Who led the western front in WWII. Commanders of the fronts of the Great Patriotic War
The encirclement of the main forces of the Western Front in the summer of 1941 is one of the greatest tragedies in the history of Russian weapons, standing on a par with the battle on the Kalka River in 1223 or the death of Samsonov's army in East Prussia summer of 1914. Yes, during the Great Patriotic War We also had large losses in numbers, but this tragedy happened first, and it was this tragedy that largely determined the further unfavorable development of the situation on the entire Soviet-German front ...
Recognized that the main fault in the fact that the German attack turned out to be unexpected for the covering troops of the western border districts and for the entire Red Army lies with the top leadership of the country. But questions remain. The main one, in my opinion, is the following: where does the responsibility of Stalin and his inner circle end and the responsibility of a lower level, the front command, begins? The relevance of the issue is determined by the highest price paid for the mistakes made.
The country's leadership reacted to the growing flow of reports about the concentration of German troops to the western borders of the USSR with a partial call-up of reserve troops. About 800 thousand people - out of the 5 million planned in the event of full mobilization - replenished the divisions of the western districts in May-June. June 12 People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko signed directives on the advancement of infantry divisions located in the rear areas of the border districts to the border. However, due to the lack of vehicles, they moved extremely slowly. By a resolution of the Politburo of June 21, 1941, the armies of the second strategic echelon, advanced from the depths of the country to the Dnieper-Western Dvina line, were united in the High Command reserve group - the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies.
However, the advancing troops were not equipped with sufficient numbers of people and equipment, and arrived to the west in parts. Worst of all was the readiness of the covering troops to repulse sudden aggression. At the direction of I.V. Stalin, the commanders of the troops of the districts were warned by G.K. Zhukov and S.K. Tymoshenko both about the need to increase vigilance and to prevent reasons for provocation. Any measures that could be interpreted by the command of the Wehrmacht as bringing the Soviet troops to full combat readiness were suppressed by the Kremlin in the strictest way.
The result is known. The troops of the Wehrmacht and its allies brought to full combat readiness - about 4.4 million people, 4 thousand tanks, 4.4 thousand aircraft opposed in the west, although large in terms of the number of tanks and aircraft - 11 thousand and 9.1 thousand, but not combat-ready, a three-million-strong Soviet grouping that was at the stage of formation and did not have a plan for a deep defensive operation. The defense was presented to the Soviet command as a short-term phase of the initial period of hostilities ...
Could the commanders of the troops of the border districts in any way influence the situation and thereby mitigate the tragic consequences of reinsurance and indecision of the top leadership?
By the beginning of the war, the commander of the Western Special Military District, General of the Army D.G. Pavlov was subordinate to the administrations of the 3rd, 10th, 4th armies, located in the immediate vicinity of the border, and the 13th - in the rear area of the district. 678 thousand people, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2,200 tanks and more than 1.5 thousand aircraft. With approximate equality in aircraft, the district was inferior to the Army Group Center in terms of people and artillery, but it was one and a half times superior in tanks. The 6th mechanized corps of General M. Khatskilevich was considered the most complete armored unit in the Red Army - 1.022 tanks, of which 352 KV and T-34. However, most of the tanks were outdated T-26s and BTs.
Information about the deployment of the offensive grouping of the Wehrmacht on the other side of the border began to arrive at the headquarters of the ZapVO from the beginning of 1941. On June 4, the head of the intelligence department of the district headquarters, Colonel Blokhin, presented General Pavlov with a special report "On Germany's preparations for war against the USSR." As noted, in the second half of May, the Germans reinforced their grouping by 2-3 infantry, two armored divisions and an SS division. At the border, the deployment of air defense and anti-tank weapons was noticed. The unloading by the Germans of a large number of trains with aerial bombs, gunpowder, landing at airfields of large aviation formations was established. The movement of the local population in the border zone was reduced to a minimum, and from many areas they were evicted to the "deep regions". All civilian hospitals in major cities and settlements were used as hospitals. Intelligence reported that "the covert mobilization of officials for future positions in western regions USSR... There are paratrooper courses in Czech Prague, for which members of the Belarusian committee from Warsaw are mobilized. At the beginning of hostilities, they will be thrown into the rear of Soviet Belarus to carry out sabotage tasks ... "
The following paragraph of the special message attracted attention: "On May 24, 1941, the branch of German intelligence in
Ciechanow sent five agents to the territory of the USSR with instructions to return no later than June 5, 1941. One of the agents said that he would not have time to return from Bialystok and Grodno by this date. The head of the intelligence point answered this: after June 5, hostilities with the USSR are possible, therefore he cannot guarantee the life of an agent ... "All agents received, among other things, the following tasks: to establish the percentage of former tsarist officers who are in the Red Army, and the mood of the population living in the border areas.
Undercover data confirmed that "the Polish population, based on the experience of preparing the war between Germany and Poland in 1939, and the German soldiers, based on the existing experience of waging war, also consider the start of hostilities with the USSR in the near future inevitable."
The head of the intelligence department came to the conclusion: "Information about the forced preparation of the theater and about the strengthening of the grouping of troops in the zone against the ZapOVO is trustworthy."
It is clear that the Kremlin and the General Staff were informed. But how did Pavlov himself react to detailed information about German preparations for war? We are helped to answer this question by materials prepared after the war, when the cases against Generals Pavlov, Klimovsky, Korobkov and others began to be reviewed for the purpose of rehabilitation.
Here is what, for example, the former head of the operational department of the headquarters of the ZapVO, Major General B. Fomin, wrote:
"Pavlov carefully monitored the preparation of the theater of operations ... Field defensive zones with bunkers were created along the entire length of the border. As for the levels, they were not built and armed by the beginning of the war. Carefully monitoring the deployment of enemy troops, Pavlov repeatedly raised a question before the People's Commissar of Defense about the redeployment of the district's troops from the depths to the border area ... However, the 113th, 121st, 143rd and 50th rifle divisions did not have time to go to the areas planned by them and the war caught them on the march .. .
By the beginning of the war, the troops of the district were in the stage of organizational measures. Five tank corps, an airborne corps were being formed... The material supply was slow... The district aviation was in the stage of pilot training on the incoming new materiel, but there were few retrained crews.
Pavlov knew about the preparation by the Germans of a surprise attack (italics ours. - M.M.) and asked to occupy field fortifications along the state border. On June 20, 1941, in a ciphertext signed by the deputy. Vasilevsky, Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Pavlov was informed that his request was reported to the People's Commissar and the latter did not allow him to occupy the field fortifications, as this could cause a provocation on the part of the Germans ... "
In the actions and deeds of Pavlov, General Fomin did not see wrecking, much less betrayal. In his opinion, the front failed for the following reasons: the numerical superiority of the enemy; surprise attack; inadequate provision of air defense systems; the lack of reserves and a defensive line along the Shchara River at the front and the withdrawal of troops from it on the night of the first to the second day of the war, "as a result of which the enemy, having occupied it without hindrance, created conditions for encircling the troops of the 3rd and 10th armies"; belated occupation of the ur lines along the old state border by troops
13th Army, the illiterate intervention of Marshal G.I. sent by Stalin from Moscow. Kulik at the disposal of the Deputy Front Commander I.V. Boldin and commander of the 10th Army K.D. Golubev, "which led to the inglorious end of the mobile front group."
In the note, Fomin also mentioned the former chief of staff of the front, Major General Klimovskikh, who, in his opinion, was distinguished by "great efficiency and honesty." However, he noted the chief of staff's lack of "a sober assessment of the enemy and his capabilities. Klimovskikh did not believe that the enemy was able to plan his initial operation so far and deliver massive air strikes far into the depth."
In conclusion, Fomin wrote that all the generals he listed, who were arrested and shot in the summer of 1941, “were cut off from command and control at the moment when, through their efforts, the pace of the enemy’s operation began to fade, and command and control of the troops was getting better.”
Fomin's opinion is worthy of attention, but, unfortunately, it leaves out the question: if Pavlov knew that the Germans were preparing a "sudden" attack, what did he actually do - not in words, but in deeds - in order not to lose all their strength in the first days of the war?
preserved a note and the former commander of the 3rd Army, Colonel-General V.I. Kuznetsova. It said:
“All the commanders of the armies, including myself, reported to Pavlov about the completely open preparation of the Germans for the war. For example, we accurately established the concentration of large German forces in the Augustow forests southeast of Suwalki.
We also had anonymous letters in our hands, which indicated the approximate time for the Germans to go on the offensive - June 21, 22, 23. Nevertheless, Pavlov, a few days before the start of the war, ordered all artillery to be sent for artillery firing several hundred kilometers from the front line ... "
Further, Kuznetsov said that he considered Marshal Kulik's instruction to organize a counterattack on June 24 by army units in the general direction of Grodno-Suwalki in order to secure the flank of the front strike group consisting of the 10th Army and Khatskilevich's mechanized corps from the north as incorrect. The fact is that the corps then had only one and a half refuelings of fuel, the front's aviation was defeated, the flanks of the front were open. According to Kuznetsov, the most reasonable would be a transition to "mobile defense" and a counterattack on the rear of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group, which was rapidly advancing towards Baranovichi from the southwest.
Kuznetsov did not see anything treacherous in the actions of Pavlov or Klimovsky, but noted that they "simply failed to master and cope with the situation of the initial period of the war."
Indeed, the opinion that Pavlov and his staff "did not master and cope with the situation" in the initial period of the war seems to be correct. But hardly anyone will undertake to prove the possibility of preventing the defeat of the troops of the Western Front even under a different, more strong-willed or more experienced commander. However, it is obvious that the origins of the tragedy of the Western Front were laid in the pre-war period, and General Pavlov did not do everything possible to prevent the worst-case scenario of hostilities. One example of this is the case with the artillery of the front, brought out just before the war to the rear for firing. It can be assumed that Pavlov's intuition failed here, but one can also think about a certain negligence shown by the employees of the headquarters of the ZapVO.
The lack of proper exactingness in the command of the ZapVO - as well as in the command of the KVO - is evident from the example of the construction of operational airfields in these districts. After all, it was precisely because of the lack of a sufficient number of landing sites that the aviation of the Western Front on the first day of the war lost about 750 combat vehicles, which amounted to about 60 percent of all our aircraft destroyed on June 22 ...
June 18 In 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense issued Order No. 0039 "On the state of construction of operational airfields according to the main construction plan of 1941." It said: “The situation with the construction of operational airfields is amazingly bad. As of June 1 this year, only 50 percent of the plan approved by me has been covered by the construction ... Construction is especially bad in the KVO and ZapVO. The main reason is the lack of exactingness on the part of the military councils of the districts , the failure to take decisive and exhaustive measures to use all the possibilities on the ground".
It is possible to dispute the accusations made in this document, signed, by the way, by S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov. Interestingly, his last paragraph read: "Additional limits on fuel will not be given," so it is necessary "to involve more horse transport and grabars in the construction." It is known that the commanders sorely lacked either the strength or the means to build airfields, but it must be admitted that they were not responsible for peaceful construction and were not simple administrators. They were responsible for the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. It was about the combat readiness of aviation, which in the event of war was supposed to cover their subordinate personnel and equipment ... It is no coincidence, apparently, that General Pavlov’s losses in aviation turned out to be much higher than on neighboring fronts. Most of his aircraft were destroyed on the ground.
Nevertheless, it is hardly productive to compare the degree of competence of one or another commander in the pre-war period or at the beginning of the war. It is very difficult to determine whose mistakes were harder and who behaved more competently. QUO - Southwestern Front- met the enemy invasion somewhat more organized than other districts, but he was the most powerful district in the Red Army. The PribVO - the North-Western Front - also managed to retreat without such severe losses as on the Western Front, but a smaller grouping of Wehrmacht troops operated in the Baltic states. The German command aimed two tank groups at once to defeat our troops in Belarus, which objectively created the prerequisites for the encirclement of our large forces near Bialystok and Minsk.
First of all, you need to look for common mistakes made by the command of the districts. The military councils could take more intensive measures aimed at reducing losses in the event of sudden aggression. These include the creation of minefields in the directions of the alleged enemy strikes, preparations for the explosion of bridges across border rivers, more active construction of airfields and the dispersal of aviation on them, the organization of reliable protection of communication lines - all these measures are purely defensive and could not give rise to a German provocation . Everything turned out differently: German tanks captured the bridges across the Bug intact, and the communication lines cut in the first hours of the war brought chaos to the organization of command and control. The high pace of the German advance to the east was predetermined from the very beginning.
Troops were not mentally prepared for the attack of the enemy. The war was expected, and at the same time they did not want to say goodbye to a peaceful life. Yes, there was a TASS report of June 14, but there was also a lack of strict discipline in the troops themselves. Demandingness was replaced by complacency, which was not long in affecting on the first day of the war. The soldiers and commanders then experienced the greatest shock, which can be judged from the text of the cipher message of the military council of the Western Front to subordinate troops, sent on the evening of June 22, 1941.
“The experience of the first day of the war,” it said, “shows the disorganization and carelessness of many commanders, including big bosses. They begin to think about providing fuel, shells, and cartridges only at a time when cartridges are already running out, while a huge mass of vehicles busy with the evacuation of the families of the commanding staff, who are also accompanied by the Red Army, that is, people of the combat crew. The wounded are not evacuated from the battlefield, the soldiers and commanders are not organized to rest, when they leave, cattle, food are left to the enemy ... "
The ciphergram was signed by D. Pavlov, A. Fominykh (a member of the military council of the front), V. Klimovskikh.
Unfortunately, the blame for the panic that began on the first day of the war, confusion, deviations from the rules of the charter lies largely with the generals themselves, who signed this document. But can the punishment that befell them be considered just? Was their condemnation to death an attempt at self-justification of the country's top leadership?
Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
In the pictures: General of the Army D.G. Pavlov; they fought to the end.
The names of the famous marshals and generals who became the direct blacksmiths of the Great Victory are known to many. Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Malinovsky ... There is hardly anyone in Russia who is not familiar with these names. The merits of these and many other Soviet military leaders have been repeatedly described in historical and memoir literature. Much less fortunate in this regard were those Soviet military leaders (as well as ordinary officers and soldiers) who fell in the first days, weeks and months of the war, never knowing the joy of victory over the Nazis. But we all owe them as much as we owe to those who reached Berlin. After all, it was these people, the real heroes and patriots of their homeland, who fought to the last, trying to hold back the onslaught of an enemy superior in armament and technical equipment on the frontiers. Soviet country. In this article, we will talk about one of these heroes.
The Kiev Special Military District in the period preceding the start of the Great Patriotic War was considered by the supreme command as one of the country's key military districts. The Kiev military district was created on May 17, 1935, as a result of the division of the Ukrainian military district into the Kiev and Kharkov military districts. In 1938, it was decided to transform the Kiev Military District into the Kiev Special Military District (hereinafter - KOVO). In the western direction, its role was decisive, since it covered the strategically important territory of the Ukrainian SSR. By 1941, it covered the Kyiv, Vinnitsa, Zhytomyr, Kamenetz-Podolsk, Stanislav, Ternopil, Chernivtsi, Rivne, Volyn, Lvov and Drohobych regions of the Ukrainian SSR.
The district was border, and this determined its strategic importance for the defense of the Soviet state. The largest grouping of Soviet troops in the western direction was stationed on the territory of the district. Naturally, a person worthy and trusted by Moscow should have commanded such an important district. Since the formation of the Kyiv Special Military District, the position of commander has been occupied by such illustrious Soviet commanders as commander of the 2nd rank Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko (in 1938-1940) and General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov (1940-1941).
On February 28, 1941, Georgy Zhukov, who became the winner of two major military games that practiced the offensive of the Soviet troops in the western direction and, accordingly, the defense in the western direction, was nominated by Joseph Stalin to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. The question arose of who would replace Georgy Konstantinovich as commander of the Kyiv Special Military District. It was supposed to be no less worthy and talented military leader. Ultimately, Stalin chose Lieutenant General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos. Forty-nine-year-old Lieutenant General Kirponos, before being appointed commander of the Kyiv Special Military District, commanded the Leningrad Military District. He was a military leader with great combat experience, who received the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the Soviet-Finnish war.
From peasant son to red commander
Like many Soviet military leaders, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was, as they say, a man of the people. He was born on January 22 (January 9, according to the old style), 1892, in the town of Vertievka, Nezhinsky district, Chernigov province, into a poor peasant family. His education was reduced in adolescence to a year of parochial and three years of zemstvo school. Since the family did not have much money, they had to stop studying and, like many peers from the village, go to work. Since 1909, Kirponos worked as a watchman, a forester in the forestries of the Chernihiv province. In 1911, he married the daughter of a saddler, Olimpiada Polyakova (later he divorced her in 1919, leaving two daughters for himself, and in the same 1919 married Sofya Piotrovskaya). When did the first World War, Mikhail Kirponos was already 22 years old.
In 1915, the young man was called up for military service. He graduated from instructor courses at the Oranienbaum officer rifle school, after which he was assigned to the 216th reserve infantry regiment stationed in Kozlov (now the city of Michurinsk in the Tambov region). In 1917, Kirponos changed his military specialty - he graduated from a military paramedic school, and in August of the same year he was sent to the Romanian front as part of the 258th Olgopolsky infantry regiment. Twenty-five-year-old Mikhail Kirponos becomes chairman of the soldiers' regimental committee, in November of the same year - chairman of the soldiers' council of the 26th Army Corps.
Apparently, during these years, young Kirponos not only sympathized with the revolutionary movement, but also tried to take an active part in it. So, he organized fraternization with Austro-Hungarian soldiers, for which he was arrested and in February 1918 demobilized from Russian army. Then he became a member of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Returning to his homeland, where German and Austro-Hungarian troops were in charge, Mikhail Kirponos joined the partisan struggle and created a small detachment that fought both against the Germans and Austrians, and against the troops of the Central Rada. Having joined the Red Army in August 1918, Kirponos almost immediately (the next month of September), as an experienced military man, was appointed company commander in the 1st Soviet Ukrainian Rifle Division. The division, by the way, was commanded by the legendary division commander Nikolai Shchors.
In the Red Army, Kirponos' career went rapidly - in December, two months before that, having commanded a company, he became a battalion commander, and then - chief of staff and commander of the 22nd Ukrainian rifle regiment in the 44th Infantry Division. In this capacity, the regiment commander Kirponos took part in the battles for the capture of Berdichev, Zhytomyr and Kyiv. In July 1919, a new appointment came - as assistant head of the divisional school of red foremen (red commanders) of the same 44th rifle division. Here begins the temporary decline of Kirponos, apparently due to his lack of military education. So, in May 1920, he became an assistant to the head of the economic team of the 2nd Kiev school of red foremen, and in June 1921, a year later, he became the head of the economic department, then - assistant commissar of the same school. In 1922, Kirponos graduated from the 2nd Kyiv school of red foremen, thus receiving a military education without interrupting his service at school.
After receiving a military education, Kirponos continued to serve for a year at the Kharkiv School of Red Starshina (October 1922 - September 1923), where he served as assistant chief for political affairs. Then followed study at the Military Academy of the Red Army. M.V. Frunze, which Kirponos graduated in 1927 and was assigned as a battalion commander to the 130th Bogunsky Rifle Regiment. However, already in December 1928, he again returned to the system of military educational institutions - this time as an assistant chief - head of the educational unit of the Kharkov military school red foremen them. VTsIK. April 1929 to March 1934 Kirponos served in the 51st Perekop Rifle Division - first, until January 1931, as an assistant, and then as division chief of staff.
In March 1934, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed head and military commissar of the Tatar-Bashkir United Military School named after. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR. Kirponos led this military educational institution for more than five years - from March 1934 to December 1939. During this time, the school has undergone several renamings - in December 1935 it was renamed the Tatar-Bashkir Military Infantry School named after the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR, in April 1936 - the Kazan Infantry School named after. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR, in March 1937 - to the Kazan Infantry military school them. Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR and, finally, in March 1939 - to the Kazan Infantry School. Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR. Since March 1937, the military school became an all-Union one and young people from all the Union republics of the USSR were able to enter it. During the five years that Kirponos led the Kazan School, many worthy commanders received training and were released into the troops, some of them were awarded high awards, including the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Kirponos himself rose in ranks during the leadership of the school and college. On October 26, 1935, he was awarded the rank of brigade commander, and four years later, on November 4, 1939, the rank of division commander.
The cadets of the school remembered Kirponos as an excellent commander and educator - military pedagogical activity was his real vocation. In addition, Kirponos, being the head of the school, was also engaged in administrative and economic work - after all, at that time the organization of the normal supply of the school also seemed to be quite difficult and, at the same time, a very necessary thing. Party and political activity remained the most important for Kirponos - since the end of the First World War, when he was elected chairman of the regimental soldier's committee, Kirponos was actively engaged in social activities. A convinced communist, he took an active part in all party meetings of the school and college. Naturally, in the spirit of the times, he had to participate in the denunciation of "enemies of the people." At the same time, it should be noted that Kirponos always, as they say, "knew the measure" - where were the real opposition to the Soviet course, and where were accidentally suspected people. For some cadets, commanders and teachers of the school, he played the role of an intercessor. The fact that Kirponos was an active communist and unreservedly supported Stalinist policies, of course, also played a role in his subsequent rapid military career. Especially when you consider that in the late 1930s. many commanders of the Red Army were repressed and their positions had to be replaced by someone.
Soviet-Finnish war and promotion
Meanwhile, the military-political situation on the Soviet borders deteriorated significantly. In the northwestern direction, the Soviet Union came into conflict with Finland. On November 28, 1939, the Non-Aggression Pact was denounced, and on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops stationed on the Soviet-Finnish border were ordered to go on the offensive. The official reason for the start of hostilities was the shelling of Soviet territory from the territory of Finland. An impressive Soviet group of troops was concentrated against Finland, consisting of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. From the first days of the beginning of the war, the need for competent and talented commanders began to be felt, in connection with which the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR turned to the practice of transferring top commanders from other military formations and military educational institutions to the active army. In December 1939, division commander Mikhail Kirponos, who at that time was head of the Kazan Infantry School, received a new appointment - commander of the 70th rifle division, which was part of the 7th army of the Red Army. Thus, the head of the school, who actually had no real experience in commanding military formations, except for a short-term participation in the Civil War, was given high confidence and, as it were, opened up opportunities for further career advancement in the event of successful command of the entrusted rifle division.
The Seventh Army was concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. By November 1939, it included, in addition to the army headquarters, the 19th and 50th rifle corps and in their composition the 24th, 43rd, 49th, 70th, 90th, 123rd , 138th, 142nd and 150th rifle divisions, three tank brigades, six RGK artillery regiments, three RGK high-capacity artillery battalions. The army air force included the 1st and 68th light bomber, 16th high-speed bomber and 59th fighter aviation brigades, consisting of 12 aviation regiments and 644 aircraft.
The 70th Rifle Division, which was to be commanded by Commander Kirponos, was part of the 19th Rifle Corps of the 7th Army and included three rifle regiments (68th, 252nd and 329th regiments), two artillery regiments (221 th light artillery regiment and 227th howitzer artillery regiment), 361st tank battalion, 204th chemical tank battalion. In February 1940, the 28th tank regiment on the T-26 was included in the division. November 30, 1939 the division entered the territory of Finland. Kirponos, who took over the division on December 25, 1939, replaced its previous commander, Colonel Fedor Aleksandrovich Prokhorov. To the credit of the latter, we can say that he prepared his fighters perfectly and the division was considered one of the best in the army. Under the command of Kirponos, on February 11, 1940, she began participating in the breakthrough of the famous "Mannerheim Line". From February 11 to February 14, division units occupied part of the field fortifications of the Karhul region, on February 17 they participated in the "battle for the islands", on February 21-23 - in the capture of the island of Liisaari (Northern Berezovy). On February 26, the division was transferred from the 19th Rifle Corps to the 10th Rifle Corps. Its fighters managed to occupy part of the Koivisto (Kiperort) peninsula, Pukinsaari (Goat) and Hannukkalansaari (Maisky) islands.
On February 29, the division was transferred to the 28th Rifle Corps, as part of which it participated in the battles for the city of Trongzund (Vysotsk), then for the island of Ravansaari (Maly Vysotsky). Most famous feat divisions began to force at night on the ice of the Vyborg Bay. Having made a six-day raid behind enemy lines, in March 1940 the division occupied a bridgehead on the northern coast of the bay and took control of the Vyborg-Khamina road. This division roll played essential role in the assault on Vyborg, which could not but go unnoticed by the higher command. The division was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 252nd Rifle and 227th Howitzer Artillery Regiments were awarded the Orders of the Red Banner. On March 21, 1940, the division commander Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union and received the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
The successful command of the 70th Rifle Division, which showed its prowess and combat skills in the Soviet-Finnish war, became the “finest hour” of division commander Kirponos, literally and figuratively. It was from this time that his rapid, but, unfortunately, short-lived, ascent through the steps of the command posts of the Red Army began. Prior to that, Kirponos led a military school for five years, and within four years he rose only one rank. But the feat of the 70th Infantry Division contributed to the fact that the divisional commander was noticed. In April 1940, a month after crossing the Vyborg Bay, Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the 49th Rifle Corps, which was part of the Kyiv Special Military District. However, already in June of the same year, two months after his appointment as corps commander, Kirponos was waiting for the next colossal promotion - he was appointed commander of the Leningrad Military District. June 4, 1940 Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded military rank"lieutenant general" (in connection with the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army).
Kyiv Special Military District
However, Mikhail Kirponos also did not stay long in the post of commander of the Leningrad Military District. Already in February 1941, less than a year after his appointment to the LVO, Kirponos was appointed commander of the Kyiv Special Military District. On February 22, 1941, Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos was awarded the next military rank of Colonel General. Appointment to the Kiev Special Military District shows that the high command trusted Mikhail Kirponos and, apparently, it was after his successful leadership of units of the 70th Infantry Division during the Soviet-Finnish War that they saw him as a promising commander capable of well preparing the troops of a strategically important districts and effectively command them.
Apparently, Stalin, appointing Kirponos as commander of the most important military district in the defense system of the western direction, hoped that Kirponos would be able to prepare the district for the coming war, without arousing suspicion from the enemy. After all, Kirponos during the years of the Civil War had a wealth of experience in participating in the partisan movement - first commanding his own rebel detachment, and then serving in the Shchors division. The command of a partisan formation requires that creativity of thinking, versatility, and the ability to make decisions independently, which the commanders of regular army units sometimes lack. Moreover, Kirponos had to combine not only military and political leadership, but also the functions of an administrator and a supplier. In general, it should be noted that there was no mistake in choosing Kirponos for the post of commander of the district - the colonel-general really corresponded to the hopes placed on him in his personal and professional qualities. Although, nevertheless, the new commander had one drawback - too little experience in commanding active combat units.
In fact, if you do not take into account the time of participation in the Civil War in the Shchors division, and later in the Soviet-Finnish war, most of Mikhail Petrovich's military service fell on military pedagogical activity - he held various positions in military educational institutions. General of the Army Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov also drew attention to this shortcoming, from whom Kirponos took command of the Kiev Special Military District: “I was glad that the Kiev Special Military District went to such a worthy commander. Of course, he, like many others, did not yet have the necessary knowledge and experience to lead such a large border district, but life experience, diligence and natural intelligence guaranteed that a first-class commander of the troops would develop from Mikhail Petrovich ”(Quoted by: Meretskov K. A. In the service of the people, St. Petersburg, 2003). That is, despite the lack of experience, Zhukov, nevertheless, recognized a promising commander in Kirponos and was convinced that the colonel-general would be able to fully reveal his military leadership talent, delving into the nuances of commanding the district.
Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan, who at that time served as the head of the operations department - deputy chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District with the rank of colonel, recalls the appointment of Kirponos as commander of the district: “Shortly after his arrival, the new commander walked around the headquarters. Apparently, he wanted to quickly get acquainted with the state of affairs, with people. He also visited us, in the operations department. His lean, fine figure was tightly fitted by a carefully pressed tunic. A golden star of the Hero gleamed on his chest. Pale, clean-shaven face with almost no wrinkles. Black eyebrows hung over large blue eyes. Dark, thick hair carefully parted. Only a slight gray hair at the temples and deep folds in the corners of the lips betrayed that this youthful man was already under fifty ”(Quoted from: Bagramyan I.Kh. This is how the war began. M., 1971).
Commander Kirponos paid much attention to the issues of combat training of troops. Understanding perfectly well that Germany is the most likely enemy of the Soviet Union, the command of the Red Army paid great attention to the preparation of military units and formations of the Kyiv Special Military District. First of all, the task was to work out actions in the event of an enemy tank attack. On the other hand, emphasis was placed on improving the training of their own tank units. Thus, the district commander, Colonel-General Kirponos, was the most frequent guest in mechanized corps, where he tested the ability of crews to control tanks, and tank units - to act in a coordinated manner in battle.
In addition to combat training, the construction and equipping of fortifications in the border areas remained the most important area of activity for the troops of the Kyiv Special Military District. However, despite all the efforts of the commander, the district experienced a lot of problems that were typical for the entire Red Army in the pre-war period. First of all, we are talking about weak armament and shortage of personnel in units and formations. According to the memoirs of I.Kh. Bagramyan, only in the Kiev Special Military District there were not enough 30 thousand military personnel. And this is despite the fact that military schools were transferred from a three-year to a two-year period of study, courses for junior lieutenants were created to accelerate the training of command personnel. As for the provision of troops with weapons and equipment, there was a lack of communications and special equipment, vehicles everywhere. It was not possible to make up for all this overnight - the country's national economy was already working at its limit.
War
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany and its satellites attacked the Soviet Union. Among the first to receive their blow were the military units and formations that were part of the Kyiv Special Military District. On the day the war began, the Kiev Special Military District was transformed into the Southwestern Front. Colonel General Mikhail Kirponos was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front. The troops of the Southwestern Front numbered 957 thousand soldiers and officers. The district was armed with 12.6 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, 4783 tanks and 1759 aircraft. Hitler's Army Group "South" was concentrated against the Southwestern Front, numbering 730 thousand soldiers and officers, 9.7 thousand artillery pieces and mortars, 799 tanks and 772 aircraft. That is, at first glance, the Soviet troops had a significant superiority not only in manpower, but also in weapons. However, in reality the situation looked different. First, almost immediately after the start of the war, Army Group South received reinforcements from 19 divisions, and Hungarian, Romanian, Italian and Slovak troops also joined it. The Southwestern Front did not receive reinforcements in such quantities, and the state of its technical fleet, although at first glance superior to the German one in terms of the number of tanks, aircraft and artillery pieces, left much to be desired. Secondly, only a few Soviet divisions were stationed in close proximity to the border, while the enemy hit Army Group South with the entire "fist" at once, securing a numerical superiority over the Soviet troops in the border area and leveling the capabilities of the troops of the Southwestern Front by more than late stages of hostilities, as they entered into fighting alternately and, accordingly, could not use their advantages in a larger number of personnel.
On June 22, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered Colonel General Kirponos to ensure the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops with the forces of the 5th and 6th armies and take Lublin. In itself, this task seemed difficult, but Kirponos had no choice but to try to complete it. Opposite points of view emerged in the front command. Corps Commissar Nikolai Nikolaevich Vashugin, a member of the Front's Military Council, advocated the immediate execution of the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters on a counteroffensive. The opposite position was held by the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant-General Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev. He understood that the troops of the front simply would not have time to concentrate to deliver a retaliatory strike and suggested organizing a defense, holding back the enemy for as long as possible in order to create fortified areas in the inner territories of the district.
Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos came up with a slightly different idea - he proposed to strike at the base of the German group directed at Kiev by the forces of three mechanized corps and rifle divisions of the 5th and 6th armies. The task of the counterattack would be the complete destruction of the enemy’s vanguard and the maximum containment of the 1st Panzer Army, commanded by General Ewald von Kleist (the tank army included five Wehrmacht panzer divisions). However, the offensive strike of the Soviet troops was unsuccessful. Interaction between mechanized corps was not established. Organizational miscalculations led to the depletion of the resource part of the old armored vehicles, which were mainly equipped with mechanized corps of the front. Finally, the 34th Panzer Division was surrounded and was able to break through to its own, only having lost all its tanks. Speaking about the causes of organizational miscalculations, P.V. Burkin draws attention to the lack of practical experience of General Kirponos in leading large military formations. Indeed, in fact, before becoming commander of the district, he commanded only a rifle division, which, moreover, did not have tank units in its composition. Accordingly, Kirponos had no experience in organizing the interaction of mechanized units (See: Burkin P.V. General Kirponos: the experience of historical and anthropological research).
However, to a certain extent, the troops of the Southwestern Front still managed to significantly impede the enemy's advance towards Kyiv. Although the counteroffensive plan failed, the Soviet troops stopped the Wehrmacht units 20 km away. west of Kyiv. This forced the Nazis to change their offensive tactics. The command of the Wehrmacht temporarily refused to storm Kyiv and sent all its forces to the left flank of the front. The enemy pushed the 6th and 12th Soviet armies to the south of Ukraine, gradually cutting them off from the main forces of the Southwestern Front. In the Tarashchi region, a retaliatory offensive by the 26th Army was conceived, but in the end it was suppressed by the enemy. The Wehrmacht pushed back the 26th Army to the northeast, after which the position of the Southwestern Front worsened even more. Enemy formations came close to Kyiv. The High Command demanded the immediate retention of the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On August 8, Kirponos organized a counterattack on enemy positions, throwing all the forces at his disposal - the 175th, 147th rifle divisions that participated in the defense of Kiev, the reserve 206th and 284th divisions, the 2nd and 6th airborne brigades. On August 9, the 5th Airborne Brigade and the Kiev People's Militia entered the battle. As a result, the Wehrmacht began a gradual retreat from Kyiv. By August 16, the enemy was driven back to their original positions by the heroic efforts of the Soviet troops. The defense of Kyiv played a crucial role in the first stage of the Great Patriotic War, significantly slowing down the advance of the enemy troops deep into Soviet territory and forcing the Nazi command to change the trajectory of the movement of the main forces of the Wehrmacht. Thus, for a whole month, which during the war had a very great importance, the Nazi offensive towards Moscow was delayed.
Since the Nazi troops were redirected from Moscow to the south, the main task was to retreat from near Kyiv. Kirponos himself, and marshals Budyonny and Shaposhnikov insisted on this. However, Stalin did not give permission for the withdrawal of troops. As a result, by September 14, the 5th, 21st, 26th and 37th armies were surrounded. Tens of thousands of Soviet servicemen died in encirclement or when trying to break through it. The troops of the Southwestern Front were divided and surrounded by the enemy. September 20 to the farm Dryukovshchina, which is 15 km. southwest of Lokhvitsa, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front and the 5th Army approached with escort forces. Here they were attacked by units of the Nazi 3rd Panzer Division. The artillery commander of the 5th Army, Major General Sotensky, and officers of his headquarters were taken prisoner. The total strength of the headquarters column at this point was about a thousand people, including approximately 800 commanders - generals and staff officers, as well as a commandant's company.
The column withdrew to the Shumeikovo grove. The column included the commander of the front, General Kirponos, the chief of staff of the front, Tupikov, members of the Military Council of the front, Burmistenko and Rykov, the commander of the 5th Army, Potapov, and other top commanders of the front. Parts of the Wehrmacht attacked the Shumeikovo grove in three directions. The battle lasted five hours. Colonel-General Mikhail Kirponos was wounded in the leg, then fragments of a mine hit him in the chest, which is why he died. The subordinates buried the front commander here, on the territory of the grove. The chief of staff Tupikov, a member of the Military Council Burmistenko, and many other commanders also died in the battle. The commander of the 5th Army, General Potapov, was taken prisoner.
In December 1943, the remains of Colonel General Mikhail Petrovich Kirponos, Hero of the Soviet Union, were reburied in Kyiv in the Botanical Garden. A.V. Fomin, and in 1957 - moved to the Park of Eternal Glory. General Kirponos did not fully manage to reveal his, of course, present military talent. He died at the very beginning of the war, catching its most tragic moments - the retreat of Soviet troops, the occupation of a huge part of the territory of Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, we can say with confidence that General Kirponos made a colossal contribution to the defense of the country from the aggression of Nazi Germany. Detaining the German troops near Kiev, he delayed the attack on Moscow, making it possible to consolidate the forces of the Red Army in the defense of the Soviet capital. Despite all those mistakes and miscalculations in the leadership of the troops, which many modern historians pay attention to, General Kirponos honorably walked his path as a Soviet soldier and died on the battlefield, in battle, without surrendering to the enemy. It remains only to bring to the end of the article the words from the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko about Colonel General Kirponos: good and bright memory in the hearts of those who knew him ... "(Moskalenko K.S. In the south-western direction. M., 1975).
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Commander of the ZapOVO troops, General of the Army Dmitry Grigorievich PavlovBorn on 23.10 (4.11). 1897 in the village. Smelly now Kostroma region. Member of the 1st World He was rehabilitated by the Commission of the General Staff "due to the lack of corpus delicti" in 1957. | |
Chief of Staff of the ZapOVO, Major General Klimovskikh Vladimir EfimovichBorn on May 27, 1885 in Kokand. On military service since 1913 Member of the 1st World War in the following positions: head of a mounted scout team, company commander, battalion commander. In the Red Army since 1918. He participated in the Civil War as an assistant chief of staff of the army, chief of staff of a division, chief of a department of army headquarters, chief of a division, and a group of troops. After the Civil War, he was the chief of staff of the rifle corps, the head of the department, and the assistant to the head of the headquarters of the military districts. December 1932 to June 1936 was a teacher at the Frunze Military Academy. From July 1936 - assistant army inspector, from February 1938. - Senior Lecturer at the Military Academy of the General Staff. From September 1939 was deputy chief of staff, from July 1940. - Chief of Staff of the Belarusian Special Military District. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War - Chief of Staff of the Western Front. Major General (1940). Awarded with the Order Red Banner, Honorary weapon. |
Deputy Commander of the ZapOVO Troops - Lieutenant General Boldin Ivan Vasilyevich
Member of the Military Council of the ZapOVO - Corps Commissar Fominykh A.Ya.
Chief of Artillery - Lieutenant General Klich N.A.
Head of the Signal Corps - Major General Grigoriev A.T.
According to "Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZAPOVO Troops" N503859/cc/s [no later than May 20, 1941]:
Border with PribOVO - Oshmeny, Druskeniki, Margerabovo, Letzen, all points except Margerabov for ZapOVO inclusive.
Border with KOVO - Pinsk, Vlodava, Demblin, all except Demblin for ZapOVO inclusive.
Cover area N1 - 3 army
Compound:
Office of the 3rd Army;
control 4
case page;
56, 27, 85
And 24
division lines;
control 11
mechanized corps
29
And 33
tank divisions;
204
motorized division;
6
anti-tank artillery brigade;
11
border areas.
Army Headquarters - Grodno
Task- strong defense of the Grodno fortified region and field fortifications on the Kanchiamietis front, up to Shchuchin claim. cover the Lida, Grodno and Bialystok directions.
N2 cover area - 10 army
Compound:
management of the 10th army;
control 1
And 5 rifle corps
8, 13, 86
And 2
division pages;
control 6 cav. cases
6
And 36
kaval. divisions;
control 6 mechanical cases
4
And 7
tank divisions
29
motorized division;
9
mixed aviation division;
border areas.
Army Headquarters - Bialystok.
6 cavalry building to have in the Tykotsin, Sokoly, Menlyanin area.
border left- claim. Add., Svisloch, Surals, Chileevo and further along the river Bug
Task- strong defense of the Osowiec and Zambrovsky fortified regions and field fortifications within the borders, covering the direction to Bialystok and especially from Johannisburg, Ostroleka and Ostrow Mazowiecki.
Cover area N3 - 13th army
Compound:
control 2 p. case
113
And 49
division pages;
control 13 mech.hulls
25
And 31
tank divisions;
208
motorized division;
border areas.
Army Headquarters Belsk
border left- claim. Kossovo, Gainuvka, Drogochin, Gura-Kalvaria.
Task- with the defense of field fortifications, firmly cover the directions to Bielsk from the direction of Kossy and Sokolow.
Cover area N4 - 4 army
Compound:
command of the 4th army;
control 28 pages of the body
6, 42, 75
And 100
division lines;
control 14 mechanized corps
22
And 30
tank division
205
motorized division;
garrison of the Brest fortified region;
10
mixed aviation division;
border areas.
border left- border of the village of Kovo.
Task- strong defense of the Brest fortified region and field fortifications along the eastern bank of the Bug River, to cover the concentration and deployment of the army.
At the direct disposal of the district command to have:
21
17
rifle division and 50
division division
47
rifle corps, 55
rifle division, 121
And 155
divisions
44
rifle corps, 108
division division , 64
division and 161
divisions, 37
And 143
divisions
Anti-tank brigades - 7
-I in the area of the station Blasostovitsa, Grudsk, Yaluvka; 8
-I - in the Lida area
Mechanized Corps:
17 microns, in the composition 27
And 36
tank divisions and 209
motorized division in the Volkovysk area
20 microns- in the composition 26
And 38
tank divisions and 210
motorized division in the Oshmyany area.
4
airborne corps in the area of Pukhovichi, Osipovichi.
Aviation - 59
And 60
fighter aviation division; 12
And 13
bomber divisions.
3
aviation corps - part of 42
And 52
long-range bomber air divisions and 61
fighter division. The corps is used according to the instructions of the High Command.
_____________________________________________________
In 13 and 11 MK, according to Pavlov, one division was trained, and the rest, having received recruits, had only a training unit, and even then not everywhere. 14 MK had only one poorly trained motorized division and rifle regiments of tank divisions.
(Institute military history MO RF: Documents and materials; 1941 - lessons and conclusions. M. 1992; Müller-Gillerband B. Land Army of Germany, 1933-1945; TsAMO. F.208. Op.25899.D.93.L.5 (the size of the front with the Pinsk flotilla)Forces and means | Western Front (only serviceable equipment is taken into account) | Army Group "Center" (without 3 Tgr) | Ratio |
Personnel, thousand people | 678 | 629,9 | 1,1: 1 |
Guns and mortars (without 50 mm), pcs. | 10296 | 12500 | 1:1,2 |
tanks | 2189 (2201 if added according to MK) | 810 | 2,7: 1 |
combat aircraft | 1539 | 1677 | 1: 1,1 |
In the first echelon, the Germans concentrated 28 divisions, of which 4 were armored.
In the first echelon of the covering armies, it was planned to have only 13 rifle divisions (WWII, M, 1998).
And here is the data published in the "Secrecy stamp lifted":
The number of troops at the beginning of the Belarusian defensive operation - 625,000 people + 2300 (Pinsk military flotilla)
(Discrepancy at 50,700 people.)
In the course of hostilities, 45 divisions were added to the Soviet troops. The duration of the operation is 18 days. The width of the front of hostilities is 450-800 km. The depth of withdrawal of Soviet troops is 450-600 km. Average daily losses - 23210 people.
Information about the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West
June 13, 1941
...
Western Front
I Ground troops
44 divisions, including SD-24, TD-12, MD-6, CD-2
II Air Force
21 air regiment
3A: 8 divisions, of which: sd - 5, td - 2, md - 1
10A: sd - 5 ( where did the cavalry divisions, the 6th MK and the 29th motorized division go?)
13A: 11 divisions, of which: sd -6, td - 2, md - 1, cd - 2
4A: 12 divisions, of which: sd - 6, td - 4, md - 2
front reserve - 8 divisions, of which: sd - 2, td - 4, md - 2
____________________________________________________________________
From the certificate "on the training of assigned personnel in rifle divisions in 1941":
Order:
64 sd
108 sd- (beginning of training camp - June 1) 6000 people
143 sd- (beginning of training camp - June 1) 6000 people
161 sd- (beginning of training camp - June 1) 6000 people
_____________________________________________________________________
From the certificate it turns out that the 44th reserve corps was replenished. None of the divisions of the 1st echelon was replenished.
Approximately, the number of ZapOVO divisions was 9327 people each. (History of the 2nd World War, 12 volumes) with headcount 14483 people.
_____________________________________________
Directive of the NPO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZapOVO [not later than June 22, 1941]
1. To increase the combat readiness of the troops to the districts, all deep rifle divisions and management rifle corps with the corps to bring to the camp in the areas provided for them by the cover plan (NPO directive for N503859 / cc / s /).
2. Leave the border divisions in place, having their withdrawal to the border in the areas assigned to them, if necessary, will be carried out on my special order.
3. 44 line corps, as part of the management of the corps 108, 64, 161 and 143 divisions and corps units - withdraw to the Baranovichi area, at your discretion.
Withdraw the 37 division to the Lida area, including it in the 21 division of the corps.
4. The withdrawal of these troops must be completed by July 1, 1941.
5. Submit the withdrawal plan with an indication of the order and timing of the withdrawal for each connection with a courier ... [June 41]
People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko
Chief of the General Staff G. Zhukov
_______________________________________________
So, the real location of our units on June 22, 1941. Data compiled from orders and memoirs of military leaders. The most detailed location of parts 4A is indicated in Sandalovo's book "The First Days of the War".
3 army
Army headquarters in Grodno.
Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Location of parts |
4th rifle corps | |||
56 rifle division | major general Sakhnov S.P. | area of the Augustow Canal 213th regiment in the Sapotskin area (took part in the construction of the Grodno UR) |
|
27 rifle division | |||
85 rifle division | west of Grodno | ||
24 rifle division | Galitsky K.N. | ||
11 mechanized corps (237 tanks, including 31 KV and T-34) | general Mostovenko D.K. | Volkovysk | |
29 tank division | Steklov | Grodno district | |
204 motorized division | Volkovysk | Volkovysk |
6
anti-tank artillery brigade - Mikhalovo area;
garrison of the Grodno fortified region;
11
mixed aviation division;
86
border squad.
124
GAP RGC
10 army
Commander Major General Golubev Konstantin Dmitrievich,
chief of staff - Major General Petr Ivanovich Lyapin.
Army Headquarters - Bialystok.
Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Location of parts |
5 rifle corps | major general Garnov A.V. | Zambrow | |
86 rifle division | Tsekhanovets | Tsekhanovets district | |
13 rifle division | Snyadovo | Sniadowo-Zambrow district | |
6 cavalry corps | Nikitin I.S. | Lomza | Lomza region |
6 cavalry division | Lomza | Lomza | |
36 cavalry division | Volkovysk | Volkovysk | |
6 mechanized corps (1021 tanks of which 14 KV and 338 T-34) | major general Khatskilevich Mikhail Georgievich | Bialystok | |
4 tank division | Bialystok | Bialystok region | |
7th Panzer Division | major general Borzilov | Bialystok region | Bialystok region |
29 motorized division | Bialystok | Bialystok region |
garrisons of the Osovets and Zambrovsky fortified regions;
9
mixed aviation division - Bialystok area;
border areas.
4 army
commander - Major General Korobkov A.A.
Chief of Staff - Colonel Sandalov Leonid Mikhailovich
Army Headquarters - Kobrin
Compound | Commander | Headquarters location | Location of parts |
28 rifle corps | major general Popov Vasily Stepanovich | Brest | |
6 rifle division | Popsuy-Shapko M.A. | Brest | Brest |
42 rifle division | major general Lazarenko I.S. | Brest | Brest, Zhabinka |
75 rifle division | general Nedvigin S.I. | Malorita | Mednaya district, Chersk, Malorita |
14 mechanized corps (520 tanks) | general Oborin S.I., chief of staff - colonel Tutarinov I.V. | Kobrin | |
22 tank division | general Puganov V.P. | Brest | Brest |
30 tank division (174 T-26 tanks) | colonel Bogdanov S.I., chief of staff - colonel Bolotov N.N. | Pruzhany | Pruzhany |
205 motorized division | colonel Kudyurov F.F. | Bereza-Kartuzskaya | Bereza-Kartuzskaya |
The 49th division was transferred to 4A from 13A.
10
mixed aviation division (commander - colonel Belov M.G.)
(from new types of aircraft: Yak-1 - 20, Il-2 - 8, Pe-2 - 5)
33rd (Pruzhany) and 123rd (Kobrin) fighter regiments,
74th Assault Aviation Regiment - field airfield southeast of Vysokoe
39th bomber regiment (Pinsk);
30
mixed air division (241 aircraft):
138 fighters (I-16 - 44, I-153 - 74 and Yak-1 - 20 aircraft)
55 attack aircraft (I-15 - 47 and IL-2 - 8 aircraft)
48 bombers (SB - 43 and Pe-2 - 5 aircraft)
Kobrin air defense brigade area:
218th and 298th air defense divisions of the RGK,
28th separate anti-aircraft artillery battery,
11th VNOS Battalion
(the anti-aircraft units of the brigade area, as well as the anti-aircraft divisions of the formations of the 4th army, were in the Krupki district camp, 115 km northeast of Minsk, 450 km from the border (!?))
Brest UR:
16th, 17th, 18th machine gun and artillery battalions
Brest border detachment(commander - Kuznetsov A.P.)
120 gap RGK - Kossovo
As Sandalov writes, "the troops of the 4th Army did not have an operational formation, however, the actual location of its formations by June 22, 1941 can be represented as a construction in two echelons: the first echelon - four rifle and one tank divisions; the second echelon - one tank and one motorized division.
* * *13th army
Commander Lieutenant General Filatov Petr Mikhailovich
chief of staff - brigade commander Petrushevsky A.V.
On June 22, the Army Headquarters was in Mogilev in connection with which,
113 sd and 13 microns were transferred to 10A,
49 sd was transferred to 4A
2 rifle corps
(commander - Major General Ermakov A.N.) - In Minsk
100
Major General Russiyanov I.N.) - In Minsk
161
rifle division (commander - Colonel Mikhailov A.I.)
21
rifle corps(commander - Major General Borisov V.B.) in the area of the station Druskeniki, Yasidomlya, Skidel, Dembrovo
17
rifle division (commander - Major General Batsanov T.K.)
50
rifle division (commander - Major General Evdokimov V.P.)
37
rifle division (commander - Colonel Chekharin A.E.) - Lida district
47
rifle corps(commander - General Povetkin S.I.) - in Bobruisk
near Pruzhany, Dams, Kartuzberez, Bluden
55
rifle division (commander - Colonel Ivanov D.I.) - Slutsk
121
rifle division (commander - Major General Zykov P.M.)
143
rifle division (commander - Major General Safonov D.P.)
44
rifle corps(commander - major general Yushkevich V.A.) - Baranovichi district
108
rifle division (commander - Major General Mavrichev A.I.) - district of Minsk
64
rifle division (commander - Colonel Iovlev S.I.) - district of Minsk
8
anti-tank artillery brigade (commander - Strelbitsky I.S.) - in the Lida area
7
anti-tank artillery brigade in the area of Blasostovitsa station, Grudsk, Yaluvka
17
mechanized corps(36 tanks, commander - General Petrov) - Baranovichi district
27
tank division - in Novogrudok
36
tank division - Nesvizh area
209
motorized division - in Ivye
20
mechanized corps(93 tanks) - Borisov area
26
tank division - in Minsk
38
Panzer Division - Borisov
210
motorized division - Osipovichi
12
13
bomber air division
3rd aviation corps (commander - Colonel Skripko N.S.)
4th airborne corps (commander - General Zhadov A.S.) - Pukhovichi district
Pinsk flotilla(commander - Admiral Rogachev D.D.)
Air Force of the Western Front
A total of 16 airfields to base 9, 10 and 11 gardens
Tirnovo (12 km from the border) - 131 aircraft (66 MiG-3 and 65 I-153)
Dolubovo (22 km from the border) - 83 aircraft (50 MiG-3 and 33 I-16)
Vysokie Mazowiec (16 km from the border) - 101 aircraft (70 MiG-3s and 31 I-16s)
At these airfields, all aircraft on the ground were destroyed.
In total, 732 aircraft were destroyed on the Western Front on the first day of the war.
Aviation formations (mixed and bomber) | Enemy aircraft shot down | Shot down in air battles | Shot down by anti-aircraft artillery | Destroyed on the ground | Didn't return from mission |
9 garden | 74 | 74 | - | 278 | - |
10 garden | 23 | 23 | - | 157 | - |
11 garden | 34 | 34 | - | 93 | - |
12 bad | - | 2 | - | - | |
13 bad | - | 15 | - | 46 | |
3rd Air Corps | 2 | 1 | - | 7 | |
Total: | 133 | 18 | 528 | 53 |
Aviation of the Western Front |
||||||||||
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|
9th garden | Bialystok (management hell) | MiG-3, I-16 | 2/0 | 5/2 | 5 | - | - | - | - | |
41 iap | Bialystok, Seburcin | MiG-3, MiG-1 | 56/14 | 27/27 | 27 | - | - | - | 16 | |
I-16, I-15 | 22/4 | 36/18 | 36 | 25 | 25 | - | - | |||
124 iap | Bialystok | MiG-3 | 70/8 | 16/16 | 16 | - | - | - | 29 | |
M.Mezovetsk | I-16 | 29/2 | 24/24 | 24 | - | - | - | - | ||
126 iap | Belsk, Dolubovo | MiG-3 | 50/12 | 21/21 | 21 | 4 | 4 | - | 31 | |
I-16 | 23/10 | 42/13 | 42 | - | - | - | - | |||
129 iap | Zabludovo, village Tarnovo | MiG-3 | 61/5 | - | - | - | - | 34 | ||
I-153 | 57/8 | 40/40 | 40 | 11 | 11 | - | - | |||
13 bap | Ros, Borisovshizna | SB, Ar-2 | 51/11 | 45/40 | 45 | 15 | 5 | - | - | |
Pe-2 | 8/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
Total in the air division | MiG-3, MiG-1, I-16, I-15, I-153, SB, Pe-2, Ar-2 | 429/74 | 256/201 | 256 | 55 | 45 | 0 | 110 | ||
10th garden | Kobrin (management hell) | Sat | 1/0 | 3/1 | - | - | - | - | - | |
33 iap | Pruzhany | I-16 | 44/7 | 70/37 | 70 | 29 | 29 | - | - | |
74 cap | Pruzhany | I-153, I-15bis | 62/2 | 70/60 | 70 | 21 | 21 | - | - | |
IL-2 | 8/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
123 iap | Strigovo, Name day | I-153 | 61/8 | 71/53 | 71 | 6 | 6 | - | - | |
Yak-1 | 20/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
39 bap | Pinsk, Zhabitsy | Sat | 43/2 | 49/39 | 49 | 18 | 18 | - | - | |
Pe-2 | 9/0 | - | - | - | - | - | ||||
Total in the air division | SB, Pe-2, Yak-1, I-16, I-15, I-153 | 248/19 | 263/190 | 260 | 74 | 74 | 0 | 0 | ||
11th garden | Lida (management hell) | SB, I-16, I-153 | 4/0 | 8/4 | 8 | - | - | - | - | |
122 iap | Lida | I-16, I-15bis | 71/11 | 50/50 | 50 | 5 | 5 | - | - | |
127 iap | Skidel, Lesishche | I-153, I-15 | 72/7 | 53/53 | 53 | 39 | 21 | - | - | |
16 bap | Stomach, Cherlena | Sat | 24/1 | 46/23 | 46 | 17 | 17 | 17 | - | |
Pe-2 | 37/0 | - | - | - | - | 39 | ||||
Total in the air division | SB, Pe-2, I-16, I-15bis, I-153 | 208/19 | 157/130 | 157 | 61 | 43 | 17 | 39 | ||
12th bad | Vitebsk (management hell) | Sat | 1/0 | 4/1 | 4 | - | - | - | - | |
43 bap | Vitebsk | Su-2 | 46/1 | 71/33 | 33 | 26 | 26 | - | 38 | |
128 bap | Ulla | Sat | 41/1 | 68/31 | 31 | - | - | - | 37 | |
6 bap | Vitebsk | Sat | 18/2 | 54/16 | 25 | - | - | - | 29 | |
209 bap | Balbasovo, Betskoye | Su-2 | 25/1 | 3/3 | 3 | - | - | - | ||
215 bap | Smolensk, Herbalists | I-15bis | 15/1 | 10/10 | 10 | - | - | - | ||
Total in the air division | SB, Su-2, I-15bis | 146/6 | 210/94 | 106 | 26 | 26 | 0 | 104 | ||
13th bad | Bobruisk (management hell) | Sat | 1/0 | 3/1 | 3 | - | - | - | - | |
24 bap | Bobruisk, Teikichi, Telushe | Sat | 41/6 | 49/35 | 49 | 27 | 19 | - | - | |
97 bap | Bobruisk | Su-2 | 51/26 | 49/25 | 25 | - | - | - | 24 | |
121 bap | Bykhov | Sat | 56/9 | 51/39 | 39 | - | - | - | 12 | |
125 bap | Bykhov | Sat | 38/6 | 55/32 | 43 | 11 | 11 | - | 12 | |
130 bap | Bobrovichi, Gnoyevo | Sat | 38/8 | 51/30 | 51 | 12 | 12 | - | - | |
Total in the air division | SB, Su-2 | 225/55 | 258/162 | 210 | 50 | 42 | 0 | 48 | ||
43rd Iad | Balbasovo (management hell) | I-16 | 2/0 | 4/2 | 4 | - | - | - | - | |
160 iap | Balbasovo, Prongeevka | I-153, I-15 | 66/5 | 75/39 | 39 | - | - | - | 36 | |
161 iap | Balbasovo, Zubovo | I-16 | 62/3 | 59/17 | 17 | - | - | - | 42 | |
162 iap | Mogilev, Edlino | I-16 | 54/4 | 95/13 | 13 | - | - | - | 82 | |
163 iap | Mogilev, Lubnitsa | I-16 | 59/3 | 82/10 | 10 | - | - | - | 72 | |
Total in the air division | I-16, I-153, I-15 | 243/15 | 315/81 | 83 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 232 | ||
313th rap | Slepnyanka | Sat | 20/1 | 67/20 | 38 | 12 | 5 | - | 29 | |
314th rap | Baranovichi | Sat | 5/0 | 35/5 | 35 | - | - | - | - | |
Yak-2, Yak-4 | 28/0 | - | - | - | - | 12 | ||||
161st reserve up | Lepel | I-16, I-153, I-15 | 42/8 | 65/34 | 65 | 7 | 7 | - | - | |
162nd Reserve. up | Zyabrovka, Bronnoe, Kholmich | I-16, I-153, SB | 64/8 | 76/56 | 76 | - | - | - | - | |
Total for dep. up | SB, Yak-2, Yak-4, I-16, I-153, I-15 | 159/17 | 243/115 | 214 | 19 | 12 | 0 | 41 | ||
Total Air Force Military District | 1658/205 | 1702/973 | 1286 | 285 | 242 | 17 | 574 | |||
Including new types | MiG-3, MiG-1, Yak-1, Pe-2, Il-2, Yak-2, Yak-4 | 347/39 | 64/64 | 64 | 4 | 4 | 16 1 |
2 - Name of dislocation points
3 - Aircraft types
4 - Number of combat aircraft (denominator - including defective aircraft)
5 - The total number of crews (the denominator - including the number of combat-ready crews capable of simultaneously taking to the air to perform a combat mission, depending on the presence of serviceable combat aircraft and combat-ready crews in the aviation regiments)
6-10 - Crews prepared for combat operations:
6 - during the day in simple weather conditions
7 - at night in simple weather conditions
8 - during the day in difficult weather conditions
9 - at night in bad weather conditions
10 - retrained or commissioned upon arrival from schools
Front commanders. It was on their ability to manage large military groups that success or failure in operations, battles and battles depended. The list includes all generals who permanently or temporarily served as front commander. 9 military leaders from among those on the list died during the war.
1. Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny
Reserve (September-October 1941) North Caucasian (May-August 1942)
2. Ivan Khristoforovich (Hovhannes Khachaturovich) Baghramyan
1st Baltic (November 1943-February 1945)
3rd Belorussian (April 19, 1945 - until the end of the war)
On June 24, 1945, I. Kh. Bagramyan led the combined regiment of the 1st Baltic Front at the Victory Parade on Red Square in Moscow.
3. Joseph Rodionovich Apanasenko
Since January 1941, the Commander of the Far Eastern Front, on February 22, 1941, I. R. Apanasenko was awarded the military rank of General of the Army. During his command of the Far Eastern Front, he did a lot to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet Far East.
In June 1943, I. R. Apanasenko, after numerous requests to be sent to the active army, was appointed deputy commander of the Voronezh Front. During the battles near Belgorod on August 5, 1943, he was mortally wounded during an enemy air raid and died on the same day.
4. Pavel Artemevich Artemiev
Front of the Mozhaisk line of defense (July 18-July 30, 1941)
Moscow Reserve Front (October 9-October 12, 1941)
He commanded the parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941. From October 1941 to October 1943, he was commander of the Moscow Defense Zone.
5. Ivan Aleksandrovich Bogdanov
Front of reserve armies (July 14-July 25, 1941)
With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was appointed commander of the front of the reserve armies. Since November 1941, the commander of the 39th Reserve Army in Torzhok, since December, the deputy commander of the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front. In July 1942, after the evacuation of the commander of the 39th Army, Ivan Ivanovich Maslennikov, Ivan Alexandrovich Bogdanov, who refused to evacuate, took over the leadership of the army and led a breakthrough from the encirclement. July 16, 1942, when leaving the encirclement near the village of Krapivna, Kalinin region, he was wounded. Having withdrawn 10,000 fighters from the encirclement, on July 22 he died from his wounds in the hospital.
6. Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky
3rd Belorussian (February-April 1945)
7. Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin
Voronezh (July 14-October 24, 1942)
Southwestern (October 25, 1942-March 1943)
Voronezh (March-October 20, 1943)
1st Ukrainian (October 20, 1943 - February 29, 1944)
On February 29, 1944, N.F. Vatutin, together with his escort, drove out in two cars to the location of the 60th Army to check on the progress of preparations for the next operation. As G.K. Zhukov recalled, at the entrance to one of the villages, “the cars came under fire from the UPA sabotage group. N.F. Vatutin, jumping out of the car, joined the officers in a shootout, during which he was wounded in the thigh. The seriously wounded commander was taken by train to a Kiev hospital. The best doctors were called to Kyiv, among them - the chief surgeon of the Red Army N. N. Burdenko. Vatutin received a through wound of the thigh with crushing of the bone. Despite surgery and the use of the latest penicillin during treatment, Vatutin developed gas gangrene. A council of doctors headed by Professor Shamov proposed amputation as the only way to save the wounded, but Vatutin refused. It was not possible to save Vatutin, and on April 15, 1944, he died in the hospital from blood poisoning.
8. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov
Leningrad (5-mid September 1941)
9. Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov
Leningradsky (June 1942-May 1945)
2nd Baltic (February-March 1945)
10. Philip Ivanovich Golikov
Bryansk (April-July 1942)
Voronezh (October 1942-March 1943)
11. Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov
Stalingradsky (July 23-August 12, 1942)
12. Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko
Western (June 30-July 2, 1941 and July 19-29, 1941)
Bryansk (August-October 1941)
Southeast (August-September 1942)
Stalingradsky (September-December 1942)
Southern (January-February 1943)
Kalininsky (April-October 1943)
1st Baltic (October-November 1943)
2nd Baltic (April 1944-February 1945)
4th Ukrainian (from March 1945 until the end of the war)
13. Mikhail Grigorievich Efremov
Central (August 7-end of August 1941)
Since the evening of April 13, all communication with the headquarters of the 33rd Army has been lost. The army ceases to exist as a single organism, and its separate units make their way to the east in scattered groups. On April 19, 1942, in battle, commander M. G. Efremov, who fought like a real hero, was seriously wounded (having received three wounds) and, not wanting to be captured, when the situation became critical, he called his wife, who served as his medical instructor, and shot her and yourself. Together with him, the commander of the artillery of the army, Major General P.N. Ofrosimov, and almost the entire headquarters of the army were killed. Modern researchers note the high spirit of steadfastness in the army. The Germans were the first to find the body of M. G. Efremov, who, having deep respect for the courageous general, buried him with military honors in the village of Slobodka on April 19, 1942. The 268th Infantry Division of the 12th Army Corps recorded on the map the place of the death of the general, the report came to the Americans after the war and is still in the NARA archive. According to Lieutenant General Yu. A. Ryabov (a veteran of the 33rd Army), the body of the commander was brought on poles, but the German general demanded that he be transferred to a stretcher. At the funeral, he ordered the prisoners from Efremov's army to be put in front of German soldiers and said: “Fight for Germany the way Efremov fought for Russia”
14. Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov
Reserve (August-September 1941)
Leningradsky (mid-September-October 1941)
Western (October 1941-August 1942)
1st Ukrainian (March-May 1944)
1st Belorussian (from November 1944 until the end of the war)
On May 8, 1945, at 22:43 (May 9, 0:43 Moscow time) in Karlshorst (Berlin), Zhukov received from Hitler's General Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel the unconditional surrender of the troops of Nazi Germany.
On June 24, 1945, Marshal Zhukov took over the Victory Parade of the Soviet Union over Germany in the Great Patriotic War, which took place in Moscow on Red Square. Marshal Rokossovsky commanded the parade.
The 41st motorized corps had a limited number of crossing facilities, so the German command ordered the movement routes of the main forces of the 4th Panzer Group to be shifted to the right, closer to Dvinsk. As a result, the right-flank 6th Panzer Division in the corps was forced to stretch its front for 45 km - from Livani, 25 km from Jekabpils to Ilukste, 10 km from Dvinsk. On the right flank of the division, the von Seckendorf battle group moved, on the left - the Raus battle group, the gap between them was covered by Major Linnbrun's 57th tank reconnaissance battalion.
The Soviet sappers also managed to blow up the bridge to Lebanon. However, a front of a couple of tens of kilometers in this sector was held only by a small group of Guryev - the 10th airborne brigade, reinforced by a rifle battalion. Therefore, the tankers of Raus were able to cross the Dvina and by June 29 move 10 km across the river.
On June 29, units of the 36th Motorized Division were also able to cross the Dvina and occupy a bridgehead in the Plyavinas area. By June 30, German sappers built two floating bridges in Livany and Krustpils, but they had a small capacity and could only withstand light tanks. The main springboard continued to be Dvinsk.
The command of the North-Western Front appreciated its importance in time. Already on June 27, the commander of the front, Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov, ordered to begin the withdrawal of troops behind the line of the Western Dvina, as a result of which catastrophic losses in manpower were avoided and the controllability of the troops was somewhat improved. On June 28, Halder noted in his diary that for the front of Army Group North "characteristically a small number of prisoners along with a very large amount of trophy property."
A consolidated group of Lieutenant General Akimov was thrown against the bridgehead in Dvinsk - two brigades of the 5th airborne corps and two combined regiments assembled from retreating units. However, a hastily prepared counterattack was not successful. On June 27, the front commander reported to the People's Commissar of Defense:
“In pursuance of your order yesterday organized an attack on the return of Dvinsk. By the evening of June 26, 1941, Dvinsk was returned, but a fierce air raid undertaken by the enemy, which lasted three hours, with renewed attacks by infantry with enemy tanks, forced us to leave Dvinsk again. Tonight I will organize a second counterattack to capture Dvinsk with the introduction of the 46th Panzer Division of the 21st Mechanized Corps (has 5 tanks). He singled out two staunch generals for leadership - Akimov and Belov. During the attack on Dvinsk, 7 bombers were shot down and 5 tanks were destroyed, the rest of the tanks were driven into the city and disappeared behind the houses.
In turn, General Akimov described this battle in a report to Kuznetsov even more restrained:
“According to your personal order, he organized an offensive to capture the city of Dvinsk from 17:00 on June 26, 1941.
The advance faltered. Separate platoons and squads entered the city from the northern and northeastern outskirts of the city, but were driven back by the summed up reserves and especially intensified automatic fire and artillery of the enemy.
The enemy used a mass of automatic weapons, heavy machine guns, tanks as fixed firing points. The mass of fire was used from the windows of houses, attics and from trees.
As a result of a three-hour battle, our units were thrown back. The main reasons for our failure are the complete absence of tanks on our side and a very small amount of artillery - only 6 guns.
On the same day, units of the 3rd Motorized Division of the 56th Motorized Corps crossed the Western Dvina north of Dvinsk, seriously expanding the existing bridgehead. Motorized reconnaissance detachments of the German units were thrown out on Rezekne (where the headquarters of the front was located) on the Dagda northeast and east of Dvinsk, giving the Soviet command the impression that the Germans were landing airborne assault forces. The front command was forced to relocate to Pskov, which again had a negative impact on command and control.
At 5 am on June 28, a new attack on Dvinsk began. In addition to Akimov's group, the 21st mechanized corps of Major General D. D. Lelyushenko, who approached here the day before, participated in it.
In fact, it was a corps only in name: by the beginning of the war, its formation had not yet been completed. Formally, the corps was staffed by 80-90% (that is, it had 28-30 thousand people), but 70% of the fighters were recruits of the April-June draft, most of them did not even have weapons. Therefore, 17 thousand "fighters" were simply left in the Opochka area for the construction of defensive structures. The corps was provided with only 10–15% of motor vehicles, and its units went to the front with a significant shortage of artillery, heavy and light machine guns and automatic rifles, as well as mortars. Most of the 76-mm guns were without panoramas, and small-caliber anti-aircraft guns - without rangefinders, which had already arrived during the hostilities.
Lelyushenko himself, in a combat report dated June 29, characterized him as follows: "Parts of the corps are actually motorized groups formed by old-timers and part of the young fighters." The three divisions thrown out to Dvinsk had about 10,000 men, 129 45 and 76 mm guns, and a certain number of light and amphibious tanks. On June 24, 105 BT-7 vehicles and 2 T-34 tanks arrived in the corps.
The 46th tank division of the corps attacked from the north, the 42nd tank division from the east, the 185th motorized division moved in the second echelon. By 7 o'clock, units of the 46th Panzer Division of V. A. Koptsov captured the village of Malinova, 12 km from Dvinsk; bypassing it, the tankers broke into the northern outskirts of Dvinsk. However, the advance of the 42nd Panzer and 185th Motorized Divisions was delayed - having fallen under enemy air strikes, they were stopped 15–20 km from the city.
The Germans managed not only to strengthen the bridgehead: on the third day infantry units began to approach here. So the 42nd Panzer Division in the Kraslava region was forced to engage in battle with units of the 121st Infantry Division of the enemy that had crossed here. 8-10 km east of Dvinsk, the crossing of units of the 3rd motorized division of the Germans was disrupted. According to Lelyushenko's memoirs, 285 people were taken prisoner during the destruction of the German bridgehead, including 10; about 400 corpses, 16 wrecked guns and 26 mortars remained on the battlefield. It should be noted that the report on this battle indicates a much more modest number of prisoners - 37 people; later, Lelyushenko reported that in just a month of fighting, 53 prisoners were taken by the corps.
By order of the commander of the 42nd Panzer Division, Major, a detachment of Captain Ivanov was sent across the Dvina for reconnaissance - five T-38 amphibious tanks with a small landing of motorized infantry. This detachment disorganized the movement behind enemy lines, according to the commander's report, destroyed up to a hundred vehicles on the roads, and according to Manstein, they even attacked the location of the rear department of the headquarters of the 56th motorized corps. Then he returned without loss to his shore.
“The outskirts and streets of Daugavpils were strewn with hundreds of enemy corpses, enemy tanks were burning all around, the trunks of broken guns were sticking out. There were wrecked cars. The commander of the 8th German Panzer Division, General Brandenberger, took refuge with his headquarters in a fortress on the southern outskirts of the city.- this is how D. D. Lelyushenko describes the battle on June 28 in his memoirs.
However, the main forces of the 56th motorized corps were already in Dvinsk, so attacks against a superior enemy had no chance of success. By evening, the soldiers of the 21st Mechanized Corps still continued to cling to the northeastern outskirts of the city, but to the right of them, units of the 5th Airborne Corps were driven out of the city by the Germans and thrown back 8-10 km to the north; there was a threat of the enemy bypassing the right flank of the mechanized corps.
As a result, the command of the corps decided to withdraw the troops to a more convenient defensive line along the line of the Rushony and Dridza lakes, 15–20 km northwest of the city. The 46th Panzer Division took up defensive positions at the Beti-Leitani line; 185th motorized division - along the Auleyas, Sakova line; 42nd Panzer Division - near the village of Shkipi, Geibi. On the right, north of Dvinsk, the 5th Airborne Corps continued to hold the line; to the east, along the banks of the Western Dvina, the flank detachments of the mechanized corps were located, and to the left of them - parts of the 112th rifle division (from the Western Front).
By order of Lelyushenko No. 4 of 20:00 on June 29, the corps formations were tasked with preventing the enemy from advancing from Dvinsk to Rezekne, Ludza and Sebezh, inflicting maximum losses on the enemy with stubborn defense and "with a stubborn defense with a transition to a mobile one, in cases caused by the situation, inflict maximum defeat on the enemy, using for this not only short blows, but also adapting the terrain to paralyze the advance of the mechanized units of the enemy."
During the day of fighting, according to our data, 42 enemy tanks, 34 guns, 32 mortars, about 250 vehicles and up to a thousand enemy soldiers were hit and destroyed by the forces of the 21st mechanized corps. At the same time, about 300 prisoners were taken - a very good result by the standards of 1941!
On June 28 and 29, the losses of the corps (without the 46th Panzer Division, which was placed at the disposal of Akimov's group) amounted to 30 people killed, 40 missing and 387 wounded. The chief of staff of the 46th Panzer Division, Lieutenant Colonel Avdeev, and the commander of the artillery regiment of the 46th Panzer Division, Lieutenant Colonel Karasev, were killed; Colonel Vasilevsky went missing. The commander of the 46th Tank Division, Colonel Koptsov, the political officer of the 42nd Tank Division, Regimental Commissar Churilov, and the commander of the 91st Tank Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ermonov, were wounded. Losses in equipment amounted to 4 tanks, 9 armored vehicles, 24 vehicles and 11 guns. At the same time, the command of the German 56th motorized corps reported 78 destroyed Soviet tanks on July 28 alone!
But even if we assume that the losses of the 46th Panzer Division were no less than in the other two divisions combined, it is obvious that the enemy suffered at least no less damage. Therefore, Lelyushenko had every reason to report that "The mood of the fighters and command staff, despite the lack of regular materiel, the lack of fuel, ammunition and food, is excellent."
On June 29, the 21st mechanized corps became part of the newly created 27th Army - along with the remnants of the 5th Airborne Forces, two consolidated regiments, the 110th artillery regiment of the RGK and units of the 16th Rifle Corps continuing to withdraw through the Dvina. However, this army was only in name - throughout all subsequent battles, its total strength did not exceed the strength of one German tank division.
Meanwhile, F. I. Kuznetsov reported to the Headquarters:
“Our forces are near Dvinsk: two airborne brigades, of which one actually does not exist due to losses incurred, two consolidated regiments formed from stragglers, the remnants of the 2nd tank division without a single tank and the 46th motorized division of the 21st mechanized corps - only 1000 people.
Enemy forces in Dvinsk: no less than an infantry division, 100 tanks installed and daily air superiority.
The 21st mechanized corps does not have "KB" tanks, which was just confirmed personally by the corps commander Lelyushenko and assistant corps commander brigengineer Katz. Obviously the tanks are on their way. The reinforced rifle regiment of the 112th rifle division did not arrive.
On June 28, 1941, the attack near Dvinsk was actually carried out by one of our infantry, which suffered serious losses. The enemy repulsed the attack with artillery fire, flamethrowers and machine guns. Two companies of enemy infantry were destroyed in the attack. Our losses are over 600 people only wounded.
On June 28, 1941, the 1st Aviation Corps did not strike at Dvinsk. On June 29, 1941, apparently, he did not take off either. The same and the 4th mixed aviation division.
The third attack by one of our infantry will not lead to success; I ask you to report to the People's Commissar of Defense to postpone the attack until the concentration of the 24th and 41st rifle corps. I will remain where I am until I receive an answer."
As we can see, the front command had rather fantastic ideas about what had happened, and both our combat capabilities and enemy forces were underestimated. The operational report of the front headquarters from the same day reported the following about the enemy.
“... Dvina direction.
... The 226th Infantry Division, reinforced by one artillery regiment and a group of tanks, is participating in the battles.
In the Plavinas area, the enemy concentrated at least an infantry division with tanks, and on the night of June 29, 1941, he transported on rafts up to two infantry regiments with tanks to the northern bank of the river. Zap. Dvina.
Krustpils is occupied by the enemy, from where [he] conducts a further offensive with a force of up to two infantry divisions with tanks.
This message smacks of panic. In fact, the bridgeheads in the Jekabpils area were initially considered by the Germans as secondary. The bridges in this area were blown up by the Soviet troops, and with the help of improvised floating bridges it was impossible to quickly strengthen the grouping on the bridgeheads. Two divisions of the 11th Rifle Corps were defending in this area, and the 12th Mechanized Corps deployed from the left bank across Riga. There were quite enough forces for defense in this area. Much more dangerous was the bridgehead near Livany, where by the evening of July 30, most of the 6th Panzer Division had already concentrated on the right bank. However, it was on him that the Soviet command paid the least attention to him.
On June 30, Hoepner reported to the commander of the North Group that the 4th Panzer Group would be ready to continue the offensive only on July 2. The 6th Panzer Division was to attack from the bridgehead at Livani, the 1st Panzer and 36th Motorized Rifle Division from the bridgehead at Krustpils, delivering an auxiliary blow from Plavinas.
The real balance of forces in the zone of the North-Western Front on July 1, 1941 was as follows.
ENEMY
(Army Group North)
18th Army
291 infantry divisions;
26th Army Corps - 61st and 217th Infantry Division;
207 security (Sich.) division;
1st Army Corps - 11th, 1st Infantry Division, 21st Infantry Division;
38th Army Corps (Army Reserve) - 58th and 254th Infantry Division.
4th Panzer Group
41st Motorized Army Corps - 1st and 6th TD, 269th Infantry Division, 36th Infantry Division;
56th motorized army corps - 290th infantry division, 8th division, 3rd division;
Motorized division of the SS "Dead Head" (group reserve).
16th Army
10th Army Corps - 30th and 126th Infantry Division;
27th Army Corps - 122nd and 123rd Infantry Division;
2nd Army Corps - 121st, 12th, 32nd and 253rd Infantry Division;
13th Army Corps (Army Reserve) - 206th and 251st Infantry Division, 281st Security Division.
Army Group Reserve - 281st Security Division.
Thus, in the Army Group "North" there were 29 divisions - 3 tank, 3 motorized and 23 infantry. In previous battles, the divisions suffered some losses, especially in military equipment, but the staffing continued to be close to the standard (about 15 thousand people in the division).
Armored vehicles of the 4th Panzer Group
In addition, the 616th tank destroyer battalion (27 Panzerjager I self-propelled guns) was attached to the tank group, and the 185th battalion and five separate assault gun battalions - a total of 48 Stug self-propelled guns - were assigned to the infantry divisions of the 16th and 18th armies. III. Thus, in the army group there were 684 tanks and self-propelled guns, of which 466 were light and 218 were medium.
(North-Western Front)
8th Army
12th mechanized corps - 23rd and 28th TD, 202nd MD;
3rd mechanized corps - 2nd and 5th TD, 84th MD;
10th Rifle Corps - 10th and 11th Rifle Divisions;
11th Rifle Corps - 48th and 125th Rifle Divisions;
Directorate of the 65th Rifle Corps;
22nd Infantry Division of the NKVD.
11th Army
1st mechanized corps - 3rd TD, 163rd MD, 5th MCP;
16th Rifle Corps - 5th, 33rd and 188th Rifle Divisions;
Thus, the front commander suggested urgently starting the transfer to the Pskov and Ostrov region of the 22nd Latvian and 24th Estonian territorial corps, which had not yet been put into battle because of their unreliability. Here, the 1st mechanized and 41st rifle corps transferred to the front were supposed to take up defense along the line of the old fortified areas. Under their cover, it was supposed to deploy troops withdrawn from the Dvina line. At the same time, Kuznetsov proposed to begin the evacuation of the Moonsund Islands and the withdrawal of the troops of the 8th Army from Riga to a new line of defense along the southern border of Estonia.
“You did not understand the order of Headquarters 0096. The current situation requires, over the next three to four days, to detain the enemy at the line of the West. Dvina. The headquarters requires the implementation of order 0096. Take all measures [to] prevent the spread of the enemy on the northern coast of the West. Dvina. Use all aircraft for systematic bombardment, day and night, of enemy crossings and crossing units. Report on performance.
As we can see, the retreat of the troops of the front from the line of the Western Dvina was not at all forbidden - but it had to take place in a more organized manner, while simultaneously holding the defensive line along the river by the covering forces. After all, it is no secret that it is the retreat that is the most difficult type of combat operations, where it is important to maintain both the controllability of the troops and the morale of the fighters and commanders. While the enemy's tank and motorized divisions were pinned down by counterattacks near Dvinsk and Krustpils, the Northwestern Front had time to create a new line of defense at the turn of the old fortified areas and along the lines of the Velikaya and Cherekha rivers.
However, there was another reason why it was impossible to retreat from the Dvina. On the southern bank of the river there was still a large number of scattered Soviet units, randomly retreating to the river. They had no connection with the command, and, apparently, Kuznetsov simply counted them as already dead - so in a report to the People's Commissar of Defense dated June 28, he reported: “The 2nd Panzer Division, apparently, perished. The 11th Army does not exist as a formation. I don’t know the regulations of the 5th, 33rd, 188th, 128th, 23rd and 126th rifle divisions, the 5th tank division and the 84th motorized division.” Meanwhile, all these troops retreated to the Dvina, trying to cross it; to leave the line of the river meant to doom them to death.
And the situation at the front was not as catastrophic as it seemed to Kuznetsov's headquarters. In addition to Dvinsk, the enemy never managed to capture serviceable bridges across the Dvina anywhere. True, on June 28-29, the Germans managed to cross it in three more places, but such attempts were repulsed on most of the front. It should be noted that in late September and early October 1943, the Soviet troops that reached the Dnieper captured up to a dozen bridgeheads only in the zone of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, however, only three of them were “opened” - one in October and two in november.
The Germans advanced furthest from the bridgehead near Livany - as we saw above, on July 30, the units of the Guryev group defending here retreated to Lake Luban. However, in fact, the troops of the 6th Panzer Division did not advance to such a depth, by evening it reached only the village of Rudzety, 20 km from the river. The division advanced almost parallel to the Dvinsk-Pskov highway, 30 km west of it. On July 1, the forward detachments of the division traveled another 25 km and reached Varaklyany (10 km west of Vilyana).
The forces of the 11th Rifle Corps (48th and 125th Rifle Divisions) and the 12th Mechanized Corps were deployed against the bridgeheads formed on both sides of Jekabpils. On June 30, his 28th Panzer Division with the 10th Motorcycle Regiment took up defense in the area from Koaknese to Plavinas, the 202nd Motorized Rifle Division between Plavinasam and Krustpils. The 23rd Panzer Division concentrated in the Ergli area (30 km north of Plavinas) with the task of preparing a counterattack on Plavinas.
During the night of June 30, the enemy tried to cross the river eight times, but all his attempts were repulsed. At 18:00, the headquarters of the corps sent a reconnaissance group consisting of three tanks and a platoon of motorized infantry to the Lyegrade region (towards Krustils) with the task of reconnoitering the enemy’s crossing across the Aiviekste River.
By this time, the mechanized corps had about 9 thousand personnel, 50 tanks and 47 guns. As we will see below, in the 11th Rifle Corps on June 4, that is, after a difficult retreat, there were still 8,769 people - that is, on the 1st, the corps numbered at least 10-12 thousand. The 181st division of the 24th Latvian territorial corps was also advanced here from Gulbene. Due to the absence of the headquarters of the 12th mechanized corps, its troops were subordinated to the headquarters of the 65th rifle corps, which did not have its own troops. Even if the forces available here were not enough to throw units of three German divisions that had managed to cross over into the river, they were quite enough to blockade the bridgeheads.
On the morning of April 30, the enemy managed to capture the bridges in Riga - but a few hours later they were repulsed by a counterattack of units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army and blown up only late in the evening, after crossing the remnants of the 90th Rifle Division and our other troops from the south coast.
By June 30, Soviet troops basically continued to hold the defense on the right bank of the Western Dvina. None of the new bridgeheads gave the enemy the opportunity to quickly concentrate troops and go on the offensive - even part of the rear of the 41st Reinhard motorized corps later had to be transported across the bridges in Dvinsk. On June 1, a counterattack against Krustpils was planned by the forces of the 202nd motorized and 181st rifle divisions.
Manstein, according to his post-war statements, rushed forward - but the command of the army group considered it best to hold the 56th motorized corps until Reinhard could launch an offensive from the bridgeheads at Krustpils.
In such a situation, at 20:45 on June 30, the command of the North-Western Front, having not yet received Zhukov's prohibition directive, ordered his subordinate formations to withdraw from the line of the Western Dvina.
First. The enemy continues the offensive in the Krustpils-Pskov and Dvina-Pskov directions. Large columns of motorized troops and infantry were found moving from the Kaunas region in the directions: Panevezys, Jekabpils; Utena, Daugavpils. The enemy, apparently, is trying to break the front at the junction of the 8th and 27th armies and prevent the withdrawal of the 8th army to the east with the simultaneous capture of fortified areas before the withdrawal of our troops.
Second. The tasks of the troops of the North-Western Front are: to prevent a breakthrough of the occupied front from the direction of Krustpils and Daugavpils to the northeast, to firmly fix and hold the Pskov, Ostrov and Sebezh fortified regions with all their forces and prevent the enemy from breaking through to the northeast and east.
Third. 8th Army on the night of 30.6. on 1.7.41, start a withdrawal to a fortified line. Intermediate milestones:
a) by the end of 1.7.41 - Cesis. lake Alauksto, Madona, Buzany, southwestern shore of the lake. Luban;
b) by the end of 2.7.41 - Dzeni, Gulbene, Yaunkanchi (northern shore of Lake Luban).
In the future, make a withdrawal to the Pskov and Ostrovsky fortified areas.
Include in your composition parts of the 12th mechanized corps in the Madona area. When withdrawing, have the main grouping on your left flank, paying special attention to communication with a neighbor on the left.
The border on the left is Jekabpils, (claim.) Lake. Lubana, (claim.) Island.
Fourth. The 27th Army continued to stubbornly hold the enemy at the line they occupied. The withdrawal to the fortified line should be started only with the beginning of the withdrawal of the 8th Army from the Dzeni, Gulbene, Yaunkanchi line. By the end of 1.7.41, get in touch with the 8th Army about the area of Lake. Luban.
The border on the left is Kraslava, Dagda, (suit.) Opochka.
Fifth. The 41st Rifle Corps should concentrate and occupy Pskov, Ostrov, Vystavka for defense on 1 July 1941, continuing to improve the fortifications, build fortified areas, anti-tank guns and field positions. The task is to prevent the enemy through the fortified areas to the east and northeast. Upon occupation of the fortified areas, enter into submission to the commander of the 8th Army.
Sixth. The 24th Rifle Corps (11th, 181st and 183rd Rifle Divisions) on the night of 1.7.41, start moving to the area (claim.) Ostrov, (claim.) Opochka, Novorzhev, where to replenish, reorganize and take the defense line (suit.) Ostrov, Opochka ... After concentrating and occupying the defense line, go to the disposal of the commander of the 27th Army.
Seventh. The 1st mechanized corps, arriving from the Leningrad Military District, is to concentrate in the Podlozhye region (40 km northeast of Pskov), (suit.) Porkhov, Borovichi (20 km north of Porkhov). The task is optional.
Eighth. The commander of the 22nd Rifle Corps, by the end of 1.7.41, go to the front of Podseva, Gorki, (suit.) Porkhov. To make parts of the hull for stubborn defense with a front to the southwest and south. Prepare passages in the zone of their defense for the 1st mechanized corps in the direction of Opochka ...
The exact time of the cancellation of this order is unknown - according to some reports, it arrived at the army headquarters only on the morning of June 2. In any case, at 7 am on June 1, the troops of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army, which were defending against the German bridgehead at Plavinas, began to retreat to the north. Parts of the 48th Infantry Division retreated in the direction of Snyteri, Dukuri Manor, Skuene Manor, Krusta-Krogs, the 125th Division - to Madliena, Rantsiemi Manor, Ramuli Manor, Amata River. By this time, according to the report of its commander, about 700 bayonets remained in the 125th division.
The command of the 12th mechanized corps was not informed about this - apparently, the command of the 11th rifle corps and its divisions decided that since everyone received the order to withdraw, there was no need to warn the neighbor about this. As a result, the enemy struck at the flank of the 202nd Motorized Division, which was defending to the left at the Krustpils-Plyavinas line.
The 28th Panzer Division, which was located near Plavinas, was also in danger of being outflanked after the enemy, advancing from the direction of Krustpils, crossed the Aiviekste River with forces near the infantry regiment with artillery. An attempt to push the Germans back behind Aiviekste was unsuccessful; in addition, around noon, an order was received from the commander of the 8th Army to withdraw in the direction of Madona.
As a result, on the evening of June 1, formations of the 12th mechanized corps, which had previously successfully repelled all enemy attempts to force the river, were also forced to begin a retreat, covering it with counterattacks from the 23rd Panzer Division.
Already in the afternoon of June 1, counter-orders went to the troops. The 8th Army was ordered to attack the enemy troops on the flank, which were spreading from the bridgehead at Krustpils and had already reached Madon. The 27th Army was ordered to take up a strong defense and prevent the German bridgehead near Dvinsk from being "opened". At 17:10, the commander of the 181st Rifle Division was ordered to leave one rifle regiment with an artillery battalion and two anti-tank batteries in the Madona area, transferring it to the command of the commander of the 202nd Motorized Division, and the rest of the forced march to the Island.
The next day, these orders were confirmed by a new order.
"First. The enemy crossed to the northern bank of the river. Zap. Dvina with the strength of up to one infantry division with tanks in the Dvinsk region and an unexplained number of motorized infantry with tanks in the Jakobshtadt and Friedrichstadt regions, with the aim of separating the North-Western Front in the direction of Madona.
Second. The armies of the North-Western Front during 2 and 3.7.41 destroy enemy units that broke through to the north of the river. Zap. Dvina, go out on the entire front to the river. Zap. Dvina and firmly hold this line ...
Fourth. The 8th Army with the 181st Rifle Division, holding the occupied front along the river. Zap. Dvina, with their own forces, from the morning of 2.7.41, destroy the enemy who crossed over in the Friedrichstadt area and prevent it from spreading to the north and northeast, for which purpose to have a strong reserve in the Madona area consisting of the 181st Infantry Division and the 12th th mechanized corps.
In the future, destroy the Jacobstadt group and reach the river on the entire front. Zap. Dvina and firmly defend it.
The border on the left is Jekabpils, Ostrov.
Fifth. The 27th Army with the 163rd Motorized Division, in cooperation with the 12th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army, pinning the enemy in the center along the Rezekne-Daugavpils highway, strike with the flanks of the army, cover the Daugavpils region from the west and east, surround and destroy the enemy in the Daugavpils region and north-east.
But the loss of at least two days made this order impossible. "Order - counterorder - disorder". Despite the fact that below Plavinas the right bank of the river was still entirely in our hands, the battle for the Dvina was already lost.
The commander of the 4th Panzer Group, E. Gepner, planned to launch a general offensive at dawn on July 2. In fact, it started a day earlier than planned. On the morning of July 1, the 1st Panzer and 36th Motorized Divisions of the 41st Motorized Corps began to advance after the retreating troops of the 11th Rifle and 12th Mechanized Corps. At the same time, units of the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army left Riga.
But the 6th Panzer Division and the 56th Motorized Corps were unable to launch an offensive even on July 2nd. Routh explains this very dully: by the poor condition of the roads south of Lake Lubana and the onset of heavy rain. Apparently, the division experienced a shortage of heavy equipment, which still could not be transported across the Dvina. By evening, the division had only reached the line of Zoblev and the Stock Exchange. There was practically no resistance from the Soviet troops in front of her front, but from the east her flank was constantly attacked by the remnants of the 10th airborne brigade.
Manstein at the appropriate place in his memoirs becomes very verbose, but also very vague.
“Finally, on July 2, we were able to speak again after the third mechanized formation arrived in the corps - the SS division “Dead Head”, and to the left of us the 41st Panzer Corps crossed the Dvina near Jacobstadt ...
However, after a sudden raid on Dvinsk, 6 days have already passed. The enemy had the opportunity to overcome the shock that he received when German troops appeared on the eastern bank of the Dvina ...
Whether it would be possible to preempt the enemy to the same extent again was, at least, doubtful ... This would be possible only if the tank group managed to direct all its forces to carry out one task. Just this, as will be shown, did not happen, although the enemy did not have enough forces to stop the advance of the tank group.
In any case, Manstein did not manage to break through the defenses of the 27th Army right away. On the morning of June 1, the commander of the 27th Army, N. E. Berzarin (the future commandant of Berlin), received an order from the front command (given at 4:55) - to hold out at the occupied lines until July 5 at any cost. For this purpose, the 163rd motorized division of the 1st mechanized corps, transferred from the Northern Front, was transferred to the army. The division advanced to the Jaunlatgale, Karsava region with the task of covering the gap between the 8th and 27th armies and organizing anti-tank defense along the eastern banks of the Pededze and Aiviekste rivers on the front from Sita station to Lake Lubana, on the probable path of enemy tanks. Thus, even without intelligence data, the Soviet command correctly determined the route of the 1st and 6th German tank divisions.
By the evening of July 1, the forward detachments of the 1st Panzer Division had already reached Madon, 50 km from the Dvina. By order of Kuznetsov, one of the regiments of the 181st division of the 24th rifle corps was urgently sent here by the front. Reinforced by an artillery battalion and two anti-tank defense batteries, the regiment was to come under the command of the commander of the 202nd motorized division with the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through from Krustpils to Madona and further to the northeast. The rest of the division was ordered to move in a forced march to the Ostrov area, where to take up defense. At the same time, another order of the 8th Army prescribed “holding the front of Riga, Jekabpils, with our own forces to eliminate the enemy units that have broken through at Friedrichstadt, ensuring our left flank in the direction of Madona from the enemy’s attack and preventing it from spreading in the northern and northwestern directions ... be ready with a short strong blow from the area of st. Luksty in the direction of Plavinas, in cooperation with the 27th Army, to eliminate the enemy units that had broken through from the direction of Jekabpils to Madona.
For a counterattack towards Madona, it was proposed to use the remnants of the 12th mechanized corps, concentrated in the area of Luksty station; at this point, only 35 tanks remained in the corps.
At 0:25 on July 2, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe headquarters of the 12th mechanized corps, a pennant was dropped with an order from the army command to stop the withdrawal and restore the situation along the right bank of the Western Dvina. That is, the army headquarters had no other connection with the corps at that moment. Having tried to fulfill this order, at 2:50 the corps command ordered the 28th Panzer Division to take the former line along the Western Dvina coast in the Koaknese, Plyavinas area by 7 o'clock, the 202nd Motorized Rifle Division to hold the occupied line of Madon, Meyrany, and the 23rd Panzer divisions from the Medzula, Lyezere area to attack enemy units on the northern bank of Aiviekste in the Lyegrade area. By 2 pm on July 2, parts of the corps were even able to take their starting position for the attack - however, the attack did not take place, since the 181st and 48th rifle divisions, having not received an order to stop the withdrawal, had already retreated to the northeast.
Already during the retreat in the Gulbene area, the vanguard of the 645th motorized rifle regiment of the 202nd motorized division attacked an enemy motorized detachment, capturing two serviceable cars and 7 motorcycles. Documents of the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th Motorized Corps (?!) were seized in one of the cars, as well as an extract from the notorious directive of May 13 “On special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa zone” - the very one that Manstein allegedly refused to send to the troops...
Meanwhile, the 27th Army was threatened by a detour from the Madona region, so on the evening of July 1, N.E. Berzarin ordered his troops to withdraw to a new line - from Lake Luban to Lake Rezna, bending his right flank to the east. Despite the multiple superiority of the enemy, the retreat of the 27th Army was carried out systematically. By 17:00 on July 1, the army units, according to the operational report of the front headquarters No. 09 / op dated 11:45 on July 2, occupied the following position:
“a) The 10th airborne brigade during the day, fighting with small groups of the enemy, holds the line of Garvatsaynieki, Dekshorn, Prizhevo. Headquarters - Vilani. The 76-mm battery of the 9th anti-tank defense artillery brigade joined the brigade.
Losses: killed - 3 people, wounded - 4 people.
b) Parts of the Akimov group on 1.7.41 continued to hold and strengthen the line of Gashish, Bashki, Leitani, Bieshen. Headquarters - Lubana.
c) Parts of the Lelyushenko group during the day of 1.7.41 put themselves in order at the turn: 185th Infantry Division - Bieshen, Kovalev; 42nd Panzer Division - (suit.) Kovaleva, Kolei, Unguri.
In front of the front of the group, the 46th motorcycle regiment and the 44th tank battalion of the enemy were installed in battle. The enemy suffered significant losses. The entire headquarters of the tank battalion was destroyed. The 280th Infantry Regiment of the 185th Infantry Division, which lost many guns, suffered the greatest losses.
At the same time, new corps arrived at the front, deploying at the turn of the old fortified areas:
“a) the 41st Rifle Corps - continues to concentrate in the Pskov, Ostrov area;
b) the 1st mechanized corps, consisting of one tank division and a motorized division, concentrated in the Pskov region;
c) the 22nd Rifle Corps - concentrated in the area of Porkhov, Podseva, Gory;
d) the 24th Rifle Corps - is concentrated in the area (claim.) Ostrov, (claim.) Opochka, Novorzhev.
In the operational report of the headquarters of the front No. 10 / op for July 2, the position of the arriving units looked as follows:
“a) the 1st mechanized corps (without the 1st tank and 163rd motorized divisions) - in the forests and the area of st. Toroshino, Podborovye (18–20 km northeast of Pskov).
b) 41st Rifle Corps (118th, 111th and 235th Rifle Divisions) 1.7.41 began to unload at the station. Pskov, st. Cherskaya. Until 18:00 on July 2, 1941, 11 echelons of the 111th Rifle Division, 13 echelons of the 118th Rifle Division and 3 echelons on the way and 6 control echelons of the 41st Rifle Corps arrived. Transportation is very late.
Upon completion of the concentration, the corps has the task of defending the Pskov, Ostrov, Vystavka sector.
c) 22nd Rifle Corps: 180th Rifle Division concentrated in the Porkhov area, 182nd Rifle Division from 1.7.41 on the move from the Petseri area to Porkhov.
d) 24th Rifle Corps: 181st Rifle Division - from 1.7.41 on the move from the Gulbene area to the Ostrov area, 183rd Rifle Division - on the move from the Tsesisvraion Ostrov area.
At that moment, the 1st mechanized corps (3rd tank, 163rd motorized divisions and 5th motorcycle regiment) had 371 tanks - 26 medium three-tower T-28s, 225 light BTs and 120 flamethrower T-26s, and also 135 armored vehicles. The corps was staffed close to the staff, that is, it had 20-25 thousand people. However, even earlier, one tank battalion, an anti-aircraft division and a certain amount of vehicles were withdrawn from the corps.
On the afternoon of June 1, the headquarters of the North-Western Front received a directive from the Stavka, signed by G.K. Zhukov, which required “conduct an active operation to eliminate the crossed to the northern bank of the river. Zap. Dvina of the enemy in order to firmly gain a foothold in the future on its northern coast. For the operation, it was allowed to use the 112th rifle division of the 22nd army of the Western Front, as well as the 163rd motorized division of the 1st mechanized corps, arriving in the North-Western Front.
In pursuance of this directive, at 0:17 on July 2, the front commander gave N.E. Berzarin a new order:
“The 27th Army with the 163rd Motorized Division, in cooperation with the 12th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army, pinning down the enemy in the center along the Rezekne-Daugavpils highway, strike with the flanks of the army, cover the Daugavpils region from the west and east, surround and destroy enemy in the area of Daugavpils and northeast. By the end of 2.7.41, capture Daugavpils with moving parts and go out. Zap. Dvina.
The corresponding order of the commander of the 27th Army was sent to the troops only at about 8 o'clock in the morning and arrived there by 10 o'clock. The formations of the front holding the defense were extremely few in number; it is unlikely that they had the opportunity to launch a serious counteroffensive. Moreover, the Headquarters, contrary to the belief of some modern historians, did not require this - remember that Zhukov's directive of June 30 ordered Kuznetsov only to delay the enemy for 3-4 days and prevent him from spreading along the northern bank of the Dvina.
Moreover, at 2 a.m., even before the arrival of the order from the front headquarters, the commander of the 27th Army ordered the systematic withdrawal of his troops from Dvinsk:
"…4. The 27th Army's rearguard units firmly hold the enemy on the occupied line and begin to retreat sequentially, along the lines, only under pressure from a superior enemy, preventing the battle formation from being destroyed piece by piece.
5. Intermediate defensive lines of retreat: the first - Lake. Lubana, r. Malta, r. Rezekne to st. Kazraji, Tiskadi, Malta, lake. Rezna-ezers, oz. Osha-ezers;
the second - r. Iga to Martuzani, Stiglov, Degl-va, Mozuli, Miroeda;
the third - Nosova, Augshpils, Krasny, Opochka.
6. Sequence of withdrawal: to line No. 1 - by the end of 2.7.41; to line No. 2 - by the end of 3.7.41; to line No. 3 - by the end of 4.7.41
7. Guryev's group to retreat in its lane, providing a junction with units of the 8th Army. The concentration area after the withdrawal of Marshavitsa, Soshihino, passing into the subordination of Akimov.
The border on the left - Larks, Augshpils, Bashki, Driceni, (suit.) Preili.
8. Akimov's group, retreating in its lane, cover the highway from a breakthrough of motorized units to the north. The concentration area is Marshavitsy, Soshihino.
The border on the left is (claimed) Maromohi, (claimed) Red, Ludza, Oguretska, Bikernieki.
9. Lelyushenko's group to depart in the indicated lane along the lines; after retreating beyond the UR, concentrate in the area of st. Vereshchagin, Vysotskoye…”
This order turned out to be very timely: at 11 o'clock on July 2, Manstein himself launched an offensive. All day long, army formations repulsed the attacks of enemy tanks and infantry in the area of Vilana, Preili and at the line of Aglona station, Leitani, Lake Sivera.
At 08:09, having finally received an order from the front headquarters, the commander of the 27th Army, by order of battle No. 014, again ordered the troops to advance on Dvinsk. Fortunately, it was already too late - by the time the German offensive began, this order could not get into the troops.
By the end of the day on July 2, the army continued to hold the front from Lake Luban through Vilany, Prizhevo, Preili, the Aglona station, Leitani to Lake Siver. In front of the army front, the non-existent 226th and 18th Infantry Divisions were installed, as well as the very real 3rd Motorized Division. In addition to it, in reality, the 8th Panzer and units of the 290th and 121st Infantry Divisions, as well as the motorized division of the SS "Dead Head" operated here. The reconnaissance detachment of this division, numbering about 200 people, broke through our guard along the highway, moved to Sebezh and broke into the city of Dagda around noon. To the west of the city was the command post of the 42nd Panzer Division and the reserve of the 21st Mechanized Corps - tank and motorcycle battalions. Urgently sent to Dagda, they defeated the German detachment in a short battle; 126 serviceable motorcycles and 34 SS prisoners were captured, including two officers.
The SS men turned out to be extremely talkative - it turned out that the advance detachment of the division was following the reconnaissance detachment to Dagda. The commander of the 42nd Panzer Division, Colonel Voeikov, organized an ambush, as a result of which he was almost completely destroyed. reconnaissance battalion"Dead Head" consisting of 10 tanks, 15 armored personnel carriers, 18 guns and 200 vehicles.
German sources are very muffled about this defeat. Manstein complains that the SS, despite their courage and excellent equipment, did not have enough experience and suffered too high losses. In popular books on the history of the SS troops and the Totenkopf Division, it is mentioned in passing that the 1st Motorized Regiment of the Totenkopf lost about a hundred people in the battle near Dagda. On the contrary, V. Haupt writes that during these battles, the "Dead Head" lost two-thirds of its (apparently combat) composition and was reduced to one regiment.
As a result, despite a significant superiority in strength, during the day of fighting on July 2, Manstein managed to advance only 7–10 km. So far, there has been no talk of any breakthrough in the Soviet defense.
By the end of the day, the units of the 27th Army had 3200 bayonets, 95 guns and 80-90 tanks. Akimov's group defended on the outskirts of Rezekne, the 163rd motorized division of the 1st mechanized corps (529th and 759th motorized rifle regiments) advanced to the Rezekne area, with its participation and with the support of the left-flank 112th rifle division of the 22nd army, the front command still intended to launch a counterattack in the direction of Dvinsk on the morning of July 3.
During the day, the columns of the 163rd motorized division were repeatedly attacked by enemy aircraft. The losses were insignificant, but the division's advance was delayed. Only by 20 o'clock the advanced units of the division reached the northern outskirts of Rezekne. Unfortunately, the 25th tank regiment of the division (without the 3rd battalion) was sent from Pskov along railway and due to the untimely supply of the train, it began to arrive at the Rezekne station only by 11 o'clock on July 3, when the main forces of the division were already involved in a fierce battle south of the city.
On the morning of July 3, the position of the troops of the front was as follows. Parts of the 8th Army occupied the Sigulda line, Luksty station, Madona. On the Pskov direction, the remnants of the 12th mechanized corps retreated through Madona and east of it on Gulbene, on the morning of July 3, they defended along the line of Sakstagala, Malta, Luni, Lake Siver. To cover Rezekne, in addition to units of the 163rd motorized division, a front headquarters security battalion was thrown from the west, which repelled enemy attacks and held the Sakstagala area until the morning of July 3.
The left flank and the center of the 27th Army have so far managed to hold their positions, but the right flank was exposed due to the withdrawal of the 12th Mechanized Corps. As early as June 2, after a fierce battle in the Vilyana region, units of the 10th Airborne Brigade, having suffered losses, were dispersed by the motorized infantry of the 6th Panzer Division, operating with the support of a company of tanks. On the evening of July 2, Akimov's group, under the onslaught of tanks and motorized infantry of the 8th Panzer Division, withdrew to the Malta region (12 km southwest of Rezekne) and since then there has been no news from it. The road to Rezekne was open.
By this time, the command of the North-Western Front had finally abandoned plans for a counteroffensive. A combat order dated 02:00 on July 3 ordered the 27th Army to "Holding back the enemy and destroying his columns that have gone too far with short counterattacks, while preserving manpower and equipment, continue the defense of the direction." The 163rd motorized division was now planned to be used for a counterattack against the forces of the 41st motorized corps and to restore contact with Akimov's group south of Rezekne.
Meanwhile, on the morning of July 3, troops of the 41st Motorized Corps reached Lake Lubana, units of the 6th Panzer Division bypassed it from the east, and the 1st Panzer Division from the west. The remnants of our 202nd motorized division, after an unsuccessful counterattack in the Madona area, withdrew to the Dzelzava manor area. Total in combat strength The 12th mechanized corps by this time had:
“23rd Panzer Division - 10 tanks, 150 infantry, no shells;
28th Panzer Division - 22 tanks, a motorized rifle regiment almost at full strength;
202nd motorized division - about 600 people; the motorcycle regiment does not exist."
At 3 pm on July 3, units of the 1st Panzer Division of the 41st Motorized Corps occupied Gulbene, pushing back the remnants of the 202nd Motorized Division defending here. By the evening of the same day, tanks of the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th Motorized Corps broke into Rezekne, where the headquarters of the 27th Army had recently been located. Two regiments of the 163rd Motorized Division and half of the 25th Tank Regiment, which arrived too late, could not hold back the enemy, although they seriously halted his advance.
Worst of all, on the evening of July 3, the forward detachments of the 6th Panzer Division, bypassing the defenses of the units of the 163rd Motorized Rifle Division near Karsava along country roads, broke from the west into the town of Gauri on the Dvinsk-Pskov highway, 55 km from Rezekne and in 20 km north of Karsava. At 16:20, a German reconnaissance detachment of 5-6 tanks was discovered on the highway in the Vilaka (Vyshgorodok) area, just 45 km from Ostrov.
As a result, Soviet troops were thrown off the highway with a side impact. The 163rd Motorized Division had to retreat eastward to Krasny Ostrov and the Lzha River. The path was open to the enemy along the highway towards Ostrov and Pskov - but, again, there was no merit of the 56th motorized corps in this ...
By evening, the Soviet command identified two main directions of the enemy's offensive: Krustpils - Madonna - Gulbene and Dvinsk - Rezekne. However, it still had no idea that the Germans were "castling" their motorized corps. The 41st, taking advantage of the open flank of the 27th Army and the absence of organized Soviet troops to its right, went to the Pskov highway, while the 56th went east - to Pushkinskiye Gory, Sebezh and Opochka.
The 21st Mechanized Corps, which formed the center and left flank of the 27th Army, was thrown back east of the Dvinsk-Pskov highway and could no longer impede the enemy's advance towards Ostrov. By the end of the day, the 46th Panzer and 185th Motorized Divisions were defending in the Brodaizhe area east and southeast of Rezekne with their front to the west. The 42nd Panzer Division still held Dagda and the area south of Lake Yesha; to the left of it to the Western Dvina and along the line of the river to the city of Drissa, the 122nd rifle division held the front.
On July 4, the enemy's 3rd motorized division, advancing towards Opochka, occupied Ludza. Moving to the right along the highway Kraslava - Sebezh, the SS division "Dead Head" finally captured Dagda and went east of Lake Yesha, finally disconnecting the corps. It was followed by the 121st Infantry Division.
And here the Germans were again unlucky. The withdrawal of the 42nd Panzer Division was covered by its 42nd motorized rifle regiment, Colonel A. M. Goryainov. Feeling the weakness of the German infantry, Colonel Goryainov launched a counterattack - and hit the headquarters of the 121st Infantry Division directly. During a short battle, the headquarters was defeated, the division commander, Major General Otto Lanzelle, died.
By the end of July 5, the 42nd tank and 185th motorized rifle divisions of the 21st mechanized corps retreated beyond the old border line to the Sebezh region and were withdrawn to the front reserve; The 46th Panzer Division continued to operate near Opochka.
By this time, the 24th Latvian Territorial Rifle Corps, which had finally arrived here, had finally been transferred to the army, in fact, before that it had not taken part in the battles. On the afternoon of July 6, the commander of the 27th Army, Major General N. E. Berzarin, reported to the Military Council of the front on the state of his troops:
“The existing corps and divisions bear only this name, but in fact it looks like this:
a) The 24th Rifle Corps - completely untrained units that do not have our equipment, armed with all weapon systems - all brands of the world. It is impossible to supply them with ammunition and spare parts.
There are no headquarters, no means of communication, the staffing of the commanding staff is up to 12-15%, the shortage is up to 90%.
Now in this corps (181st plus 128th rifle divisions) there are no more than 8 thousand [persons].
b) The 21st mechanized corps endured heavy battles, it is eliminated special units, and in fact the body is eaten by the enemy.
c) The 163rd motorized division after heavy fighting is completely unfit for combat, having lost people (up to 60%), lost artillery (up to 70%), lost tanks (up to 50%). All these data are only approximate - they are currently being collected and counted. A division cannot be thrown into battle.
d) The 235th Rifle Division (arrived as one 806th Rifle Regiment) - I don’t know where it is and when it will be at our front.
In short, a rather difficult situation has arisen that can only be rectified by a cardinal decision - to create a strong defensive zone in the depths with fresh units, and to withdraw the entire listed composition behind some kind of barrier and form it for new actions. It must be borne in mind that the army in its composition has thousands of examples of courage and heroism of all and many people. But the trouble is that we do not have a well-established command and control, we do not have aviation, and the enemy, using our weak points, persistently uses them ... aviation literally terrorizes our units, being unpunished.
Lieutenant General Comrade Akimov, whom I am sending to you as having already completed his tasks, can report in detail on the state of affairs.
I and all of us have enough determination to fight and fight by any means, but for the common good of the country, I would like to orient you with this short note.
Thus, the front of the 27th Army was broken through only on July 3. It should be noted that this happened as a result of bypassing it from the west and the defeat of the right flank by the forces of the 41st motorized corps, which broke through from the Krustpils area into the junction of two Soviet armies. We have already analyzed the reasons for this breakthrough.
It can be stated that the bridgehead at Dvinsk did not play a decisive role in the success of the German offensive. The Soviet defense was broken through by the blow of the 41st motorized corps from the bridgehead at Krustpils - and this success of the Germans, in turn, was due to the untimely withdrawal of two divisions of the 11th rifle corps.
The enemy did not count on success at Krustpils, where he did not have a permanent bridge at his disposal, and made the main bet on the bridgehead in the Dvinsk area. However, during the week Manstein was unable to crush the defenses of the units of the 27th Army opposing him, which were significantly inferior in size and capabilities to his 56th Motorized Corps. And only the mistake of the commander of the North-Western Front, combined with the delay in orders caused by poor communications, led to disastrous results.
On June 3, F.I. Kuznetsov was removed from his post and a week later he was appointed commander of the 21st Army. The next day, his place was taken by the former commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov, and Corps Commissar V.N. Bogatkin became a member of the military council. Even earlier (July 1), Lieutenant-General N.F. Vatutin, the former Deputy Chief of the General Staff, assumed the post of chief of staff of the front.
P. P. Sobennikov recalled:
“On July 3, 1941, already on the retreat from the city of Riga, which was occupied by small units of the Germans, I received an order from the front commander, Colonel-General Kuznetsov, to assume the post of commander of the North-Western Front. I received this prescription from a motorcyclist. On July 3, I met, having arrived in Pskov, at my reserve command post, General Ivanov, appointed in my place, oriented him on the move in the situation known to me and, having arrived at the headquarters of the front near the city of Pskov, took command of the troops of the front of the same date " .
From that moment on, the fate of the North-Western Front depended on whether the unfired troops of the 41st, 24th, and 1st Mechanized Corps would have time to take up defensive lines along the old border line and the Velikaya River, and on the number of front forces that could be withdrawn to these lines.
According to the report of the headquarters of the North-Western Front to the General Staff of the Red Army dated July 4, 1941, in total there were:
8th Army:
10th rifle division: officers - 52, junior officers - 81, privates - 429. Total - 562. Horses - 10. Ordinary rifles - 257, automatic - 76, light machine guns - 5, easel - 3, DP - 6, cars - 9, carts - 3, kitchens - 1.
11th rifle division: personnel -1450; easel machine guns - 6, 45-mm guns - 1, 122-mm - 3, armored vehicles - 1.
48th Rifle Division: officers - 336, junior officers - 348, privates - 1365. Total - 2049. Horses - 765. Ordinary rifles - 1445, automatic - 198, light machine guns - 45, easel - 26, large-caliber - 3 , anti-aircraft - 6, DP - 89, guns 45-mm - 15, 76-mm - 12, 76-mm anti-aircraft - 3, 122-mm - 23, 152-mm - 1, motor vehicles - 91, walkie-talkies - 14, tractors - 15.
67th Rifle Division - no information.
The 125th Rifle Division, together with the corps units of the 11th Rifle Corps: officers - 681, junior officers - 550, privates - 5489. Total - 6720. Horses - 501. Ordinary rifles - 6496, automatic - 35, light machine guns - 80, easel - 25, anti-aircraft guns - 23, DP - 35, guns 45 mm - 5, 76 mm - 12, 122 mm - 10, 152 mm - 46, cars - 292, motorcycles - 1, tractors - 87.
10th rifle corps with corps units: officers - 170, junior officers - 246, privates - 1439. Total - 1855. Ordinary rifles - 850, light machine guns - 63, easel -11, anti-aircraft guns - 2, walkie-talkies - 5, guns 45 mm - 1, 76 mm - 2, 76 mm anti-aircraft guns - 26, 122 mm - 26, 152 mm - 9, vehicles - 61, tractors - 42.
12th Mechanized Corps:
Management and corps: personnel - 1550, tanks - 32.
23rd Panzer Division: officers - 384, junior officers - 347, privates - 2467. Total - 3198. Rifles - 2008, light machine guns - 42, 37-mm guns - 12, 45-mm - 10, 122- mm - 7, tanks - 11, armored vehicles - 2, vehicles - 167.
28th Panzer Division: officers - 464, junior officers - 578, privates - 2692. Total - 3734. Ordinary rifles - 2276, automatic - 2, mortars - 2, light machine guns - 59, anti-aircraft guns - 2, DP - 41 , guns 45 mm - 0, 37 mm - 6, 76 mm - 1, 122 mm - 2, 152 mm - 1, tanks - 3, vehicles - 384.
9th anti-tank defense artillery brigade: officers - 226, junior officers - 356, privates - 1549. Total 2131. Ordinary rifles - 1686, automatic - 6, light machine guns - 27, DP - 3, 76-mm guns - 13, 85 mm - 7, cars - 64, radios - 12, motorcycles - 3, tractors - 3.
Management of the 65th Rifle Corps: officers - 63, junior officers - 245, privates - 245. Total - 553. Ordinary rifles - 286, light [machine guns] - 3, vehicles - 30, radios - 3.
No information was received on the 2nd Panzer Division, the motorcycle regiment of the 3rd Mechanized Corps.
202nd motorized division: officers - 114, junior officers - 46, privates - 875. Total - 1035. Rifles - 306, light machine guns - 22, DP - 2, 76-mm guns - 2, 122-mm - 6 , tanks T-26 - 5, T-38 - 1.
27th Army:
Army Directorate, 5th Airborne Corps, 112th Tank and 163rd Motorized Divisions of the 1st Mechanized Corps: officers - 3715, junior officers - 6088, privates - 22,181. Total - 31,984. Horses - 94. Rifles - 16,971, automatic rifles - 1016, mortars - 243, light machine guns - 660, easel - 151, large-caliber - 36, anti-aircraft guns - 23, DP -1747, guns 37-mm - 20, 45-mm - 95 , 76 mm - 48, 76 mm anti-aircraft guns - 4, 122 mm - 12, 152 mm - 12, tanks - 360, armored vehicles - 73, vehicles - 3632, radios - 7.
Management of the 22nd Rifle Corps and corps units: officers - 400, junior officers - 340, privates - 1432. Total - 2172. Guns 107-mm - 53, 152-mm - 9.
180th Rifle Division: officers - 1030, junior officers - 1160, privates - 9132. Total - 11 322. Horses - 3039. Rifles - 11 645, mortars - 35, light machine guns - 535, heavy machine guns - 212, large-caliber - 3, anti-aircraft - 24, DP - 5, walkie-talkies - 0, 37-mm guns - 31, 45-mm - 58, 76-mm - 74, 76-mm anti-aircraft - 4, 122-mm - 14, 152-mm - 12, armored vehicles - 6, vehicles - 72.
182nd Rifle Division - no information received.
(From) 24th Rifle Corps, 181st and 183rd Rifle Divisions, 41st Rifle Corps, 111.48 and 235th Rifle Divisions no information was received.
Management and body parts 1st Mechanized Corps: officers - 216, junior officers - 250, privates - 1255. Total - 1721. Rifles - 193, automatic - 1, mortars - 24, light machine guns - 162.
3rd Panzer Division: officers - 1096, junior officers - 1652, privates - 6455. Total - 9203. Ordinary rifles - 4847, automatic - 946; mortars -39, light machine guns - 161, easel - 35, guns 45 mm - 5, 76 mm - 4, 152 mm - 12, 203 mm - 12, T-26 tanks - 16, T-38 - 27 , BT-7 - 121, others - 36, armored vehicles - 81, motor vehicles - ... 10.
17th Communications Regiment: officers - 92, junior officers - 205, privates - 468. Total 765. Rifles - 516, light machine guns - 7.
25th Engineer Regiment: officers - 14, junior officers - 29, privates - 187. Total - 230. Vehicles - 2.
402nd howitzer artillery regiment: officers - 155, junior officers - 266, privates - 885. Total - 1306. Rifles - 1962, automatic - 4, light machine guns - 5, 122-mm guns - 2, 203-mm - 24, armored vehicles - 0, cars - 112, motorcycles - 12, tractors - 104.
110th howitzer artillery regiment: officers - 143, junior officers - 190, privates - 1205. Total - 1538. Rifles - 1862, guns of the 203rd - 22, vehicles - 112.
10th Air Defense Brigade: officers - 176, junior officers - 272, privates - 1774. Total - 2222. 85-mm guns - 24, 76-mm - 37, 40-mm - 16, 37-mm - 16 , heavy machine guns - 2, quad installations - 16, cars - 95, motorcycles - 8, tractors - 27, radio stations - 9.
12th air defense brigade: officers - 114, junior officers - 85, privates - 479. Total - 678. No guns, quad installations - 1, vehicles - 30.
14th air defense brigade: officers - 81, junior officers - 37, privates - 252. Total - 370. 85-mm guns - 4, 37-mm - 3, heavy machine guns - 3, quad installations - 7, cars - 34.
306th separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion: officers - 22, junior officers - 39, privates - 256, 85-mm guns - 8, quadruple installations - 3, vehicles - 13.
362nd separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion: officers - 38, junior officers - 57, privates - 329. Total - 424. 76-mm guns - 7, quad installations - 8, vehicles - 33, tractors - 3.
Air Force:
6th mixed aviation division: officers - 577, junior officers - 1345, privates - 1378. Total - 3300. Rifles - 2723, aircraft - 69.
7th mixed aviation division: officers - 536, junior officers - 1422, privates - 1260. Total - 3218. Rifles - no data. Aircraft I-16 - 2; I-15bis - 19; I-153 - 2; Sat - 3. Total - 26.
8th mixed aviation division: officers - 804, junior officers - 678, privates - 846. Total - 2328. MiG-3 aircraft - 14, I-153 - 8, I-16 - 1, I-15bis - 6 Total - 29.
57th mixed aviation division: officers - 781, junior officers - 667, privates - 693. Total - 2141. I-16 aircraft - 6, I-153 - 18, SB - 5. Total - 22.
By 11th Army(16th Rifle Corps, 29th Rifle Corps, 179th and 184th Rifle Divisions, 5th, 33rd, 128th, 188th, 126th, 23rd Rifle Divisions, 84th Motorized Division, 5th Tank Division , 10th anti-tank defense artillery brigade, 429th howitzer artillery regiment, 4th and 30th pontoon regiments) no information.
* * *
On July 5, it was decided to create the Luga defensive line along the rivers Luga, Mshaga, Shelon to Lake Ilmen. Due to the lack of forces at the North-Western Front, this line was transferred to the command of the Northern Front, which was supposed to ensure that it was filled with troops. The border of the zones of responsibility between the fronts was drawn along the Pskov-Novgorod line, while the defense of Estonia remained under the jurisdiction of the North-Western Front - the 8th Army operating here was transferred to the Northern Front only on the morning of July 14 (directive of the Headquarters No. 2068 of July 13) .
We have already mentioned above that by this time, at the turn of the old fortified areas along the Velikaya River, a front reserve was deployed - the 41st Rifle Corps. In addition, the troops of the 22nd Estonian and 24th Latvian territorial rifle corps were supposed to leave here.
22nd Corps was transferred from Estonia by rail; according to the operational report of the front headquarters from 22:00 on July 3, by that moment only one control echelon of the 22nd Rifle Corps and 3 echelons of the 180th Infantry Division had arrived in the Pskov region, another 7 control echelons and 9 echelons of the division were on the way. There was no information about the echelons of the 182nd division in the report.
Parts 24th Corps were scattered - the 181st Rifle Division, which arrived first, did not have time to take part in a counterattack against the German bridgehead at Krustpils, and now defended itself on the Pskov highway in the area of Gauri, Vilaka. The 183rd Rifle Division was moving towards the Ostrov on foot from the Cesis region (on the Riga-Pskov highway).
Troops 41st Rifle Corps were transported to the region of Pskov and Ostrov by rail, however, the delivery of troops due to congestion on the road was carried out very slowly.
The 118th division arrived from Kostroma, the 111th from Yaroslavl and the 235th from Ivanovo. By the time they were sent, the divisions were almost completely manned (10-12 thousand people per division), but they had a shortage of weapons, ammunition and transport. In addition, recruiting personnel were poorly trained.
Corps management - 7 echelons arrived, 13 were on the way;
118th Rifle Division - 20 echelons arrived, 2 on the way, 10 on the way;
111th Rifle Division - 29 echelons arrived, 1 on the way, 3 on the way;
253rd Rifle Division - 3 echelons arrived, 2 on the way, 28 on the way.
The 111th and 118th divisions were unloaded from the echelons in the Pskov, Karamyshevo, Cherskaya region starting from July 1, but the last echelons arrived only on July 6, and only on that day were all their units able to occupy the designated defense lines. The 118th division (463rd and 527th rifle regiments) was to defend in the Staro-Pskov fortified area on a front of 26 km, and the 111th division with two regiments (399th and 532nd) - in Novo- Pskov fortified area at the front, 44 km. The 468th Rifle Regiment of the 111th Division was in the second echelon. In the interval between the 118th and 111th divisions, a battalion of the 62nd rifle regiment, formed from units of the 10th rifle division that retreated here, took up the defense, the main forces of which retreated to Estonia. The defensive structures of the fortified regions were occupied by permanent garrisons of the 153rd and 154th separate machine-gun battalions. These battalions were fully staffed with personnel, but they had only machine-gun weapons.
The Ostrovsky fortified area was supposed to be defended by the 235th Infantry Division, but, since its arrival was delayed, on July 4, the 398th Infantry Regiment of the 118th Division was advanced to the Peskovo, Kholmatka sector.
In the rear between the island and Pskov, units were concentrated by this moment. 1st Mechanized Corps- 3rd Panzer Division, 5th Motorcycle Regiment and other corps units. On July 4, the 3rd motorized rifle regiment of the division was placed at the disposal of the front command and sent to the west. He took up defense along the line of Liepna, Kuprava station 50 km from Ostrov, blocking the path of the 36th motorized division of the Germans.
So, the line of old fortified areas in the region of Pskov and Ostrov was covered by two fresh full-blooded divisions and the "backbone" of the 1st mechanized corps - the 3rd tank division, the 3rd howitzer artillery regiment, the 5th motorcycle regiment and other parts of the corps subordination.
The main forces of the 181st Rifle Division were also located here, as well as disparate units, mainly retreating from near Krustpils and Plavinas - among them were the remnants of the 12th Mechanized Corps, which were being reorganized in the Soltsy area. In the near future, at least three more divisions that did not take part in the battles were to approach Pskov and Ostrov.
Against these forces were three divisions of the 41st German Motorized Corps - the 1st and 6th Panzer and the 36th Motorized - and all three were far from being at full strength, since the enemy was still on the march. Even taking into account the smaller number and completeness of the Soviet divisions, the Germans did not have superior forces. At 5 am on July 5, the 3rd Panzer Division had 258 tanks - 10 heavy KB, 28 medium T-28, 148 light BT, 30 linear and 42 flamethrower T-26. Unfortunately, some of this equipment was still on the march or was out of order and therefore could not take part in the battle that took place on July 5 ...
* * *
Meanwhile, the German offensive was developing successfully. On July 3-4, infantry divisions began to cross the Dvina, following the motorized corps. Manstein mentions in his memoirs that the command of the 4th Panzer Group had a plan: to bypass the grouping of Soviet troops found in the Pskov region from the east, and if not surround it, then cut it off from the forces of the Western Front. The presence of the "1st Tank Corps" here was of particular concern to the Germans - they did not know that the divisions of the 1st Mechanized Corps had already been "gutted" and were used separately to plug holes in different directions.
As mentioned above, the direction of movement of the 56th motorized corps was shifted to the right: the 8th tank division was to leave the Dvinsk-Pskov highway and turn from Karsava to Pushkin mountains; to the right of it, the 3rd motorized division moved through Ludza to Opochka; even more to the right and far behind the SS division "Dead Head", finally breaking through the Soviet positions at Dagda, moving along the highway to Sebezh and further to Idritsa
Instead of Manstein's corps, the 41st motorized corps of Reinhard entered the Pskov highway. By the evening of July 3, the advance detachment of his 1st Panzer Division, advancing through Luban and Gulbene, occupied Balvy, and on the morning of July 4 reached the front line of the Ostrovsky fortified area. The 154th separate machine-gun battalion and the 398th rifle regiment were defending this sector. The 235th Rifle Division has not yet arrived here - its first echelons began to approach only on July 5th. The defending units lacked artillery, there were practically no anti-tank hand grenades and anti-tank mines.
On the morning of July 4, the 6th Panzer Division was still held back on the highway by the remnants of the 181st Rifle Division, however, to the north-west of the 1st Panzer Division, Soviet troops attacked, occupying defenses along the line of the Ostrovsky fortified area. German tanks with motorized infantry in several groups bypassed the defense nodes from the north and south, already in the afternoon one of the mobile groups was discovered 6 km west of the island (it was mistaken for an airborne assault).
In the evening of the same day, the advance detachment of the 1st Panzer Division entered the Pskov highway and, without meeting resistance, broke into Ostrov. The highway and railway bridges across the Velikaya River were captured by the enemy intact - although they had previously been prepared for an explosion. The combat log of Army Group North for July 4 stated:
“By evening, the 4th Panzer Group, with the main forces of both corps, overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, approached the Baltic-Russian border. On the right flank, it has already been crossed. With a quick move, the 1st Panzer Division reached the southern part of the Island. Railway and road bridges were captured in good condition.
At the same time, the main forces of the enemy's 36th motorized division, which had reached the Kachanovo area 35 km northwest of Ostrov, struck at the joint between the 399th and 532nd rifle regiments of the 111th rifle division. Thus, the enemy broke through the Ostrovsky fortified area with the first blow in two places at once.
The front command reacted very quickly - already at 18:00 on July 4, Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov ordered the commanders of the 41st Rifle and 1st Mechanized Corps to destroy the enemy that had broken into the Island, capture the city and push the Germans back behind the line of fortified areas. Having contacted by telephone the commander of the 41st Rifle Corps I.S. Kosobutsky, the chief of staff of the North-Western Front, General N.F. Vatutin demanded:
“Liquidate the incident, destroy the enemy and prevent him from crossing the river. Also destroy all suitable enemy reinforcements. Keep in mind that the liquidation and destruction of the enemy are assigned personally to you, under your personal responsibility. You are responsible for the execution of this order with your head.
The main blow was to be delivered by the 3rd Panzer Division. motorized rifle regiment it already had, but the attack was supported by the 468th rifle regiment of the 111th division, detached from the reserve of the 41st rifle corps.
On July 5, at 08:50, units of the 3rd Panzer Division, after a short air raid on enemy positions, launched an attack. Having passed the battle formations of the infantry, two battalions of the 6th Tank Regiment and a battalion of the 5th Tank Regiment broke into the city, starting a battle with German tanks. The 8th company of the 6th regiment, having passed through the whole city, went to the bridges across the Great - but due to the lack of infantry, it could not stay here. At the same time, the 468th regiment did not go over to the offensive, as a result of which our tanks were driven out of the city. In addition, at the same time, German reconnaissance detachments (as always mistaken for airborne assault forces) appeared in the areas of Shvanibakhovo and Selikhnovo, forcing the corps command to send tank detachments to fight them.
The next attack began at 15:25. This time, it was possible to concentrate larger forces for her - in particular, the 3rd howitzer artillery regiment of the 3rd tank division (24 guns) and one wound of the 41st rifle corps were brought up; there is information that not one, but two rifle regiments participated in the attack. By this time, the city was defended by the battle group of Colonel Kruger, reinforced by the anti-tank division of the 73rd Motorized Artillery Regiment of Major Zeta.
Over the next half hour, destroying enemy tanks and artillery, the 5th Tank Regiment again passed through the city and in separate units reached the left bank of the Velikaya River. However, without sufficient artillery support and in the absence of air support, the 3rd Panzer Division suffered heavy losses in equipment and personnel from enemy anti-tank and artillery fire in this battle. There were no infantry to secure the occupied line and clear the city of the enemy - only up to one and a half battalions of the 111th Infantry Division followed the tanks; the rest of the division either did not take part in the attack, or randomly retreated, falling under enemy fire.
At 1555 hours, the enemy, with strong artillery and air support, launched a counterattack. There are allegations that it was at this moment that detachments of the 6th Panzer Division approached the city from the south, however, according to Routh's memoirs, all day on July 5, this division was still engaged in a fierce battle with units of the 398th regiment of the 118th rifle division on the Ostrovsky line fortified area and reached the Island only by the morning of July 6.
The 3rd Panzer Division, having practically no infantry cover, held back enemy attacks until 17:00, gradually retreating to the outskirts of the city. But under the blows of artillery and Ju-87 dive bombers, who used incendiary bombs and a combustible mixture, the division was driven out of the city at about 19 hours, while the 468th regiment of the 11th rifle division left its positions and fled.
Until 19:00, the 3rd Panzer Division continued to hold the outskirts of the city, but in the evening, under pressure from the enemy, it was forced to begin a retreat. The 5th tank regiment retreated to Porkhov, the 6th - to the north, to Pskov. The 3rd howitzer artillery regiment took up firing positions in the area southeast of Lopatino. The division headquarters was located in the B. Lobyanka area, the headquarters of the mechanized corps - in the forest area north of Puzakov Gora.
According to the operational report of the front headquarters dated 03:55 on July 6, in the battles for Ostrov, the 3rd Panzer Division lost 7 BT-7 tanks and 3 KB tanks, but in reality the losses were much higher. By the evening of July 5, in the combat units of the division (though according to incomplete data), 43 tanks remained on the move - two KB, one T-28 and 40 BT-7. True, it should be noted that by July 7, the division again numbered about a hundred tanks.
At 08:55 on July 6, the front headquarters received a report from the commander of the 1st mechanized corps, Major General Chernyavsky, that the 3rd tank division had been defeated in the battles for Ostrov and, under pressure from the enemy tank division, supported by artillery and dive bombers, was retreating in the direction on Porkhov. Apparently, the fighting in the vicinity of Ostrov continued until the morning of July 6 - at least in the combat log of Army Group North for July 6 it is written:
“The enemy, with strong rearguards, tried to delay the advance of the 4th Panzer Group. The fighting was fierce. During July 5 and 6, the 1st Panzer Division destroyed over 140 tanks in the Ostrov bridgehead.
The reasons for the failure are clear. It was quite obvious that the enemy would concentrate all his mobile forces on the Island, where there were bridges across the Velikaya River. Nevertheless, the command of the 41st Rifle Corps "smeared" its regiments along the line of fortified areas - and even after the Germans captured the bridgehead, they sent no more than a third of the corps' forces against it. Meanwhile, General Kosobutsky had a day at his disposal to organize a counterattack, and it was already clear that it was necessary to hold not the fortified areas, but the line of the river. At the same time, judging by the order of the front command of July 6, Kosobutsky tried to put all the blame for the failure of the attack on the Island of Kosobutsky on the commander of the 1st mechanized corps, Major General Chernyavsky.
Nevertheless, the Soviet counterattack delayed the enemy for more than a day. At this time, the 36th Motorized Division, operating to the west, from July 5 to July 7, unsuccessfully tried to break through the defenses of the 399th and 532nd rifle regiments of the 111th rifle division along the line of the Novo-Pskov fortified area. As you can see, in this place the infantrymen of the division acted quite worthily, that is, the problem was not in the soldiers, but in the command of the corps and the organization of hostilities.
On the morning of July 6, the enemy launched an offensive from the bridgehead in Ostrov. Parts of the 1st Panzer Division moved along the highway to Pskov, the 6th Panzer Division - to the east, to Porkhov. Despite the fact that the rains ended and the weather improved again, on this day the Germans managed to cover no more than a dozen kilometers.
On the afternoon of July 7, the enemy resumed the offensive in two directions. On the other side of the Velikaya River, the main forces of the 118th and 111th Rifle Divisions continued to hold back the offensive of the 36th Motorized Division on the line of the old border, and if the first was firmly on the defensive, then the second was forced to gradually retreat to the north, bending the flank under the onslaught of the German motorized infantry.
At that time, the 235th Rifle Division, which had already been transferred to the 24th Latvian Rifle Corps, was finishing unloading at the Krasnye Prudy station. If only she had arrived two days earlier! Now, units of the division immediately engaged in battle with the tanks and motorized infantry of the 6th German Panzer Division and, unable to withstand the onslaught, were forced to retreat east of the highway in the direction of Karamyshevo.
By the afternoon of July, the tanks of the 1st division reached the area of Filatov Gora, Vydra and the crossing over the Mnoga River. There were still about 20 km to Pskov. The front command was forced to throw into battle here the remnants of the 23rd Panzer Division of the 12th Mechanized Corps - the so-called detachment of Colonel Orlenko, reinforced by the 3rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 3rd Panzer Division, as well as a rifle battalion and a mortar battery from the 118th Rifle Division .
The Orlenko detachment took up defense on the Pskov highway near the village of Cherekha, covering the automobile and railway bridges across the river of the same name - the right tributary of the Velikaya, which flows into it several kilometers to the west. The remnants of the 3rd Panzer Division, directly subordinate to the commander of the 41st Rifle Corps, the 6th Tank Regiment with the division headquarters, corps headquarters and some corps units, were also located here near the highway. To the left they occupied the defense - the 235th rifle division and the 182nd rifle division of the 22nd Estonian Corps, which had finally arrived, reinforced by the 5th regiment of the 3rd tank division. The 468th regiment of the 111th division was defending to the south towards Ostrov and the front to the west - the front command did not give up hope of once again counterattacking Ostrov from this direction, sending the 163rd motorized division and the remnants of the 21st mechanized corps here from the south.
As we can see, the front command finally managed to build a relatively integral defense in the main direction, having behind it a water line (the rivers Velikaya and Cherekha), behind which it was possible to deploy newly arriving units.
At 17:00 on July 7, the 6th Panzer Regiment attacked the flank of the advanced units of the German 1st Panzer Division on the highway south of Cherekha. A real tank battle unfolded, in which at least 200 vehicles participated on both sides.
Meanwhile, to the east, at 17:30, the German 6th Panzer Division attacked the positions of the 182nd Rifle Division. On the right German flank, the tanks of the Raus combat group broke through to the bridge over the Cherekha near the village of Shmoylovo, but here they were met by vehicles of the 5th tank regiment and were forced to retreat. Near the village of Cherekha, units of the 1st Panzer Division attacked the Orlenko group along the highway, but were driven back by a tank counterattack, losing (according to our data) 22 tanks and 9 anti-tank guns. Our losses amounted to 12 combat vehicles.
Thus, for the 41st motorized corps, the day of July 7 was unsuccessful - it was not possible to break through the Soviet defenses anywhere, and the losses were great. Unfortunately, this day also revealed the problems of our troops. The troops of the 41st Rifle Corps were scattered in three directions, interspersed with "foreign" units.
At the same time, there were no radio stations in the corps at all, and instead of the prescribed 300 km of cable, there were only 36 km of telephone cable, and wire communication lines during the battles were constantly disabled by artillery fire and enemy aircraft strikes. Therefore, from the beginning of hostilities, communication had to be maintained in the old fashioned way - with the help of messengers. Only on July 5 the corps received one radio station and 160 km of cable in coils, without coils. True, this cable was lost almost immediately - because the communications battalion was thrown into battle by the corps commander to cover the withdrawal of corps units and because of this did not have time to remove the already established lines.
But much worse was that the infantry was completely unadapted and not trained to act against tanks. There were no anti-tank grenades and mines in the units, the soldiers were simply afraid of German tanks, even attacking without infantry support. In addition, the artillery was short of ammunition; food was also delivered irregularly to the positions. The corps command justified this by saying that all the roads were clogged with retreating troops and refugees - but it is obvious that General Kosobutsky also had a significant share of the blame for the situation.
By the morning of July 8, parts of the detachment of Colonel Orlenko withdrew to the northern coast of the Cherekha. The tanks were withdrawn to the Kresta area and to the southern outskirts of Pskov. The next day, the Orlenko group was withdrawn to the Soltsy area for reorganization, where it joined the rest of the 12th mechanized corps.
The situation was worse in the zone of the 235th Rifle Division, where on the morning of July 8, units of the Seckendorf combat group of the 6th Panzer Division managed to cross the Cherekha with the help of pontoons. At 09:15, two companies of tanks (or vehicles with motorized infantry) entered the Pskov-Porkhov highway east of Karamyshevo. By Directive No. 24 of July 8, the front command ordered a counterattack here by the forces of the 3rd Panzer Division, gathering less than four rifle regiments to support it.
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From this place began the final act of the tragedy. On the night of July 8, the commander of the 118th Rifle Division, General Glovatsky, arrived at the command post of the 41st Rifle Corps. He reported that all enemy attempts to cross the Velikaya River in the areas of Vydra and Filatov Gora were successfully repelled by units of the 527th Infantry Regiment, after which the bridges in these places were blown up. Enemy tanks did not appear here - and not surprisingly, since there were none in the 36th motorized division.
According to the operational report of the front headquarters from 20:30, on the morning of July 8, units of the 41st Rifle Corps occupied the Korla front, Odvorets (15 km southwest of Pskov on the left bank of the Great River), Vetoshka (15 km southwest of Pskov), Gorushka, Priborok (10 km southeast of Pskov, near the second railway bridge across the Cherekha) and further along the northern bank of the Cherekha River. The headquarters of the corps was located in Luni, 8 km southeast of Pskov, there was no communication with it by the evening, the delegates of the front headquarters, sent on a communication plane with a directive from the front commander to take up a stubborn defense at the turn of the Velikaya and Cherekha rivers, had not yet returned. The front also had no connection with the 1st mechanized corps - both with its headquarters and with individual units.
The 22nd Rifle Corps in the Porkhov direction continued to hold the line of the Cherekha River at the turn of Porechie, Bolshaya Zaborovye (35 km southwest of Porkhov), Vertoguzovo (40 km southwest of Porkhov), Zhiglevo (40 km north of Novorzhev) with the front to the west, repelling attempts by enemy reconnaissance groups to penetrate to its forward edge. His 182nd Rifle Division defended the Porechye-Vertoguzovo line, the 180th Rifle Division - Shakhnovo, Zhiglevo.
The 181st and 183rd divisions of the 24th Rifle Corps and the remnants of the 27th Army defended behind the left flank of the corps with a front to the west, partially holding the line of the Velikaya River in its upper reaches. The 1st mechanized corps, having suffered losses in the battles on July 6 and 7, by 4:00 on July 8 withdrew in the Podberezye area, Vystavka, 35 km east of Pskov, where it put itself in order.
Aviation noted the movement of large motorized columns of the enemy from Ostrov in the direction of Porkhov - these were the forces of the 6th Panzer Division and the units of the 169th Infantry Division of the enemy advancing after them. In the evening, enemy columns were discovered heading west from Ostrov, towards Novorzhev - units of the 3rd motorized division of the 56th motorized corps advanced here.
Thus, the enemy still failed to overcome the line of defense along the rivers Velikaya and Cherekha, and to the west he was stopped on the line of the Pskov fortified area. The operational summary of the headquarters of the North-Western Front from 10:00 on July 9 indicated that the 235th Infantry Division, defending the line of the Cherekha River in the area of Staranya, Podberezye (35 km east of Pskov), created "bridge positions in front of the crossings to Karamyshevo", then there tried to block the bridgehead of the Seckendorf group on the northern bank of the river. However, on the night of July 8-9, the Raus combat group had already been transferred to the bridgehead.
In this situation, holding two divisions and units of the Pskov fortified area on the left bank of the Velikaya River lost its meaning - the Germans had only one 36th motorized division here, at least not superior in strength to the troops opposing it. Under these conditions, it was logical to leave the Pskov UR, withdraw the troops of the 111th and 118th divisions to Pskov beyond the line of the Velikaya River, and use part of them to strengthen the line along the Cherekha.
B. N. Petrov in the article “How Pskov Was Abandoned” writes that the commander of this division, Major General Glovatsky, proposed to withdraw the forces of the 118th Infantry Division beyond the Great on the night of July 8 at the command post of the corps. However, based on the operational documents of the front headquarters, it can be assumed that this decision was made by the corps headquarters a little later - after the crisis had arisen at the crossings near Karamyshevo.
The corps commander did not inform Glovatsky that from the left bank, in addition to his division and parts of the Pskov fortified area, two regiments of the 111th Infantry Division of Colonel I. M. Ivanov should simultaneously withdraw. For some reason (apparently, because of the sluggishness of the corps headquarters), the railway bridge over Velikaya, located south of the city, was not used for the withdrawal of the 11th division. This bridge was blown up by a group of sappers led by junior lieutenant S. G. Baikov only when the enemy approaches.
The road bridge, located three kilometers north of the railway, was also prepared for the explosion by a team specially assigned for this from the 50th engineer battalion of the 1st mechanized corps. Formally, the bridge was in the zone of responsibility of the 118th Infantry Division. However, the command of the corps did not organize a withdrawal and did not give any orders on the procedure for crossing the river by parts of various divisions. As a result, the groups of both divisions approaching the bridge at different times were mixed up, and no one was in charge of the order of crossing and the defense of the bridge. Apparently, when most of the 118th division crossed the river and the transition of parts of the 111th division began, Major General Glovatsky decided that he was no longer responsible for the bridge - especially since the head of the engineering service of the 111th rifle division, Major, had already arrived here I. V. Viktorov.
As a result, the head of the subversive team, military engineer A. A. Spitz, having no specific instructions, data about the enemy, and generally instructions from the authorities, blew up the bridge when there was no direct threat from the enemy. Again, it is possible that some of the units of the 111th division approaching the bridge were mistaken for the approaching Germans. N. S. Cherushev writes that the bridge was blown up by border guards, and even in the presence of NKVD officers, but this statement is not true. The border guards (who themselves were members of the NKVD) could carry out direct protection of the bridge as a military facility, but all documents clearly indicate that the subversive group belonged to the 50th engineer battalion of the 1st mechanized corps.
As a result of the premature explosion of the bridge, part of the forces of the 118th and 111th divisions did not have time to withdraw across the Velikaya River; the fighters were forced to cross on improvised means, under the onslaught of the approaching enemy, leaving equipment and artillery. As a result, both divisions were scattered and demoralized.
The 1st Panzer Division failed to break through to Pskov from the Ostrov side; the 36th Motorized Division was detained for some time on the left bank of the Great River. However, the case was decided by the breakthrough of the 6th Panzer Division from the direction of Karamyshevo, which, in the conditions of the loss of combat capability of two divisions of the 41st Rifle Corps, turned out to be nothing.
On the morning of July 9, two battle groups of the 6th Panzer Division launched an offensive from the bridgehead near Karamyshevo. The Seckendorf group, which was marching to the right, attacked to the east, in the direction of Porkhov. The Raus group first advanced north, occupied Zagoska, went to Lopatovo, and only here turned east along the highway. Under these conditions, units of the 41st Rifle Corps of the 118th Rifle Division, fearing a detour from the east, left the city of Pskov on the morning of July 9 and began to retreat to Gdov.
The next day, the Raus group was stopped by the stubborn defense of the Soviet troops in the Yamkino area, 40 km from Karamyshevo. According to Routh's descriptions, the Soviet troops used heavy KB tanks here with extreme skill - and the Germans did not have the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns that Manstein had previously taken. As a result, by order of Hoepner on July 11, the 6th Panzer Division was again deployed to the north, to assist the 1st Panzer Division in the attack on Luga. Now, on her way to Leningrad, only the Luga line remained before the Germans ...
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After leaving Pskov, organizational conclusions followed. Already on July 9, Corps Commissar V.N. Bogatkin, a member of the Military Council of the Front, reported to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army about the unfavorable situation at the front, about the lack of organization, the loss of control by commanders during hostilities, and the ignorance of the commanders of the position of the forces entrusted to them. On July 11, Major General of Aviation A.P. Ionov, Commander of the Air Force of the Front, was removed from his post and arrested. Following him, the commander of the 41st Rifle Corps, I.S. Kosobutsky, was arrested and put on trial - Vatutin’s threat “answer with your head” was carried out, albeit with some delay. On July 19, the commander of the 118th Infantry Division, Major General N. M. Glovatsky, was arrested, accused of withdrawing troops without an order and surrendering Pskov to the enemy.
During the investigation, Glovatsky pleaded not guilty, saying that the order to withdraw the 118th division was given by the corps commander, and that Glovatsky was not informed about the simultaneous withdrawal of the 111th rifle division. Kosobutsky denied these accusations. We do not have the materials of the case at our disposal, and from a very brief presentation of it in Cherushev's work, it is impossible to understand what kind of charges were brought against each of the commanders and which of them was confirmed by documents.
As a result, on July 26, 1941, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced N. M. Glovatsky to death, I. S. Kosobutsky to 10 years in prison. A year later, in connection with a petition for pardon, the former General Kosobutsky was released and sent to the South-Western Front as an assistant to the formation commander. On October 30, 1943, his criminal record was expunged, he ended the war as commander of the 34th Rifle Corps, receiving the rank of lieutenant general in September 1944. N. M. Glovatsky, like many other generals convicted for a case and not for a case, was rehabilitated by the decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of December 8, 1958.
What are the reasons for the defeat of the North-Western Front? Why were his troops, having several convenient natural and artificial defensive lines, unable to detain the enemy on any of them?
Of course, the German troops had an advantage in manpower and mobility. Only in terms of the number of vehicles, Army Group North exceeded the North-Western Front by several times. This superiority was aggravated by the fact that the divisions of the second echelon arrived at the front gradually, often with long delays due to the situation on the railway, and therefore the enemy had the opportunity to smash the Soviet troops in parts, receiving overwhelming numerical superiority at each stage of the hostilities.
The next group of reasons is the objective state of the Soviet troops. It's no secret that the level of technical equipment of the German troops was significantly higher, with the superiority of German technology, it could not be otherwise. Soviet tanks could surpass the German ones in tabular characteristics, such as the caliber of guns or the thickness of the armor, but in practice they were much less reliable and convenient in practical use, and often failed during marches. Finally, the absence of motorized infantry or vehicles for its transportation in mechanized formations did not allow tankers to consolidate the successes achieved even where they were.
Under such conditions, deep tank strikes became meaningless - even where it was possible to deliver them. Therefore, the Soviet command was forced to “pull apart” mechanized formations, transferring them to reinforce rifle units and formations, and then creating impromptu “battle groups” of tanks and infantry in various sectors. Later, in 1944, the Germans would also resort to similar tactics.
Separately, it should be said about the state of communication. In this area, the superiority of German technology made itself felt most painfully. In conditions of maneuvering operations, wire communications, especially in advanced units, turn out to be unreliable and inflexible; radio communication is of great importance. However, in the Soviet infantry, mobile radio stations at an automobile base were available only at the corps level, often they were not even in divisions, and portable radio stations were absent altogether. The situation was somewhat better in the tank troops - the vehicles of the battalion commanders were equipped with radio transmitters, although at the level of platoons, and sometimes the company, communication was still carried out by flags or it was not available at all. However, surprises could lie in wait here too - for example, on July 6, radio communication between the front headquarters and the headquarters of the 1st mechanized corps was lost, and it was possible to resume it only after the corps retreated from Pskov. But in any case, the tank units could at least report their location to the formation commander, transmit operational or reconnaissance information. The commanders of rifle units and formations could only dream of such a thing.
But even where communication was well maintained, completely unforeseen problems of a psychological nature could arise. So, Major General P. M. Kurochkin, who at that time was the head of communications of the North-Western Front, tells a completely wild story. The front headquarters had constant radio contact with the headquarters of the encircled 11th Army and received encrypted reports from it. But at some point, the front commander suspected that a "radio game" was being waged with him - the enemy defeated the army headquarters, captured ciphers and radio operators, and now transmits false information using them. Then a member of the Military Council of the Front, Corps Commissar P. A. Dibrova, decided to call a member of the Military Council of the 11th Army for a conversation through the PAT radio station. The decision in this situation was quite logical - the Germans really practiced such things, and a personal conversation between people who knew each other was the only way to avoid deception. However, this time at the headquarters of the 11th Army they suspected a “radio game” - and they themselves cut off communication with the front headquarters ...
At the same time, the German troops (primarily motorized) had a well-established wire and radio communication scheme, their advanced and reconnaissance detachments were well controlled "from above" and could quickly inform the leadership about the situation. As a result, the German command had a complete and complete picture of what was happening, and the Soviet command had only fragments of it, in addition, distorted by the untimely transmission of information.
However, these reasons are objective. And there were also subjective ones. First of all, this is the combat experience of soldiers and commanders. The enemy had such experience, because german army was mobilized already in August 1939, while a significant part of the Soviet divisions, especially the second strategic echelon, consisted of conscripts who did not have time to undergo at least some training.
Undoubtedly, against this background, personnel formations seriously stood out for their training and combat effectiveness - primarily rifle divisions located along the border, as well as tank units and formations. Alas, the personnel border divisions were the first to come under German attack and were either destroyed or forced to break through from the encirclement, for some time ceasing to exist as combat formations. The tank units, as noted above, were not able to fight without the support of the infantry. Establishing interaction with "foreign" infantry turned out to be quite difficult. And here the fault is not only of the commanders - it is clearly seen from the operational documents that in small “battle groups”, often drawn up with the world one by one and from pine forest, but having a single command and some time to prepare, the interaction of tanks with infantry turned out to be where the best.
Already on July 11, Lieutenant-General Fedorenko, assistant commander of the Severo-Western Front, wrote about all this to the head of the GABTU. tank troops Major General Vershinin:
“The general impression is that tanks are being used incorrectly: without infantry and interaction with artillery and aircraft. Worst of all, mechanized corps do not exist, since Colonel-General Kuznetsov completely pulled them apart, which contributed to huge losses in materiel, unprecedented in size ... All tanks require repairs, but circumstances force them to be kept in battle. In addition, there are still no spare parts.
... The wooded and swampy terrain of the theater and the way the Germans act (exclusively along the roads, tanks with infantry and artillery) indicate the mandatory need for us in these conditions to often use tanks in small units (company, battalion) [in cooperation] with infantry, artillery and aviation. Large formations are needed only for deep maneuvers in order to encircle and destroy large enemy groupings. Unfortunately, due to poor management and the inability to fight infantry, we cannot linger, let alone advance.
What do the Germans take? More impact on the psyche of a fighter than any "terrible" means that cause damage. His aviation dominates, but it is not so much striking as frightening. So are all her combat means. Often our fighters retreat without seeing the Germans, only under the influence of aviation, small groups of tanks, and often only from German artillery fire. Commanders do not hold fighters in their hands, are not responsible for failure to comply with the order, and withdraw at their own discretion. Units where a strong, brave commander, not even brilliant with tactical talents, beat the Germans, only fluff flies. Such, for example, is the motorized regiment of the 42nd Panzer Division (commander Colonel Goryainov)."
At the same time, many mechanized units fought just fine. So, according to the report of the commander of the 21st mechanized corps D. D. Lelyushenko to the commander of the 27th army dated July 23, 1941, during the month of the war, the loss of the corps in killed, wounded and missing amounted to:
Command staff - 394 people;
Junior commanding staff - 830 people;
Ordinary staff - 5060 people.
Total losses - 6284 people, that is, 60% of those who participated in the hostilities.
At the same time, in a month of fighting, according to Lelyushenko's report, the corps captured: 53 prisoners, 95 rifles, 39 motorcycles and bicycles, 12 cars, and 3 guns; in addition, about 10 more guns captured from the enemy were blown up when the shells were used up. According to the corps, a total of 9575 soldiers and the enemy, 90 machine guns, 86 guns of various calibers, 53 tanks and armored vehicles, 834 cars and 503 motorcycles, as well as 412 horses were destroyed.
Of course, the given figures of enemy losses here are seriously overestimated. However, if all formations of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 acted with the same efficiency, the enemy would hardly have advanced further than Pskov, Smolensk and Kyiv ...
It is interesting to compare the actions of Lelyushenko's corps with the results of the actions of the 12th mechanized corps. On June 21, 1941, the 12th mechanized corps included (without a motorcycle regiment and an air squadron) 28,832 people. By July 8, that is, for half a month of fighting, his losses in killed, wounded and missing amounted to 11,941 people - and this also includes the fighters of the units withdrawn from the corps by senior commanders, about whose fate the corps command had no more news.
Thus, the losses of the 12th mechanized corps in 16 days of continuous retreat from the border itself amounted to about 30%, and the 21st mechanized corps, which retreated slowly, with fierce battles, and never got into an environment - 60% in 20-odd days ( after July 18, the corps practically did not participate in the battles).
It can be said with confidence that these figures reflect the degree of tension in the use of mechanized corps, and, accordingly, the effectiveness of their actions. In fact, the 12th mechanized corps, formally part of the 8th army, did not have a firm and permanent subordination. He retreated to Pskov separately from the main forces of the army, receiving orders both from the headquarters of the army and from the headquarters of the front, and periodically losing contact and being left to himself. As a result, the corps was torn apart into divisions, and then into smaller units, which were constantly withdrawn and transferred somewhere, and every now and then were forced to leave their positions without a fight under the threat of a bypass.
At the same time, the 21st Mechanized Corps was mainly used as a single unit and under a single command and fought more than retreated. Obviously, a considerable share of the merit here belongs to the commander of the 21st mechanized corps, Major General D. D. Lelyushenko - as well as his immediate superior, the commander of the 27th Army, Major General N. E. Berzarin. At the same time, we especially emphasize that neither one nor the other mechanized corps was defeated and, in general, both showed a fairly high combat capability. But, as you can see, combat capability alone is not enough for success.
Only by taking into account all the factors listed above, one can talk about the personal responsibility of certain commanders for the outcome of hostilities. On the example of the actions of the 21st mechanized corps (and the 27th army in general), we see that the effectiveness of the actions of troops is primarily determined by their combat qualities and leadership at the level of regiments and divisions. Any directive from the Headquarters, any order from the command of the front and the army will remain ineffective if the commanders of the middle and lower levels are unable to carry them out.
If the results of the actions of the troops of the North-Western Front against the 56th motorized corps, given the general situation and the balance of power, turned out to be generally not bad, and against the 41st motorized corps - extremely unsuccessful, then it means not only the command of the front and problems with communications, but also in local leadership, at the level of armies and corps. Or the reasons lie in the unequal level of leadership on the part of the enemy - but then we will be forced to admit that Manstein's authority as a brilliant commander and master of maneuver warfare is exaggerated.
However, let's leave this extremely interesting hypothesis for now and return to the analysis of the actions of the Soviet command. We note right away that in modern near-historical journalism it is widely believed that with a lack of forces, the troops should go on the defensive, and this defense could easily win the 1941 campaign without major problems and losses.
Yes, more on military department we were taught that a successful offensive required a threefold superiority over the enemy. But for some reason, many people forget what is meant here. local superiority created by maneuvering troops. Going on the defensive means consciously transferring the initiative to the enemy. Having at least a slight superiority in forces (or even not possessing it at all), in the absence of our active actions, the enemy will be able to freely maneuver forces, choose a place for a strike and secure at least a threefold, at least tenfold superiority there.
Of course, there are reserves for this - free forces that are quickly transferred to the breakthrough site and deliver a counterattack. However, for a successful counterattack, these reserves must not be too far from the breakthrough and be strong enough, otherwise they will not be able to do anything. But the enemy is also not sitting idly by, as far as possible he disguises the concentration of his forces in the main direction and actively performs distracting maneuvers in secondary sectors.
Well, if we unravel the meaning of these maneuvers and determine in advance the place of the impending strike. Well, how can we go wrong? Deaf defense is a constant balancing on a tightrope: "we will find out - we will not find out", "we will be in time - we will not be in time". Even if you managed to react and not make a mistake nine times, there is no guarantee that you can do it on the tenth ...
Recall that even in 1943 near Kursk, when the approximate time and approximate place of the German attack were known, and the Red Army had a significant superiority in forces, the high maneuverability of troops and the flexibility of command allowed the Germans to achieve local superiority in the direction of the main attack and maintain it in within a few days. When the reserves taken from the "calm" sectors of the front approached the Soviet troops, the German offensive bogged down - but by this time the enemy had already overcome two defensive lines and was close to breaking through the third.
Let's not forget what historians of the "revisionist" direction are trying to forget: until 1944, the Wehrmacht significantly outnumbered the Red Army in the quantity (and quality) of vehicles, that is, in operational mobility. German divisions (and not only armored and motorized ones) were able to move faster than the Soviet troops retreated, even "mobile". Thus, the 12th mechanized corps, which was retreating from the Dvina line parallel to the 41st motorized corps of the enemy, was able to overtake it only on the approach to Pskov, where the German troops were detained for several days.
The best way to avoid the described situation is to counterattack. Any counterattack forces the enemy to attend to its parry, the very possibility of a counterattack forces him to allocate part of his forces to the reserve, thereby weakening the strike force. Enemy troops that have broken through are often easier to stop with a counterattack to the flank than with frantic attempts to create new defenses in their path. Finally, tank and motorized infantry divisions in the offensive, with all their mobility, have extremely vulnerable communications; the release of even insignificant forces on these communications can thwart the entire offensive.
Thus, we see that the constant counterattacks of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1941 were not at all the result of the incompetence of the command or a misunderstanding of the situation. Often this was the only way stop the enemy, or at least delay his advance. It was the counterattacks of the 21st mechanized corps against the German bridgehead in Dvinsk that not only detained Manstein here for a week, but also inflicted significant losses on the Germans - and this despite the fact that the enemy had superior forces here.
It would be wrong to place all responsibility for the failures only on the front commander, Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov. Yes, it was his untimely order to withdraw from the Dvina line that caused the collapse of the entire Soviet defense. But Kuznetsov expected that the divisions of the 1st Mechanized and 41st Rifle Corps transferred to him would have time to arrive in the area of Pskov and Ostrov on July 2–3. Alas, Kosobutsky's rifle corps completed unloading only on the 6th, and Chernyavsky's mechanized corps was "gutted" along the way.
Less obvious (but no less important) is that F. I. Kuznetsov initially chose the wrong tactics to control his troops. Knowing well about the shortcomings of communication, he continued to give orders, now and then canceling each other, and often - over the head of the army and corps command. As a result, orders from the front headquarters came to the troops irregularly, often later in time could overtake those given earlier, and almost always they no longer corresponded to the changed situation. Probably, in this situation, it was necessary to confine ourselves to only general directives, entrusting their implementation to the commanders of the armies, who, nevertheless, were closer to the front and had the opportunity to respond more quickly to the situation.
The presence of a number of formations, often improvised and with unclear subordination, also made it difficult to lead the troops. Apparently, Kuznetsov understood this himself - hence the attempt to ensure control of the 12th mechanized corps, transferring it to the "empty" 65th rifle corps, which had no other troops. However, under the current conditions, it would be much more efficient to put the tankers under the command of the commander of the neighboring 11th Rifle Corps - or else create a management structure more high level, making it responsible for the defense of the entire threatened area in front of the German bridgeheads in Livani, Krustpils and Plavinas. By the way, the 27th Army, also created literally “on the knee” from the group of General Akimov and the 21st mechanized corps, became just such an impromptu association. True, the availability of free command of the army, led by the energetic General Berzarin, played a significant role here.
It should not be forgotten that the troubles continued even after the removal of Kuznetsov. If the sudden capture by the Germans of the bridges in Dvinsk can be justified by the "unconventional" actions of saboteurs, then the equally quick and effective capture of the bridges across the Velikaya near Ostrov has no explanation. True, the bridges across the Cherekha were blown up in time, but this river no longer became a significant obstacle. On the other hand, the bridge across Velikaya near Pskov, on the contrary, was blown up prematurely, which led to tragic consequences.
Without knowing the details and not having the materials of the case in hand, it is difficult to determine the degree of guilt of the convicted generals Glovatsky and Kosobutsky: for blowing up the bridge, for losing command of the troops, for failing to hold Pskov, even with organized defense at a natural line. However, in the battle for Ostrov on July 5, two regiments of the 111th division of the 41st corps acted extremely passively, unable to support a tank attack, and then unable to withstand even a weak onslaught of the enemy. If the inability of the infantry to fight can be explained by the lack of experience among recruits and reservists, then the fault for the lack of control in battle lies with the division commander, and the responsibility for poor interaction with the tankmen of the 3rd Panzer Division lies with the commander of the rifle corps as a senior commander.
Here is how the reasons for the unsuccessful military operations of the troops of the North-Western Front on the Riga-Pskov and Ostrov-Pskov directions were formulated in the report of Major General of Artillery Tikhonov to Colonel General Gorodovikov, authorized by the Headquarters, dated July 9, 1941:
“Without going into the root causes of the withdrawal of the troops of the North-Western Front, it is necessary to state the presence of the following shortcomings in the troops today:
1. There is no proper desire to wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy, both from combined arms commanders, up to corps commanders, and from fighters ...
It is necessary to create a decisive change in this matter. There is only one way - to introduce into the minds of the troops from the commander to the soldier the Suvorov rule: "The enemy is weaker - attack, the enemy is equal - attack, the enemy is stronger - also attack."
This rule should be applied not only on the offensive, but also on the defensive, which is especially important for the troops of the North-Western Front at the moment...
2. In defense, commanders and fighters are unstable, they especially lose their presence of mind under artillery, mortar and air fire and when attacking tanks.
We had to see many cases when the withdrawal began without the order of the chief, without the pressure of the infantry, under pressure only from tanks or artillery fire or mortar fire.
On the one hand, the reason for this lies in the fact that people do not dig in (a significant part of them do not have shovels), on the other hand, they do not have time to dig in due to lack of time ... The lines occupied are often exposed to the enemy before they are equipped (line river Western Dvina, line of the 111th and 235th rifle divisions 8.7.41) ...
3. In all the operations that we had to witness (the Riga-Pskov and Ostrov-Pskov directions), there was very often no connection between the higher headquarters and the subordinates and the latter among themselves. Sometimes this happened due to lack of funds, but more often due to the low demands of the commander and his staff in organizing communications (the 1st mechanized corps, having a communications battalion, had no communication with the 41st rifle corps during 5.7.41) …
4. Intelligence is conducted insufficiently, primitively, carelessly. Headquarters do not set tasks for reconnaissance in battle. The intelligence data received remains unused, the proper conclusions are not drawn, often they are not reported to the higher headquarters, and, as a rule, they do not inform the lower headquarters and neighbors at all.
As a result, the troops are working blindly - not a single case has been noted when the commander would make a decision, having more or less accurate information about the enemy.
Aviation does not work in the interests of the commanders of rifle corps and rifle divisions.
5. Front and army reserves are brought too close to the front line, in parts and units are substituted under attack (the 235th rifle division - near Ostrov, the 46th rifle division - in Pskov).
It is necessary to concentrate reserves at a proper (according to the situation) distance from the front and to bring in whole formations, in an organized manner, from the march into battle.
6. Interaction on the battlefield between ground forces, inside them and with aviation is poorly organized (on 5.7.41 near Ostrov, the 5th and 6th tank battalions and aviation acted separately in time). Reasons - lack of communication ...
7. Aircraft target designation is not applied to ground troops.
In this matter, the enemy has a huge advantage over us, which affected the battles near Ostrov on July 5, 1941 and near Cherekha on July 7, 1941.
8. Artillery shows instability, prematurely withdraws from firing positions, does not use the full power of its fire.
Insufficiently planned and organized concentrated and barrage fire.
Anti-tank guns in defense are also unstable, leaving their positions prematurely, as a result of which enemy tanks are in command on the battlefield.
In the offensive, anti-tank guns do not seek enough for tanks, they fall behind, leaving the latter without support for single combat with strong enemy anti-tank artillery, which causes heavy losses of tanks,
9. Tanks, in the presence of an offensive impulse (6th Tank Regiment) and the determination to smash the enemy, maneuver weakly on the battlefield, tend to act crowded along the roads, do not provide themselves with the suppression of enemy anti-tank weapons, are poorly camouflaged, as a result they suffer heavy losses.
10. Infantry is the weakest point of the troops. The offensive spirit is low. It lags behind tanks in the offensive, is easily disorganized under the influence of artillery fire, mortar fire and air attacks (on 5.7.41, the tanks, having occupied the Island, put the Germans to flight. Tanks captured the city. forced to withdraw with heavy losses).
Part of the command staff, especially in the link up to the battalion commander, does not show due courage in battle, there are cases of leaving the battlefield without the order of the chief by loners and even units ... ".
And yet, the main reason for the failures, wrong actions, erroneous decisions of Soviet commanders in the summer of 1941 can be formulated in just a few words: lack of experience. Most of the commanders of corps and divisions, commanders of armies and fronts have not yet had the opportunity to take part in modern warfare - maneuverable and mechanized, while notable for its high density of troops and duration of operations. The experience of the Civil War could not help much here, the experience of Spain, Khalkhin Gol and even Finland was also not comprehensive, and even a minority of Soviet military leaders could get it.
Not everyone manages to learn from victories - someone has to be content with experience gained in defeats.
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