. Nobody sent any support and help. No tanks, no helicopters, no troops.
The help of artillery and bombers was almost symbolic and more like not supporting a fighting unit, but a planned shelling of a square of terrain in the mountains. Such attacks were carried out quite often, when, according to intelligence data, another gang of Mujahideen "listed" in a certain square. Like they made a little noise, maybe someone will be hooked. How to sprinkle water from a plastic cup on a crowd of fighting people.
So here. They made a little noise and that's it. And the company is beating, the company is asking for dense fire on itself. There is no fire. Fight the company itself, die.
7. Almost no one was awarded for this battle, except for the dead. Well, the dead, of course, are always rewarded. The living were not fully awarded, even the wounded.
The battalion commander of the second battalion, to which the fifth company was assigned, personally promised all the officers of the commanders and one of the best sergeants (the deputy platoon commander from Chelyabinsk, in fact, the guy held half the mountain himself and commanded the battle in his sector himself, did not let any of the spirits) to introduce to the stars Heroes of the Soviet Union, all the dead to be presented to the Orders of the Red Banner, all the wounded to the Orders of Soldiers' Glory of the 3rd degree, all the living to the Orders of the Red Star, and personally rewrote the names, and personally ordered the clerks to document all this. There are witnesses to this.
8. When the wounded came to the armor, they were only then transported by helicopter to the tent of the deployed army medical battalion. There were no regimental or divisional doctors anymore, they left for Kabul (so the wounded were told). And again for 2 hours there is no medical assistance. Then, after bandaging and first aid, in the tent of army "pills", again by helicopter, the wounded were taken to Kabul airport.
There they were unloaded on take-off, and left. The helicopter pilots communicate by radio and ask to send a car for the wounded, and they are told that the 350th regiment is in position, the 5th company has died, there are no survivors, and these are not their wounded, but most likely from another unit.
From the Kabul airport, the wounded on their own walked almost two kilometers to the medical battalion. There was not a single doctor or surgeon in the medical battalion. They also knew nothing about the incoming wounded. They didn't know anything about the fight.
It couldn't be. Doctors were always ready to wait for days for incoming wounded, they never failed. When asked where the doctors and nurses were, they answered that the regiment had been in position for a long time, everyone was resting and celebrating the victorious Panjshir operation.
The soldiers of the fifth company are sitting, blood flows from under them, the orderly runs and rubs it on the floor with rags and substitutes basins. They simply didn’t remember about the fighting 5th company, they didn’t even prepare surgery. Maybe they hoped that there would be no one to operate? Or even then they brazenly decided to delete the battle from the history of the Afghan war.
From the meager soldier facts, only one very terrible version so far emerges: the company was doomed to death, in the hope that the Mujahideen would completely destroy it, either in battle, or when the company would go with the dead and wounded for many kilometers to the armor.
Who and why sent the 5th company so far from the main forces on the very last day of the operation?
All major battles in this operation are described in detail on the Internet. Nothing about this battle of the 5th company. Vacuum emptiness of information. Still.
The overall picture of the situation so far is as follows:
In April-May 1984, our and Afghan troops carried out one of the largest operations in the entire ten-year Afghan war in the Panjshir Gorge. Marshal Sergei Sokolov, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, personally supervised the operation.
When the main forces of Ahmad Shah were allegedly "forced out" from the Panjshir Gorge, the Soviet Army began to comb the surrounding areas.
The battalion commander of the first battalion, by the time the huge two-month military operation to liberate the Panjshir Gorge from the gangs of Ahmad Shah Massoud, was already a “legendary” battalion commander, who became famous for having the lowest percentage of casualties among the personnel during the command of the battalion. Although he could not protect his soldiers from killings on the basis of hazing.
Let's not blame the battalion commander for this. In order to get away from the non-regulation and come to a caring attitude towards the soldiers, it was necessary to change the entire army system of work and thinking of the then officers of the entire Soviet Army.
Margelov was no longer there, there was no one to respect the soldier, there was no one to “love” him.
At the age of 30, a brave commander, the first battalion commander, having the Order of the Red Star and the Red Banner, having been wounded in battle, enjoying the love and respect of his soldiers and higher commanders, a paratrooper officer - a legend, had served by this time in Afghanistan for almost two and a half years. Six months more than the due date. These are two and a half years of the hardest psychological load of real front-line life. By the same time, the battalion commander was the first to be nominated for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and was preparing to receive this title soon.
Without waiting for the arrival of the battalion to the regiment, the first battalion commander, leaving his battalion (with the permission of the commander of the regiment? Division?), Leaves the Panjshir operation for Bagram, and from there by An-12 aircraft, flies to the location of the regiment.
It's time to fly home. Boards in the USSR went extremely irregularly, you will miss "your" plane, and sit, cuckoo for several months until flights open again. Yes, and it is necessary to prepare a farewell with military friends officers.
Ahmad Shah and his gang, in fact, were not in the mountains of Panjshir. The entire operation to liberate the gorge was against almost no one. Thanks to the betrayal, the Shah was warned in advance about the offensive of the Soviet and Afghan troops, withdrew the main forces to a safe place and screwed himself away. In the gorge were lagging behind the main Mujahideen army, small and scattered parts of gangs.
More information on this site:
1) Chasing the Lion of Panjshir
2) The third military operation of formations and units of the 40th Army and Afghan troops in Panjshir against the formations of Ahmad Shah Massoud
The Panjshir operation of 1984 consisted of two parts: before the May holidays and after. Between these two halves, Soviet units, including the 350th Airborne Regiment, arrived at their places of permanent deployment for a two-day rest, replenishment of supplies and to take with them any remaining manpower reserve.
They raked both turners and bakers, if only there was more strength on the armor.
For a temporary shift of the 350th regiment, at the place of its permanent deployment, an airborne regiment stationed there arrived from Fergana. The poor soldiers of the Fergana regiment were not even told that they were being taken near Kabul to Afghanistan. The fact that they are in Afghanistan, the soldiers learned only from us, who came to visit them. They did not believe for a long time, they thought that they were being played. Whether they were later sent back to the Union, I do not know.
The appearance of a large and serious military mess was created. The more noise, the more stars on the chest and shoulder straps of all kinds of staff colonels and generals who have at least something to do with this hype, from Kabul to Moscow. "Much ado about nothing". Big "heroic" deception.
Before the first half of the Panjshir operation, there was a betrayal by the intelligence chief of the 149th motorized rifle regiment stationed in Kunduz. An officer in the conflict shot the mayor of Kunduz, took two soldiers with him, and went to the Mujahideen. 783rd Separate reconnaissance battalion, which was supposed, among other things, to provide high-quality intelligence of Panjshir, was thrown to detain a traitor. The search failed, the traitor was not taken. It is possible that an officer of this rank also had information about the impending operation, which he handed over to the spooks. And on April 19, 1984, the "great", final Panjshir operation against Ahmad Shah Massoud began.
On April 30, almost at the end of the first half of the operation, in the Khazar gorge, the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was killed: the losses of the Soviet troops amounted to about 60 people killed. Just one of the generals gave the wrong order. The commander of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was transferred to Belarus and demoted. The major general commander of the 108th motorized rifle division was also removed from the post of division commander. The trial was going on in Tashkent, in the Military Court of the Turkestan Military District. There were heroes commanders, there were downcast defendants in court. Their careers were ruined forever.
There is a lot of information about this fight on the Internet.
So there was something to be afraid of both our regiment commander and our new division commander. For losses and many hours of slaughter, the judiciary did not stroke the head. If they knew about these losses and massacres. And if they didn’t recognize it, then “no, and there is no trial.”
Before the second half of the operation, on May 3, 1984, the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion itself was ambushed and lost 13 people - 3 officers and 10 soldiers. And again, there is no full-fledged intelligence of Panjshir.
The Internet is simply crammed with information about this fight.
Only about the battle of the 5th company there is nothing.
Moreover, in the first half of the Panjshir operation of 1984, there are now tremendous losses, but there is no huge number of prisoners and dead spirits, so necessary for victorious reports. But, there are still a large number of wounded Soviet soldiers. There are a large number of disabled people who were blown up by mines, both Mujahideen and their own, unexploded "petals" (mines dropped from Soviet aircraft and self-destruct in a few days). Such mines did not always self-destruct. There is information on the Internet that about 1,000,000 such mines were dropped on Panjshir in 1984 and there were several hundred of our soldiers blown up on them.
Short note: 1,000,000 (think!!! A million!!!) min frogs only. Each at a cost of not 5 and not 100 rubles. The dollar then went for 1 ruble for 1 green (even the hucksters changed one to three in an easy way). And the rest of the investments are only in this operation!? Equipment, planes, helicopters, fuel, ammunition, food, clothing, wages, and so on…
5 billion rubles a year Soviet authorities public money to Afghanistan. Wasn't it easier to just buy all the Mujahideen with giblets for this money? Approximately 100,000 rubles a year for any of the most seedy Mujahideen. The CIA spent much less. We could buy up all the gangs of Afghanistan and send them to necessary USSR channel.
So no. The Union needed to shake weapons to the whole world and have a huge training ground where human meat was the same consumable item as cartridges. Only the cartridges were treated much more carefully.
The command of all types is nervous, and is afraid of losing, there were already close ones, golden stars, orders and extraordinary titles.
For some commanders, the question is simply about maintaining their existing ranks, orders and freedom, some have not been before the new “starfall”.
Nobody wants another big loss. And if you hide the death of the fifth company, without helping it out, then you can lower its death on the brakes. Itself, they say, the company is to blame. It climbed incomprehensibly where and then it was destroyed. And the signal, they say, the company did not have time to give, so it’s clear that the walkie-talkie flew right away, or it was smashed with bullets. The company, perhaps, would have been written off retroactively or later and accused of unprofessionalism and arbitrariness of advancing further than necessary.
It turns out that either there really was a mistake by the company commanders on the map and half of the battle’s fault lies with them, or they really drove the company where “Makar didn’t drive the calves to graze” (why?), Or they deliberately sent the company very far away (whether it’s not to Paradise itself in heaven and for what?). A riddle upon a riddle.
And if you help the company with artillery and instantly with helicopters, put forward large army forces to help it, then x..n knows how things will go.
And suddenly the number of killed soldiers and officers will be hundreds and even thousands. After all, there are several thousand Mujahideen and the fifth company squeezed them to the fullest. Masudovtsy tried to get out of the gorge bottle at any cost. It was as if at first they were afraid that the entire might of the Soviet Army would now fall upon them.
Here you can’t write off that the spirits are gone, there will be a battle of thousands Soviet soldiers with thousands of Afghan dushmans. And it is not clear how the card will fall. What if the spirits win? Or they won’t win, but they will lay down several hundred or even thousands of our fighters and commanders.
Generals and officers for heavy losses and incorrect orders could expect not just a dressing, a military court and real prison terms were waiting. There were examples. Career in the bucket, stars and orders in the trash, glory in the bucket.
In short, general and officer ranks, careers and orders with the stars of Heroes flew into hell.
We should have fought for real. Maybe for the first time in Afghanistan, it was possible to fight for real, with a huge army of the Mujahideen, and not with individual gangs.
Staff officers and generals came together. Personal well-being became closer to them. X .. n with her, with the fifth company, they said.
That is the version. There was and never was a victorious Panjshir operation. There was bullshit.
According to the original plan of the operation, the retreat of the regiment and division was to be provided by the first battalion. The plan was approved at the very top and long before the start of the operation. And the first battalion commander is missing. The commander of a regiment or division may change his mind on the go. For cover, instead of the first battalion, the second battalion is advanced. And to make it look plausible, they announce to us that the first battalion, allegedly, was squeezed by spirits and needs help.
Why? First battalion commander and regiment commander, Good friends. By that time, both, as smart and competent officers, they understand that the Panjshir operation is an inflated empty shell, the Mujahideen left from there in advance. Yes, and the whole of Anava, even before the start of the operation, knew that the spirits had left on Panjshir. Anava must have shared her suspicions with our regimental and divisional officers.
The 2nd Battalion of the 345th Separate Guards Airborne Regiment was located in locality Anava. The headquarters of the battalion was in the fortress.
The Panjshir Gorge blocked 20 outposts of the battalion. And the rest of the 345th Airborne Regiment generally stood in Bagram, from where the battalion commander of the first battalion flew out. Information spread quickly among the officers, so there was no secret for the battalion commander of the 1st battalion of the 350th regiment, and the commander of the 350th regiment, that the forces of Ahmad Shah roam freely, between Kabul and Panjshir in huge numbers.
The battalion commander is the first to understand that his battalion, God forbid, may run into gangs that have left Panjshir. And it is he who formally commands the battalion. The first battalion commander, sensitive to personal glory, could ask the regiment commander (or maybe the division commander) to change his first battalion to the second battalion. Just in case. After all, nothing bad is expected. They changed and urgently brought the first battalion to the location. Away from sin.
And then the 5th company stumbles upon spirits. She would send the first battalion to help, but he is not around. She would have her own battalion to help, and who will cover the withdrawal of the division? You stop the division, you stop the Army.
5th company would have helicopters, artillery to help, and then the arbitrariness of the commander of the regiment (or division?) And the battalion commander of the first will emerge. And goodbye to careers, goodbye to the stars of the Heroes of the Soviet Union, goodbye to the legend of the first invincible battalion commander, goodbye to the general rank of the new division commander of the 103rd Airborne Division.
Farewell to all well-deserved officer honor and glory, hello to the military court, which will fully ask for every violation of officer military discipline that led to combat losses of personnel. And the personnel is the property of the State. Marshals were broken off, not only officers.
And the terrible begins. The company is fighting, but the battle is silent. Do not report on the fight, probably upstairs. And no help is given. Only light shelling and weak bombardment of the battle square, this is all that the regiment commander can do for the company. It's all.
The death of the 5th company suited everyone. I arranged for the first battalion commander and the regiment commander, they did not need to investigate what had happened. She arranged for the division commander and the army commander, because the linden of the Panjshir operation and the failure of this operation did not surface. There is no need to accept thousands of and unpredictable battle with the Mujahideen who appeared out of nowhere, after the operation has already been carried out.
And the captured Mujahideen and their leaders will certainly testify that the Panjshir operation of May 1984 is a complete crap. And the victorious reports had already gone to Moscow, and the ceremonial tunics were already full of holes under the victorious orders and stars. For the division commander, a colonel, who by that time had served in Afghanistan for only three months, this was the first major operation, the rank of general and a good order, and maybe the title of Hero, loomed ahead.
From the company, perhaps, they expected death. We were very much looking forward to it. It couldn't be otherwise. The practice of the war showed that in battles and twenty times with a smaller enemy, the companies were simply erased. Yes, the company had to die. Then it could be said that the company went in the wrong direction, the radio was immediately covered, and the company did not have time to transmit anything. All the blame could be put on the company itself.
Therefore, even after the battle, the company was not pulled out, but forced to go to the armor itself, in the hope that the Mujahideen would finish it off.
But the company survived. Only seven were killed. True, there are many wounded, but these are lightly wounded, and there are also few seriously wounded. The company is combat-ready and can move itself. With difficulty, but it can. And he can fight. And the radio is intact. And the spirits didn't make it. The 5th Company won.
And the big commanders all the same pretended that there was no battle. It was not profitable to show this fight. Not by washing, so by skating. Nowhere on the Internet is there even a mention of this fight. None. There are detailed ones about all the others, with maps, lists of the dead, testimonies and memoirs of witnesses, but there is no information about this battle of the fifth company.
I am an old operative higher education and although all this is my speculation, but according to the meager facts I have and knowledge of the human s ...... and Soviet society, everything looks exactly as described above. Although we will not rush, and for now we will consider all this as a version.
They tried to contact the battalion commander of the first battalion, the man simply did not begin to talk about this topic, was silent on the phone, did not put it down for a very long time, then did not pick up repeated calls and generally switched off.
But he managed to say that he flew from Bagram to Kabul, leaving the battalion immediately after the Panjshir operation. But this is a violation of the combat charter. The commander leaves the battalion until he arrives at the location of the unit. By whose order and to whom does it leave?
Another fact: when the triggers of the 5th company at the end of June 1984 flew home from Afghanistan, a sergeant from the 1st battalion, wounded in the leg, flew with them. The wound was fresh, during the flight his stitches opened, and blood flowed, he poured it out of his boot.
He also received his wound somewhere at the end of the Panjshir operation.
Maybe the fifth company was really put forward to change the positions of the first battalion, because some part of it collided with the spirits? But what, and why did the rest of the 1st battalion, past whose positions the 5th company walked, know nothing about this?
One of the commanders of the 5th company, whose man his soldier found after Afghanistan, who was also in that battle, who became for the soldier who found him, a friend and a person whose opinion he valued very much (a soldier for many years, on his way to the next treatment, stopped by to visit the commander home in Moscow, lived in his apartment), for a long time did not want to raise this topic, left it by any means (for the soldier it was not quite the main thing then and he did not insist, and the commander referred to the lack of facts and left everything finding out about the fight, in which he was also himself, for later).
Moreover, at the same time, the commander of this soldier sincerely wanted the soldier to write the history of the 5th company and find out the truth about this battle. At least he sincerely told the soldier about this desire.
When a soldier specifically and directly got the commander on the phone (and they live in different cities) by the fact that he urgently needs some clarifying facts on this battle, which are known to this particular commander, as a participant in the battle and a junior officer, the commander of this soldier suddenly referred to suddenly busy and asked to call back the next day.
The soldier called back, the commander said hello, again referred to being busy and said that he would call back himself. More soldiers could not get through to him, and the commander does not call back and does not pick up the phone.
This had never happened before with this officer. He is a serious and obligatory person, he did a lot of good things for a soldier. Maybe he is trying in this way to save his former soldier from big trouble? Maybe for someone the truth about the battle of the 5th company is still terrible?
Terrible, even despite the fact that absolutely all the crimes of the Afghan war are legally amnestied and forgiven. Who is afraid of not even the law, but what? Just afraid of the truth? Afraid of condemnation of veterans and colleagues in Afghanistan? Afraid of shame?
I don't want to throw mud at anyone. I don't blame anyone. This is just a version put together by me, a rather experienced specialist with a special higher education, from very scarce and not fully covered and transmitted to me facts (my friends in Afghanistan, former soldiers of the 350th regiment, among them there are also specialists with higher education in similar issues, they say that they see no other explanation for the events).
More than anything, I want it, this terrible version, to turn out to be just complete nonsense of my brain and was not confirmed in a single point. But I need some facts and answers to simple questions to cover the entire history of the battle of the 5th company.
I am ready to declare all my versions simply ridiculous and stupid versions, but I want a real and honest officer's truth. I don't want to publish anyone's names until all the circumstances are fully clarified. And then I will not print the names.
Not only the paratroopers fought bravely in this bloody 1984. The losses of the 40th Army in 1984 were the heaviest for the entire period of hostilities in Afghanistan and amounted to 2,343 people killed and 7,739 wounded and injured and maimed.
Soldiers of the 350th Airborne Regiment will continue this complex investigation in the name of our fellow soldiers killed and wounded.
Two months after writing the above, the following information was discovered on the Internet:
“... 06/05/84. 1 battalion 350 RAP moved closer to the mountains. At the very beginning, 3 PDRs were ambushed. The company commander in the 3rd PDR was Novozhilov, and the platoon commander Tokarev and two fighters Fedulov, Bogolyubov died ... "
So, there was still a battle of the 1st battalion, and there were dead and wounded. Why was this fight silenced? Why was only one fifth company nominated to replace an entire battalion, because there are three companies in the first battalion? And after all, the fifth company was told that they clamped the first battalion exactly on June 4, 1984. And here is information about the fight on June 5th. Maybe a date shift on the Internet?
Learn more and understand...
But still, where was the battalion commander of the first battalion when his soldiers and officers were dying on June 5, 1984?
I have no desire to press the first battalion commander with this case. And I don't want to blame him. He is a heroic man, no words, but no more heroic than any normal trigger of our regiment. I know the boys of the 350th airborne regiment are no less brave. And the soldiers personally saved entire platoons and companies, and with severe wounds received in battle while rescuing their colleagues, they left home, and do not have a single medal. And to me, with my two Courages for Afghanistan, their exploits are far and away. No, I honestly earned mine, but still ... It's a shame for me that the guys are Heroes without awards. It's somehow unfair.
And in the first battalion there was the same non-Ustavism as in any other. And the soldiers there slaughtered each other and killed young soldiers for not bringing a ration of butter to an old-timer.
There were bullying and beatings, lice, accidents, dystrophy. There were heroism, self-sacrifice and feats.
Only the battalion commander became the Hero of the Soviet Union. And most of the ordinary front-line soldiers went home without a single combat award, despite all their many feats. But the same picture was in the second battalion.
Any ordinary combat soldier triggering the 350th regiment, if he were in the place of any battalion commander or any company or platoon officer, would have commanded no worse. Of course, education would not interfere with school and somewhere experience in leading people, but there would be no less courage and courage. Simply, everyone got their own Afghan, precisely at a certain moment in the biography.
Then many soldiers who went through Afghanistan became both officers and generals, commanded companies, regiments and platoons in another war, in Chechnya, and did their job no worse than the battalion commander of the first battalion and no less heroic.
So, by Afghan standards, the battalion commander was a normal officer, and there were many such officers. And they performed feats and saved lives, and they made mistakes more than once.
By the way, he personally did good to me twice (although he probably doesn’t remember) and I remembered him as a very human officer, and not a soulless jackal.
But personally, I want to know if I owe fourteen fragments in my head and the loss of two best friends to his act.
All triggers, soldiers and officers who have passed Afghanistan have their own dark spots in biographies, it is impossible to divide front-line soldiers into whites and blacks, but everyone should ask his brother-soldiers who suffered because of him and God for sincere forgiveness for their sins that led to death, injuries and disabilities of combat brother-soldiers.
Ask in person and try with all your might to make amends if you still do not forgive.
And you have to forgive. Have to forgive. It's hard to blame, even harder to forgive. To live without forgiving the repentant is a sin.
Probably every adult man and most women in the country are well aware that the 345th (Airborne) regiment is legendary. Fame became widespread after the release of the cult feature film by F. Bondarchuk "9th Company", which poignantly told about the battle near Khost, where the 9th Airborne Company of this regiment heroically died.
Start
The regiment was finally formed on New Year's Day, the thirtieth of December, when before Great Victory there was still almost six months left. Forty-fourth, the town of Lapichi near Mogilev in Belarus, liberated and tormented by the Nazis. It was from here that Regiment 345 (Airborne Forces) went on the paths of war. The regiment was originally a rifle regiment - based on the Fourteenth Guards Airborne Brigade.
The final renaming took place in June 1946. From July of the same year until 1960, the 345th (VDV) regiment was stationed in Kostroma, after, until December 1979, in Fergana, merging with the 105th guards division Airborne.
Continuation
Already in 1946, the regimental banner carried with honor Until the end of the victorious year, the regiment guarded the peace of Hungary. For the high level of military training, the Minister of Defense of the USSR awarded the pennant "For Courage and military prowess"Regiment 345 (Airborne Forces). This regiment practically did not see the world, constantly being in the hottest spots of the country and the planet.
In total, from 1979 to 1998, the regiment, without interruption for a single day, participated in various armed conflicts and wars, and so eighteen years and five months passed. Then, on December 14, 1979, no one knew about it yet. With the status of "separate", the 345th airborne regiment, Bagram, also receives a new assignment.
Afghanistan
Soviet troops had not yet been introduced into this neighboring country, and the second battalion was already helping the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment to guard the Bagram airfield. Our military transport helicopters and planes were based there. The ninth company in the amount of eighty people at the end of December 1979 had already stormed Amin's palace (as part of the Fortieth Army). In 1980, unparalleled heroism and courage earned another award - the Order of the Red Banner.
Retrofitting
In the spring of 1982, new equipment came to 3 Bagram. Afghanistan did not win back until our troops left the country. In 2002, the Americans began to use the airfield built by the powerful Soviet efforts and our largest military base.
The new landing equipment of the early eighties was more adapted to partisan actions in mountainous conditions. BMD landing) did not interfere with fragments of mines, and regular BTR-70 and BMP-2 well protected the airborne soldiers sitting inside. The 345th Airborne Regiment in Afghanistan was pleased with the new equipment, despite the fact that they loved the old car very much - powerful, maneuverable and fast.
no longer parachute
The staff structure of the unit also changed for the better: the regimental weapons received an effective means of firepower - a howitzer division (D-30) and a tank company (T-62). It was practically impossible to land with parachutes here - the mountainous terrain was too difficult, therefore, as unnecessary, landing support in the form of airborne service units was removed.
The enemy did not have aviation and armored vehicles, therefore, both the anti-aircraft missile and anti-tank batteries went where they were needed: to cover the columns on the marches from Bagram and to Bagram. The 345th Airborne Regiment thus became more like a motorized rifle regiment.
Revisiting the album
The tasks during the hostilities in Afghanistan were of a very different nature: the soldiers guarded the roads and directly the motorcades on the way, cleared the mountainous areas, set up ambushes, went on raids, both individually and in support of the "Commandos" and "KHAD", helped the units government police ... What can be seen in the photo albums of those years? Here in the photo - 345 Airborne Regiment. Kunduz. The fighters smile, seemingly serenely, but their weapons, if not in their hands, then close, close ...
Looking at the photographs, you understand how much dangerous work, requiring the utmost professionalism, was carried out by the fighters. Here is another page. Again 345 Airborne Regiment. Bagram (Afghanistan). The photo does not convey even the smallest fraction of the dangers that fighters lay in wait every minute for a long and bloody nine years. Nine years of daily losses. It's good that the 345th Airborne Regiment managed to take photos and managed to save them. Amazing inner composure in poses, at first glance, calm, even relaxed. Years later, many want to figure out why the victory did not come. Such strong people in the photographs. Confident and very, very beautiful. And high, dizzying mountains around.
Work
Any military operation in the highlands has a fifty-fifty chance of success. A frontal offensive is possible only in certain directions. Artillery, no matter how ironed the nearby mountains, rarely justifies the effort. It is necessary to radically change both tactics and forms of maneuver. The main thing is to capture all the dominant heights. For this, there is a helicopter landing where the “bypassing” detachments help little, which most often do not reach the goal, because they get in their way sheer cliffs, then insurmountable gorges gape.
Detours and paths are long and dangerous to look for. Alpinist units would have helped, but there were none in the 345th Airborne Regiment. checked the Soviet paratroopers in all respects: endurance, psychological stability, strength, endurance, mutual assistance - everything turned out to be in place for them. At altitudes of 3-4 thousand meters, reconnaissance was carried out for 2-3 weeks, on foot, with a load of 40 kilograms on each back, with a complete ambiguity of the situation. When you don't know when and where to expect an attack. For a week in the mountains, paratroopers lost up to 10 kilograms of their own weight.
Whose war is this?
In April 1978, Afghanistan was shaken by a revolution that brought the PDPA party to power, which immediately proclaimed socialism in the Soviet version. The US, of course, did not like it. Mohammad Taraki was elected the leader of the country, and his comrade-in-arms, even the closest one, who graduated from a university in the United States, became the prime minister. Taraki asked L. Brezhnev to send troops. But General Secretary The CPSU was a kind man, but fearful. He refused.
Probably, it was necessary to be bolder in defending their interests in neighboring territories. The experience was acquired - heavy and terrible. By order of Amin, Taraki, who was a great friend of Brezhnev, was first arrested, then strangled. By the way, immediately after he was arrested, the USSR Secretary General personally asked Amin to save Taraki's life. But Amin had already enlisted the support of the United States by that time and was not going to follow the lead of his closest neighbor.
chagrin
Brezhnev was upset to the core. Therefore, on December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo, the question of the situation in Afghanistan was raised. The decision to use Soviet armed forces supported by Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov. Agarkov and Kosygin opposed. By a majority of votes, the start of the war was laid.
Here, as if in parentheses, that is, in a whisper, it must be admitted that since July 1979, troops have been quietly transferred to Afghanistan: KGB special forces and the Airborne Forces, for example, including the Alpha, Zenit, Thunder units .. . And even " Muslim battalion By the fall, he began to explore Afghanistan.
The 345th Airborne Regiment was sent there as one of the first landing units. And on December 25, 1979, the troops of the USSR had already openly crossed the state border into Afghanistan. Literally two days later, Amin's residence was stormed, and he himself was killed. In these battles, the regiment suffered its first losses. Eight guardsmen of the 345th Airborne Regiment will never hug their relatives again. These losses were not the last ...
Sanctions
Like the Olympics in our country, so the war in the neighborhood is traditional. As early as January 2, 1980, the US began sanctions over the war in Afghanistan. One of them was the refusal to participate in the Olympics-80. One hundred and four member states of the UN supported the sanctions. Only eighteen - no.
And in Afghanistan, a leader loyal to the USSR appeared - the United States, of course, did not leave it like that. Already in February, uprisings against the PDPA broke out one after another in Afghanistan. Money (and more often promises) plus a crazy herd - that's the uprising ready. And then the massacre began. Bloody nine years and two months. Only on February 11, 1989, the 345th (VDV) regiment left Afghanistan.
Phoenix rising from the ashes
April 13, 1998 by order of the Minister of Defense Russian Federation 345 (VDV) regiment was disbanded. The combat banner and awards are stored in the Central Museum of the Armed Forces. Copies transferred Nowhere and never dropped the honor Soviet army, who observed all military traditions and faithfully, regardless of life and death, performed all combat missions, the 345th Airborne Regiment, fanned with glory, was disbanded, not even allowing him to set foot on native land. Sixty-four kilometers remained to Russia.
The memory will never fade. In many cities, veterans of the Airborne Forces have created organizations to prevent this from happening. Honor the 345th Airborne Regiment Novosibirsk, Ryazan, Moscow, many cities of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, all territories of the former Soviet Union.
Most recently, V. Shamanov confirmed that the airborne troops will receive a newly formed separate assault brigade, which received the number 345 - in honor of the legendary parachute regiment, which has more than seventy years of history. The formation will end in 2016 in Voronezh.
On December 12, 1979, the Central Committee of the Party adopted a resolution on the introduction of troops into Afghanistan. Soviet troops were supposed to stand in garrisons and not get involved in an internal conflict and hostilities. They were ordered to protect the local population from gangs, as well as to distribute food, fuel and basic necessities.
A day before the official document, the Vitebsk division was raised on alarm. Including the 350th Airborne Regiment. Once in a neighboring state, the "fifty kopecks" - as the regiment is called in the ranks of the fighters - became an active participant in military operations on the territory of Afghanistan.
AiF.ru spoke with the soldiers of the regiment, participants in the Afghan war, about life, service and military brotherhood.
Reference:
In 1979 he was a conscript soldier. Now he heads the Kolpinsky branch of the Union of Disabled and Veterans of Afghanistan and Chechnya.
In 1983-1985 he was the commander of a reconnaissance company. Now he is the chairman of the executive committee of the Union of Russian Paratroopers.
Valery Yuriev. Photo: AiF / Inna Kireeva
Valery Krasnov. Photo: From the family archive /
- I served in the first company of the 350th Airborne Regiment Vitebsk division. There was a year left before the demobilization. We were alerted, I don’t remember now, on December 10 or 11 at night. And that’s all, we didn’t return to Borovukha, the village where the regiment was located. For a week we were taken by train to Bykhovo, an airfield in Belarus. Then they flew to Chimkent and on December 25 in the evening flew to Kabul. Nobody really said anything. They said that we were going somewhere to the East. Probably the officers knew all the background.
- Orders were not discussed with us, they said to go - I went. We were told that we were fulfilling an international duty. And then it was not just words for us.
In Afghanistan, soldiers of the 350th regiment served for a year and a half. Prior to that, they had six months of training in which they were preparing specifically for service in Afghanistan. The officers were not trained to serve in Afghanistan, at least in my period. For six months, somewhere, officers were informed about the trip, a passport was issued. We had a transit point Tuzel in Tashkent. There we were loaded onto an An-12 aircraft, which ferried us to Kabul, where our regiment's base was.
- My passport was the Il-76 aircraft. We were loaded, given a bag of cartridges, a machine gun. And we flew. The task was to capture the airfield in Kabul. On approaching, we were given the command: “Parachutes under the benches!”. This meant that we would be landing by landing method. We missed the first time. The plane went to the second circle: dushmans put out the lights on takeoff, the plane overshot between takeoff and taxiing. I thought: "Well, that's it, let's crash now." The whole board shook, the pilot gave gas. Sat down from the second round. The planes did not even stop: on takeoff, taxiing, the ramp opened, we all jumped, and the board flew away. First, they took the airport into the first ring under guard. Then they began to expand further. And then, about 20 minutes later, the main regiment entered.
About the first days in Afghanistan
- The base of the regiment was the Kabul airport. When we entered, we did not even have tents. They slept on bare ground. A tarpaulin with an infantry fighting vehicle was spread out, five people lay down on one half, the second one took cover. That's how they slept. The guys who wore mustaches had an ice mask on their faces in the morning. And what is most surprising, no one even got a runny nose.
- When I landed, the Afghan heat subsided. It was dusty. At that time, the units lived in plywood houses. Came to the mouth. Changed clothes. And then he left for a military operation.
About losses
- For some reason, everyone celebrates the beginning of the war on the 27th, when the assault on Kabul took place. But in general, it is more correct to consider December 25, because the first losses were already on that day. Our plane crashed, crashed into a mountain. 40 people died. We saw a flash of 40-50 kilometers from the airport in Kabul. There was such a glow! There was no sound from the fall, and the flash was strong.
“Many people die in war because of slovenliness. There were such cases in Afghanistan. A GRU special forces group landed by helicopter. There was snow at the top, and they were in sand-colored suits, in thieves' sneakers, in bags of canned food. The scouts settled in one house. It was in the evening. We started cooking our own food. The fire was lit, but they forgot about the blackout. Not far from the house were tankers, our Soviets. They saw fire in the house, turned the tank gun and fired. 11 special forces men died immediately.
- In general, they asked seriously for the loss of soldiers and officers. And they were held accountable.
About fear
“There was no such thing as fear. I was 19 years old. Everything felt like an adventure. When we landed, we hardly slept. We had the task of equipping the ammunition depot. All night from December 25 to December 26, we dragged boxes of ammunition to one place, grenades, shots for grenade launchers ... And on the night of December 27 to 28, we went to Kabul. Operation "Baikal-79" has begun. Each battalion had its own task. Our battalion blocked the Afghan garrison. He was outside Kabul, thirty kilometers in the mountains.
— You know, the fear starts when the shooting starts. When you see the real consequences of shots, explosions, when someone is injured or killed, then yes. You start to think, and fear appears.
The most important thing is to overcome this fear. Don't panic. Don't show it to your subordinates.
Valery Yuriev in Afghanistan. Photo: From the family archive /
About letters home
- It was possible to write home to parents only general phrases: we serve, we miss. But my mom, dad and brother knew that I was in Afghanistan. I accompanied a dead soldier from our battalion. He took his remains to Perm. And my parents lived in Chuvashia. I wanted to fly from Perm by plane, the guys collected money for me. But there was no direct message. I approached two colonels - the head of the Perm garrison and the commandant - and said that I wanted to go home. They replied that there was no problem. Went with them for tickets. Were only on the train and only to Kazan. I sent a telegram home. My parents came to Kazan several hundred kilometers away to see me. Roughly speaking, it was AWOL. And so, in general, before demobilization, it was impossible to write to relatives where you are and what you are doing there.
The letters were very important to us. When letters were delivered to the war zone, for us it was an incentive and an irresistible desire to survive AND the happiest moment. Separation from the family for all of us was a difficult test. They wrote home about love and friendship. Not a single line about the war.
The personnel of the 5th Airborne Company of the 350th Guards Airborne Regiment with full combat gear is descending from the mountain. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / from the personal archive of a serviceman of the 5th PDR Sergei Novikov.
About war and military brotherhood
— In a year I had 10 special operations. They went to the mountains for a week or two, then went down to the regiment, rested for a week. And back to the mountains. I didn't get to the snow. But the workload was very high. One would probably be scared. As you think, the house is not one thousand kilometers away. But there were friends. They encouraged each other. And lucky with the commanders. We have platoon commander was Alexander Pinchuk, 12 years served before Afghanistan, and all the senior lieutenant. He was going to quit and build a career in civilian life. In early December 1979, he was in the hospital. So he ran to us straight from the hospital. We told him, they say, comrade senior lieutenant, you were going to quit. And he answered: where will I send you alone. So he left with us.
- In Afghanistan, the most important thing in officers is reliability. For example, the ability to accurately navigate. We took 30-50 kilograms with us to combat operations. And they carried it all. I made the fighters always carry two rounds of ammunition with them. They took water - it is more important than ammunition, thirst in Afghanistan was sometimes worse than a bullet. Plus grenades, sleeping bag, mortars and other weapons. I personally wore it on myself, no one wore it for me, although some officers had such a practice. And imagine if the officer who leads the unit gets lost - that's it, there is no longer faith in him, and he will not win authority.
- There were cases when, in violation of the orders of higher authorities, I allowed my fighters not to take helmets and bulletproof vests. We left them on the armor when we climbed the mountains. This decision was made after a difficult case with a loss. We retreated from the line under the dense fire of dushmans, I had Yurchenko, a medical officer, he was so physically exhausted that he could not run. Bullets landed next to him. I shouted to him where to go, but he did not hear everything, he no longer controlled himself. That's why I decided that's it: we're going to the mountains without armor. When they acted in the "green", then they were fully equipped.
- Somehow we flew on a special operation. Information has been received that more than 3,000 dushmans are concentrated near Kabul: a meeting of field commanders is taking place. We fly, sucks in the stomach, we are waiting for serious resistance. And when we sit down, there is snow, a blizzard, nothing is visible. We jumped out, lay down, the helicopter flew away, we quickly moved to the nearest rocks. And silence. Nobody shoots. It got warm right away. So no one fired. We found only one ancient pistol there. It turned out that this special operation was developed for the arrival of a big boss in Kabul a month ago. But the chief did not come, the intelligence was not updated, and we were sent nowhere.
350th Guards Airborne Regiment in Afghanistan. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / Anatoly315
About the attitude of local
How did the locals react? During the day they smiled: "Shuravi, shuravi." Shots were fired at night. They saw us as invaders. Although, if you look at the cargo that was then going to Afghanistan from the USSR, then most of it was intended specifically for the Afghans.
- It was forbidden to communicate with women there. And the children, when we came to the village, came out to meet us. Here you go on the armor, they stand and shout: “Commander, baksheesh ( gift - adj. ed.) let's!". Of course, the children were sorry. We did not see them as enemies. Everything that remained from the ration was thrown at them.
About rest
- When we returned to the unit from the war, we were sent to checkpoints. They were sent to the quarry of a house-building plant. We blocked the road. They defended their shift there, and then do whatever you want. Basically, the guys slept off. And when they were preparing for hostilities, classes were already beginning there: tactical, physical and other training.
- In the combat area, we rested for 2-4 hours. That was enough. When we went out to the armor (descended from the mountains), they were waiting for us there with fried potatoes and cake. Cake is crumbled cookies, condensed milk and nuts. Delicious. When we returned to the base, there was a good rest. They went in for sports. Sometimes artists come to us.
About weather
- Acclimatization was difficult for some guys. They suffered especially in spring and early summer. We were told that the summer here is very warm. I thought that's it, we'll all die here from the heat. But, oddly enough, there was not a single heat stroke in the company. They had hepatitis, dysentery.
- Because of the increased loads in the mountains, I was thirsty. I dreamed that I would come to Tashkent, get drunk from a belly of water or kvass. We were on one of the operations, my fighter died of heat stroke. The temperature then reached 70 degrees. We were in the Pechdara Gorge. We fought on this operation only at night. Until 10-11 o'clock in the afternoon they carried out a combat mission, then they went into the shade. They put up guards and rested until 19 pm ... And when the sun went down, they began the operation. Although the climate there is sharply continental, the sun has set, and that's it, it's cold. In winter, I had an episode on the Panjshir: they landed, went out to ambush, worked on the "spirits" ( dushmanam - approx. ed.). An order is received to occupy a height of 4965 meters. Below the heat, on the mountain of snow to the waist. When they crawled over the rocks, the soldiers' gloves were worn off on the fingers. As a result, about 20 of the fighters I led got severe frostbite.