Troops dra. Limited contingent of Soviet troops
During the war years in Afghanistan, Soviet soldiers, who served in Afghanistan, developed their own dictionary of army jargon, which was a kind of mixture of local dialects and nomenclature names of military equipment.
"Antoshka" - military transport aircraft (An-12, An-26)
"Asker" - soldier of the government army Democratic Republic Afghanistan (i.e. the government that the USSR supported in Afghanistan)
"Afghan " - Afghanistan proper, DRA
"Afghan" 1) A Soviet soldier who served in Afghanistan, a veteran of the Afghan war 2) Local Afghanistan. 3) A dry desert wind that sometimes blew for days and raised sandstorms typical of the region.
"Afonya / Afgashka" - Afghani (monetary unit of Afghanistan)
"Babay" - Mujahideen (Afghan who fought against the USSR)
"Barabuhaika" - heavy Afghan vehicle
"Baksheesh" - gift or alms
"Bacha" - A boy, a young man, both an Afghan and a Soviet soldier. In addition, Afghan veterans sometimes refer to each other with this word.
"Boer" - British rifle of the early XX century, manufactured by "Lee Enfield". After the British left Afghanistan, a large number of these rifles remained in the country, later actively used by the Mujahideen. The name "Boer" comes from the time of the Anglo-Boer War.
"Pinwheel" - helicopter (Mi-8, Mi-24, etc.)
"Happy" - multipurpose supersonic fighter MiG-21. En route to Afghanistan in large numbers. It got its nickname for its speed and agility.
"Wave" - a group of helicopters on a combat mission
"Eight" - Mi-8 helicopter
"Citizen" - a soldier on the threshold of demobilization, almost gone "to civilian life"
"Rook" - attack aircraft Su-25
"200th" - The dead soldier (From the transport term "Cargo-200", which refers to the bodies of the dead)
"Dekhkan" - Afghan peasants. It's interesting that this concept used in our time in the republics Central Asia to refer to peasants.
"Jirga" - council of revered elders
"Juma" - Friday; day off
"Dukan" - a small shop. Sometimes the Soviet deficit was delivered through dukans
"Spirit (sometimes Dushman)" - A fighter of anti-government Afghan formations fighting against the Soviet army, a Mujahideen.
"Over the river" - to go "across the river" meant to go to war in Afghanistan from the USSR. This designation appeared because the border between Afghanistan and the USSR passed along the Amu Darya River.
"Zelyonka" - unusual for Afghanistan areas covered with plants. From the point of view of military affairs, areas of the so-called "green" can be of particular danger, since foliage and bushes hide enemy movements in such areas. The so-called "Charikar greenery" in the province of the same name has gained wide popularity.
"Caravaners" - military personnel with experience in destroying enemy caravans. Often such caravans came from the territory of Pakistan.
"Pencil" - the symbol of a soldier in the Soviet army radio
"Pocket Artillery" - this name was used in Afghanistan for hand grenades (usually F-1). For obvious reasons, such "hand artillery" was effective for destroying the enemy in the gorges.
"Kishmishevka" - Afghan thirty-degree moonshine. Sold, by the way, not in containers, but in plastic bags.
"Canned food" - zinc coffins with the bodies of servicemen; mines.
"Box" - infantry fighting vehicle (IFV).
"Crocodile" , "Bumblebee", "File" - fire support helicopter "Mi-24" From a height of 2000 meters could hit any ground target.
"Brassiere" - a vest for carrying ammunition, worn before a combat operation. In terms of the complexity of the fasteners, of course, it cannot be compared with the prototype, but still. There were cases of self-finishing and adding weight to these vests, since in addition to the transport function, they also performed a protective one.
"Million on a Million" - Phraseologism, meaning excellent visibility. Used by pilots.
"Navir" - car with fuel. Especially dangerous in Afghanistan was the service as a driver of such cars. When shelling caravans, such vehicles flared up instantly.
"Naujavan" - young man, youth
"Thread" - the informal name of a convoy following a narrow mountain road. Very often, it was precisely such "threads" that were the target of attacks by the Mujahideen.
"Bee" - multi-purpose helicopter Mi-8
"Salam" - hello (a greeting as such)
"Sarbaz" (Sarboz)- soldiers of the troops of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan i.e. government soldier
"Welding" - heavy machine gun DShK (Degtyarev Shpagin large-caliber). He got his nickname for the fact that in the process of shooting he produced flashes really similar to the work of a welding machine. Such machine guns were extremely convenient for suppressing enemy firing points at distances up to 3 km.
"Tashakor" - "thank you" in Afghan.
"Three hundredth" - wounded. It comes from the concept of "cargo 300", which in army terminology means a wounded soldier ("cargo 200" - killed)
"Black Tulip" - An-12 transport aircraft. It acquired a mournful shade because it was on it that the coffins with the dead were taken away.
"Black storks" - members of special detachments of the Mujahideen, specialized in sabotage operations. As a rule, "black storks" were based in the highlands of Afghanistan on the border with Pakistan.
"Shuravi" - Afghan name for Soviet soldiers (literally "Soviet" from the Arabic word "shura", which means "council")
From an interview given by Major General Alexander Alexandrovich Maireichev on the eve of the anniversary of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan to employees of the FSB Directorate for the Western Military District:
Afghanistan. Great period of your life. After all, you were the very first person to represent military counterintelligence in Afghanistan. Tell me how it was?
- In May 1978, I served as the head of a special department of the KGB of the USSR for 38 combined arms army(Transcarpathian military district). A call was received through the government communications line from the deputy head of one of the departments of the KGB of the USSR, Major General N.A. Loiko. Nikolai Antonovich said that the leadership suggested that I urgently go on a business trip for three months to assist the government of the DRA and the command of the armed forces in the formation of the structure military counterintelligence.
Probably, the choice was on me, taking into account the service. The fact is that from 1964 to 1969 I was in the Group Soviet troops in Germany he gained some experience of working together with the security agencies of the GDR.
The next day after talking with N.A. Loiko, I arrived in Yasenevo, near Moscow, where the intelligence agency KGB of the USSR, and immediately went for a briefing to the first deputy head of the department, Lieutenant General B.S. Ivanov. In addition to me, Colonel Filippov, Lieutenant Colonel Kirillov, Major Kutepov were present at the briefing. Boris Semyonovich Ivanov said that there had been a change in the leadership of the country in Kabul, and explained: the head of state M. Daoud was killed, leftist forces came to power, he personally named M. Taraki and B. Karmal.
On May 17, 1978, he left for Afghanistan as the first adviser to the command of the Afghan army on military counterintelligence.
Alexander Alexandrovich what tasks did the leadership of the KGB of the USSR set for you?
A business trip to Kabul for a period of 3 months was supposed. The leadership of the KGB of the USSR set operational tasks:
- study the situation in the Afghan army and inform the Center about it;
- to assist in ensuring the security of the troops of the Afghan army.
The number of the Afghan army in 1978 was about 200 thousand troops - 3 army corps, 10 infantry divisions, 3 tank brigades, 7 air regiments and a grouping of air defense forces and means.
At that time, there were no security agencies in the country and the army.
There was only a small group of employees at the Ministry of Defense, which was engaged in identifying and detaining suspicious persons in the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense and the immediate environment. In corps, divisions, regiments, the tasks of counterintelligence were assigned to one of the officers of the personnel apparatus, part-time.
Having met with the Minister of Defense of the DRA, General Abdul Kadir and Colonel Abdul Haq, who acted as the head of state security of the Afghan army, they took practical measures to create security departments in the troops, as required by the difficult situation in the country and the troops.
It was necessary to counter the intrigues of foreign intelligence and anti-government speeches.
For additional acquaintance with the situation in the troops with a group of Afghan officers, I visited units and formations that were stationed in the cities - Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and other settlements.
Upon their return, they worked out the position and structure of the security agencies in the DRA troops, which, after agreement with the Minister of Defense Abdul Kadyr, was approved by the head of state M. Taraki.
In a short time, leaders and operational officers were selected for the formed departments of the military counterintelligence of the Afghan army, with whom I held monthly training camps.
Taking into account the further aggravation of the situation, we managed to convince the leadership of the representative office of the KGB of the USSR in the DRA to increase the presence of our advisers from among the military counterintelligence officers. At the beginning of 1979, the first group of Soviet military counterintelligence officers arrived in Afghanistan: Yu. Ivanov, A. Maslov, Yu. Polikashin and Yu. Stepanov.
In 1978 - 1979 (before the entry of Soviet troops), Afghan officers, under the leadership of our advisers, identified and exposed more than twenty agents of gangs sent to the troops, two agents of Pakistani intelligence, and prevented 11 attempts at anti-government demonstrations.
What was the internal political situation in the DRA?
The situation in Afghanistan and the army was complex and contradictory.
After the so-called Saur (April) revolution in 1978 (1456 according to the Afghan calendar), the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power.
The party included two competing groups: Khalq (translated into Russian - the people) - it was made up of representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, middle strata of the intelligentsia and officers, headed by M. Taraki; and Parcham (translated into Russian - banner) - which included people from families of large landowners and feudal lords, headed by B. Karmal.
The struggle between them led to the fact that in 1978 the Parchamists were removed from power. Babrak Karmal was sent to Czechoslovakia as the ambassador of the DRA.
In 1978 and 1979, M. Taraki and H. Amin repeatedly turned to the Soviet government with, to put it mildly, extraordinary requests. One of them is to include the DRA in the USSR as a union republic. The second is to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the struggle for power in the country and within the Khalq began to intensify.
Hafizullah Amin, the second person in the state, did not enjoy the confidence of the Soviet government - there were suspicions about his possible connections with American intelligence. On his orders, Minister of Defense General Abdul Kadyr, political leaders of Afghanistan - M. Rafi, Keshmand and many others, including many officers, ended up in the Poli-Charkhi prison.
In September 1979, I was on vacation in the Soviet Union when I heard about the death of the Afghan leader M. Taraki. Upon returning to Afghanistan, I learned the details of the events that had taken place.
On September 14, 1979, in the city of Kabul, on the territory of the royal palace, N. Taraki met with Soviet representatives, including General of the Army Pavlovsky Ivan Grigoryevich and Ambassador of the Soviet Union Puzanov Alexander Mikhailovich. The issue of the possibility of further tenure as Prime Minister H. Amin was discussed.
During the meeting, M. Taraki invited me by phone to come to the palace of H. Amin. However, after H. Amin arrived and entered the building of the palace, shots rang out. As a result, Colonel Tarun, accompanying Amin, was killed - one of the active participants in the Saur Revolution, close to both N. Taraki and H. Amin.
After the incident, H. Amin left for his residence, where he gathered the Politburo of the PDPA, at which he declared M. Taraki guilty of the murder of Tarun and put him under house arrest. A few days later, M. Taraki was strangled with pillows and secretly buried.
In honor of the deceased Tarun, the city of Jalalabad was renamed by H. Amin into the city of Tarun-Shahr. It is possible that in this way he tried to cover up the traces of the tragic performance he played on September 14 in the palace.
This name of the city lasted only 4 months. After the overthrow of H. Amin, he again became Jalalabad.
What did you know about the entry of Soviet troops into the republic?
Given the repeated requests of the Afghan leaders to the Soviet government for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, as well as the unpredictability of H. Amin, the ongoing serious contradictions in the PDPA, on December 27, 1979, the 40th Army was introduced into Afghanistan.
Before the introduction of Soviet troops and, especially during the overthrow of Kh. Amin, the Soviet apparatus carried out work to prevent possible anti-government and anti-Soviet actions in the troops.
In the last days of December 1979, the Zenit group (KGB of the USSR), led by Colonel G. Boyarinov, together with Afghan units, carried out an operation to capture the Topein-Tajbek Palace, in which H. Amin and his supporters were located. Amin's regime was overthrown. The Afghan government was headed by Babrak Karmal. He became general secretary Central Committee of the PDPA, Chairman of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister.
The security agencies (KHAD) were headed by parchamist Dr. Najib (Najibullah). Subsequently, he became the head of state of Afghanistan, and after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, he was arrested and hanged by the Taliban.
The entry of Soviet troops further complicated the political situation in the country. The people of Afghanistan have always had a negative attitude towards the presence of foreign troops in the country. The entry of Soviet troops strengthened the positions of anti-government formations and had a negative impact on the combat readiness and morale of the Afghan army. The number of deserters increased, anti-government protests began in the troops. Especially dangerous anti-government actions took place in 1980 in the 11th tank division(Jalalabad) and the 14th Infantry Division (Ghazni).
In this situation, on the instructions of General of the Army S. Akhromeev, I had to fly to Ghazni together with the state security officers of the Afghan army. Through difficult, lengthy negotiations with the division commander, Colonel Jafar and the officers, we managed to extinguish the aggravation of extremely dangerous contradictions between the Khalqists and the Parchamists. This prevented possible bloodshed.
At the same time, American intelligence (CIA) became even more active. From the territory of Pakistan, it increasingly actively introduced its agents into the troops of the DRA in order to decompose the army. It supplied more and more weapons to bandit formations and prepared new formations at the expense of refugees to Pakistan from Afghanistan. With the help of our advisers, the Afghan counterintelligence agencies identified dozens of agents who infiltrated the troops, both to collect information about the planned military operations against the dushmans, and to organize anti-government demonstrations.
The question that you are asked in all interviews is “Was it worth it to send our troops to Afghanistan?”. What is the lesson we learned from this war?
I have always expressed my negative attitude towards the introduction of our troops, into General Staff The sun also had many opponents. The war in Afghanistan was a mistake for which our people paid a huge price - more than fifteen thousand dead. The Afghan people were against military intervention, and the people are a huge force.
What would you like to wish veteran soldiers - Afghans on the eve of the celebration of the anniversary dedicated to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan?
First of all, good health! Wounds received in youth, including spiritual wounds, are affecting now. Take care of the world so that there is no war.
Dear Alexander Alexandrovich, thank you very much for the interview. Please accept congratulations from all employees of the FSB Directorate of Russia for the Western Military District and all counterintelligence officers on the holiday. Good health and all the best to you.
We say - Russia and Ukraine, Russia and Belarus - and no one doubts that the historical destinies of these close peoples have been closely intertwined for many centuries. We say - Russia and Afghanistan - and involuntarily think about how quickly and how tightly the events of just a few decades can connect peoples and countries so different in ethnicity, religion and culture. Meanwhile, domestic and foreign policy turns in the development of independent Afghanistan in the 20th - early 21st centuries. cannot be conceived without the direct and indirect influence of the USSR / Russia, and the “radical changes” in our history of the 80-90s. 20th century forever remain associated with the period of the Afghan war and its aftermath.
The participation of Soviet troops in the war in Afghanistan was the longest and largest use of the contingent of the Armed Forces of the USSR outside the country in peacetime. The Soviet troops were opposed by a fairly organized, strong and convinced enemy. An exhaustive description of the Pashtuns (Afghans), which has not lost its relevance to the present, was given at the beginning of the 20th century. an outstanding Russian military figure and orientalist general: “The following qualities are required from the people for war: patriotism, composure, courage, physical strength, endurance and patience. An analysis of the military qualities of an Afghan shows that all these qualities are present in him.”
The entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) into Afghanistan was preceded by a series of events in that country. In early 1978, a political crisis arose here: the persecution of leftist forces intensified, the authorities carried out direct repressions against the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), up to the arrest of a number of its leaders. In response, on April 27, 1978, the military rebelled, led by members of the PDPA. As a result of the armed uprising, power passed into the hands of the Military Revolutionary Council, and on May 1, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was formed, headed by Nur Mohammed Taraki.
By decrees of the new leadership, a program was promulgated to overcome centuries of backwardness and eliminate feudal remnants, reflecting the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population - the national bourgeoisie, merchants, intelligentsia, artisans, the peasantry, and the working class. However, in practical activities, the PDPA and the DRA government allowed hasty steps and excessive radicalism, which negatively influenced the development of the situation in the country. The mistakes of the new authorities provoked open resistance from the opponents of the regime.
During the summer of 1979, anti-government demonstrations swept most territory of the country and developed into civil war. The situation in Afghanistan was negatively affected by the lack of unity in the ruling party. It was also complicated by the active interference of foreign states and organizations in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The deliveries of weapons, ammunition and other materiel to opposition forces were carried out by NATO member countries, Islamic states and China. On the territory of Pakistan and Iran were established training centers in which the militants of the opponents of the leftist regime were trained.
The leadership of the DRA considered the support of the armed opposition by third countries as their participation in the war against Afghanistan and repeatedly turned to the USSR with requests for direct military assistance. By the end of 1979, the situation in the country deteriorated sharply, the threat of the fall of the left regime looming, which, according to the Soviet leadership, could lead to an increase in the influence of Western countries near the southern borders of the USSR, as well as to the transfer of armed struggle to the territory of its Central Asian republics.
In the context of the aggravation of the Afghan crisis, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on December 12, 1979 decided to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan "in order to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as to create favorable conditions for preventing the possibility of anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states." The official justification for the legitimacy of such a decision was Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation of December 5, 1978, Article 51 of the UN Charter and repeated requests from the Afghan government for military assistance.
The OKSV was entrusted with the implementation of a wide range of tasks: assistance in strengthening local authorities; protection of national economic and military facilities, main roads and ensuring the passage of convoys with goods along them; conducting combat operations together with the Afghan troops to defeat detachments and groups of the armed opposition; covering the state border of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran from the penetration of caravans with weapons and detachments of the Mujahideen; rendering assistance to the armed forces of the DRA in the preparation of headquarters, troops, etc.
Initially political and military leadership The USSR evaded participation in the armed struggle against the opposition. However, already on January 10-11, 1980, several divisions of the OKSV were involved in hostilities. In February, in connection with the increasing incidence of attacks on columns and shelling of the garrisons of Soviet troops, the command of the 40th Army was followed by an official instruction: “To begin, together with the DRA army, active operations to defeat opposition detachments.” Subsequently fighting against anti-government groups became the main content of the stay of the OKSV in Afghanistan. The OKSV and the government forces of Afghanistan were confronted by large forces of the Afghan armed opposition, the total number of which in different years ranged from 47 to 173 thousand people. In 1980-1988 formations and units of the 40th army in Afghanistan were almost continuously engaged in active combat operations.
In April 1985, the new political leadership of the USSR proclaimed a policy of renunciation of the use of force in international relations and began to take steps to reduce combat strength OKSV. So, by September 20, 1986, six regiments were redeployed from Afghanistan to the territory of the USSR. In turn, the Afghan leadership, headed by Najibullah in May 1986, developed and in 1987 proposed to the opposition a policy of national reconciliation. However, the opposition leaders did not accept it and continued the "war to the bitter end." Nevertheless, the position of official Kabul gave a new impetus to the negotiations held since 1982 in Geneva on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.
The agreements signed in Geneva came into force on May 15, 1988. A four-party agreement was reached (USSR, USA, Afghanistan and Pakistan) on the timing and schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan within nine months. Soviet side The Geneva agreements were fully implemented: by August 15, 1988, the number of OKSV was reduced by 50%, and on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet unit left Afghan territory.
On December 25, 1979, the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan began.
This undeclared war, which lasted 9 years, 1 month and 19 days, remains an unknown war to this day despite numerous published books of memoirs of participants, very detailed descriptions of the events of the war, veteran websites, etc. If we compare how much is known about the three-year Patriotic War 1812 and the four-year Great Patriotic War, we can say that about Afghan war we know next to nothing. The image of a ten-year "camp across the river" in the minds of people, filmmakers and journalists is not at all cleared up, and, after 33 years, all the same clichés about a "senseless bloody war", about "mountains of corpses" and "rivers of blood", about numerous, veterans who went crazy from these "rivers of blood", who then drank themselves or became bandits.
Some young people, seeing the abbreviation OKSVA, think that this stupid tattoo artist made a mistake in the word "Moscow". I was 16 years old when this strange war began, and a year later I graduated from school and either entered college or the army. And me and my comrades really did not want to get into this very OKSVu in Afghanistan, from where the first zinc coffins had already begun to come! Although some reckless ones themselves rushed there ...
And the way it all began...
The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret decree of the CPSU Central Committee. The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. As a formal basis, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU used the repeated requests of the leadership of Afghanistan for the introduction of Soviet troops.
The armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other took part in this conflict. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the Dushmans were supported by US military specialists, a number of European countries- NATO members, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.
December 25, 1979 at 15:00, the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Fayzabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar. December 27 special groups of the KGB "Zenith", "Thunder" and " muslim battalion» GRU special forces stormed the Taj Beck Palace. During the battle, Afghan President Amin was killed. On the night of December 28, the 108th motorized rifle division entered Kabul, taking control of all the most important objects of the capital.
The composition of the Soviet contingent included: the administration of the 40th Army with support and maintenance units, divisions - 4, separate brigades- 5, separate regiments - 4, military aviation regiments - 4, helicopter regiments - 3, pipeline brigade - 1, material support brigade - 1. And also, units Airborne Troops Ministry of Defense of the USSR, parts and subdivisions of the GRU General Staff, Office of the Chief Military Adviser. In addition to formations and units of the Soviet Army, there were separate units in Afghanistan border troops, KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.
On December 29, Pravda publishes the “Appeal of the Government of Afghanistan”: “The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, taking into account the increasing intervention and provocations of external enemies of Afghanistan in order to protect the gains of the April Revolution, territorial integrity, national independence and the maintenance of peace and security, based on the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness of December 5, 1978, appealed to the USSR with an urgent request for urgent political, moral, economic assistance, including military assistance, with which the DRA government had previously repeatedly appealed to to the government of the Soviet Union. The government of the Soviet Union granted the request of the Afghan side.”
Soviet troops in Afghanistan guarded roads, objects of Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation (gas fields, power plants, a nitrogen fertilizer plant in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif, etc.). Ensured the operation of airfields in major cities. Contributed to the strengthening of government in 21 provincial centers. They conducted convoys with military and national economic goods for their own needs and in the interests of the DRA.
The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activity conditionally divided into four stages.
1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, their placement in garrisons, the organization of the protection of deployment points and various objects.
2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active hostilities, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.
3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986 Transition from active hostilities mainly to supporting the actions of the Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special Forces units fought to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of six Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.
4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989 Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership's policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for their return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.
On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its contingent within 9 months, starting from May 15; The US and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988.
February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.
Losses: According to updated data, total in the war Soviet army lost 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were wounded, shell-shocked, injured. The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. Available estimates range from 1 to 2 million people.
Materials of the sites: http://soldatru.ru and http://ria.ru and photos from open Internet sources were used.