Coordinated operations of Soviet partisans and underground fighters. Guerrilla operation "Rail war"
A characteristic feature of the combat activity of the partisans in the winter-spring period of 1944 was their closer interaction with the advancing regular troops.
Partisans and underground fighters actively participated in all major offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. During the battles near Leningrad and Novgorod, Leningrad, Estonian and part of the Kalinin partisans attacked the rear of the Nazi Army Group North. Ukrainian, Moldovan and Crimean partisans helped to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea. The partisans of Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and the Kalinin region of the RSFSR destroyed enemy communications in the western direction and thus made it difficult for the enemy to maneuver forces and means along the front line and from the depths.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, when planning and organizing operations, determined the tasks for the partisans. The central committees of the communist parties of the union republics and the regional committees set specific combat missions for the partisan formations, having previously coordinated them with the military councils of the fronts and armies.
The main efforts of the partisans were aimed at providing maximum assistance to the advancing troops. For this purpose, reconnaissance was carried out, the work of the rear of the enemy was disrupted: the patriots disrupted enemy transportation, destroyed communication lines, destroyed warehouses and bases, attacked enemy columns and convoys, attacked headquarters and airfields, garrisons and commandant's offices. An important place was occupied by the partisans' actions to save the population from deportation to Nazi Germany and people's property from looting and destruction.
Combat missions for partisan formations were usually determined for a fairly long time, covering the preparation and conduct of offensive operations, and sometimes going beyond this. So, in the process of preparing the offensive near Leningrad and Novgorod, the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement - the chief of staff M.N. directions from Leningrad. Each brigade was assigned certain sections of roads and areas (339). In preparation for the offensive of the troops on Right-Bank Ukraine The Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine approved the plan of combat operations of partisan formations for January - March, in accordance with which the republican headquarters of the partisan movement - chief of staff T. A. Strokach - sent directives to formations and individual detachments that determined their combat missions (340) . In the Crimean operation, the partisans of the Crimea - Chief of Staff V.S. Bulatov - had to actively disorganize the work of transport behind enemy lines, take the population and people's property under protection (341) .
Favorable conditions created by the course of hostilities determined further development operational and tactical interaction of partisan formations with units and formations Soviet army. The planning of combat operations of partisans became more concrete and purposeful due to the use of accumulated experience, the availability of the necessary means of communication, which made it possible to quickly lead partisan formations. At the beginning of 1944, out of 1156 detachments registered with the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, 1131 had radio contact either with the headquarters of the brigades, or with the headquarters of the partisan movement of the republics and regions, or with their representations at the fronts (342).
The planning of combat operations and the organization of the interaction of partisans with the troops were carried out by the republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement, their operational groups or representations at the fronts and armies, which kept close contact with the military councils and headquarters of the fronts and armies. For example, the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement had operational groups on the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts. The latter also had a representative office from the Kalinin headquarters of the partisan movement - the chief of staff S. G. Sokolov. The Belarusian partisan headquarters - chief of staff P. Z. Kalinin - had such groups on the 1st Baltic, Western and 1st Belorussian fronts. At the military councils and headquarters of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts there were representations of the Ukrainian headquarters. The interaction of the partisans with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front was carried out directly by the republican partisan headquarters.
The main concern of the republican and regional headquarters, their representative offices or operational groups was the most efficient use of partisan forces in the interests of operations conducted by the troops. As a rule, the actions of partisans and troops were linked in terms of purpose, place and time. Sometimes this was reflected in special tables of interaction, in which, for each day of the operation, the tasks of both regular troops and partisans were indicated (343) .
Republican and regional headquarters, their representative offices and operational groups took all measures to ensure that combat missions and the procedure for interaction were communicated to partisan formations and detachments in a timely manner, mainly by radio. Often, senior officers of operational groups and representative offices flew behind enemy lines with tasks from regional and republican headquarters and on the spot helped the command of formations and detachments organize combat sabotage operations in accordance with the plans of operations of the troops.
An important duty of the partisans and underground fighters was to conduct reconnaissance, the tasks for which were assigned to them by the Soviet Supreme High Command, the commands of the fronts, armies and formations. For example, the command of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, while preparing an offensive operation in the northwestern direction, instructed the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement to clarify data on enemy forces and means, their grouping, to establish the location of bases, warehouses, airfields, headquarters, communication centers, to find out if the enemy in the tactical and operational depth of defensive lines, in particular along the Oredezh, Luga, Narva, Plyussa rivers, and the degree of their engineering equipment, the system of defensive structures around the cities of Kingisepp, Luga, Gdov, Slantsy, Novgorod, Batetsky, Utorgosh, Soltsy, Shimsk and others.
In the course of the development of operations, the partisans received additional reconnaissance assignments. In March, during the offensive in the Right-Bank Ukraine, the republican headquarters of the partisan movement was instructed to determine what troops the Nazi command had concentrated in the area of the cities of Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava-Russkaya, Lvov and Przemysl; the numbering of their units and formations, their combat effectiveness, the age and nationality of the personnel, the locations of the highest headquarters, the names of the commanders, the tasks performed by these troops, etc. It was also necessary to find out which dirt and railways Eastern Poland, when and in what direction the enemy is moving troops and equipment, and where they are concentrated (344) .
Through their agents, by organizing surveillance, partisans and underground workers managed to record a significant part of the movements of enemy formations, find out the locations of the highest headquarters, the names of commanders, etc. In December 1943, when an offensive was being prepared against Army Group North, the partisans reported to the command about the beginning of the transfer by the enemy of manpower and military equipment from near Leningrad to Polotsk, Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Vinnitsa. At the same time, reports were received from Belarusian partisans about the relocation of German units from Mogilev to the area north of Vitebsk, and from there to the Kovel area. They also established the arrival of an infantry division in the Idritsa region, as well as the entry into the first line from the reserve of the 252nd infantry and 391st training divisions (345). The partisans also reported about the transfer of formations from Italy and Western Europe to the Soviet-German front. Information was received from them about the redeployment of the occupying Hungarian divisions (346). Important information came from partisan intelligence officers about the location of the formations of the 2nd German field army (347).
The Nazis almost failed to hide from the partisan intelligence, and consequently, from the Soviet command the regrouping of their troops. Only Ukrainian partisans in 1944 reported 61 times to the command about the concentration of enemy troops in a particular area, 225 times about enemy regroupings, 374 times about the location of his headquarters and the number of garrisons in cities and towns (348) . In the first half of the year, Belarusian partisans and underground fighters recorded 21,397 echelons of the enemy passing through the railways of the republic. At the same time, not only the directions of transportation were established, but also the nature of the cargo, the number and type of troops transported. On highways and dirt roads, the transfer of 1360 tanks, 351 armored vehicles and a large number of trucks and cars (349) was noted.
The Soviet command regularly received information about the enemy air defense around big cities, road junctions, warehouses, airfields and other important facilities. This information was especially needed by aviation, which inflicted powerful bombing strikes on them. Of great value were intelligence data on the enemy defense, its engineering equipment and fire system. They were taken into account both in the planning and preparation of offensive operations, and in the course of combat operations of fronts and armies.
Partisan scouts reported very important information about the construction by the enemy of a defensive line along the western bank of the Narva River, Lake Peipus and Pskov, the Velikaya River and on the eastern border of Latvia, as well as intermediate lines along Oredezh and Luga, about their equipment in engineering terms and about the fire system ( 350) . Information was also received about defensive fortifications around the cities of Narva, Porkhov, Dno and others. From the Ukrainian partisans and underground fighters, information was received on the enemy grouping and the system of its defense in the Proskurov area, on headquarters, warehouses, airfields and defensive structures in the areas of Starokonstantinov, Krasilov, Izyaslav and the Proskurov-Volochisk railway line, on the military units of the enemy located in the area Lvov, in Lutsk and the settlements surrounding this city, on the construction of fortifications northeast of Kovel and along the Kovel-Brest and Kovel-Lutsk highways (351).
The reconnaissance activities of partisans and underground workers were highly appreciated by the Supreme High Command and the command of the fronts and armies. In one of the documents General Staff, sent to the intelligence department of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, it was said: "Intelligence data on the armies of our opponents, received from you, are very valuable" (352) . The chief of staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, General S. S. Biryuzov, wrote: “Your data on the transfer of enemy troops for our front had great importance... "(353) .
Significant assistance in collecting information was provided by intelligence agencies of state security. Relying on the underground and partisans, coordinating their activities with them, they helped the partisan command to improve the intelligence service, carried out responsible tasks for infiltrating enemy intelligence centers and headquarters, obtained valuable information, carried out sabotage at especially important facilities, were engaged in active counterintelligence work, identifying and paralyzing plans fascist command and occupation administration to combat popular movement in the rear, struck at the punitive and reconnaissance bodies of the enemy ..
One of the main tasks that the partisans and underground workers solved in the interests of the Soviet Army was the disorganization of the enemy rear and the disruption of its communications. Railways remained the most important object for their combat and sabotage operations, since the enemy transported the bulk of manpower and equipment along them. The disruption of the railway transport had a severe impact on general condition enemy shipments. The main efforts of partisan strikes were concentrated on those sections of the roads where the movement towards the front was the most intense. The people's avengers were especially active on the railway lines, converging to such large nodes as Dno, Pskov, Rezekne, in the north-western direction; Polotsk, Molodechno, Orsha, Minsk, Baranovichi, Brest, Luninets - in the western; Rovno, Kovel, Shepetovka - in the southwestern and Dzhankoy - in the Crimea.
Although the military activity of the patriots was carried out continuously, during the periods of preparation and implementation of major offensive operations, its intensity increased sharply. In the days when the soldiers smashed the enemy on the flanks of the Soviet-German front, the partisans especially actively helped them, striking at the enemy's rear and communications. The partisans operated along the entire length of the Soviet-German front, simultaneously in different areas. This made it impossible for the enemy to concentrate security units in the most important places, forcing him to disperse his forces. On January 1, Ukrainian partisans attacked sections of the Shepetovka-Novograd-Volynsky, Shepetovka-Zdolbunov, Shepetovka-Berdichev railway lines, while Leningrad partisans attacked on the Narva-Rezekne road. In the following days, attacks on enemy communications continued with ever-increasing force. From January 14 to January 25, Leningrad partisans blew up 34 railway bridges, blew up over 22,000 rails, destroyed about 30 km of the railway track and defeated 11 stations and sidings, during raids on such objects they destroyed many enemy soldiers and officers from security units (354) . In total, during the operation near Leningrad and Novgorod, the partisans destroyed more than 21.5 thousand Nazis, blew up over 58,500 rails and about 300 bridges, derailed 136 enemy trains, destroyed over 500 km of telephone and telegraph communications, destroyed 1,620 vehicles and 28 warehouses (355) .
In January alone, Ukrainian partisans organized 145 wrecks of enemy echelons, 156 in February, and 179 in March. Brest - 97, Kovel - Chelm - 45, Luninets - Brest - 65 (356). Over 670 echelons of the enemy were derailed in January by Belarusian partisans. They hit the railroads constantly. From January to May, sabotage groups carried out 757 different combat actions against enemy echelons (357) in the sections Minsk - Brest - 757, Minsk - Orsha - 578, Minsk - Bobruisk - 391, Baranovichi - Lida - 236, Brest - Kovel. The partisan formations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Kalinin region, Moldova and Crimea were also active.
In total, according to incomplete data, from January to June, partisans and underground workers blew up and derailed over 4,800 enemy echelons (358). A significant part of the station facilities and track facilities was destroyed and damaged. Material losses, transport downtime led to a sharp reduction in enemy traffic to the front.
As a result, in Belarus, the throughput of roads ranged from 12 to 40 percent. On the sections Orsha - Vitebsk and Orsha - Mogilev, with a capacity of 72 pairs of trains per day, from January to June, on average, only 9 pairs passed. On the section Baranovichi - Brest, the Nazis managed to let through 13 pairs on average, with the possibility of 60 pairs per day. Even on such an important line for the enemy as Minsk - Orsha, the protection of which he paid special attention to, no more than 22 pairs of trains passed with a capacity of 84 pairs (359) of the road.
Partisans inflicted tangible blows on highways and dirt roads against enemy carts and columns, as well as individual vehicles and wagons. Only Belarusian partisans in the winter-spring period blew up more than 100 bridges on the roads on average and blew up up to 1000 vehicles (360) every month. Telegraph and telephone communications were destroyed for thousands of kilometers. The enemy was forced to carry out the movement of columns and convoys mainly in the daytime under a strong escort. And even under these conditions, the fascists often had to fight heavy battles with the partisans, who unleashed attacks from ambushes arranged on the enemy's movement routes.
On the instructions of the command of the Soviet Army, during the period of the offensive of the regular units, partisan formations with their own forces captured settlements, road junctions, crossings at water lines behind enemy lines and defended them until the approach of Soviet troops, which contributed to their successful advance. Often, together with regular troops, partisans participated in the battles for the liberation of cities and towns, and repelled enemy counterattacks. So, the partisan detachment of the Leningrad 9th brigade, together with units of the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front, fought for Gdov. From February 3 to February 16, the 2nd brigade assisted the troops of this army in encircling and destroying the enemy's 58th infantry division in the area of Plyussa station. Assessing the role of the partisan unit in these battles, the commander of the 168th rifle division General A. A. Yegorov wrote: “Please accept greetings and thanks from the Red Army for the combat assistance provided by the partisans of the brigade from the officers, sergeants and privates of the division entrusted to me. Your assistance helped the units of the Red Army complete the defeat of the enemy's 58th Infantry Division" (361).
The partisans of the Right-Bank Ukraine and the Crimea took a direct part in the battles for Lutsk, Rovno, Odessa, Simferopol. They helped regular troops liberate the regional centers of Berezna, Vysotsk, Vladimirets, Dombrovitsa, Rivne region, Izyaslav, Lyakhivtsi, Pluzhnoye, Slavuta, Yampol, Kamenetz-Podolsk region, many railway stations and other settlements (362) . Assessing the role of the Ukrainian partisans in the defeat of the invaders in Right-Bank Ukraine, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, General N.F. Vatutin, wrote: perfectly interacted with our troops in the battles for the destruction of large defense centers, for the capture of cities, for the defeat of the Germans on their fortified lines ... This is, first of all, clear evidence of the combat power of the partisans, their ability, independently and together with units of the Red Army, to carry out serious, complex and large-scale military operations” (363) .
Partisans and underground fighters struck not only in the tactical and operational zones of the enemy's defense, but also in his deep rear. Along with local formations, raiding formations and detachments were actively operating there. In winter and spring, partisan formations, detachments and groups under the command of I. A. Artyukhov, P. P. Vershigora, V. A. Karasev, G. V. Kovalev, Ya. I. Melnik, M. I. Naumova, M. Ya. Nadelina, N. A. Prokopyuk, S. A. Sankov, B. G. Shangina, M. I. Shukaev, I. P. Yakovlev and others. They attacked the rear and communications of the enemy, carried out work among the local population, involving them in an active struggle against the invaders.
The raids were carried out according to previously developed plans, approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the republican headquarters of the partisan movement. They determined the tasks, the route of movement and the final area. Here is how, for example, the task was formulated for the Rovno partisan formation under the command of I.F. Fedorov:
“In order to assist the advancing units of the Red Army, to prevent the enemy from bringing manpower and equipment to the front line, as well as the export of Soviet citizens, bread, factory equipment and other valuables to Germany, I order:
1. The unit commander Fedorov and Commissar Kizya with a unit consisting of 8 detachments, with a total number of 1460 people, go to the territory of the Drogobych region in the Borislav region to develop and intensify the partisan movement.
2. Deploy sabotage and combat activities in the specified area: along the Stryi-Sambor and Stryi-Tukhlya railway lines, on the Stryi-Sambir and Stryi-Klimets highways.
3. Conduct reconnaissance of the enemy in the area of operations of the formation.
4. If the situation is favorable, the next task is to go into the forests southwest of Stanislav in the Bytkov area, destroy the oil rigs in this area.
The unit commander should daily radio the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement about the location of the unit and report intelligence data ”(364) .
The raiding formations and detachments fought hard and exhausting battles, were constantly under the threat of the impact of superior enemy forces. So, the partisan division named after S. A. Kovpak, moving through the territory of the Rivne, Volyn, Lvov regions of the Ukrainian SSR, the Lublin and Warsaw voivodships of Poland, the Brest, Pinsk and Polessye regions of Belarus, passed 2100 km through enemy rear lines in three months, having spent 139 battles with the enemy (365) . The Ukrainian partisan cavalry formation under the leadership of M. I. Naumov for 45 days of the raid passed through the territory of 35 districts of the Rivne, Volyn, Lvov and Drohobych regions of Ukraine and the Lublin province of Poland. During the raid, the partisans, in addition to inflicting huge losses, the disorganization of its rear carried out a lot of political and mass work among the local population, which contributed to the intensification of the struggle of the people in these areas, the growth in the number of partisans.
Partisan formations found themselves in especially difficult conditions when carrying out raids on a territory where there were few forests. There they were quickly discovered by the enemy, who gathered units for their pursuit. ground forces and aviation. This led to heavy losses, in some cases forced to stop raiding and return to the area of the former deployment. Summarizing the experience of the January-February raids, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine noted: “The experience of military operations of large partisan formations in the northern regions of Ukraine has fully justified itself. However, large partisan formations that entered the Lvov, Drogobych and Stanislav regions were continuously pursued by the enemy due to the presence of a small amount of forests and a dense network of roads in these areas. At the same time, detachments of 150-200 people without heavy weapons and with a small convoy are successfully fulfilling their tasks ”(366) . In this regard, small detachments and organizing groups, equipped with the most trained partisans and underground fighters, began to be sent to the western regions of the republic, which during the raid grew due to replenishment by local patriots and successfully carried out their combat missions in the areas designated for them.
In the winter and spring of 1944, the partisans had to operate in a difficult situation. The fascist German command intensified its attempts to liquidate partisan detachments in its rear, undertaking a number of major operations, in which, along with security and police units, a large number of regular troops and selected SS units participated. In January - March, the Kalinin partisans, who were in the southern regions of the region, 7 times repelled the attack of the punishers. During January - February, the Nazis inflicted five blows on partisan detachments northwestern regions Vitebsk region. Repeated punitive operations were undertaken against the partisans of the Mogilev, Minsk, Polesye, Baranovichi and Brest regions of Belarus, as well as against the Lithuanian, Latvian and Crimean partisans.
In January, partisan detachments of the Kalinin region, which were based in the areas of Opochka, Sebezh, Idritsa and in the Vitebsk region, as well as partisan formations stationed in Polissya, were subjected to blows. Initially, the punishers sought to clear their immediate rear. Up to 18 thousand troops, withdrawn from the front, supported by 200 tanks (367), were thrown against the Vitebsk partisans along with police and security units. Waging heavy defensive battles, the patriots repelled all enemy attacks, mostly retaining their bases.
In February, the fascist German command undertook even larger offensive operations with the aim of crushing all the main groupings of partisan forces. The patriots again had to repel the fierce attacks of the enemy, who this time, at the cost of heavy losses in manpower and equipment, managed to push the brigades of the Kalinin partisans from their bases. The detachments of the Mogilev and the Ptich Rivers of the Polesye formations were forced to retreat across the Drut River, having suffered heavy losses in battle, having lost a number of food bases and leaving winter camps. Having replenished their ranks, the brave partisans recaptured many previously lost bases from the enemy.
Operations against partisan forces continued in the spring. So, in April, the Nazis, having decided to destroy a group of partisans with a total number of about 17 thousand people in the Ushach-Lepel zone (Vitebsk region), threw more than 60 thousand troops, 137 tanks, 235 guns and up to 75 aircraft (368) against it. For twenty-five days there were fierce battles with superior enemy forces. The enemy managed to create a continuous encirclement front, seriously pushing the partisan detachments and brigades. The patriots found themselves in a territory that was shot through not only by artillery, but also by small arms. Concentrating their forces on a narrow area, they broke through the enemy ring and went to another area.
The partisan command made extensive use of manoeuvres, skillfully used such a technique as infiltration of small groups through the battle formations of the advancing enemy and striking him from the flank and rear. This gave good results. The Nazis became confused and were forced to stop their attacks. In the disruption of punitive expeditions, partisans of different detachments and regions interacted. They aimed their blows at the rear of the enemy and their flanks. In this way, it was often possible to disrupt offensive operations against partisans and force the enemy to abandon punitive expeditions.
Aircraft provided great assistance to the partisans, delivering weapons and ammunition to the areas of battles of blockaded partisan groups, taking out the wounded and sick, families of partisans and underground workers; For example, in the brigades of the Ushach-Lepel zone, which found themselves in a difficult situation, front-line and long-range aviation delivered over 200 tons of combat cargo (369) from January to May, making 354 sorties. With air strikes against enemy troops and equipment, Soviet pilots contributed to people's avengers in repelling the advance of the enemy.
Thanks to the mass heroism of Soviet patriots who fought behind enemy lines, the energetic and effective measures of the party organs and headquarters of the partisan movement, the command of the fronts and armies, the attempts of the fascists to crush the partisan forces were thwarted. In the hard struggle against the punishers, the partisans and underground fighters became even more tempered, strengthened organizationally, and improved their military skills. They not only defended themselves, but also switched to active combat operations, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. . . ,;.
The General Staff of the Red Army began planning an offensive operation to liberate Belarus in early April 1944. On May 20, General A. Antonov presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief a plan that provided for a simultaneous breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses in six sectors, the dismemberment of enemy troops and their defeat in parts. Particular importance was attached to the elimination of the most powerful flank groupings in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the rapid advance to Minsk, as well as the encirclement and destruction of the main forces of Army Group Center east of Minsk at a depth of 200-300 km.
Troops from four fronts were involved in Operation Bagration. The 1st Baltic Front (commander General I. Bagramyan) advanced from the area northwest of Vitebsk, the 3rd Belorussian Front (commander General I. Chernyakhovsky) - south of Vitebsk to Borisov. The 2nd Belorussian Front (commanded by General G. Zakharov) operated in the Mogilev direction. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front (commanded by General K. Rokossovsky) were aimed at Bobruisk and Minsk.
To coordinate the actions of the fronts, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief allocated its representatives. Thus, the offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts was coordinated by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A. Vasilevsky, and the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts were coordinated by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal G. Zhukov.
In the operation "Bagration" an important role was assigned to the Belarusian partisans. By the summer of 1944, 143 thousand partisans were operating on Belarusian soil, which were part of 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments. The Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement was assigned specific tasks by the Supreme High Command: to disrupt communications behind enemy lines, destroy German headquarters, disable enemy equipment, conduct reconnaissance in the interests of the advancing fronts, capture and hold advantageous lines and bridgeheads on the rivers until the army approaches, provide support to military units during the liberation of cities, railway junctions and stations, to organize the protection of settlements, to disrupt the export of Soviet citizens to Germany, in every possible way to prevent the Nazis from destroying industrial enterprises and bridges during the retreat.
So, before the start of the Belarusian operation, partisan brigades and detachments of the Polessky, southern parts of Minsk, Pinsk, Baranovichi, Brest and other regions, operating in the offensive zone of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, were supposed to capture and hold the crossing until the Soviet troops approached, organize thorough reconnaissance transfer the enemy and data about him to the advancing units, meet the troops of the front, indicate crossings to them and provide them with guides, make it difficult for the enemy to regroup troops, and disrupt the transportation of goods by rail.
Since mid-May, the commands and headquarters, all the soldiers and partisans involved in the liberation of Belarus, launched preparations for the offensive. By the beginning of the operation, 2,400 thousand people, 5,200 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated in four fronts. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 2 times, in tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns - by 5.8, in guns and mortars - by 3.8, in combat aircraft - by 3.9 times.
The interaction of partisan formations with the advancing Soviet regular troops acquired a wide scale. It was the closest and most effective during the Belarusian operation. During this offensive, the partisans provided significant assistance to units and formations. The Zheleznyak partisan brigade, operating under the command of A.V. Sklyarenko in the eastern part of the Minsk region, on June 27 reached the Berezina River, captured the crossing and, repelling repeated attempts by the retreating German units to break through it, held the bridgehead until the approach of the 35th tank brigade of General A.A. Aslanova. The tankers, in cooperation with the partisan brigade, utterly defeated the enemy, successfully transported the tanks along the two bridges built by the partisans to the opposite bank of the river and continued the offensive, in which the Zheleznyakovites participated as guides.
Each partisan brigade drew up a plan for reconnaissance of enemy forces, areas of operation and specific military installations. Brigades and detachments were a reliable base for army intelligence and its groups. Army groups used both the forces of partisan intelligence and its information about the enemy to carry out their tasks. Many formations and brigades placed their reconnaissance units, individual scouts and guides at the disposal of the army command.
During the period of close operational-tactical interaction between partisans and units of the Red Army, the number of captures of soldiers and especially officers of the Wehrmacht, operational documents, and samples increased sharply. military equipment, personal documents of the Nazis. With the help of "tongues" valuable information was obtained not only for tactical, operational, but sometimes also for strategic purposes. In almost all brigades, Komsomol youth groups were created to capture the "languages" and documents of the enemy.
Of great value to the command of the Red Army was the intelligence of the partisans on enemy communications. Intelligence work was organized in such a way that control over the movement or advance of enemy columns was carried out sequentially in the zone of each partisan formation. The headquarters of the fronts were repeatedly informed about the concentration of military echelons of the Wehrmacht at the railway stations. This helped Soviet aviation to deliver bombing and assault strikes against them with great accuracy. Thanks to continuous monitoring of the enemy's transportation along railways and highways, partisan reconnaissance and underground workers also identified places where enemy military equipment was concentrated and directed our bomber aircraft at targets.
The largest operation of the partisans was the 3rd stage of the "rail war", which began three days before the Soviet troops went on the offensive. On the night of June 20, 1944, the partisans of the Mogilev formation attacked the important Vitebsk-Orsha-Mogilev road line, captured it with fighting, destroyed 40 kilometers of the railway track, blew up 5000 rails and 2 railway bridges. The destruction was so significant that the Nazis were never able to restore the line before the arrival of our troops. The 10 echelons remaining on the hauls became trophies of the Red Army.
Partisan brigades and detachments of the Mogilev and Minsk regions controlled many sections of the highways Mogilev-Minsk, Mogilev-Bobruisk, Orsha-Minsk, a dense network of improved roads in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Drut, Drut and Berezina, in the Borisov-Osipovichi-Minsk triangle. In these areas, they steadfastly held the zones through which the Nazi troops tried to break through.
The partisans of the Mogilev formation only during the period of the expulsion of the Nazis from the territory of the region destroyed more than 2000 and captured up to 4000 fascist soldiers and officers, capturing many trophies.
The participation of partisans of the region in the Belarusian offensive operation was a fact of great operational and strategic importance. The vast combat experience accumulated over three years of fighting behind enemy lines was fully applied to assist the Red Army. The command of the 1st Belorussian Front in one of its documents noted: “The Military Council of the Front expresses its gratitude to the fearless avenging fighters, the Belarusian partisans, who victoriously completed their difficult path of struggle against the fascist invaders.”
Never before has the nationwide struggle acquired such a powerful scope as during the Byelorussian offensive operation, and never before have partisan formations struck the enemy with such force as in those days.
As a result of the defeat of large enemy forces near Vitebsk, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Minsk, the immediate goal of the Bagration operation was achieved, and several days ahead of schedule. For 12 days - from June 23 to July 4 - Soviet troops moved almost 250 km. The Vitebsk, Mogilev, Polotsk, Minsk and Bobruisk regions were completely liberated.
The whole of Belarus took part in Operation Bagration. When crossing the Western Dvina training battalion The 167th Guards Rifle Division, the peasants of the village of Bui, Beshenkovichi District, not only indicated the most convenient places for the crossing, but also transported the soldiers on boats and rafts. And such examples are countless. An 80-year-old peasant from the village of Novaya Dubrova, Oktyabrsky district, V. Kolenkevich undertook to lead the Soviet companies to the river through the forest and swamp. The appearance of soldiers near the banks of the river was so unexpected for the Germans that they were forced to flee without having time to blow up the bridge. More than once, A. Yermolenko, a resident of the village of Bechi, Zhitkovichi District, led scouts and soldiers of the Red Army through thickets and swamps to the rear of the invaders. For courage in battle, for resourcefulness and assistance, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star.
The losses of four Soviet fronts for the entire operation "Bagration" in killed, wounded, missing reached 765,815 people (48% of the total by June 23, 1944). Of the total casualties, 178,507 were killed. From June 23 to the end of July, that is, during the battles for the liberation of Belarus, Soviet troops lost 440,879 people (29.8% of the personnel), including 97,232 people (6.6%) killed. During the years of the war, including Operation Bagration, almost 26,000 Belarusian partisans died directly in battles with the Nazi invaders, of which 11,797 were missing. The Motherland saluted 36 times in commemoration of the military successes of the armies and partisan formations of the four fronts. 662 military units and formations that distinguished themselves during the liberation of Belarus were given honorary names of Belarusian cities and rivers.
For courage and courage shown in the battles against the Nazi invaders in June - August 1944, more than 500 thousand army soldiers and partisans were awarded orders and medals, more than 1500 became Heroes of the Soviet Union. In total, starting from 1941, the exploits of 140 thousand Belarusian partisans were awarded orders and medals, the most distinguished were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The famous Belarusian operation of 1944 was one of the most powerful in World War II in terms of its scope and military-political results. The Byelorussian SSR, part of the Lithuanian and Latvian SSRs were liberated. The Red Army entered the territory of Poland and advanced to the borders of East Prussia.
An exceptionally important role in the liberation of Belarus was played by partisan formations. Solving tasks in close cooperation with the troops of the Red Army, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 27 who especially distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union. On August 15, the leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus - P.K. Ponomarenko, P.Z. Kalinin, V.E. Lobanok and V.E. Chernyshev were awarded the military order of Suvorov, I degree, V.T. Merkul, D.V. Tyabut, A.A. Prokhorov - orders of Kutuzov I degree. Hundreds of partisans were awarded the orders of Lenin, the Red Banner, Patriotic War, Suvorov and Kutuzov II degree, Red Star.
But the victory came at a high price. The losses were excessive, justice demands to admit it. During the offensive, the troops of the four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and sick, which is 48.8% of their total strength at the beginning of the operation. Irretrievable losses amounted to 178,507 people. From June 23 to August 29, the fronts lost 2957 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2447 guns and mortars, 822 combat aircraft and 183.5 thousand units small arms. Particularly heavy damage in terms of personnel and military equipment was suffered by the troops in the first days of the operation - when breaking through the defenses and forcing the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, as well as at the final stage of the offensive - when forcing the Vistula, Neman, Narev rivers, while repelling enemy counterattacks in the Baltic, in the areas of Mangushev and Pulawy. From June 23 to the end of July, when the struggle for the liberation of Belarus was going on, Soviet troops lost 440,879 people, including 97,232 people killed.
Such losses in personnel were explained by the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the strength of his defense, the difficulties of forcing many rivers, ineffective artillery and aviation training, the unsatisfactory actions of the 5th Guards Tank Army, and poor interaction between troops and aircraft and partisans. They were also due to shortcomings in the combat training of soldiers drafted into the army in the course of the operation itself. So, former partisans, underground fighters, and these were mostly young people of military age, after the liberation of the territory of the republic, they immediately joined the units and formations of the Red Army; often hastily, on the move, without proper military training, they were thrown into battle. Showing courage and courage, they nevertheless did not possess tactical skills, therefore among them there were unjustifiably large losses, which is also the fault of the command.
By the end of 1942, the heroic struggle Soviet people behind enemy lines acquired a mass character and became truly nationwide. Hundreds of thousands of patriots fought against the invaders as part of partisan formations, underground organizations and groups, actively participated in disrupting the economic, political and military measures of the occupiers. Communications, especially railways, became the main object of the partisans' combat activity, which, in its scope, acquired strategic importance.
For the first time in the history of wars, partisans carried out, according to a single plan, a number of major operations to disable enemy railway communications over a large area, which were closely connected in time and objects with the actions of the Red Army and reduced the capacity of railways by 35 - 40% Drobov M.A. . Small war (partisanship and sabotage). - M., publishing house "Enlightenment", 1996, p. 133.
In the winter of 1942-1943, when the Red Army smashed the Nazi troops on the Volga, the Caucasus, the Middle and Upper Don, they launched their attacks on the railways, along which the enemy threw up reserves to the front. In February 1943, in the sections Bryansk - Karachev, Bryansk - Gomel, they undermined several railway bridges, including the bridge over the Desna, along which from 25 to 40 echelons passed daily to the front and the same number of trains back - with broken military units, equipment and stolen property.
Strong blows were dealt to enemy communications during the summer-autumn campaign. This made it difficult for the enemy to regroup, transport reserves and military equipment, which was a huge help to the Red Army.
Grandiose in scale, in terms of the number of forces involved and the results achieved, was a partisan operation that went down in history under the name "Rail War". It was planned by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, prepared for a long time and comprehensively, and was called upon to assist the Red Army offensive on Kursk Bulge. the main objective The operation was to paralyze the transportation of the Nazis by rail with the simultaneous massive undermining of the rails. The partisans of the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol regions, Belarus and partly Ukraine were involved in this operation.
Operation "Rail War" began on the night of August 3, 1943. 2 air transport divisions, 12 separate air regiments, and several long-range aviation regiments operated to transfer explosives and other means behind enemy lines. Exploration was active.
On the very first night, 42,000 rails were blown up. Mass explosions continued throughout August and the first half of September. As a result of the operation, about 215 thousand rails and many enemy military trains were blown up (see Appendix 2, Photos 6 and 7), in some areas the movement of enemy trains was paralyzed for 3-15 days. Balashov A.I., Rudakov G.P. History of the Great Patriotic War. - St. Petersburg, publishing house "Peter", 2006, p.407.
On September 19, a new operation began, which received the code name "Concert". This operation was closely connected with the offensive of Soviet troops in Ukraine. The partisans of Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Crimea joined the operation. Even stronger blows followed. So, if 170 partisan brigades, detachments and groups, numbering about 100 thousand people, took part in Operation Rail War, then 193 brigades and detachments numbering more than 120 thousand people took part in Operation Concert. Balashov A.I., Rudakov G.P. History of the Great Patriotic War. - St. Petersburg, publishing house "Peter", 2006, p.408
Attacks on railways were combined with attacks on individual garrisons and enemy units, with ambushes on highways and dirt roads, as well as with disruption of the Nazis' river traffic. During 1943, about 11,000 enemy trains were blown up, 6,000 steam locomotives, about 40,000 wagons and platforms were disabled and damaged, more than 22,000 vehicles were destroyed, and more than 900 railway bridges were destroyed. Drobov M.A. Small war (partisanship and sabotage). - M., publishing house "Enlightenment", 1996, p. 153
Powerful partisan blows along the entire line of the Soviet-German front shocked the enemy. Soviet patriots not only inflicted great damage on the enemy, disorganized and paralyzed railway traffic, but also demoralized the occupation apparatus.
The main significance of the fighting of the partisans along the lines of communication was that the Nazis were forced to divert large forces to guard communications. In the areas of active partisan operations, the Nazis were forced to provide each 100-kilometer section of the railway with up to two regiments. Considering that in the spring of 1943 the enemy operated 3,000 km of railways on the occupied Soviet territory, it becomes quite obvious what enormous difficulties the partisans created for him.
During September - November 1943, a special operation "Desert" was carried out to destroy the water supply system on railway communications. As a result, 43 pump stations were put out of action. But due to the lack of mine-explosive means, it was not possible to completely paralyze the work of the enemy's railway communications.
A vivid example of the interaction between the army and partisans is the Belarusian operation of 1944 (see Appendix 2, Map 2). The purpose of the operation was to defeat Army Group Center and liberate Belarus. The operation involved 49 detachments with a total number of over 143 thousand people. Most of the reserves of the fascist army group "Center" were shackled by the fight against them.
On the night of June 20, the partisans carried out a mass attack on all the most important communications. As a result, traffic on some sections of the railway track was completely stopped. Many of them the enemy could not recover. During the offensive, the partisans continued to strike at communications, and only on June 26-28 blew up 147 echelons.
MILITARY OPERATIONS OF BELARUSIAN PARTISANS AND UNDERGROUND WORKERS
Sergey Savvich, combat operations Soviet partisans and underground, according to some researchers of the partisan movement, were simply unnecessary due to the fact that after the death of high-ranking Nazi officials, terror began against the local population. In particular, Ilya G. Starinov, a veteran of the partisan movement, adheres to this point of view.
I would like to hear your opinion on this issue, using the example of the liquidation of the Gauleiter of Belarus Wilhelm Kube. It would also be interesting to learn about other little-known military operations of partisans and underground fighters.
The partisans conducted a considerable number of military operations against the Nazi invaders and their accomplices. I would like to dwell on the combat activities of the partisans of Belarus, since I am most aware of the elimination of executioners and traitors by the partisans of this republic.
Special operations of Soviet partisan formations, including terrorist acts against top Nazi dignitaries and traitors to the Motherland, were one of the areas of partisan struggle that unfolded in the temporarily occupied territories of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.
The preparation and execution of each such act required great experience, courage, patience and resourcefulness. Needed precise knowledge and
taking into account the specific situation, in particular, the complex system of protection of Hitler's executioners. They, the initiators and leaders of the villainous actions, the victims of which were hundreds of thousands of brutally tortured and killed civilians and prisoners of war, were the first to receive acts of just retribution. Each of them was preceded by thorough reconnaissance, the search for specific performers, the development of various options for bringing them
into action.
The organizers and perpetrators of the terrorist attacks against the Nazis and their henchmen had to make incredible physical, and mostly psychological efforts. Often, things did not go as smoothly as they wrote in the reports and reported to the management. The execution of the executioner of the Belarusian people Wilhelm Kube is no exception.
All partisan commanders operating in the Minsk region received the task of liquidating Cuba. Throughout the summer and September 1943, the Gauleiter of Belarus was hunted. However, all attempts were unsuccessful. Partisans of many detachments hunted for Cuba for a long time and persistently, including S. A. Vaupshasova, P. G. Lopatin, I. F. Zolotar, D. I. Keimakh and others. city committees of the Communist Party of Belarus.
So, on July 22, 1943, there was an explosion in one of the theaters in Minsk. According to reliable data from the TsSHPD and the GRU, 70 enemy soldiers and officers were killed and 110 wounded. But Kube left the theater a few minutes before the explosion.
In the summer of 1943, scout V. V. Gurinovich from the Vaupshasov brigade (underground nickname "Gradov") established that Kube often travels to one of his country residences at the Lokshitsa state farm. A group of reconnaissance partisans penetrated the southern outskirts of Minsk, after spending several days in an ambush on the Minsk-Lokshitsy highway, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich this residence was located. However, these days the Gauleiter's car did not appear on this road.
At the end of August 1943, "Gradov" again sent a group of "hunters" to Minsk: it became known that a big banquet was scheduled for September 6 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Hitler's coming to power. It was then that an explosion was carried out in the officer's canteen. 36 high-ranking fascist officers and officials were killed. But Cuba did not appear at the banquet. Soon, one of the underground workers managed to get to an appointment with Cuba, but his behavior aroused the suspicion of the guards, and he was killed during a shootout.
The direct perpetrators of the act of retribution are considered to be three Heroes of the Soviet Union - Elena Mazanik, Maria Osipova and Nadezhda Troyan.
Elena Grigoryevna Mazanik was born on April 4, 1914 in the village of Poddegtyarnaya, Pukhovichi district, Minsk region (Belarus), in a peasant family. Belarusian. Member of the CPSU since 1946. At the beginning of the war, she tried to get away from the advancing Nazis. However, like many others, she had to return to Minsk. In order not to starve to death, Mazanik first worked at menial jobs in German military units: she washed clothes, cleaned rooms, etc. She took part in the Great Patriotic War from September 1943. In the elimination of Cuba was the direct executor. The hero of the USSR. In 1948 she graduated from the Higher Republican Party School under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, in 1952 - Minsk State pedagogical institute. In 1952-1960 - Deputy Director of the Fundamental Library of the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR.
Maria Borisovna Osipova was born on December 27, 1908 in the village of Serkovitsy, Tolochin district, Vitebsk region, in a working class family. Belarusian. Servant. In 1935 she graduated from the Higher Agricultural School and the Law Institute in Minsk. During the Great Patriotic War, he was the head of an underground group in Minsk. Personally carried out the transfer of the mine to Elena Mazanik, who eliminated the Gauleiter of Belarus. After the war
was a member of the Supreme Court of the BSSR. Honorary citizen of Minsk.
Nadezhda Viktorovna Troyan was born on October 24, 1921 in the city of Verkhodvinsk, Vitebsk region, in the family of an employee. Belarusian. Member of the CPSU since 1946. From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he worked underground in the city of Smolevichi. From July 1942 she was a scout and a nurse of the partisan detachment "Storm" of the Smolevichi district of the 4th partisan brigade "Uncle Kolya" of the Minsk region. She participated in operations to blow up bridges, attacks on enemy carts, more than once engaged in battle with punishers. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded on October 29, 1943. In 1947 she graduated from the 1st Moscow Medical Institute. Candidate of Medical Sciences, Associate Professor. She worked as director of the Scientific Research Institute of Health Education of the Ministry of Health of the USSR.
Knowing that Mazanik had access to the rooms where the Gauleiter of Belarus worked and rested, the leadership of the Uncle Kolya partisan brigade (commander - State Security Captain P. G. Lopatin) made an attempt to use this circumstance to assassinate Cuba.
Elena Mazanik was the first to contact Elena Mazanik with a proposal to eliminate the Gauleiter, the resident of the intelligence department of the Kanskaya brigade, Nadezhda Troyan. However, Mazanik was afraid that Troyan could not be a partisan, but a Gestapo agent, and stopped meeting with her.
Two weeks before the explosion that ended the Gauleiter, underground worker Maria Osipova came to Mazanik. The meeting was organized by the director of one of the cinemas in Minsk, Nikolai Vasilievich Pokhlebaev. In the early days of the war, he was seriously wounded. In an unconscious state, the Germans picked him up and placed him in a hospital for prisoners of war in Minsk. After recovering with the help of one nurse, Pokhlebaev disappeared. Later, he managed to get a job in a cinema, where he soon became a director.
By prior arrangement, Elena Mazanik and her
sister Valentina Shutskaya, who worked in a casino. However, they did not show up at the appointed time. Osipova expressed her doubts to Pokhlebaev about the trustworthiness of Gali (partisan pseudonym Mazanik), since there was information that "she was walking with the Germans."
Osipova painfully expected a meeting with her sisters, since the disruption of the first meeting in the tense atmosphere of the occupied city made a painful impression on her.
Here is how Elena Mazanik describes the meeting with Osipova: “The connection with Maria Osipova and through Nikolai Pokhlebaev was firm and reliable. When my sister introduced me to Nikolai, for some reason I immediately felt great sympathy for this man. It was he, Nikolai, who introduced me to Maria Osipova. He introduced her as a contact from the Dima detachment, and said bluntly: “Girls (he meant me and my sister), I trust you and will tell you a secret: I met Osipova several times in the Dima detachment, and we both received assignments. Of course, they are different, but the goal is the same - the fight against the enemy, I hope that you will help us too. I replied: “Thank you for your trust, we will work together.” One sunny day, Valentina and I went down the Potemkin Stairs to the Svisloch River. Here Nicholas and Maria were waiting for us, they walked arm in arm, like a couple in love. We approached them, greeted them like old friends, although I saw Maria for the first time. Nikolai and Valentina walked away, and Maria and I began to talk about the case. Mary made me good impression She was a calm, serious woman. When I told her that I would start training on the condition that she and Valentina go to the detachment together, Maria readily agreed.
We see a somewhat different picture in the story of Maria Osipova. “Galya and I went one way, and Valya and Nikolai went the other way. I told Galya that I would have a short conversation with you. Nikolai obviously warned you who he introduces you to and what I want from you. I had taken with me from-
Rava. I thought of giving it to Galya, but she told me that she did not trust Nikolai, but she did not know me at all, she wanted to see someone from the detachment's superiors. After that, she said that some kind of Nadia came to her, offered money for the murder of Cuba, which she refused, and that Nadia arouses suspicion in her behavior, as she openly carries leaflets around the city and behaves cheekily. To this I replied to Galya that I had no money, I am not going to buy you for them, but I hope for your consciousness.
As we can see, two stories about the same episode differ significantly from each other. In my opinion, the memoirs of Maria Osipova are more objective and as close as possible to that difficult operational situation in occupied Minsk.
The fears of Mazanik, who wanted to know for sure that it was the representatives of the partisans who contacted her, are also objective. Working for a long time in the office of the Gauleiter, she was probably aware that the Nazi secret services had an extensive agency from among local residents. And she, of course, was afraid that Gestapo agents might be sent to her to reveal her trustworthiness.
Seeing that the conversation could end in vain, Osipova said to Mazanik: “You understand perfectly well the situation we are in. The hour is approaching when each of us, remaining behind enemy lines, will have to report to the Motherland what he did to liberate her from damned fascism.
Mazanik insisted on a meeting with the leadership of the partisan detachment. Osipova agreed to this, warning that she would have to walk forty kilometers. However, Mazanik, referring to being busy, said that her sister Valya would go instead.
The next day (it was Saturday, September 10) at six o'clock in the morning, Valentina met with Maria Osipova, and they left for the partisan detachment.
From the detachment they returned safely the next day.
On September 13, by agreement, Maria Osipova went to meet her sisters, but they did not appear at the appointed time. After waiting for a while, so as not to arouse suspicion, she left.
The next day, September 14, Nikolai Pokhlebaev organized another meeting. At this meeting, it was decided to eliminate Cuba by laying a mine in his office or bedroom. They decided to abandon the original plan to kill Cuba by poisoning, since his children were the first to eat in the house.
So, an agreement with a possible perpetrator of the attack was reached. It remains to bring mines from the partisan detachment and hand them over to Elena Mazanik.
The liquidation of Cuba was the order of the Center for all partisan formations. A question arises that haunts the historians of domestic special services: who had a hand in the murder of the Gauleiter, military intelligence or state security agencies?
The last instance where Osipova received mines was the special detachment "Dima" of the Main Intelligence Directorate operating in the Minsk region, led by D. I. Keimakh, K. Kornienko and N. P. Fedorov.
Maria Osipova contacted under the guise of a speculator. From the city she carried different clothes, as if to change for bread, but in fact the necessary information was sewn into it. She returned from the village (that is, from the detachment) with food supposedly for sale, and under the food she often carried leaflets and explosives.
Having received two small-looking mines in the Dima detachment, Osipova put them in a basket, covered them with lingonberries, put eggs and boiled chicken on top. On the way to Minsk, she was stopped by the police. Here is how she herself told about it: “What are you talking about?” the policemen asked. - I made a stupid face, shrugged my shoulders and
I say that I bring berries, testicles and chicken. One of the policemen asked, "What's under the berries?" I smiled stupidly and said: “What can be there?” The policeman ordered to empty the berries from the basket. I began to cry that I have many children, and the berries get dirty in the sand, no one will buy them from me. Paid off the cops with chicken, eggs and 25 marks. After that, I barely reached the place, as I was in a state of stress.
One can only guess what the brave underground woman experienced during this short period of time of communication with the police. If mines were discovered, Osipova would undoubtedly have been taken to the Gestapo and probably shot.
On Friday, September 16, Maria Osipova, as agreed, went to a meeting with Mazanik, after wrapping the mine in a newspaper and placing it in a net, and covering it with torn shoes on top. Mazanik did not show up for the meeting. Osipova's condition at that moment was on the verge of collapse.
It turns out that Mazanik did not come to the meeting due to the departure of Cuba on a business trip.
The next meeting between Osipova and Mazanik took place at the latter's apartment on Sunday, September 19, 1943. Mazanik said that the Gauleiter's wife would go shopping on Tuesday, and perhaps on that day there might be a favorable situation for laying a mine.
On Monday, September 20, in the evening, their control meeting took place, at which Osipova gave Mazanik a mine.
On Tuesday, September 21, at six o'clock in the morning, Elena Mazanik, having put a mine in her bag, went to last time to work in the house of Gauleiter Kube. With her sister, they agreed that if the Gestapo suddenly appeared in the Gauleiter's house, this would mean that the operation had failed, and Elena would have to leave immediately.
As Mazanik recalled, she and her sister had poison, which was supposed to be taken in case of failure.
The contents of the bag were covered with a beautiful handkerchief. In addition, Mazanik also carried
a briefcase with a washcloth and a towel, as if she was about to bathe in the shower.
At the entrance to Kube's house, the servants were always searched. On this day, fortunately for Elena Mazanik, the soldier with whom she was in good relations. The search was formal.
Arriving at her place, Mazanik changed clothes, and tied a mine under her dress below her chest. She put on an apron over the dress, but did not tie it at the back so that it hung freely on her - so the mine was completely invisible. Thus, the brave woman walked with a mine until 11 o'clock.
At 9 o'clock in the morning, Cuba, his wife and children woke up. Cuba, meeting Mazanik on the stairs, inquired about the reason for her pallor. She replied that she had not slept all night because of a bad tooth, and asked him for permission to go to the dentist and not come to work that day again. Kube reacted positively and ordered that she be taken to a German dentist.
Kube with his adjutant Vilenshtein left for service. Gauleiter's wife younger son Willie went to the grocery store. The two eldest sons of Kube went to school.
The maids and the SD officer on duty remained in the house, who was on duty at the telephone from morning until late at night. His room was just opposite Kube's bedroom. He rarely left his post, especially when Kube and his wife left home.
In the bedroom, Mazanik quickly laid a mine between the mattress and springs, closer to the head of the bed. Then she sat down on the bed - she checked if a mine was felt, no, everything was fine - there was still a thin feather bed on the mattress. And this is where it all fell apart...
As soon as she had time to get out of bed, the officer on duty appeared at the door of the bedroom. He looked at her suspiciously and asked what she was doing here alone, why she was in a room that was being cleaned by another maid.
The officer carefully examined the bedroom, looked into the nightstand, opened the wardrobe, lifted
darling, a blanket, and Mazanik said: “You can go, Russian pig, so that your spirit is no longer here!”
Maria Osipova, Elena Mazanik and her sister Valentina Shutskaya were taken out of the city by Nikolai Furs, the driver of the cinema, headed by Nikolai Pokhlebaev. Then they independently reached the partisans.
Kube returned home at one o'clock in the morning, said that he did not feel well, and immediately went to bed. At 0040 hours on September 22, 1943, a mine exploded in the bedroom of General Commissar and Gauleiter Wilhelm Kube, as a result of which he tore the left side of his chest and tore off his left arm. The wounds were, of course, fatal. His corpse, in a half-burned state, was carried out of the bedroom engulfed in fire by the duty team raised on alarm.
Immediately after the assassination attempt, a large special commission was created, headed by SS Sturmbannführer Bondorf.
Based on the materials of investigations conducted by similar special commissions regarding mine explosions in important German institutions, it was established that in this case the found fragments of an explosive device were the remains of a British-made magnetic mine delayer of indefinite duration.
The inquiry was limited primarily to the immediate identification of the circle of persons who, during last day before the assassination attempt, they did something in the Gauleiter's house. At the scene, 4 maids who worked and were employed in the household were detained. The check at the beginning did not show any connection between them and the assassination attempt.
Already on the morning of September 22, 1943, the commission found that Elena Mazanik was the only maid who did not live in the Kube house. Her apartment in Minsk was opened at 48 Teatralnaya Street, apartment 10, she was not at home. It turned out that there were practically no things there.
Her sister Valentina, who lives at the same address, was not in the apartment either.
The commission found that when applying for a job, at the request of Cuba, E. Mazanik for some reason was not checked through the Gestapo. Also, the investigation was surprised by the fact that Mazanik treated her teeth on the special order of the Gauleiter from a German doctor, despite the fact that she was Belarusian.
Upon further checking the circle of acquaintances of both sisters, the investigation came across Mazanik's "lover" named Stepan, who was identified as Stefan Tillner, head of the post office at the General Commissariat. A photo of Mazanik suitable for reproduction was confiscated from him.
Investigating this case, the Nazis quickly reached out to Nikolai Drozd, who provides certain services to the underground and partisans. In his wooden shed, in a pile of firewood, two detonators were found, which, according to Drozd, were brought by a certain Maria, nicknamed Black Maria. She was later installed as Maria Osipova.
The owner of the estate, Nikolai Drozd, as well as his wife Elena and their daughter Regina, were arrested shortly before their planned escape.
Drozd admitted that on September 18, 1943, Maria Osipova and Maria Dubrova (Gribovskaya) were waiting for him on the bridge in Minsk when he returned from the village of Vyachi from picking berries, from whom he received two mines. He brought these mines home, and Osipova hid them in his garden.
Dubrova, who was under arrest, had to confirm that these data were true and that she received these mines in the forest near the village of Vyachi from an unknown man. This unknown man was related, according to Dubrova, to the partisans.
During the inquiry, it was established that since April 1943, Osipova, living with Drozd, repeatedly undertook so-called business trips, and also conducted intensified anti-fascist propaganda among her acquaintances.
The investigation also identified Georgy Kulikov, a liaison to Maria Osipova, who collected intelligence for her about the mood among the local population, in German units, the location of individual units of the Wehrmacht, etc.
At the same time, he was assisted by Vladimir Sibko. Working as a musician in a German home, he forced waitresses he knew to show him letters from German soldiers, wrote out field mail numbers and other important details from them, and also tried by all possible methods to obtain information about the German troops. Both were arrested.
The ongoing search for Mazanik, her sister and Maria Osipova was not successful. The investigation almost immediately became aware that Mazanik and his sister, after completing a special assignment, were sent with the help of Osipova to Moscow by plane from the nearest partisan region. This once again confirms that the Nazi secret services had their informants in the partisan detachments.
The commission came to the conclusion that Maria Osipova acted on the instructions of Moscow, namely the NKVD, to which the direct executor Elena Mazanik was also related.
The Nazis brutally avenged the death of Gauleiter Kube. Captured on May 7, 1945, SS Brigadeführer Gerf Ebergard, at the time of the assassination of Kube, the head of the order police in Belarus, testified: “Terrible atrocities in Minsk after the assassination of Kube were committed by order of the Higher SS and Police Chief Gottberg ... In the following days, the police raids were carried out jointly with the SD. Innocent people, including women and children, caught in the streets and in houses, were shot ... Two thousand people were shot in these raids, and a much larger number were imprisoned in a concentration camp.
As already noted, the NKVD, the GRU, and the TsShPD were hunting for Cuba. After receiving data on his liquidation, it was still not clear who exactly carried out the act of retribution. Some rushed
report to the Center that it was their agents that liquidated the Gauleiter. In particular, my former subordinate, head of the special department of partisan detachments of the Vitebsk region, State Security Captain Yurin, whose agents were also involved in the murder of Cuba, hastened to report to his leadership in Moscow about this. He reported to the Center that the murder of the Gauleiter was carried out by his people. After that, he was summoned to Moscow and arrested for fraud. He was given 6 years in the camps. And only thanks to my petitions, Yurin served only 1.5 years.
The murder of Cuba is perceived by historians ambiguously. In connection with the destruction by the Nazis of a large number of civilians who were not related to the death of the Gauleiter, some authors adhere to the point of view of denying terror during hostilities.
I am inclined to believe that Cuba was executed (not killed, but executed by the verdict of the Soviet people) rightfully. I argue my point by the fact that within the framework of global war When there was a question about the survival of entire nations, the liquidation of Cuba was a natural response to his atrocities. In addition, after perfect justice, mourning was declared in Berlin, and on the fronts and in the rear there was a complete demoralization of the enemy personnel. Let's be objective, if this executioner had survived, he would have committed even more atrocities. And believe me, I am not alone in my opinions on this issue. Most veteran guerrillas will support me.
Probably everyone who took the course knows about the murder of Cuba high school. But the partisans also eliminated the notorious traitors to the Motherland. The murder of Fabian Akinchits was no exception.
From the first days of the seizure of power by the Nazis, Germany prepared spy and sabotage personnel for sending to the Soviet Union.
In 1934, for these purposes, the Gestapo recruited a certain Fabian Akinchits, born in 1895, a native of the Pinsk region, a Belarusian who, in
In 1920 he emigrated to the territory of Poland and until 1938 he was in Vilna (now Vilnius). At Vilna University, he taught Belarusian literature as an assistant professor. His family consisted of a wife and two children, lived in a small private estate in the Grodno district of the Bialystok region.
Since 1925, Akinchits was one of the prominent figures in the Belarusian national democratic movement abroad. In Vilna, Belarusian youth concentrated around him, mainly students of Vilna University. In the same period, Dr. Tumash, priest Godlevsky, priest Mickiewicz, Adamovich and others worked with him from among the national democrats.
The activity of the National Democrats in Poland in those years was expressed in organizing meetings, publishing and distributing various kinds of National Democracy literature, issuing individual articles, etc. revolutionary-democratic organization of the workers of Western Belarus, Fabian Akinchits, by betraying his party comrades, achieved a lenient sentence from the Polish court and was soon completely released.
In 1930-1931, Akinchits again appears on the Vilna political horizon, speaking with slanderous and pogrom articles directed against Soviet Belarus.
In 1934, while traveling from Paris through Berlin to Poland, Akinchits was detained by the Gestapo and brought to A. Rozenberg, who recruited him as a Gestapo agent under the nickname Belorus. On the instructions of the Gestapo, Akinchits on the territory of Poland was to create several intelligence residencies under the guise of Belarusian national demographic organizations that would carry out intelligence work on the territory of the USSR and Poland and conduct pro-fascist propaganda among those involved in this activity.
In addition to Akinchits, the following were recruited as residents of the Gestapo: a teacher at Vilna University, editor of the Minsk newspaper Kozlovsky (nickname Kozlovshchik) and Nikolai Shchors from the Stolbtsovsky district of the Baranovichi region, a doctor.
Akinchits created the main intelligence residency in 1936 in Vilna and led it personally. Later established residencies in the cities of Stolbtsy, Baranovichi and Novogrudok were headed by Shchors, and in Warsaw by Kozlovsky. From these residencies, contacts were established with some national democrats in Minsk. Akinchits used the legal press to spread Nazi propaganda in Poland. So, he personally wrote the brochure "Our Tasks", published in Polish and Belarusian languages. In it, he formulated the main tasks of the fascist national democrats to create, with the help of Germany, an "independent Belarusian state", whose borders included part of the Smolensk and Leningrad regions. He also personally edited and published the "Belarusian calendar", assembled from articles of pro-fascist content. This literature was distributed in Poland and in some quantity was abandoned on the territory of the USSR.
In connection with the discovery in Warsaw of the Polish counter-revolutionary residency, headed by Kozlovsky, in May 1939 the Polish police had an order to arrest Kozlovsky, Shchors and Akinchits. But they got ahead of this event by leaving illegally for Germany.
In November 1939, the Belarusian Self-Help Committee (BCS) was organized in Berlin, funded by the German government. Akinchits became the head of the BCS, Kozlovsky became his deputy. The Steering Bureau of the BCS was formed, which included Dr. Yermachenko, Kozhur, and others.
At the same time, in cities and large settlements located near the newly established Soviet-German border against the Byelorussian SSR, branches (branches) of the BCS were organized: in Warsaw, headed by Shchors,
Belo-Podlaska, Tiraspol, Suwalki and other places.
The BCS was allegedly created to provide cultural and educational assistance to Belarusians living abroad. In reality, all BKS organizations were subordinate to the Gestapo, which instructed all their activities. The main purpose of the BCS was to carry out intelligence activities and conduct fascist agitation on the territory of the USSR, in the selection and recruitment of intelligence officers for the Gestapo from among Belarusians living abroad. This was quite fully reported by agents and various kinds of messengers sent to our territory in the period 1939-1941 in large numbers, sent by the BCS from Warsaw, from Berlin, recruited personally by Akinchits.
On the instructions of the Gestapo, the BCS paid special attention to establishing contacts with the Belarusian National Democrats who were on our territory. Most of the messengers had the task to visit Minsk, Baranovichi, Stolbtsy, Novogrudok, Vilna, Vileyka and other settlements of the main concentrations of Belarusian national-democratic formations. Many of them were supplied with literature, the author of which was Akinchits. The activity of the BCS was especially intensified before the war.
In April 1941, at a meeting of the governing bureau of the BCS, the composition of the future "Belarusian government" was outlined, which was supposed to consist of a president (this seat remained vacant) and a cabinet of ministers. So, Nikolai Shchors was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kozlovsky - Minister of Agriculture. At a meeting of the same leading bureau, the position of the Belarusian National Socialist Party (BNSP) was approved. The regulation provided for the BNSP as the only leading party under the new Belarusian government. Fabiyan Akinchits was approved as the head of the Belarusian National Socialist Party at the leading bureau.
Hating the fascist invaders and their accomplices - traitors like Akinchits and Kozlovsky, the Belarusian people, organizing themselves into partisan detachments, waged a decisive struggle against them.
The fascist German invaders received simultaneous blows from the partisans and their agents, who, by virtue of various reasons or performing special tasks, they worked in German institutions and enterprises.
The liquidation of Fabian Akinchits was carried out by the underground worker A. L. Matusevich, born in 1902, Belarusian, non-party, in the past a literary worker. After the capture of Belarus by the Germans, Matusevich remained underground, and then went to work as a technical editor of the fascist newspaper Minsker Zeitung with sabotage and reconnaissance purposes.
Remaining a Soviet patriot, Matusevich, after repeated attempts at the end of 1942, through comrade Sosnovsky, established contact with the underground district party committee of the Logoisk district, and then with the command of the Voronyansky partisan brigade.
Carrying out a number of tasks of the underground district committee of the party and the command of the Voronyansky brigade, Matusevich simultaneously carried out preparations for the destruction of the traitors Kozlovsky and Adamovich.
The first attempt to destroy Kozlovsky and Adamovich was unsuccessful due to the use of a weak poison.
Fulfilling the task, Matusevich, together with Grigory Ignatovich Strashko and Afanasy Ivanovich Prilepko, on March 5, 1943, shot the traitor Akinchits in Minsk.
At the end of February 1943, Matusevich, Strashko and Prilepko, having received the appropriate instructions on how to conduct this operation, went to Minsk.
The massacre with this bandit was carried out in this way. Early in the morning at 7 o'clock, three partisans drove up in a car to the editorial building on Freedom Square, located next to the police. Although the driver was a reliable person, Matuse-
Vich nevertheless decided to leave the partisan Prilepko in the car, and he and Strashko (the first with a revolver, the second with a pistol) went to the 3rd floor.
Having cut the phone and spread partisan flyers (leaflets) on the tables, in one of the rooms they found a cleaner who, at gunpoint, was forced to be silent and sit in the room they locked.
Then they knocked on the door of Kozlovsky's apartment, who lived on the 3rd floor next to the editorial office. Akinchits himself ended up in the apartment. He was not yet dressed and opened the door after two or three questions.
Matusevich went into the second room to make sure there were no other dangerous guests there. There were only two people in the apartment. Continuing the conversation that had begun about his departure allegedly to Baranovichi, Matusevich went into the hall and commanded: "Tishka, start." At that moment, Strashko fired at Akinchits and ran to another room where Kozlovsky was.
Akinchits, with a howl, rushed to Matusevich's right hand, but he managed to fire 4 shots. Akinchits tossed about for a minute, fighting with his hands, then he rushed to run and fell on the threshold.
Hearing the shots, Kozlovsky grabbed his revolver and, after Strashko's pistol failed (due to a warped cartridge), he began to shoot at the partisans from his room.
There was no time to think and act further, since the whole operation was carried out in front of the police and the Germans (the police house was 10 meters away on the other side, and the Germans lived on the 2nd floor of the house where the operation was carried out, and there was a post in the courtyard) .
Having run out into the street, the partisans quickly got into a prepared 3-ton German truck and rushed out of town.
Concluding this topic, I want to say that I maintain the warmest relations with one of the organizers of the liquidation of Cuba, Hero of the Soviet Union Nadezhda Viktorovna Troyan.
Let us now consider the largest operations carried out during the partisan movement during the Second World War.
3 .1 Rail War
The rail war is a major operation carried out by Soviet partisans during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 - in August - September 1943 in the occupied territories of the RSFSR, the BSSR and part of the Ukrainian SSR in order to disable the railway. enemy communications. In June 1943, the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Belarus put forward a plan for the simultaneous mass destruction of railway sections in the occupied territory of the republic. The Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) involved in the implementation of this plan, in addition to the partisans of Belarus, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol and part of the Ukrainian partisans. Operation "Rail War" was connected with the plans of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to complete the defeat of the Nazi troops in Battle of Kursk, carrying out the Smolensk operation of 1943 and the offensive with the aim of liberating the Left-Bank Ukraine.
Restored in May 1942, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement began to develop a plan for the first operation of the partisans on the railway communications of the enemy on a strategic scale. The plan of the operation was based on the Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus "On the destruction of the enemy's railway communications by the "Rail war", i.e. the destruction of the rail bed by mine-explosive and other methods. partisan rail warfare on the enemy's communications" it was stated that "the huge growth and scope of the partisan movement now makes it possible to deliver massive widespread strikes on railways in order to completely disorganize them and disrupt the enemy's operations on the fronts." Possibility of achieving the strategic goal - the complete disorganization of railway communications in the rear of the enemy did not raise doubts either in the governing bodies of the partisan movement, or in the partisan detachments themselves.However, the way to achieve the goal - undermining two hundred thousand rails met with objections.
On January 1, 1943, the length of the railways operated by the enemy reached 34,979 km, which amounted to 2,798,320 pieces of rails fixed on the railway track (the length of the rail at that time was 12.5 m). Hundreds of thousands of rails were in reserve for replacement. That's why this method achieving the goal of the operation, according to military experts in sabotage, was not entirely appropriate. So, the technical department of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement under the leadership of the deputy head of the Ukrainian broadband for sabotage, Colonel I.G. Starinov, with the help of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Red Army, calculations were made of the effectiveness of the destruction of 85 - 90 thousand rails, intended according to the plan of operation to undermine the partisans of Ukraine. Calculations showed that the specified number of rails was only 2% of the 4,000,000 pieces of rails available in the occupied part of Ukraine, and it was necessary to spend all available mine-explosive means on their undermining. The VOSO certificate stated that the enemy does not lack rails and even sends some of them for remelting, and that the most vulnerable point in the German railway communications system are steam locomotives, of which there are less than 5,000 in the entire occupied part of the USSR. This assessment was later confirmed by a German researcher in this G. Teske, who wrote that Germany "in 1939 had a much smaller fleet of steam locomotives and wagons than the Kaiser empire in 1914. The reason for this was the overestimation of the motor. It was not possible to completely correct this mistake during the war itself." Undermining the rails, in addition, caused a break in traffic only for the time necessary to replace them (several hours), while significantly complicating the normal operation of the railways after the liberation of the territory from the Germans. Ultimately, the Ukrainian Headquarters of the partisan movement managed to obtain the right to start preparing the operation, concentrating the main efforts on arranging the collapse of military echelons, i.e. disable enemy trains, not undermine the rails. On May 30, 1943, the Central Committee of the CP(b)U decided to start not a "rail war", but a "war on rails".
The operation was planned in three stages, each for 15-30 days. The operation was planned to begin approximately on August 1-5, 1943 with a sudden infliction of the first strategic massive strike, simultaneously blowing up 26,000 rails. In the first 15 days, the main railway communications in the rear of Army Group Center were to be destroyed. In the future, it was supposed to inflict several other massive strikes and, having paralyzed the movement on the remaining railway communications, subsequently proceed to systematic sabotage actions to prohibit the operation of railway communications behind enemy lines. The grouping of partisan forces created for the operation included 167 partisan brigades, separate detachments and groups with a total strength of 95,615 people, deployed over a territory stretching over 1,000 km along the front and in depth from the front line to the western border of the USSR, which indicated a strategic scale and a special the nature of the group. The partisan grouping behind enemy lines was already so powerful that the partisan formations were located near most of the most important railway communications. Therefore, the redeployment of partisan formations, if necessary, was carried out at a distance of 70-80 km and only sometimes - more than 100 km.
To carry out the tasks of undermining rails and other objects on the railways, it was necessary to deliver an additional 200-250 tons of explosives to the rear of the partisans. The main difficulty in preparing the operation was the need to allocate the flight resource of Li-2 or Si-47 transport aircraft to deliver the necessary cargo.
Thus, the transfer of explosives and other means behind enemy lines required 400 sorties during July-August, including 180 sorties over 5-6 days, starting from July 12 to prepare for the first sabotage strike. The significant dependence of the success of the operation on the actions of aviation confirmed the significant influence of this factor on the scale and content of sabotage and other special actions behind enemy lines. The need for the partisans to transfer many hundreds of tons of cargo to the rear of the enemy required the centralized and systematic use of aviation formations and units. By the middle of 1943, two air transport divisions, twelve separate air regiments, several long-range aviation regiments, squadrons of front-line and army aviation and aviation operated in the interests of the partisans. airborne troops. In total, during the war years, 109 thousand sorties were made to the partisans, 96% of the flights were made at night. The use of aviation in the interests of the partisans revealed a number of essential requirements and features of the combat use of aviation forces and means.
The local headquarters of the partisan movement and their representations at the fronts determined areas and objects of action for each partisan formation. The partisans were provided explosives, fuses, mine-explosive classes were held at the “forest courses”, local “factories” mined tol from trophy shells and bombs, in workshops and forges, fastenings of tol checkers to the rails were made. Exploration was actively carried out on the railways. The operation began on the night of August 3 and continued until mid-September. The actions unfolded on the ground with a length of about 1000 km along the front and 750 km in depth, they were attended by about 100 thousand partisans, who were helped by the local population.
On the very first night, three brigades operating in the Volkhov Front disabled 1032 rails. On the Vitebsk road between the stations of Cholovo and Torkovichi, detachments of the 11th brigade blew up 436 rails. Near the Plyussa station of the Warsaw railway, detachments of the 5th brigade destroyed 286 rails. And detachments of the 2nd brigade in the region of Zarechye blew up the bridge and 310 rails.
It must be said that the Leningrad partisans delivered the first massive blow to the railway lines after the Oryol ones and a few days earlier than the main forces that took part in the Rail War - in other regions this operation began on the night of August 3-4. By this time, the force of attacks on enemy communications near Leningrad had increased markedly, the Rail War had become not a short-term campaign, but a permanent form of struggle against the enemy. Sabotage was organized not only by partisan units, but also by inter-district underground party centers. For example, the Kingisepp center carried out a series of attacks on the Baltic road, which the Nazis had previously considered "calm", and the Pskov center - along the Pskov - Weimarn road, south of the zone of operations of the 2nd LPB. Despite all the measures taken, the Nazis no longer secure their railway communications. could.
The results of the first strike and further sabotage during August had a significant impact on the work of the railways, but it was not possible to completely paralyze the movement. In the journal of military operations of the headquarters of the High Command of the Wehrmacht after the first massive strike, it is noted: "August 4. East. Railway traffic in the East often stops due to undermining the rails (75 major accidents and 1,800 explosions) The movement of trains in the area of Army Group Center was stopped from August 4 for 48 hours.
The following figures speak of the scale of the "rail war" near Leningrad: in August, the partisans blew up over 11 thousand rails (this is tantamount to the complete destruction of the railway track along the entire length of the road from Leningrad to Luga), destroyed 20 railway bridges, 34 kilometers of telegraph and telephone communications, derailed 21 enemy trains. Enormous traffic jams formed at the stations, and trains waiting for the restoration of the track became an excellent target for our aircraft strikes. At the end of the month in Pskov, for example, 50 trains stuck at the station were subjected to an air attack at once. And the battle on the rails, meanwhile, was just flaring up. By mid-November, the total number of rails destroyed by the Leningrad partisans exceeded 52.5 thousand. This means that the track with a total length of more than 650 kilometers was put out of action.
In early November, partisans intercepted a large batch of letters from Nazi soldiers to their relatives and friends near the village of Zryachaya Gora, Karamyshevsky District.
A powerful blow to the railway lines was unexpected for the enemy, who for some time could not resist the partisans in an organized manner. During the operation, about 215 thousand rails were blown up, many echelons were derailed, railway bridges and station buildings were blown up. The massive disruption of enemy communications made it much more difficult to regroup the retreating enemy troops, complicate their supply, and thereby contributed to the successful offensive of the Red Army.
In total, from July 20 to September 16, 1943, according to the operational department of the TsSHPD, 214,705 pieces of rails were disabled during Operation Rail War, which accounted for 4.3% of all rails on the operated sections of the railways. Based on the results of the last operation, the leadership of the TsSHPD made some conclusions, and during the next operation on the railway communications "Concert", which lasted from September 20 to November 30, 1943, the partisans' sabotage actions were more aimed at putting the enemy's rolling stock out of action. At the same time, during September - November 1943, according to the TsSHPD plan, a special operation "Desert" was carried out to destroy the water supply system on railway communications. As a result of the operation, 43 pump stations were put out of action. However, a significant reduction in combat capabilities to commit sabotage due to a lack of mine-explosive means did not allow partisan formations to paralyze the work of the enemy's railway communications.
3 .2 Operation Concert
“Concert” is the code name for the operation of Soviet partisans September 19 - November 1, 1943. The operation was carried out on the territory of Belarus, Karelia, Leningrad and Kalinin regions, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Crimea, occupied by Nazi troops, covering about 900 km along the front (excluding Karelia and Crimea) and to a depth of over 400 km . It was closely connected with the upcoming offensive of the Soviet troops in the Smolensk and Gomel directions and the battle for the Dnieper. The operation involved 193 partisan formations (brigades and separate detachments, over 120 thousand people in total); leadership was carried out by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. The task of the operation "Concert" was to put out of action large sections of the railway tracks in order to disrupt the enemy's military transportation. Based on the general plan of the operation, each partisan unit received a specific combat mission, which included blowing up rails, organizing the collapse of enemy military echelons, destroying road structures, disabling communications, water supply systems, etc. Detailed plans for combat operations were developed and mass training of personnel in the production of demolition work.
The success of the partisans in the rear, on the communications of the Nazi armies depended on their timely supply with the necessary amount of ammunition and subversive means. State Committee The defense assigned this work, in addition to Aeroflot and the Air Force, to long-range aviation. The commander of the ADD allocated three air regiments flying on Li - 2 to provide the partisans.
Since January 1943, by order of the commander of the ADD, all data on communications with partisans and signals that were supposed to indicate partisan sites converged to the headquarters of the 101st - GO aviation regiment (chief of staff, Major A. M. Verkhozin). Here, in the 101st regiment, there were representatives of all the republican headquarters of the partisan movement with their loading teams and cargo prepared for landing.
At that time, most partisan formations and many large detachments already had radio stations, with the help of which they maintained contact with the mainland. But these radio stations were, unfortunately, shortwave and low power. We could not search for partisan detachments lost in the forests with their help: the radio compasses and radio semi-compasses installed on the aircraft received signals only in the wavelength range of 200 - 2000 meters. Therefore, partisan detachments and formations used only light signaling. Fires lit in a predetermined order were arranged in the form of triangles, squares, rhombuses, envelopes or in a line - three, four, five, sometimes more. Often fires were supplemented with rockets, lanterns " bat", bonfires laid out away from the main identification signals. Additional signals were necessary: the enemy from the air conducted enhanced reconnaissance of partisan areas and often discovered the sites of the detachments by light signals. German pilots either bombed these points or reported to their command post about their location location and sight. And the Germans laid out the same signals not far from the partisan ones - in order to disorientate our pilots. Sometimes they succeeded. Having found several identical light signals in a given area, our pilots were forced to return, without completing the task, to their airfield.To prevent this from happening, the guerrillas reported in advance about additional signals or changes in the location of the main fires.As soon as the guerrilla observation posts saw their aircraft approaching the landing site, they lit or extinguished one of the main fires or gave an agreed signal with rockets. deprived the alarm system and the enemy's ability to mislead our aviation.
Due to the deterioration of meteorological conditions, by September 19, Soviet aviation delivered only 50% of the planned combat cargo to the partisans, so the start date of the operation was postponed to September 25. However, part of the partisan brigades had already left their base areas for their starting lines and, on the night of September 19, struck at enemy communications. The bulk of the partisan formations of the beginning fighting on the night of September 25th. Having defeated the enemy's guards and having mastered the railway lines, they proceeded to massive destruction and mining of the railway track. The fascist German command made efforts to restore railway traffic: new railway restoration battalions were transferred to Belarus, the local population was driven to repair work, rails and sleepers were delivered from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany. But the partisans again undermined the repaired areas. During the "Concert" only Belarusian partisans blew up about 90 thousand rails, derailed 1041 enemy echelons, destroyed 72 railroads. bridge, defeated 58 enemy garrisons, killed and wounded over 53 thousand Nazis, Operation Concert caused serious complications in the transportation of Nazi troops; the capacity of railways has decreased by 35--40%. This made it much more difficult for the fascist German command to carry out maneuvers on its own and provided great assistance to the advancing Soviet troops. Operation "Concert" intensified the struggle of the Soviet people against the fascist invaders in the occupied territory; in its course, the influx of the local population into partisan detachments increased.
3 .3 Belorussian operation 1944
The Belorussian operation of 1944, one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, was carried out from June 23 to August 29. The Belarusian ledge, formed as a result of the advance of Soviet troops in the Polotsk and Kovel directions in the winter of 1944, was of great importance in the system enemy defense, because covered the shortest routes to the borders of Germany. To hold the ledge, the enemy attracted the troops of the right flank of the 16th Army of the North Army Group, the Center Army Group (3rd Tank, 4th, 9th and 2nd Armies; Commander Field Marshal E. Bush, since June 28, Field Marshal V. Model) and the left-flank formations of the 4th Panzer Army of the Northern Ukraine Army Group - a total of 63 divisions and 3 brigades (over 800 thousand people, excluding rear units, about 10 thousand guns, 900 tanks and assault guns, over 1300 aircraft). The enemy occupied a pre-prepared and well-organized defense, which relied on a developed system of field fortifications and natural lines, including major rivers-- Western Dvina, Dnieper, Berezina; the depth of defense reached 250-270 km.
The goal of the Belarusian operation was to defeat Army Group Center and liberate Belarus. The main idea of the operation: simultaneous penetration of the enemy defenses in 6 sectors, encirclement and destruction of enemy flank groupings in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, and then the development of a rapid offensive in depth with the aim of encircling and destroying the 4th german army near Minsk. For the Belarusian operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic (General of the Army I. Kh. Bagramyan), 3rd Belorussian (Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd Belorussian (General of the Army G. F. Zakharov) and 1st th Belorussian (General of the Army K. K. Rokossovsky) fronts - a total of 166 divisions, 9 rifle brigades and field fortified areas (1.4 million people without front and army rears, 31.7 thousand guns and mortars, 5200 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, over 6 thousand aircraft). Belarusian partisans were actively operating behind enemy lines, representing in essence the 5th front, interacting with four advancing fronts.
By mid-June 1944, a partisan grouping of 150 brigades and 49 detachments with a total strength of over 143 thousand people was operating on the territory of Belarus, not counting the reserve of 250 thousand people. (including about 123 thousand armed). Most of the reserves of the fascist German army group "Center" were shackled by the fight against the partisans. During the preparation of the operation from May 31 to June 22, the partisans identified and confirmed information about 287 enemy units and formations located in the rear, 33 headquarters, 900 garrisons, defensive lines with a length of 985 km, 130 anti-aircraft batteries, 70 large warehouses, established the composition and organization of 108 enemy military units, discovered 319 field postal stations, 30 airfields and 11 landing sites, recorded the passage and composition of 1642 echelons, captured 105 operational documents.
On the night of June 20, the partisans carried out a massive attack on all the most important railways. communications, blowing up over 40 thousand rails. As a result, traffic was completely stopped in the sections Orsha - Borisov, Orsha - Mogilev, Molodechno - Polotsk, Molodechno - Lida, Baranovichi - Osipovichi, Baranovichi - Minsk, Baranovichi - Luninets, etc. The enemy could not restore some sections. During the offensive, the partisans continued to strike at communications, and only on June 26-28 blew up 147 echelons. The partisans provided great assistance to the Soviet troops in forcing the river. Berezina, Sluch, Ptich, Drut, Lekhva, Neman, Shchara, and others, in some cases even capturing and holding bridges until the forward detachments approach (for example, across the Shchara River on the Slutsk-Brest highway). The partisans interfered with the enemy's organized retreat, holding important lines and roads, which forced the enemy units to turn off the roads, abandon military equipment and leave in small groups through the forests, suffering heavy losses. Belarusian partisans liberated and held a number of settlements, including Vidzy, Ostrovets, Svir, Ilya, Starobin, Uzda, Kopyl, Korelichi and others, and with the approach of tank units they acted as tank landings and participated in the liberation of Minsk, Slutsk, Borisov, Cherven, Dokshitsy, Mogilev, Osipovichi , Klichev, Pinsk, Luninets and other cities. They assisted the Soviet troops in liquidating encircled enemy groupings, covering the flanks and rear of formations, and in clearing the liberated areas of the remnants of defeated enemy units. During the Belarusian operation, the partisans destroyed more than 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers.
Successful operations behind enemy lines were carried out by partisan formations led by: in Belarus - I. N. Banov, A. P. Brinsky, T. P. Bumazhkov, S. A. Vaupshasov, I. D. Vetrov, A. I. Volynets , I. P. Dedyulya, K. S. Zaslonov, F. F. Kapusta, I. P. Kozhar, V. I. Kozlov, V. Z. Korzh, V. I. Liventsov, G. M. Linkov, V E. Lobanok, P. G. Lopatin, R. N. Machulsky, P. M. Masherov, F. F. Ozmitel, K. P. Orlovsky, F. I. Pavlovsky, M. S. Prudnikov, I. F. Sadchikov, V. E. Samutin, V. F. Tarunov, A. K. Flegontov, V. E. Chernyshev, M. F. Shmyrev, and others; in Ukraine - V. A. Andreev, V. A. Begma, I. F. Borovik, P. E. Braiko, P. P. Vershigora, A. M. Grabchak, L. E. Kizya, S. A. Kovpak , S. F. Malikov, D. N. Medvedev, Ya. I. Melnik, V. A. Molodtsov, M. I. Naumov, A. Z. Odukha, M. G. Salay, F. F. Taranenko, A F. Fedorov, I. F. Fedorov, V. P. Chepiga, M. I. Shukaev, and others; in Karelia, K. V. Bondyuk, I. A. Grigoriev, F. F. Zhurikh, B. Lahti, F. I. Tukachev, and others; in Estonia - E. M. Aartee, P. I. Kuragin, A. F. Filippov, I. Yu. Yurisson, and others; in Latvia - E. Abolin, I. K. Bogadisty, V. Ya. Laivin, A. Matsipan, O. P. Oshkali, A. S. Poch, P. K. Ratynsh, V. P. Samson, I. Ya .Sudmalis and others; in Lithuania - T. Monchunskas, K. Rodionov, P. Simenas, B. Urbonavichyus, and others; in Moldavia, Ya. A. Mukhin, N. M. Frolov, Ya. P. Shkryabach, and others; in Leningrad region- A. N. Brednikov, N. G. Vasiliev, A. V. German, K. D. Karitsky, V. P. Obedkov, I. I. Sergunin and others; in the Kalinin region - N. M. Varaksov, V. I. Margo, V. V. Razumov, A. F. Shorokhov, A. I. Shtrakhov, and others; in Smolensk region- V. I. Voronchenko, A. I. Voropaev, S. V. Grishin, V. V. Zhabo, T. G. Davydkin and others; in Oryol region- A. D. Bondarenko, I. A. Gudzenko, M. I. Duka, D. V. Emlyutin, D. E. Kravtsov, M. P. Romashin, F. E. Strelets and others; in Moscow and Tula regions- M. A. Guryanov, I. I. Evteev, P. S. Makeev, S. I. Solntsev, P. I. Fomin and others; in the Rostov region - S. G. Morozov, M. M. Trifanov and others; in the North Caucasus, A. A. Egorov, P. K. Ignatov, T. A. Karabak, P. E. Krivonosov, A. G. Odnokozov, I. I. Pozdnyak, V. I. Khomyakov, and others; in the Crimea - D. I. Averkin, I. G. Genov, B. B. Gorodovikov, V. S. Kuznetsov, M. A. Makedonsky, A. V. Mokrousov, M. F. Paramonov, G. L. Seversky , F. I. Fedorenko and others.
- 185 thousand partisans were awarded orders and medals of the USSR, more than 230 people. received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, S. A. Kovpak and A. F. Fedorov were awarded this title twice.
- On June 23, the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts went on the offensive, and on June 24 the 1st Belorussian Front. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front broke through the enemy defenses and already on June 25, together with the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, surrounded 5 German divisions west of Vitebsk, which were eliminated by June 27; the main forces of the front crossed the river on the move. The Western Dvina and June 28 captured the city of Lepel. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front successfully broke through the enemy defenses, and the 5th Guards Tank Army was introduced into the breach, which on July 1, in cooperation with the 11th Guards and 31st Armies, liberated the city of Borisov. As a result, the German 3rd Panzer Army was cut off from the 4th Army, which was deeply engulfed from the north. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front broke through the enemy's strong defenses along the river. Pronya, Basya and Dnepr and on June 28 liberated Mogilev. On June 27, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front completed the encirclement of 5 German divisions in the Bobruisk area, which were liquidated on June 29; at the same time, the troops of the front reached the line of the river. Svisloch, Osipovichi, Luban. Thus, in 6 days of the offensive, the enemy's flank groupings in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk were defeated and the front was broken through in the Mogilev direction. The fascist German command unsuccessfully tried to form a solid front. By June 29, his troops in the Minsk area were deeply engulfed from the south and south. Minsk from the south, and the rest of the forces - to Slutsk. The 3rd Belorussian Front was rapidly advancing west and southwest. On July 2, its tank formations captured important nodes roads Vileyka and Krasnoe, cutting off the enemy's retreat to Vilnius. The main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, having captured Stolbtsy and Gorodeya, cut off the enemy's retreat from Minsk to Baranovichi. On July 3, Minsk was liberated, to the east of which the main forces of the 4th German Army (over 100 thousand people) were surrounded. By July 11, this grouping was liquidated, over 70 thousand were killed and about 35 thousand were taken prisoner. The troops of the 1st Baltic Front liberated Polotsk and continued to develop the offensive on Siauliai.
A 400-km gap appeared in the center of the German front, which the Nazi command could not fill. On July 13, Vilnius was liberated. By mid-July, Soviet troops reached the approaches to Dvinsk, Kaunas, Grodno, Bialystok and Kobrin. On July 17-18, Soviet troops crossed the state border of Poland on a wide front and entered its territory. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command introduced its strategic reserves in the Šiauliai direction. On July 27, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front captured Siauliai, and on July 31 they reached the Gulf of Riga in the Tukums area, cutting off the land communications of Army Group North. In the second half of August, the enemy launched strong counterattacks with large tank forces and restored land communications with Army Group North. Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front crossed the river. Neman, on August 1, captured Kaunas and reached the borders East Prussia. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front liberated Grodno on July 16, Bialystok on July 27, and by the end of July they reached the river. Narew. On July 18, in the Lublin direction, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive, which on July 20 crossed the river. Western Bug and entered the borders of Poland. Lublin was liberated on July 23, and Brest on July 28. Developing the offensive, the troops of the front in the period from July 28 to August 2 crossed the Vistula south of Warsaw on the move and captured bridgeheads in the areas of Magnuszew and Pulawy. In August - September, Soviet troops, repelling enemy counterattacks and consolidating the achieved lines, captured the eastern part of Warsaw - Prague, reached the river on a wide front. Narev and captured bridgeheads on it in the areas of Rozhan and Serotsk.
As a result of the Belarusian operation, Belarus was completely liberated, a significant part of Lithuania, part of Latvia and the eastern regions of Poland. The strategic front of the enemy was crushed to a depth of 600 km . 17 German divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed, 50 divisions lost 60-70% of their composition.
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