List of Russian prisoners of war in the First World War. Captivity of the First World War - shameful and honorable - MAMLAS
Slavic prisoners of war in Russia during the First World War
annotation
The article attempts to present the history of the creation by the Russian authorities of national formations from prisoners of war of the Slavs of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies - Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Croats, Serbs, etc., since out of more than 2.2 million enemy soldiers and officers taken by the Russians troops captured, they accounted for more than half, a significant part of them surrendered to Russian captivity voluntarily.
Keywords
World War I; Slavic prisoners of war in Russia; POW camps; national military formations from Slavic prisoners of war
Time scale - century
XX
Bibliographic description:
Bazanov S.N. Prisoners of war-Slavs in Russia during the First World War // Proceedings of the Institute of Russian History. Issue. 11 / Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Russian History; resp. ed. Yu.A. Petrov, editor-coord. E.N. Rudaya. M., 2013. S. 171-184.
Article text
S.N. Bazanov
SLAVES PRISONERS OF WAR IN RUSSIA DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR
In the history of the Second World War, and for our people the Great Patriotic War, the concept of “Vlasovites” by the name of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who surrendered and transferred to the service of Nazi Germany. On his initiative, the so-called Russian liberation army(ROA), designed to "liberate the peoples of Russia from the Stalinist regime."
In the First World War, it was unthinkable that a Russian prisoner of war would fight as part of the German or Austro-Hungarian, and even more so the Turkish army against his compatriots "in order to fight the autocracy." Our soldier remained true to his oath. But his opponents are dressed in soldier's greatcoats the Slavs of the armies of the German bloc - masses surrendered to Russian captivity. Many of them, being in captivity, asked our command to enlist them in the Russian army to participate "in the struggle for the liberation of the Slavic peoples from Austro-German enslavement." Why did this happen?
World War I was a turning point that radically changed the course and character of historical processes in Europe, opened the subsequent era of wars and social upheavals. Undoubtedly, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, which redrawn the political map of the Balkan Peninsula, were a major acute crisis that hastened its unleashing. They dramatically changed the alignment of forces of large and small states in this troubled region and deepened their contradictions to the extreme.
Serbia, whose relations with Austria-Hungary at the beginning of the 20th century. were full of conflicts, significantly increased its territory. Having received a common border with Montenegro, Serbia as a result blocked the path for the further expansion of Austria-Hungary into the depths of the Balkan Peninsula. The Slavic population of Bosnia, Croatia and Herzegovina, under the rule of Austria-Hungary, counted on the help of Serbia in the struggle for their national liberation.
Behind the Balkan states of Serbia and Montenegro stood the great powers. Naturally, any, even the most insignificant, conflict on the Balkan Peninsula affected their interests. The performance of Austria-Hungary against Serbia inevitably led to a war with Russia, which was vitally interested in strengthening the position of the fraternal Orthodox state in the Balkans. However, in the war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, if one arises, their allies in military blocs, the Entente countries and Germany, could not but intervene.
Thus, any conflict on the Balkan Peninsula inevitably led to a pan-European and global one. As you know, the Sarajevo assassination on June 15 (28), 1914, which sharply aggravated relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, served as the reason for it. The latter decided to use this incident to attack Serbia and a month later, instigated by the German Emperor Wilhelm II, declared war on Serbia. Wanting to help the Slav brothers, the Russian Emperor Nicholas II announced mobilization. In response, Germany issued an ultimatum to Russia, which, as you know, went unanswered. As a result, on July 19 (August 1), Germany, and on July 24 (August 6), Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.
Nicholas II in the famous Highest Manifestos of July 20 and 26 (August 2 and 8) clearly outlined the reasons for our country's entry into the war - the protection of the territory of the Fatherland, its honor, dignity, Russia's position among the great powers, as well as the protection of half-blooded and fellow-faith brothers-Slavs . So, the first Supreme Manifesto of Nicholas II solemnly proclaimed:
“Following its historical precepts, Russia, united in faith and blood with the Slavic peoples, has never looked at their fate indifferently. With complete unanimity and special force, the fraternal feelings of the Russian people towards the Slavs have awakened in recent days, when Austria-Hungary presented Serbia with demands that are obviously unacceptable for a sovereign state. Despising the compliant and peaceful response of the Serbian government, rejecting the benevolent mediation of Russia, Austria hastily launched an armed attack, opening the bombardment of defenseless Belgrade.
Forced by the circumstances to take the necessary precautions, We ordered that the army and navy be brought to martial law, but, cherishing the blood and property of Our subjects, making every effort to achieve a peaceful outcome of the negotiations that have begun.
In the midst of friendly relations, Germany, allied with Austria, contrary to Our hopes for an age-old good neighborhood and not heeding Our assurance that the measures taken have no hostile goals, began to seek their immediate cancellation and, having met with a refusal of this demand, suddenly declared war on Russia.
Now it is no longer necessary to intercede only for the unjustly offended kindred country, but to protect the honor, dignity, integrity of Russia and its position among the great powers.
The second manifesto was more emotional:
“Now Austria-Hungary, the first instigator of world turmoil, who unsheathed a sword against the weakest Serbia in the midst of the deep world, has thrown off her mask and declared war on Russia, which had saved her more than once.
The forces of the enemy are multiplying: both mighty German powers took up arms against Russia and all the Slavs. But with redoubled strength, the just wrath of peaceful peoples is growing towards them, and with invincible firmness, Russia, challenged to battle, stands before the enemy, faithful to the glorious traditions of its past.
The Lord sees that not for the sake of warlike designs or vain Worldly glory, we have raised weapons, but protecting the dignity and security of our God-preserved Empire, we are fighting for a just cause. We are not alone in the forthcoming war of the peoples: our valiant allies stood up with us, also forced to resort to the force of arms in order to finally eliminate the eternal threat of the German powers common peace and tranquility.
May the Lord Almighty bless our and allied weapons, and may all of Russia rise to a feat of arms with iron in hand, with a cross in its heart.
Soon many states were drawn into the war, and it took on a global character. But the Slavic question throughout the war was one of the primary factors, and at the end of it - contributed to the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
According to the plan of the German-Austrian ruling circles, the outbreak of the First World War was to become a "grave for the Slavic peoples." There is no doubt that the victory of the German bloc for many years would have consolidated the oppression of both the Slavic peoples of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and soon Serbia and Montenegro occupied by them. But the aggressive plans of Austria-Hungary and Germany were not destined to come true. Russia, the only great Orthodox power, thwarted the German blitzkrieg plan.
The outbreak of the First World War, provoked by Germany, touched such strings of the national self-consciousness of our people that for a while the tsarist regime even received a credit of trust from the Russian society, especially since only he could organize a rebuff to the enemy. And this happened despite the fact that the not so old bloody events First Russian Revolution 1905-1907 Russian soldiers felt themselves part of the Slavs. They went to the defense of the Slavic brothers and their land. Yes, and they went to the front to the sounds of the new military march "Farewell of the Slav", created in 1912 by the Russian Kapellmeister Staff Captain Vasily Agapkin.
Well-known military historian and theorist Lieutenant-General Professor N.N. Golovin, being in exile, published a number of books in which he tried to recreate the true picture of the beginning of that war. Giving a description of the patriotic upsurge that flared up brightly in those fateful July days of 1914, he wrote:
“Everyone who witnessed the war between Russia and Japan cannot be struck by the huge difference in popular sentiment in 1904 and 1914.
The first stimulus that pushed all sections of the population of Russia to the feat of arms was the consciousness that Germany itself had attacked us. The peace-loving tone of the Russian Government towards the Germans was widely known, and therefore doubts such as those that took place in the Japanese war could not arise anywhere. The threat of Germany awakened in the people the social instinct of self-preservation.
Another stimulus for the struggle, which seemed understandable to our common people, was that this struggle began from the need to defend the right to existence of the consanguineous and coreligionist Serbian people. This feeling was by no means that “pan-Slavism” that Kaiser Wilhelm liked to mention when pushing the Austrians to the final absorption of the Serbs. It was sympathy for the offended younger brother. For centuries, this feeling was brought up in the Russian people, who waged a long series of wars with the Turks for the liberation of the Slavs. The stories of ordinary participants in various campaigns of this age-old struggle were passed down from generation to generation and served as one of the favorite topics for interviews of village politicians. They were taught to feel a kind of national chivalry. This feeling of a defender of the offended Slavic peoples found its expression in the word "brother", which our soldiers dubbed during liberation wars Bulgarians and Serbs, and which passed into the people. Now, instead of the Turks, the Germans threatened to destroy the Serbs - and the same Germans attacked us. The connection between these two acts was perfectly clear to the common sense of our people.
The very fact that the Germans were the first to declare war on us contributed to the formation of its perception among the masses of the people as a domestic war, aimed at repelling enemy aggression and protecting the Slavic brothers. Prayers were held throughout the country "for the granting of victory over the perfidious and insidious enemy", and in the cities - processions and demonstrations, especially powerful in St. Petersburg and Moscow.
Leading alone on his vast Eastern Front fighting against Austria-Hungary, Germany, and on October 20 (November 2) also Turkey, Russia, however, already in the first months of the war in the Battle of Galicia, inflicted serious defeats on the troops of Austria-Hungary, deeply advancing into its territory. The Russian army brought liberation from the Austrian oppression to the Slavic peoples inhabiting Galicia. And two years after the famous Brusilov breakthrough, Austria-Hungary was already on the brink of a military disaster.
The successes of Russian weapons gave hope to the enslaved Slavic peoples. They hoped that the Austro-Hungarian Empire would not withstand the blows of the war, that favorable conditions would be created for the creation of independent Slavic states. Therefore, the Slavs - Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Croats, Serbs, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Slovenes, etc., who constituted a significant part of the population of Austria-Hungary, began to fight for national independence from the very first days of the war. This struggle took various forms.
So, the Czechs and Slovaks tried by all means to avoid mobilization into the Austro-Hungarian army, unrest broke out in many military units formed from them sent to the Eastern Front. Naturally, this greatly reduced the combat capability of the Austro-Hungarian army. Recall that in its ranks there were 17.5% of Czechs and Slovaks alone, and in general the share of Slavs was 45.2% (10.2% of Poles, 7.5% of Serbs and Croats, 7.4% of Rusyns, 2.6 % of Slovenes).
It is deeply symbolic that the first fraternization on the Eastern Front took place precisely between the Slavic soldiers of the opposing armies. This happened on the biggest Orthodox holiday - Holy Easter in April 1915. Moreover, Russian command in those days it wasn't much of a hindrance. These first fraternizations, coming from the depths of the Slavic soul, had nothing to do with the politicized fraternizations of 1917, often organized by the Bolsheviks and the Austro-German command and contributing to the fall of discipline, and the further collapse of the Russian army.
At the same time, on the Eastern Front, Czech and Slovak soldiers, not wanting to fight for Austria-Hungary, surrendered to Russian captivity in large groups. Voluntary surrender took on such a massive character that already in the spring of 1915, as you know, it came to the transition to the Russian side of entire military units. So, on April 3 (17), during the period of the Carpathian operation, the 28th Prague Regiment voluntarily went over to our side. As noted in the report that then arrived at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, “28th (Prague. - S.B.) did not fire on our units sent by the chief of staff to the flank - and surrendered entirely, without causing any losses to the Russians.
In May of the same year, in the area of the river. San there was a massive surrender to Russian captivity of over 1500 soldiers of the 36th Mladoboleslavsky regiment. This was followed by a massive transition to our side of most of the 21st Chaslavsky, part of the 13th Olomouc militia regiments. In smaller groups, soldiers of other Czech regiments ran across to the Russians. This forced the command of the Austro-Hungarian army to reorganize all Czech units and distribute Czechs and Slovaks in small batches to other regiments.
Recall: out of 2.2-2.3 million enemy soldiers and officers taken prisoner by the Russian army (this, by the way, is the most established figure in our reference literature), the Germans, for example, amounted to only about 190 thousand, and the remaining 2 million were soldiers of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. Of this number, there were about 450 thousand Austrians, more than half a million Hungarians, about 63 thousand Turks, the rest of the prisoners of war were Slavs. For example, according to S.N. Vasilyeva, there were 670-830 thousand people: 200-250 thousand Czechs and Slovaks, approximately the same number of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 150-200 thousand Poles, 120-130 thousand Ukrainians. Thus, every third or fourth prisoner of war was a Slav. And, as already noted, a fairly significant part of them surrendered to Russian captivity voluntarily.
Naturally, such a situation, which had developed already in the first months of the war, could not but attract the attention of the tsarist government and military authorities. In addition, the goal of their policy towards Slavic prisoners of war was determined by the ideological justification of the Second Patriotic War(as it was called in official propaganda at that time), i.e. the war of liberation waged against the Austrian and German enslavement of the Slavs. It was also extremely important for the tsarist government to present Russia in the eyes of the Slavic peoples of Austria-Hungary and Germany as a liberator.
So, at first behind the scenes, there was such a different attitude of the tsarist government, military authorities, and the population as a whole towards prisoners of war - Slavs and non-Slavs. In this regard, in the first months of the war, their territorial distribution was assumed according to nationality and citizenship. For example, prisoners of war of the German army were to be sent to the camps of Eastern Siberia, and the Austro-Hungarian - Western Siberia and Central Asia, where the climate is milder. It should be noted that this plan had to be abandoned due to the difficulties that arose with its implementation. In addition, as already noted, there were 10 times more prisoners of the Austro-Hungarian army than the German one.
It should be emphasized that the national principle (Slavs and non-Slavs) was steadily put into practice throughout the war. Already at the assembly points, Slavic prisoners of war were separated from the Austrians, Hungarians and Germans, the trains with which followed to the regions of the European, Siberian and Far Eastern North. Representatives of Slavic nationalities were sent to the European part of the country (mainly to the central and southern provinces) and to Western Siberia. However, camps where exclusively Slavic or non-Slavic prisoners of war would be kept were not created. As a number of studies have shown, depending on the location of the camp, representatives of one or another nationality only prevailed in it. So, according to the census conducted in the Omsk military district in February 1915, 68% of prisoners of war were Slavs, and only about 10% were Germans, Hungarians and Romanians.
By the beginning of 1917, more than 400 prisoner-of-war camps had been set up in Russia. Geographically, they were distributed as follows. Within the Moscow military district there were 128 camps (where 321 thousand people were kept), Kazan - 113 (285 thousand people), Omsk - 28 (199 thousand people), Turkestan - 37 (155 thousand people), Amur - 5 (50 thousand people). There were 78,000 prisoners of war in the camps of the Minsk Military District, 406,000 in Kyiv, 80,000 in the Caucasus, 217,000 in Odessa, and 76,000 in the Don Army Region. from 2 to 10 thousand people were kept, in Siberia - large ones, where up to 35 thousand prisoners of war simultaneously stayed.
As can be seen from the above figures, the distribution of prisoners of war throughout the country was uneven. And if in late 1914 - early 1915 they were sent mainly to Western Siberia and Far East, then from the end of 1915 they began to place in European Russia. This was due to the rapid increase in the number of prisoners of war and the need to use them in agricultural work. Note that throughout the war, prison camps were subordinate to one department - the Main Directorate General Staff located in Petrograd.
As already noted, Slavic prisoners of war, unlike non-Slavs, enjoyed significant benefits. They mainly tried to place Slavs in the central and southern provinces with favorable climatic conditions, they were sent to agricultural work, while non-Slavs were sent to mines, construction, road work, etc. Slavic officers of war were given free time, and soldiers were given the opportunity to take Sunday walks. All of them could also communicate with compatriots. Recall that in those years in Russia, with the permission of the authorities, numerous Slavic societies, compatriots, whose representatives often visited prisoner of war camps, distributed their brochures, newspapers and leaflets, conducted anti-German and anti-Austrian agitation, and also engaged in charitable activities.
All this significantly influenced the attitude of Slavic prisoners of war towards the war. Many of them expressed their desire to defend the independence of their homeland with weapons in their hands. We emphasize: only true patriots could take such a step. Indeed, in the event of being captured, they were not waiting for a prisoner of war camp, but a tribunal with all the ensuing consequences. And although the use of such volunteers at the front was a gross violation of the principles of the Hague Convention of 1907, the military authorities met them halfway, since in the eyes of Russian society this gave the ongoing war a liberating character.
Even at the very beginning of the war, special national units began to be formed as part of the Russian army. So, the chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General N.N. On August 14 (27), 1914, Yanushkevich, explaining the purpose of creating the Czech squad, wrote to the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front, General of Artillery N.N. Ivanov: “this is done mainly for political reasons, bearing in mind that during the actions of our troops within Austria, these units will break up into separate parties in order to become the head of the Czech movement against Austria.”
It should be clarified here that initially the Czech squad was formed from volunteers of Czechs and Slovaks living in Russia. According to various estimates, the Czech-Slovak diaspora in our country on the eve of World War I ranged from 70 to 100 thousand people. However, these were people in mostly civilian professions, and many were not at all suitable for military service. Therefore, already in the autumn of 1914, the military command raised the issue of replenishing the Czech squad with volunteer prisoners of war of Czech and Slovak nationalities.
On September 17 (30) from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General N.N. Yanushkevich received a telegram emphasizing that, as the front command found out, “on the part of the Supreme Commander of the objections to the admission of Czech prisoners of war (the Czech squad. — S.B.) I inform you that His Imperial Highness sees no obstacles to the aforementioned reception.
Soon, on December 2 (15), an order was received from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (the Younger), which allowed “the entry [to] the Czech squad formed in Kyiv, also wishing Czech prisoners of war, and such a reception is recognized as possible to allow immediately after being taken into captive." After this order, volunteer prisoners of war of Czech and Slovak nationality became the main source of replenishment for this military unit.
The next largest contingent of Slavic prisoners of war were the Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc.) - soldiers and officers of the Austro-Hungarian army who were captured or voluntarily surrendered to the Russians, because they did not want, like the Czechs and Slovaks, to fight for the interests of the Habsburg monarchy.
Yugoslav prisoners of war were scattered throughout almost the entire territory of the Russian Empire. Among other Austro-Hungarian military personnel, they were in camps located both in European Russia and in Western Siberia and Central Asia. We emphasize that a fairly large number of Yugoslav prisoners of war ended up on the territory of Ukraine, especially in the Odessa region, where the formation of Serbian volunteer units (Serbian Detachment) unfolded. Initially, the recording of volunteers from among them pursued the goal of replenishing the thinned ranks of the Serbian army after heavy battles with Austria-Hungary, but already from the end of 1915, after the defeat of the Serbian army and the occupation of Serbia by Austro-Hungarian troops, the formation of volunteer units from Yugoslav prisoners of war began to their use in the Russian army in the field. At the request of the Serbian government in exile, these military formations began to be called Serbian, although they also included Croats, Slovenes and representatives of other Yugoslav peoples.
It should be noted that in the first years of the war, the creation of such national formations proceeded rather slowly. Russia has not yet felt the need for manpower for the front. Their shortage began to show itself after the bloody battles of 1915, when the German bloc shifted its main efforts to the Eastern Front in order to withdraw Russia from the war.
April 8 (21), 1916, who replaced N.N. Yanushkevich, the new Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General M.V. Alekseev turned to Nicholas II with a written report, where he noted: the board of the Union of Czech-Slovak Societies is petitioning the military authorities for the release of prisoners of war Czechs and Slovaks, "who have proven their devotion to the Slavic idea and have the guarantee of the Czech-Slovak organization", with the aim of a wider and more expedient their use, mainly for the needs of the army. According to M.V. Alekseev, initially it was necessary to release the former military personnel of the 28th Prague and 36th Mladoboleslavsky regiments who voluntarily surrendered to Russian captivity, as well as Slavic refugees from Austria-Hungary who left with the retreating units of the Russian army in 1915, as well as other Slavs, for the loyalty of which Slavic societies and fraternities will vouch. To all the above, M.V. Alekseev, the tsar replied with "agreement in principle".
Soon, on June 5 (18) of the same year, the Minister of War, Infantry General D.S. Shuvaev also turned to Nicholas II with a written report, where, referring to the positive resolution of the monarch on the report of M.V. Alekseev, raised the issue of the release of Slavic prisoners of war, "whose complete loyalty to Russia is vouched for by the societies of Slavs legalized in our country." The draft developed by that time by the military authorities provided for their transfer to the category of "workable", involvement in work without the right to care and mandatory supervision of them. All these questions were entirely within the competence of the military authorities, while the wages of Slavic prisoners of war released under such conditions were to be established by the tsarist government. However, any participation of Slavic societies was completely excluded here.
On July 27 (August 9), Nicholas II again expressed his agreement with the project, which was submitted for consideration to the “Special Meeting on Combining All Efforts to Supply the Army and Navy and Organizing the Logistics”, and then to a special meeting at the Main Directorate of the General Staff, to whom, as already noted , obeyed prisoner of war camps. Note that this project, although it was constantly being finalized, was still not approved.
After February Revolution the Provisional Government that came to power continued the policy of the tsarist authorities in relation to Slavic prisoners of war. On June 30 (July 13), 1917, the military and naval minister of the Provisional Government A.F. Kerensky approved the "Rules Establishing Special Benefits for Prisoners of War Czechs, Slovaks and Poles". The rules allowed correspondence with prisoners of war in other camps, Czech-Slovak and Polish public organizations and individuals, the provision of work in their specialty, the receipt of literature in their native language, the creation of mutual aid funds and libraries, the joint presence of brothers and other relatives in one camp. Officers and volunteers were even allowed to marry Russian women and live in private apartments.
The interim government also very actively contributed to the creation of national military formations from Slavic prisoners of war, which began, as previously noted, royal authorities. Thus, the aforementioned Czech squad formed in 1914 in February 1916 was transformed into rifle regiment, then to a brigade, in June 1917 - to a division, and in September - to the Separate Czech-Slovak Corps of about 45 thousand soldiers and officers. In October, Russian Major General V.N. was appointed its commander. Shokorov, and the commissioner - Deputy Chairman of the Russian branch of the Czechoslovak National Council P. Max.
In January 1917, the Polish Reserve Rifle Regiment was formed in Belgorod, numbering about 16 thousand people. Then on Southwestern Front the 1st Polish rifle division. Subsequently, it was replenished by soldiers of the Polish Reserve Rifle Regiment. July 23 (August 5) Supreme Commander-in-Chief Infantry General L.G. Kornilov appointed Lieutenant General I.R. Dovbor-Musnitsky as commander of the 1st Polish Corps of Legionnaires, the basis of which was the 1st Polish Rifle Division. The headquarters of the corps was in Bykhov, Mogilev province. By October, the corps already had three infantry divisions, cavalry units and artillery, and its total number reached almost 25 thousand soldiers and officers.
In 1915, on the basis of the Serbian detachment, which was mentioned earlier, two divisions were formed from among the prisoners of war, reduced in 1917 to the Yugoslav Volunteer Corps. Its headquarters was in Odessa, General of the Serbian army M. Zhivkovich was appointed commander. By October 1917, the corps already numbered 30 thousand people, and all three of these corps together - at least 100 thousand. Other, smaller units and subunits were also created from Slavic prisoners of war. Thus, every seventh or eighth Slavic prisoner of war voluntarily joined military formations as part of the Russian army in order to fight for the independence of their homeland with arms in hand.
The ideological policy towards prisoners of war in the post-October period was fundamentally different from that pursued by the tsarist and Provisional governments. The Soviet government did not divide them into Slavs and non-Slavs. The national orientation was replaced by a class one, which corresponded to both the foreign and domestic political goals of the Bolshevik Party.
In addition, the Council of People's Commissars soon banned the further creation of national military formations from Slavic prisoners of war, and those already created were to be disbanded and demobilized. So, in January 1918, the command of the Separate Czech-Slovak Corps had to ask the French government to officially transfer its military personnel to serve in the French army, and also to agree with the Soviet government on the transfer of the corps through Vladivostok to the Western (French) front. However, as we know, these plans were not destined to come true: on May 25, 1918, an armed anti-Bolshevik action of units and formations of the corps took place, the echelons of which stood along the line railways from Penza to Irkutsk, which played a huge role in the Civil War. Only in February 1920 between the government of the RSFSR and the command of the corps was an armistice agreement signed, guaranteeing the evacuation of Czechoslovak legionnaires from Soviet Russia. The last units of the corps left for their homeland in September 1920 via Vladivostok.
No less tragic was the further fate of the 1st Polish Corps of Legionnaires. Thus, for the refusal of the command of the corps to comply with the decree of the Soviet government on the democratization of the army, the Soviet command of the Western Front, in the rear area of \u200b\u200bwhich the units and formations of the corps were located, issued in January 1918 an order to disarm, disband and demobilize it. However, the corps commander, Lieutenant General I.R. Dovbor-Musnitsky did not obey this order, for which both he and the corps were outlawed by the Soviet authorities. After a series of battles with the Soviet troops, parts of the corps retreated towards Minsk and occupied the city on February 20. The next day, German troops entered Minsk. The Polish units, by agreement with the German command, were allowed to temporarily remain on the territory of Belarus, and in May 1918, I.R. Dovbor-Musnitsky, under pressure from the Germans, gave the order to disband the corps.
Severe trials fell on the lot of the Yugoslav Volunteer Corps. In the autumn of 1917, his headquarters and the 1st division were transferred from Odessa to Arkhangelsk, from where they were partially sent to the Thessaloniki front, and the units that arrived in Arkhangelsk later remained in it until the end of the Civil War. At the end of the year, the group of soldiers of the corps who remained in Odessa voluntarily joined the 1st International Detachment of the Red Guard, and the reserve battalion of the corps, which was also located there, also went over to the side of the Soviet authorities. At the same time, the 1st Serbian Soviet Revolutionary Regiment was created from a part of the soldiers and officers of the corps in Yekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk). The Yugoslav shock battalion stationed in Kyiv at the beginning of 1918 was reorganized into the 1st Yugoslav communist regiment. Some units and formations of the former corps participated on the side of the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Civil War in various regions of Russia (the Volga region, Siberia, the Far East).
The fate of Slavic prisoners of war who did not join the national military formations developed differently. Some of them took part in the Civil War as part of the national units of the Red Army, others fought in various anti-Soviet armed formations. Most of the Slavic prisoners of war did not participate in the Civil War and were waiting for their return to their homeland. This process began in 1919 and continued until the end of 1922.
FOOTNOTE original text
See for example: Keegan, J. World War I: [transl. from English]. - M., 2002. - S. 193, 194; Stepanov, A.I., Utkin, A.I.. The All-Russian Empire and the USSR in World Wars. — M.; Krasnodar, 2005. - S. 13.
Cit. on: Petrov, A.A.. The formation of the Czech-Slovak units in the composition Russian army in 1914-1917 // Forgotten War and dedicated heroes. - M., 2011. - S. 238.
The participation of Yugoslav workers in October revolution and civil war in the USSR: Sat. documents and materials. - M., 1976. - S. 8.
Lisetsky, A.M. On the situation of prisoners of war in Russia after the victory of the February Revolution // Participation of workers foreign countries in the October Revolution. - M., 1967. - S. 117.
Great October Socialist Revolution: Encyclopedia. - 3rd ed., add. - S. 410, 411, 583, 600.
Senyavskaya E.S. The situation of Russian prisoners of war during the First World War: an essay on everyday reality // Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series "History". 2013. No. 1. C. 64-83.
E.S. Senyavskaya
The position of Russian prisoners of war during the First World War:
sketch of everyday reality
The First World War literally shook the world public consciousness, was psychological stress for the entire modern civilization, showing that all the scientific, technical, cultural and supposedly moral progress achieved by people is not capable of preventing humanity from instantly sliding into a state of bloody barbarism and savagery. The year 1914 opened the way for the wars of a new era, in which "unprecedented massive and sophisticated cruelty and hecatombs of victims" appeared after the "relatively benevolent" wars of the 18th and 19th centuries, when the "traditions of knightly nobility and military magnanimity" still retained their strength. .. “In the bloody slaughter, from now on, all the laws of morality and morality, including military ones, were violated. They poisoned people with gases, stealthily sneaking up, drowned ships and ships from under the water, drowned the submarines themselves, and their crews, corked in compartments, fell alive into the abysses of the sea, people were killed from the air and in the air, armored vehicles appeared - tanks, and thousands of people were crushed by their steel caterpillars, as if these people themselves were not people, but caterpillars. This, and even on a massive scale, did not happen in any previous wars, even the most destructive ones. Such was the daily reality of those who were directly involved in the First World War. A reality in which people lived and died.
Unprecedented in comparison with the wars of previous eras was in the First World War and the number of prisoners of war. In the Russian army, losses by prisoners from August 1914 to December 31, 1917 amounted to more than 3.4 million people, that is, 74.9% of all combat losses, or 21.1% of total number mobilized . Of these, 42.14% were kept in Germany, 59.9% - in Austria-Hungary, less than 1% - in Bulgaria and Turkey.
The situation of Russian prisoners of war of the First World War (including such subjects as the legal aspects of military captivity, the policy of their own and enemy governments towards them, the activities of public organizations to alleviate their plight, the conditions of detention and the use of forced labor of prisoners, their contacts with the local population, psychological condition trapped behind barbed wire, the impact of captivity on the mentality of soldiers and officers, and many others) has been especially actively studied in our country since the mid-1990s, which is the subject of extensive literature. So, in the monograph by O.S. Nagornaya "Another military experience": Russian prisoners of war of the First World War in Germany (1914-1922)" analyzes in detail the experiences of the "little man" when faced with a foreign socio-cultural environment, camp life, relationships within the prisoner community, religious practices, survival strategies and the development of behavioral models, the formation of a memory of captivity, etc.
In this essay, which does not pretend to complete coverage of the problem, only some aspects of the everyday life of military captivity will be touched upon.
Let's start with the fact that "the ideas of Russian soldiers about the conditions of German captivity were formed long before they got to the front ... Under the influence of previous experience and public sentiments in the soldier's environment, an idea was formed about captivity as the best lot and the way to possibly avoid death:" Of course, our brother gets captured, just to save his life, and forgot the oath. ... almost everyone who participated in Japanese war and were in captivity in Japan, they are still in captivity, and now they write letters from captivity home, and at home it is read not only by one family, but by the whole village. His neighbor or acquaintance went to fight - he was also taken prisoner ... ". According to O.S. Nagornaya, “German interrogation protocols contain soldiers’ confessions that “retired soldiers who were captured in the Japanese war persuaded their comrades to surrender””, and in the correspondence of the Russian Main Directorate of the General Staff and Headquarters, concerned about the high number of captured Russian soldiers, “it was noted that almost from the very beginning of the war "in the villages ... recruits are released with advice: do not fight to the point of bloodshed, but surrender in order to stay alive" ".
Influenced the mood of the soldier masses and a fairly common myth about the "rich life" of "cultural Germans". So, in the diaries of V. Aramilev, a curious case is cited. “A fugitive from German captivity Private Vasiliskov. He talks about the Germans with delight.
— Byada, devils live well. Their trenches are concrete, as in the upper rooms: clean, warm, light. Pishsha - what do you need in restaurants. Each soldier has his own bowl, two plates, a silver spoon, a fork, a knife. Expensive wines in flasks. You drink one sip - the blood in your veins will sparkle. Primus for cooking soup. They do not drink tea at all, only one coffee and cocoa. Coffee is poured into a glass, and five pieces of sugar are at the bottom of the pieces. If you start drinking cocoa with sugar, you are afraid that you won’t swallow your tongue.
— Sweet? the interested soldiers ask.
- Passion is so sweet! exclaims Vasiliskov. And then he adds:
“Where can we fight against the Germans!” His soldier is well-fed, shod, dressed, washed, and the soldier has good thoughts. What do we have? There is no order, the people are only toiling.
- Why did you run away from a good life? the soldiers joke about Vasiliskov. — Serve the German tsar. Here's the fool!
He rolls his eyes in bewilderment.
— How is it possible? I'm partly family. Baba in my village, children, put on three souls I have. What is the order, if every peasant will arbitrarily move from one state to another. They, the Germans, are here, and we are there. Everything will be mixed up, you won’t make it out for ten years. ”
A simple-minded, illiterate peasant did not even suspect that he was “thrown in the eyes” in captivity, treated to unusual “delicacies”, and then allowed to run away to his own to be used as an agitator, demoralizing the morale of his colleagues. So everyday life became a weapon of the “information war”, anticipating leaflets of a later time with calls for enemy soldiers to surrender and promises of a sweet and satisfying life in captivity.
From the point of view of the military leadership, captivity was perceived as a disgrace, and the majority of prisoners were traitors who betrayed their duty and oath. First of all, this concerned those who voluntarily surrendered, which were considered fighters who got to the enemy unwounded and did not use means in defense. But suspicions and the stigma of potential traitors fell on all those who were captured, which directly or indirectly affected their situation, the provision of material, food and other assistance to them, the organization of correspondence with the Motherland, and, finally, the moral and psychological state of the prisoners themselves.
So, noting cases of mass surrender of the lower ranks of the Russian army (not only after several years of sitting in the trenches, which can be explained by fatigue from the protracted war and the general decomposition of the army, but already in the autumn of 1914!), The command issued numerous orders in which it was said that all those who voluntarily surrendered at the end of the war would be put on trial and shot as “vile cowards”, “low parasites”, “godless traitors”, “our unworthy brothers”, “shameful sons of Russia”, who had reached the point of betrayal of their homeland, whom , "for the glory of the same motherland, it must be destroyed." The rest, “honest soldiers,” were ordered to shoot in the back those who were running away from the battlefield or trying to surrender: “Let them firmly remember that if you are afraid of an enemy bullet, you will get yours!” It was especially emphasized that those who had surrendered to the enemy would be immediately reported at their place of residence, “so that their relatives would know about their shameful act, and that the issuance of benefits to the families of those who surrendered would be immediately stopped.” General A.N. Kuropatkin stated that “in the military environment, captivity itself is considered a shameful phenomenon, ... all cases of surrender are subject to investigation after the war and punishment in accordance with the law.” In 1916, a special propaganda brochure was published in Petrograd “What awaits a soldier who voluntarily surrendered and his family. Conversation with the lower ranks”, which explained the repressive measures that would be applied to the “traitors of the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland”.
Another measure designed to prevent voluntary surrender was the widespread dissemination of information about the violation by the enemy of the norms international law: on the implementation in the German and Austrian armies of orders not to take Russians alive as prisoners; about torture and sophisticated murders of the wounded captured on the battlefield; about hardships and bullying awaiting a prisoner in the camp, etc. The materials of the Extraordinary Investigation Commission were published both in the rear and in the army newspapers. Thus, in the newspaper Nash Vestnik, published at the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North-Western Front for free distribution to the troops, notes were regularly printed under eloquent and often repeated titles: “In Captivity”, “German Furies”, “German Atrocities”, “Christians Germans?”, “Shooting of 5,000 prisoners”, “In the investigative commission on German atrocities”, “In German captivity”, “Cossacks about surrendering prisoners”, “Crucifixion of a Cossack”, “Shooting of Cossacks”, “Three fugitives”, etc. .P. Other publications printed materials similar in content: “Outstanding atrocities of the Austrians”, “How the Germans interrogated the prisoners”, “German atrocities in the Russian trench”, “Barbaric killing of the wounded”, “Poisoning by the Germans of a Russian captive officer”, “Blood massacre of prisoners”, “The burning of Russian wounded officers and soldiers”, “What is German captivity”, “Shooting for refusing to dig trenches for the Germans”, “Death reigns in prisoner of war camps”, “Under the cover of Russian prisoners of war”, etc. Subsequently, already in 1942 ., these and other materials collected by the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry were published in a separate brochure "Documents on German atrocities in 1914-1918." .
The nature of these publications can be judged from the following fragment, which cites the testimony of an Austrian prisoner of war lieutenant infantry regiment, who argued that the mockery of Russian prisoners in the German and Austro-Hungarian armies was built into the system. "At the end of April and in May [ 1915 - E.S.], when the Russians retreated to the San River, my soldiers - Czechs, Poles and Rusyns - repeatedly resorted to me and reported with horror that somewhere nearby German and often Austrian German soldiers were torturing Russian prisoners, torturing them to death, - he told. - How many times have I turned in the indicated direction and seen a really terrible picture. In different places, the abandoned, disfigured and mutilated corpses of Russian soldiers were lying around. The German soldiers who were nearby each time announced to me that they were only following the orders of their superiors. When I asked the German officers if this was true, they answered me: “This is how every Russian prisoner should be treated, and until you Austrians do the same, you will not have any success. Only brutalized soldiers fight well, but for this our soldiers must practice cruelty against Russian prisoners, who, as traitors to their homeland and voluntarily surrendered, deserve nothing but torture.
Summarizing the information received from a variety of sources, the newspapers angrily wrote: “The brutally cruel attitude towards the prisoners and wounded taken by the Germans is fully manifested from the first moment they are taken prisoner, on the battlefields. Those who surrender are brutally tortured, often to death, the wounded are finished off with rifle butts and bayonets. Many eyewitness officers testify that in their presence a group of captured Cossacks was shot from machine guns.
Of course, such publications, as well as the facts of the cruelty of the enemy, which the servicemen had to face personally or learn "first hand" from witnesses and eyewitnesses, caused a reasonable fear of the possibility of being captured and subjected to torment and abuse. It is no coincidence that in German letters, diaries and notebooks, along with references to the capture of Russian soldiers (“... this cowardly people (Russian infantry), with stronger pressure from our side, threw down their weapons and immediately surrendered”) there are also examples of a different kind : "One Russian officer shot himself so as not to be taken prisoner".
On August 21, 1914, the commander of the 33rd ersatz battalion, Captain von Besser, writes about the battles in East Prussia: “My people were so embittered that they did not give mercy, because the Russians often show that they are surrendering, they raise their hands up, and if you approach to them, they again raise their guns and shoot, and as a result there are heavy losses. In his wife's reply dated September 11, 1914, we find the following response, reflecting the mood in the rear of Germany towards the prisoners: “You are absolutely right that you do not allow any indulgence, why? War is war, and what a huge amount of money it takes to keep people capable of military service in captivity! And this gang also wants to eat! No, this is too generous, and if the Russians committed such terrible vile things as you saw, then these cattle should be made harmless! Inspire this also to your subordinates.
Nevertheless, the mass character of captivity became a reality of the world war, and the specific experience of staying and surviving “behind barbed wire” became the fate of over 3.4 million Russian prisoners.
The fugitives, whose testimonies were recorded in questionnaires collected, in particular, by intelligence units at the headquarters of the front commanders, spoke in detail about the conditions of being in captivity - both at the stage of transfer and in points of temporary and permanent detention.
So, in a survey of Grigory Kuznetsov, a private of the 324th Klyazma Infantry Regiment, who escaped from captivity, dated July 6, 1915, it was reported: “They fed us poorly and little on the road, they gave 1 pot of coffee for two and 1/2 pounds of bread, buckwheat and corn flour... The Austrian escorts treated us well. German soldiers confiscated clothing, especially boots; They took away my watch… The Rusyn escorts sold us bread for 50 kopecks. pound..."
Ensign of the 12th company of the Siberian Regiment A. Denisov and junior non-commissioned officer Ivan Banifatiev told how they were driven as part of a column of prisoners of war to the border, and then taken by rail to Germany: “We were led from Brezin almost naked, without boots and overcoats to the border. Many of us were wounded and sick. We went 6 days. We were not fed. They will lead you to a pit with potatoes or beets and shout: "Eat, Russian pigs."
The wounded, bleeding, walked two versts. Although we supported each other all the way, but, exhausted, lagged behind and fell. The backward Germans killed everyone. Not even half of us made it to the border. Here they put us in dirty wagons. 80-90 people were stuffed into each car. They took us with the doors locked. There were no windows. The stuffiness is unbearable. Some died from exhaustion and overcrowding. We put them against the wall of the car. The groan, the cries of the wounded and sick terrified everyone. At the sight of all this suffering, some of us were close to insanity. I, says Denisov, cried several times. In Berlin, our carriages were opened. We carried the dead out of the wagons. We were given soup and a small piece of bread; the bread was with straw, but we were ready to eat stones too…”
On July 4, 1915, privates of the 231st Drogichinsky Regiment Ivan Verbilo and Roman Cherepakha, who escaped from captivity, testified that they were used in the construction of military fortifications: he said that he was sick, the German doctor examined him and, if he found him healthy, they gave him 15 sticks each ... The position that we dug stretches from Yaroslav through Radymno to Przemysl. We began to think about how to escape from captivity, since we considered it a shame to dig fortifications against our own, and in general it was difficult in captivity in all respects. ... The lodging place was surrounded by a high wire fence ... The German and Austrian escorts treated us badly: they beat and scolded us. The food was very bad. Barley soup without meat and fat, one pound of very bad bread with chaff, and two glasses of tea a day. At the expense of food, the escort Germans are better, the German will soon give our hungry prisoner a piece of bread for nothing; an Austrian, whatever nation he may be, strives to sell and take a ruble for half a pound.
Private of the 6th company of the L.gv. Vasily Kuznetsov of the Semenov Regiment said: “... In Suwalki, the prisoners were doing work. I personally worked on the housework and on loading on the railway, but I know that our prisoners in the Suwalki region dug trenches even under the fire of Russian artillery, and three were killed ... The Germans treat Russian prisoners very badly. They beat them with sticks, almost do not feed them. For Jewish soldiers, an exception is made and seniors are appointed to work ... "
The lower ranks of the sergeant major of the 206th Salyan Infantry Regiment Ivan Lavrentyev Anoshenko and the senior non-commissioned officer of the 74th Stavropol Regiment Zakhary Ivanov Zhuchenok, who escaped from captivity together, reported: “... In captivity they are fed very poorly, so there are many thefts by our prisoners. When loading provisions, two of our lower rank prisoners were shot in Rava-Russkaya for taking one bottle of wine and several breads. The treatment is cruel in general ... "I. Anashenok added:" ... We worked in Belzec to unload various things - food and fodder, but I, as a sergeant major, did not work. Z. Zhuchenok also confirmed this: “... I, as a senior non-commissioned officer, did not work and stayed in the tent and met Sergeant Major Anoshenok, and we decided to escape from heavy captivity.”
Some of these testimonies were included in proclamations distributed among the troops, warning against surrender, and published in newspapers. So, on July 2, 1915, the newspaper Nash Vestnik wrote on the first page: “Every day our prisoners come from Germany who managed to get through the border after long days of wandering and hunger strikes.
Their stories are full of horrors. There are no boundaries to the torment and humiliation that befalls the unfortunate, whom fate forced into captivity.
Continuous hunger strike, shameful work on the removal of sewage, beatings, severe brutal punishments for unsuccessful work due to emaciation; lack of care for the wounded and sick - this is what the stories of those fellows who managed to get through at the cost of terrible hardship and risk are filled with,
And the immeasurable malice of the tormentors, who, like animals, enjoy the suffering of our unarmed and defenseless soldiers.
With these words, one of those who fled through Switzerland ends his story: “God forbid, brothers, no one should fall into such hellish torment. If you get sick from hunger at work, then you will receive several pushes with the butt for treatment: several of our soldiers cried from such torment. And not a few buried in the damp earth. Many could not endure such torment of the enemy. And may God punish me if I'm telling a lie ... "
... Such an attitude towards prisoners of war is the best characteristic of our enemy, who, in impotent rage, seeing his inevitable shame, vents it on defenseless prisoners.
In another issue, July 9, 1915, Our Vestnik gives the story of three fugitives who fled from German captivity to Holland, reprinted from the Petrograd Courier, whose Rotterdam correspondent met with them at the Russian Consulate General. Corporal of the 141st Mozhaisk regiment Iosif Filobokov and senior fireworker of the 5th battery of the 36th artillery brigade Ivan Matovov were captured at the very beginning of the war, in mid-August 1914 in Prussia, and spent 9 months in captivity. Their fellow volunteer of the 163rd Lankaran-Kotenburg Regiment Vladimir Timchenko was captured on December 2, 1915 and spent 5.5 months in captivity. From their testimony, one can get a fairly complete picture of the daily diet of Russian prisoners of war of the lower ranks: “They all unanimously describe their stay in this captivity in the most gloomy colors. Food was given to them in extremely insufficient quantities. Recently, for example, the bread ration has been reduced to 100 grams or 1/4 pound per person per day. In the morning, two cups of coffee were dispensed. The same in the evening. Sometimes evening coffee was replaced by salted water with some kind of seasoning. Dinner invariably consisted of one dish all the time: unpeeled potato mash, lately (after complaints!) laced with cornmeal. And it's all!"
The story contains a description of the camp itself and the conditions of detention in it, the attitude towards prisoners on the part of the camp administration and guards, and their use in forced labor:
“The treatment of prisoners is outrageous. They scold, beat and mutilate them in passing, for all sorts of trifles. All guard camps are guilty of this, but especially the fugitives we met complained about non-commissioned officers and sergeant majors: “Dogs are chained, not people!” …
The camps, according to the description of the fugitives, are below any criticism. Made of boards, they leak, they do not keep heat in winter. They have no furniture. Instead of a bed - straw on the floor. Therefore, the barracks are dirty, stuffy and "lousy".
Due to the lack of food and the unhygienic barracks, as well as the absence of baths, all kinds of diseases can be said to be rampant among the prisoners. The mortality rate there is unusually high. Medical assistance is not always given, because the administration suspects all those who fall ill in a simulation.
All of the above information is not news. We have heard similar complaints more than once from fugitives from another camp. Lack of food, mistreatment, filth, disease - all these charms are also characteristic of other German camps. But the last fugitives complained about the exhaustion of their hard work, this was news to us. According to them, the Germans use prisoners exclusively for the most difficult work. When building, for example, railways, they are forced to carry logs, sleepers, and other weights, dig ditches, etc.
Everyone is required to work. When, for example, non-commissioned officers stated that, according to the Russian military regulations, they should not be used for work, they were told that they were not in Russia, but in Germany, and that everyone was equal here, and privates, and non-commissioned officers, and sergeants , and ensigns, and everyone should work.
The Germans oblige the prisoners to work even on major Orthodox holidays. So, the work was carried out by prisoners on Palm Sunday. At Easter, only one day was given for rest.
The prisoners themselves, in fact, would have nothing against the work. They even prefer to work. But the trouble is that the food given to them does not correspond to the work asked of them. Then they are outraged that they are used for work related to the defense of Germany: the construction of strategic roads, the construction of factories for the manufacture of military supplies, etc. .
On July 11, 1915, Our Bulletin publishes the story of two more fugitives - the junior medical assistant of the 314th mobile field hospital Ivan Yelensky and the shooter of the 39th Siberian regiment Nil Semenov, who described in detail their stay in the prisoner of war camp and the peculiarities of the routine in it: “... The prisoners were placed in the stable of the cavalry regiment that had lodged there before the war. 6 people were placed in each stall, which created incredible crowding. Soon, various diseases appeared. At first, the prisoners were given three pounds of bread for two days, but this did not last more than two months, after which the same three pounds were given for five days, and sometimes they were not given out for several days. For breakfast and dinner, the prisoners were given black coffee, bitter, no more than one glass for each, and lunch consisted of thin stew in a very insufficient amount. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Germans did not allow anyone to have money and from the very first day they took away not only all the money and valuables, such as watches, rings, etc., but even removed their overcoats and boots from everyone, giving them wooden shoes in return. , which were incredibly heavy and rubbed their legs.
Landsturmists were assigned to them as guards, almost all of them elderly people. These soldiers were terribly rude and cruel.
When sick people appeared among the prisoners, they were not provided with any medical assistance; the Germans did not believe in their illnesses, suspected pretense and sent them to the doctor only when the patient collapsed exhausted at work or was already close to death in the stinking stable. Apart from these proofs of illness, the Germans believed in nothing. When a prisoner declared that he was unwell, he was usually beaten with cleavers and rifle butts, after which they were driven to work. Many of these patients died on the job.
The prisoners were not allowed to smoke under pain of cruel punishment. During the first few weeks of captivity, they were forbidden to say anything among themselves, which was an unbearable burden for the unfortunate, deprived of even this consolation.
... Despite the tightness and dirt in the room and the uncleanliness of the prisoners associated with this, the Germans in no case allowed them to wash, arguing that the Russians are pigs and do not need it ... " .
Describing the working conditions of prisoners of war in forced labor, the fugitives said that on November 24, 1914, they were sent to build canals for an electric station in the town of Bransberg. In total, about 500 people were sent, and they were promised pay and improved food, but they were deceived: the conditions were terrible, the prisoners were not given any clothes, they did not even return their overcoats, people “worked knee-deep in ice water, and after work they could not even dry their clothes ". Moreover, "they worked 12 hours a day, without exception, without distinction of rank."
In such unbearable conditions, which put people on the brink of survival, many prisoners thought about escaping, and some made real attempts to escape: “On the first day of Easter, 10 prisoners escaped from work, using a hole cut with knives in the wall of the barracks. Immediately, in the dead of night, all the prisoners were gathered for verification: the Germans raged and shouted, tried to vent their furious anger on those who remained; whole platoon German soldiers rushed along the river in pursuit of the fugitives, but the search for them was unsuccessful. The prisoners were already secretly glad that at least some of their comrades managed to get out of this hell, but it turned out differently. At dawn, the fugitives were overtaken, eight people were caught, and the remaining two disappeared ... Those who were caught were subjected to preliminary torture, after which two fell dangerously ill and, it seems, died the next day, and the rest were sent under heavy escort to Danzig. The prisoners did not learn anything about the fate that befell them ... Immediately after this incident, the regime deteriorated even more. The prisoners were forbidden to have even penknives, they made a general search and threatened with immediate execution if someone found a knife or other sharp object ... After this incident, the prisoners were literally starved ... " .
Based on the testimonies of prisoners who fled from various camps in Germany and Austria-Hungary, as well as other sources, including reports from representatives of the Red Cross, conclusions and generalizations were drawn about the widespread violation by the enemy of the norms of international law in relation to prisoners of war and the monstrous conditions of their detention: Recently, completely reliable information about the situation in Germany of our prisoners of war officers and lower ranks gives the following gloomy picture of those exceptionally extremely difficult living conditions that the Germans have created for Russian prisoners who have fallen into power with them ... ".
Particularly noted was the violation of international conventions in relation to captured officers, deprived of not only the usual, but at least minimal comfort: “Transportation of prisoners of war officers, including up to senior commanders, is usually carried out in unlit wagons, often filthy with cattle - 40 people in one wagon. At the same time, they have to sit right on the dirty floor, where the officers are forced to sleep when moving, lasting several days.
For some reason they feed prisoners on the road for the most part at night, giving a disgusting greasy brew, without bread, which makes many people vomit. Water is released in an extremely limited amount and then raw, but they do not give boiling water at all. Buying anything on the way is completely prohibited.
The treatment of prisoners of all ranks and ranks by the escorts and their superiors is invariably barbarously rude and cruel. So, the escorts once tore off a cross from a regimental priest and trampled it underfoot, a wounded officer was beaten on a mutilated leg.
At the points of permanent quartering of Russian prisoners of war, officers are placed in dirty barracks, 15-18 people in a small room equipped with two tiers of bunks. Often officers are placed even in stables and sheds. Two captured generals were placed in a cramped non-commissioned officer's closet.
Consolidated companies composed of officer ranks, which also include generals, are commanded by the German lower ranks, showing in everything the most rude attitude towards their unfortunate subordinates. Twice a day, officers and lower ranks of the prisoners of war are called over, each time in the yard, even in rainy and cold weather, despite the fact that the vast majority of prisoners are dressed only in light protective shirts.
Officers and generals are constantly subjected to searches that are insulting in form and, in general, the most impossible conditions of everyday regime are created for them in concentration camps.
The nutrition of the officers, extremely unsatisfactory in quality, is more than meager. Terrible anemia develops among the prisoners, and placing a significant part of them in dark, damp and fetid underground casemates causes serious rheumatic diseases. .
At the same time, the document emphasized the extremely harsh conditions of detention of Russian soldiers and gave examples of “disciplinary action” on them by the German authorities: “Our captured lower ranks have a particularly hard time in Germany. For food, they are given half a pound of the worst bread a day, twice a week they are given a small piece of meat, and on other days only one podbolka. Captured soldiers are dressed up for all sorts of hard work, subjecting them to terribly harsh punishments. So, for example, for the smallest misdemeanors, they are tied to a tree for several hours or forced to run to exhaustion with a bag full of sand behind their back, which painfully beats on the back while running. The lower ranks are beaten with sticks, whips, butts - for the slightest oversight.
One lower rank, who wrote in a letter home that he received half a pound of bread a day for food and meat twice a week - as it is, in fact, was sentenced to two years in prison for libel.
On the basis of malnutrition, with increased hard work and the absence of any medical care, a large mortality develops among the lower ranks. Cases of suicide are also very frequent; so, recently, the lower rank was stabbed to death with a box of sardines.
The intercourse of prisoners of different camps among themselves is completely prohibited. .
It should be noted that none of the warring parties "was ready to accommodate such a number of captured enemy soldiers and officers and to provide them in a protracted confrontation." At the same time, “during the war, the desire to strengthen the morale of their own population and influence the opinion of neutral countries that measured the civilization of a belligerent state by the level of mortality in prisoner of war camps led to the desire of all parties to underestimate or hide the number of their own soldiers who surrendered, as well as sick and dead prisoners of war enemy."
Inconsistency of the conditions of detention with sanitary standards, famine and epidemics, as well as numerous violations of the provisions of international law, caused a high death rate in the camps. According to domestic researchers, the mortality rate among Russian prisoners of war was 7.3%, and in general, 190 thousand people died in the camps of the Central Powers, of which about 100 thousand were in Germany. At the same time, the mortality rate among immigrants from the Russian Empire was twice as high as the corresponding indicators of captured Western European nationalities. According to incomplete German statistics, 91.2% of deaths were caused by diseases (of which 39.8% of deaths were due to tuberculosis, 19% to pneumonia and 5.5% to typhus, 31% to "other diseases" in which , obviously, included such "typical camp diseases" as dysentery, cholera and starvation), 8.2% - injuries and 0.6% - suicides.
From the Central Committee Russian Society At the end of August 1916, the Red Cross reported: “The Committee received information that our prisoners of war in Germany and Austria-Hungary are dying of tuberculosis in a significantly large number and that in general the infection with this disease, taking on threatening proportions there due to malnutrition, can serve as a focus the spread of this disease in Russia during the return of our prisoners. In view of this, in addition to strengthening the food supply of our prisoners of war with food parcels, an agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary on the evacuation of tuberculosis patients to neutral countries is necessary.
The question was raised about the exchange of disabled prisoners of war (about their mutual return to their homeland), about the transfer of sick and wounded prisoners of war to neutral countries and their internment until the end of the war. Relevant agreements were signed between several belligerent powers, the exchange was carried out through the mediation of the Red Cross and the Vatican. However, in Russia, the solution of this issue was hampered at the level of interdepartmental agreements, which, in particular, is evidenced by the secret correspondence between the director of the Second Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry A.K. Bentkovsky and the leadership of the General Staff in February 1915. “If, on the one hand,” Bentkovsky wrote, “the removal of our prisoners of war from Germany can have a favorable effect on their living conditions, then on the other hand, the release of the German government from the obligation to provide food is quite large in number its number of prisoners of war can to some extent, at least for a while, improve its situation with regard to providing the population of Germany with nutrients, which from our military point of view, undoubtedly, seems extremely undesirable. The Main Directorate of the General Staff, represented by Major General Leontiev, expressed full agreement with this opinion, although, of course, he understood that hunger and exhausting labor for the wounded and seriously ill people was tantamount to a death sentence. But “political and military expediency” turned out to be more important for high officials than humanitarian considerations and alleviating the plight of their compatriots who were captured.
Obstacles were placed even to public charitable initiatives to organize assistance to prisoners, collect money and send food. So, M.A. Alekseev called for a ban on the publication of collection announcements in newspapers, arguing that "prisoners are in more tolerable living conditions than the defenders of the Motherland at the front, who are every minute in mortal danger," and if information about hunger and abuse with prisoners in the camps until now stopped the mass transition to the enemy, then reports of the collection of money and the organization of assistance could set the "cowardly, who have not mastered the concept of duty, to surrender", and, in addition, the collected funds would reduce "the costs of the Germans to maintain our prisoners” and made it possible to direct the released resources to the conduct of the war.
As a result of this approach, assistance to prisoners of war from Russia was organized late and turned out to be ineffective, and the German authorities widely used the tragic situation of Russian prisoners for their own purposes, spreading propaganda among them that they were left to their fate, thereby undermining their morale. and the authority of the tsarist government.
As early as April 1915, the Russian ambassador in Paris reported that in a number of camps "soldiers are dying of hunger, sending money is inexpedient, since it is forbidden for soldiers to buy food." But to the request of the Chief of the General Staff about the need to send food to the prisoners, Emperor Nicholas II refused, citing "the impossibility of verifying that the bread would really be delivered to its destination, and would not be used for food by the German troops." On July 29, 1915, the Chief of the General Staff sent a secret letter No. 1067 to the Chief of the Main Directorate of Posts and Telegraphs about a ban on sending crackers in parcels for prisoners of war. However, after some time this ban was lifted.
Rumors spread among the Russian population that parcels sent to Russian prisoners of war were stolen in Germany and Austria-Hungary or confiscated by decision of the governments of these countries. The metropolitan and provincial press wrote very emotionally about the loss of parcels. As a result, many relatives and close acquaintances of prisoners of war, as well as some public organizations, refrained from sending them food supplies. Meanwhile, many parcels were lost on the way, never reaching the borders of Germany and Austria-Hungary. On November 10, 1915, Major General Ivanchenko wrote to the Moscow Committee of the Red Cross: our prisoners of war, this camp must be recognized as exceptional. From the most reliable sources, I know that their commandant is a fine, honest old man, who is very concerned about the possible improvement of their lot, the treatment is correct, the care for the sick is excellent, but they are starving because there is a lack of food everywhere, and all hope for our help, and from This is what comes out of her: the son writes: “Mmm V ... (From Moscow) sent 14 parcels to my husband (directly by mail) and 4 to me. None received. Parcels come to us with Russian seals, are opened with German accuracy in our presence and, for the most part, are robbed. "Look for the villains at home" ... "
Non-commissioned officer I.I. Chernetsov was taken prisoner in 1915. The last letter from the front received from him by his relatives was dated January 15, the first postcard from captivity - June 15, 1915. He was held in a prisoner of war camp in Germany, in the city of Worms. Letters from captivity, or rather postcards on the standard form of the Red Cross, were allowed to be sent 6 times a month. The content of most of these postcards in 10 lines by I.I. Chernetsov's standard: "I'm alive, well, thanks for the parcel ..." And then a listing of its contents usually follows, probably in order to make sure that nothing was lost along the way. And only on February 19, according to the old style (March 4, according to the new style), 1917, in an Easter greeting to his relatives, his restraint and pragmatism give way to feelings: “Christ is Risen! Dear and dear Lisa, Alexei Ivanovich and Bobochka! I congratulate you on the great holiday and with all my heart I wish you to meet and spend it in full health and peace of mind. Being mentally with all of you, I am constantly connected by invisible spiritual threads that connect us, and at least this consciousness will be a consolation to you and me on this great day. Parcels 10 and 11 received on February 15 and 17. Thank you very much for everything. Congratulations on the holiday to all relatives. Kisses, loving brother Vanya. All postcards from captivity have a return address: “For a prisoner of war. Unter. Of. Chernetsov Ivan. Bat. III, company 15, N 1007. Germany, city of Worms. It should be noted that sister I.I. Chernetsova E.I. Ogneva corresponded not only with her brother, but also with other prisoners of war from this camp, his fellow soldiers, sent them parcels and received news about her brother through them, in turn, passing news from her correspondents to their families.
The opportunity to keep in touch with the house, with relatives, give them news, inform about oneself, reassure loved ones who are in constant anxiety about their fate, was the most urgent need for prisoners. main theme The letters were the economic and family affairs of relatives who remained at home, and the main incentive that supported the will of people to live was the desire to return to their homeland. Meanwhile, tight censorship and careful checking of letters and parcels resulted in significant delays from Russia. postal items prisoners of war, for whom they were matters of physical and moral survival, and the repression of the German authorities in the form of the cancellation of correspondence led to a loss of interest in reality: "people lost heart, walked like clouds and did not want to hear anything" . The resumption of contacts with the Motherland instantly improved the morale of the prisoners, brought them out of depression.
The process of adaptation of soldiers and officers to the situation of captivity was manifested in a wide range of behavioral models - from passive acceptance of imposed realities and escape from reality, different forms cooperation with the German authorities and the camp administration, to covert and open resistance, including spontaneous and organized protests. The prisoners of the camps zealously followed the development of the situation on the fronts, vigorously discussed political events in Russia. In order to justify themselves (as opposed to the suspicions of treachery widespread in their homeland), they tried to present their stay in captivity in the light of a martyr's halo, and even introduce an element of heroization, including in self-presentation a refusal to work for the enemy or an unsuccessful attempt to escape. One of the young officers characterized his experiences behind the barbed wire as a process of social maturation: “From a weak boy, I turned into a man with a beard, I experienced a lot of grief and hardship, but hard trials strengthened me, now it’s not scary to look ahead.”
In general, it should be noted that the experience of captivity was as individual for everyone as the front-line experience itself. Someone was lucky more, someone less. The officers had more chances of survival than the lower ranks, the healthy - more than the wounded and sick, those who owned any craft - more than those who did not know it, the educated - more than the illiterate , etc. The conditions in which the prisoners of war were kept depended not only on the general state policy, economic reasons, the constant forcing in society of the “image of the enemy”, which caused an increase in hatred for the prisoners among different segments of the population, but also simply on “ human factor”: abuse of power, uncontrolled arbitrariness in the camps and work teams came, most often, from the local authorities. “In a separate camp, the level of violence depended, first of all, on the commandant, who had not only the right to determine the disciplinary regime, but also to make final decisions on the implementation of punishments in specific cases”
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- Under the protection of Russian generosity Prisoners of war of the First World War in the Saratov Volga region 1914-1922, Kalyakina A.
Among the series of tragedies of the Great Patriotic War, along with the millions of dead, one of the most serious is captivity. To some extent, captivity is even more terrible for perception than death in battle, because one can understand when millions died with weapons in their hands, protecting their native land from invaders. But it is difficult to imagine that millions find themselves in enemy captivity.
In total, during the war years, 4559.0 thousand were reported missing, almost 40% of the total number of irretrievable losses. Most of them ended up in captivity, from which only 1836 thousand people returned (1)
When the bill goes into millions, it always causes shock and a dumb question: how is it ?! Some kind of catch is immediately implied, well, 4,5 million soldiers and officers couldn’t just objective reasons be captured without exhausting all the possibilities for resistance!
This is what liberals and pseudo-historians take advantage of in the most impudent way, laying out a ready-made answer: it was they who, they say, did not want to fight for the Bolsheviks. So they surrendered to the Germans without exception, until the bloody “commies” detachments began to force the army to go into battle.
Tellingly, this point of view is shared by both monarchists and Nazis, and, of course, liberal democrats. This is one of the key points of their unity in the fight against a common enemy - Soviet state(even the deceased) and directly with our history.
Their bread is to give simple answers to difficult questions. Take any one negative trait and inflate it to universal proportions, because if you do not delve into the events of those terrible days in detail, then such an answer, in principle, will even seem logical. After all, if they wanted to fight for their country, they would have fought, and not surrendered, right? ..
As a rule, bawlers are silent about how the thin line of covering armies had to stop the armada of the Germans and their allies. About how the infantry “on its own two feet” should have avoided the encirclement of the Germans by motorized units, the answer is all the more unanswerable.
The purpose of this article is not to analyze how stubbornly the Soviet troops defended themselves (German documents are full of reports on the stubborn, sometimes desperate resistance of the encircled), we will only touch on this topic in passing when there is a special need for it.
Along the way, forgive me common sense, I will try to apply the logic of the liberals to the events of those times and compare them with the events of the Great Patriotic War. I’ll make a reservation right away: the author fundamentally does not accept such a “liberal” approach to history, and aims to show all its absurdity, simultaneously conveying to the reader a lot useful information about the battles of past wars.
Part 1 is here for you - "Two boilers", which is based on reflections on the similarities and differences between the encirclement of the Soviet 3rd and 10th armies in the Bialystok pocket and the death of the 2nd Russian army near Tannenberg.
So, in 1914, the Russian army, after the mobilization, totaled 6 million 553 thousand people. (2)
It is worth comparing this number with the 4.8 million people who were in the Red Army on June 22, 1941, of which there were only 2.9 million people in the western districts, divided into three unrelated operational echelons.
active phase first world war after a series of preparations, it began for the Russian army with the planned deployment and invasion of the 1st and 2nd armies into East Prussia on August 17, 1914, that is, almost three weeks after the announcement of mobilization. Despite the poor preparation of the offensive and the inconclusive deployment of forces, there was still plenty of time, especially in comparison with the time that the Red Army had to prepare for war. Let me remind you that the first measures to deploy the army began to be taken only after the TASS report, namely on June 18-19, 1941.
With a total of 304 battalions against 183 of the Germans and 183 (!) Squadrons against 84, having an overwhelming qualitative superiority of personnel divisions over the German reserve corps, mixed with units of the Landwehr and Landsturm, the armies of the North-Western Front launched an offensive. Having successfully started the operation with the Battle of Gumbinnen, in which the Germans suffered a painful defeat, the 1st and 2nd armies began, to the delight of the Germans, who were already thinking about a retreat, slowly, and completely inconsistently, fanning out in different directions. The German command seemed to have just regained confidence in their strength. Radio intercepts of unencrypted orders to the armies of Rennenkampf and Samsonov completely outlined the disposition of the Russian armies: a gap of many kilometers was formed between them, unfilled by anyone. Possessing an overwhelming superiority in cavalry, our generals could not really use it even to cover the flanks, not to mention the effective pursuit of the retreating Germans and lighting up the “fog of war” in front of the troops advancing blindly towards death. Taking advantage of the sluggishness of the offensive from the 1st Army, the German units (including partially even the Königsberg garrison) broke away from the pursuit, plunged into trains and, carrying out a railway maneuver, went straight to the flank of Samsonov's 2nd Army. There, having joined with the arrived reserves and the main forces of the 8th Army, they began an operation to encircle. On August 27-30, the corps of the 2nd Russian Army found themselves in a ring, being separated from the corps of the 1st Army by 80-100 km. Torn off purely voluntarily and by their own stupidity, and not under the influence of the blows of the Germans imposing their will.
Agree, what a striking contrast with the circumstances of the encirclement of units of the 3rd and 10th Soviet armies in the Bialystok ledge! When two tank groups, much more powerful than their opponents, broke through the front and quickly reached the rear communications of an area so poor in communication routes, trapping Soviet troops in a wooded and swampy area, continuously ironing the retreating columns with bombs, burning tractors, forcing them to abandon artillery and go for a breakthrough with rifles against machine guns.
In our case, the superiority of forces is entirely on the side of the armies of Samsonov and Rennenkampf, but the Germans manage to turn the initial defeat into a brilliant victory.
How did those around you behave?
Separate units of the 2nd Army offered heroic resistance, as 25 years later the troops in the Bialystok cauldron. As General M. Zaionchkovsky writes (2),
In this battle, the Russians defeated the 6th and 70th Landwehr Brigades at Gross-Bessau and Mühlen, the Goltz Landwehr Division, the 3rd Rez. division near Hohenstein, 41st Infantry Division near Waplitz, 37th Infantry. a division under Lana, Orlau, Frankenau; finally, they defeated the 2nd infantry. divisions near Uzdau, but the individual successes of the Russians were not linked to a common victory.
But what are individual successes against the backdrop of a general catastrophe?
Parts of XIII and XV corps and 2 infantry. the divisions broke up into separate groups, made up of different military units of infantry, artillery and Cossacks (divisional cavalry), and continued to fight on August 30 and 31. Few managed to break through, but for the most part these groups, left without the leadership of senior commanders, made their way at random along forest roads and, when meeting with the enemy, were unable to organize a successful breakthrough.
Behind the phrase "were not able to organize a successful breakthrough" very unpleasant things are hidden.
For example, General A.A. Blagoveshchensky, commander of the 6th Army Corps, one of the direct culprits for the encirclement of the 2nd Army, fled from his troops. The corps uncontrollably rolled back behind the commander behind the border, opening the flank of their comrades for the Germans. As he then justified himself, "I'm not used to being with the troops." (A.A. Kersnovsky, "History of the Russian Army")
Commander of the 23rd Army Corps, General K.A. Kondratovich also fled from his troops to the rear.
But the main "hero" in this whole tragedy is, of course, General N.A. Klyuev, commander of the XIII Corps.
During the fighting in the encirclement, he, leading a divisional column that was going to break through, in front of the last line of German machine guns, suddenly ordered the orderly to go to the Germans with a white handkerchief in his hands. And more than 20 thousand people with weapons surrendered without a fight, not wounded, having every opportunity not only to continue resistance, but also to safely break through to their own.
A characteristic touch - of all the higher ranks of the corps, only the chief of staff of the 36th Infantry Division, Colonel Vyakhirev, made his way. Of the entire composition, 165 people and a team of scouts made their way. It was they who did not obey the order to surrender and went on a breakthrough. As we can see, successful. (Ibid.)
The circumstances of the suicide of General Samsonov also deserve attention - when, while trying to break through with his headquarters, he was not supported by an escort who did not want to go to machine guns, and was forced to shoot himself in order to avoid shame.
It is worth noting that the topic of command in the tsarist army deserves detailed consideration in a separate article.
Again, a striking contrast with the frenzy with which the Soviet 10th and 3rd armies made their way through the swamps to their own, sweeping away German barriers one after another, inflicting sensitive losses on the enemy, stubbornly defending and delaying their pursuers at every possible line, clinging to bridgeheads with their teeth at key crossings in June 1941. (5)
The enemy managed to complete the encirclement only on July 2, 1941, having wandered in order through the forests and decently disheveled their divisions. According to German data, 116,100 prisoners were taken prisoner (here it would be worth mentioning the methods for counting prisoners of war by the Germans, but this is a topic for a separate material), but the success was only partial - a significant part Soviet troops safely escaped from the boiler, despite the loss of heavy artillery and most of the equipment.
Let me remind you that Samsonov’s army, which did not encounter breakthroughs of tank groups and bomb carpets, had equality with the enemy in manpower (10.5 infantry divisions versus 11.5 for the enemy) and surpassed them qualitatively, lost 92 thousand prisoners in those battles in 3 days , with combat losses of only 8 thousand people killed. (3) Other estimates give figures from 80,000 to 97,000 prisoners. Regarding the losses killed in the 3rd and 10th armies in 1941, the German report of Army Group Center unequivocally stated: "The loss of the enemy killed, according to unanimous estimates, is extremely high." Feel the difference, as they say.
After the encirclement of the 2nd Army, the German blow logically fell on the 1st Army, which had previously shamefully left its comrades in trouble, and until September 17, the Rennenkampf army added another 45 thousand captured to the German “piggy bank”.
It's time to ask the question - why, in fact, the captured soldiers and officers of the Soviet army are recorded by our precious liberals as "those who did not want to fight" and "surrendered at the first opportunity"?
Excuse me, but if 116 thousand prisoners, who fought a much stronger enemy for a week and a half, “did not want to fight for the power of the Bolsheviks,” then 97 thousand prisoners in East Prussia, who fought with an enemy at least equal, or even weaker, all the more should were not willing to fight "for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland"? Otherwise, how did the Germans collect such a significant "harvest"?
Sorry, but the logic is lame. If we operate only on the number of prisoners, then an argument of this level instantly becomes a double-edged sword, and it hits the tsarist army no less painfully, in the period of its greatest power. When there were no Bolsheviks even close, the country lived in the expectation of victory, on the wave of patriotism, the catastrophe and the "shell hunger" had not yet struck, a well-trained personnel army on pre-war reserves went to smash the enemy with little blood on its territory.
Agree, to accuse the divisions of Samsonov's army of pacifism is at least stupid, which no one actually does. But for some reason, in relation to the prisoners in the same Bialystok cauldron, such statements are pouring in as if from a cornucopia.
But our rulers of thoughts and biased "historians" have long been accustomed to the policy of double standards. So let's think for ourselves.
But all this was only the beginning, much more terrible events will unfold in 1915, which we will talk about.
*Note.
1) G.M. Krivosheev, “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century, statistical study”
2) M. Zayonchkovsky, "The First World War"
3) N. Golovin, "Russia's Military Efforts in the First World War"
4) A.A. Kersnovsky, "History of the Russian Army"
For more information about the death of the 2nd Army in East Prussia, see also, for example, G. Isserson, Cannes of the World War.
5) For the battles of the 3rd and 10th armies, see A. Isaev, “Unknown 1941. Stopped blitzkrieg.
Senyavskaya E.S. The situation of Russian prisoners of war during the First World War: an essay on everyday reality // Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series "History". 2013. No. 1. C. 64-83.
E.S. Senyavskaya
The position of Russian prisoners of war during the First World War:
sketch of everyday reality
The First World War literally shocked the world public consciousness, was a psychological stress for the entire modern civilization, showing that all the scientific, technical, cultural and allegedly moral progress achieved by people is not capable of preventing humanity from instantly sliding into a state of bloody barbarism and savagery. The year 1914 opened the way for the wars of a new era, in which "unprecedented massive and sophisticated cruelty and hecatombs of victims" appeared after the "relatively benevolent" wars of the 18th and 19th centuries, when the "traditions of knightly nobility and military magnanimity" still retained their strength. .. “In the bloody slaughter, from now on, all the laws of morality and morality, including military ones, were violated. They poisoned people with gases, stealthily sneaking up, drowned ships and ships from under the water, drowned the submarines themselves, and their crews, corked in compartments, fell alive into the abysses of the sea, people were killed from the air and in the air, armored vehicles appeared - tanks, and thousands of people were crushed by their steel caterpillars, as if these people themselves were not people, but caterpillars. This, and even on a massive scale, did not happen in any previous wars, even the most destructive ones. Such was the daily reality of those who were directly involved in the First World War. A reality in which people lived and died.
Unprecedented in comparison with the wars of previous eras was in the First World War and the number of prisoners of war. In the Russian army, the loss of prisoners from August 1914 to December 31, 1917 amounted to more than 3.4 million people, that is, 74.9% of all combat losses, or 21.1% of the total number of mobilized. Of these, 42.14% were kept in Germany, 59.9% - in Austria-Hungary, less than 1% - in Bulgaria and Turkey.
The situation of Russian prisoners of war of the First World War (including such subjects as the legal aspects of military captivity, the policy of their own and enemy governments towards them, the activities of public organizations to alleviate their plight, the conditions of detention and the use of forced labor of prisoners, their contacts with the local population, psychological the state of those caught behind barbed wire, the impact of captivity on the mentality of soldiers and officers, and many others) has been especially actively studied in our country since the mid-1990s, which is the subject of extensive literature. So, in the monograph by O.S. Nagornaya "Another military experience": Russian prisoners of war of the First World War in Germany (1914-1922)" analyzes in detail the experiences of the "little man" when faced with a foreign socio-cultural environment, camp life, relationships within the prisoner community, religious practices, survival strategies and the development of behavioral models, the formation of a memory of captivity, etc.
In this essay, which does not pretend to complete coverage of the problem, only some aspects of the everyday life of military captivity will be touched upon.
Let's start with the fact that "the ideas of Russian soldiers about the conditions of German captivity were formed long before they got to the front ... Under the influence of previous experience and public sentiments in the soldier's environment, an idea was formed about captivity as the best lot and the way to possibly avoid death:" Of course, our brother gets captured, just to save his life, and forgot the oath. ... almost everyone who participated in the Japanese war and was in captivity in Japan, they are still in captivity now, and now they write letters from captivity home, and at home it is read not only by one family, but by the whole village. His neighbor or acquaintance went to fight - he was also taken prisoner ... ". According to O.S. Nagornaya, “German interrogation protocols contain soldiers’ confessions that “retired soldiers who were captured in the Japanese war persuaded their comrades to surrender””, and in the correspondence of the Russian Main Directorate of the General Staff and Headquarters, concerned about the high number of captured Russian soldiers, “it was noted that almost from the very beginning of the war "in the villages ... recruits are released with advice: do not fight to the point of bloodshed, but surrender in order to stay alive" ".
Influenced the mood of the soldier masses and a fairly common myth about the "rich life" of "cultural Germans". So, in the diaries of V. Aramilev, a curious case is cited. “Private Vasiliskov, who escaped from German captivity, made his way into our trenches. He talks about the Germans with delight.
— Byada, devils live well. Their trenches are concrete, as in the upper rooms: clean, warm, light. Pishsha - what do you need in restaurants. Each soldier has his own bowl, two plates, a silver spoon, a fork, a knife. Expensive wines in flasks. You drink one sip - the blood in your veins will sparkle. Primus for cooking soup. They do not drink tea at all, only one coffee and cocoa. Coffee is poured into a glass, and five pieces of sugar are at the bottom of the pieces. If you start drinking cocoa with sugar, you are afraid that you won’t swallow your tongue.
— Sweet? the interested soldiers ask.
- Passion is so sweet! exclaims Vasiliskov. And then he adds:
“Where can we fight against the Germans!” His soldier is well-fed, shod, dressed, washed, and the soldier has good thoughts. What do we have? There is no order, the people are only toiling.
- Why did you run away from a good life? the soldiers joke about Vasiliskov. — Serve the German tsar. Here's the fool!
He rolls his eyes in bewilderment.
— How is it possible? I'm partly family. Baba in my village, children, put on three souls I have. What is the order, if every peasant will arbitrarily move from one state to another. They, the Germans, are here, and we are there. Everything will be mixed up, you won’t make it out for ten years. ”
A simple-minded, illiterate peasant did not even suspect that he was “thrown in the eyes” in captivity, treated to unusual “delicacies”, and then allowed to run away to his own to be used as an agitator, demoralizing the morale of his colleagues. So everyday life became a weapon of the “information war”, anticipating leaflets of a later time with calls for enemy soldiers to surrender and promises of a sweet and satisfying life in captivity.
From the point of view of the military leadership, captivity was perceived as a disgrace, and the majority of prisoners were traitors who betrayed their duty and oath. First of all, this concerned those who voluntarily surrendered, which were considered fighters who got to the enemy unwounded and did not use means in defense. But suspicions and the stigma of potential traitors fell on all those who were captured, which directly or indirectly affected their situation, the provision of material, food and other assistance to them, the organization of correspondence with the Motherland, and, finally, the moral and psychological state of the prisoners themselves.
So, noting cases of mass surrender of the lower ranks of the Russian army (not only after several years of sitting in the trenches, which can be explained by fatigue from the protracted war and the general decomposition of the army, but already in the autumn of 1914!), The command issued numerous orders in which it was said that all those who voluntarily surrendered at the end of the war would be put on trial and shot as “vile cowards”, “low parasites”, “godless traitors”, “our unworthy brothers”, “shameful sons of Russia”, who had reached the point of betrayal of their homeland, whom , "for the glory of the same motherland, it must be destroyed." The rest, “honest soldiers,” were ordered to shoot in the back those who were running away from the battlefield or trying to surrender: “Let them firmly remember that if you are afraid of an enemy bullet, you will get yours!” It was especially emphasized that those who had surrendered to the enemy would be immediately reported at their place of residence, “so that their relatives would know about their shameful act, and that the issuance of benefits to the families of those who surrendered would be immediately stopped.” General A.N. Kuropatkin stated that “in the military environment, captivity itself is considered a shameful phenomenon, ... all cases of surrender are subject to investigation after the war and punishment in accordance with the law.” In 1916, a special propaganda brochure was published in Petrograd “What awaits a soldier who voluntarily surrendered and his family. Conversation with the lower ranks”, which explained the repressive measures that would be applied to the “traitors of the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland”.
Another measure designed to prevent voluntary surrender was the widespread dissemination of information about the violation by the enemy of the norms of international law: about the implementation in the German and Austrian armies of orders not to take Russians alive as prisoners; about torture and sophisticated murders of the wounded captured on the battlefield; about hardships and bullying awaiting a prisoner in the camp, etc. The materials of the Extraordinary Investigation Commission were published both in the rear and in the army newspapers. Thus, in the newspaper Nash Vestnik, published at the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North-Western Front for free distribution to the troops, notes were regularly printed under eloquent and often repeated titles: “In Captivity”, “German Furies”, “German Atrocities”, “Christians Germans?”, “Shooting of 5,000 prisoners”, “In the investigative commission on German atrocities”, “In German captivity”, “Cossacks about surrendering prisoners”, “Crucifixion of a Cossack”, “Shooting of Cossacks”, “Three fugitives”, etc. .P. Other publications printed materials similar in content: “Outstanding atrocities of the Austrians”, “How the Germans interrogated the prisoners”, “German atrocities in the Russian trench”, “Barbaric killing of the wounded”, “Poisoning by the Germans of a Russian captive officer”, “Blood massacre of prisoners”, “The burning of Russian wounded officers and soldiers”, “What is German captivity”, “Shooting for refusing to dig trenches for the Germans”, “Death reigns in prisoner of war camps”, “Under the cover of Russian prisoners of war”, etc. Subsequently, already in 1942 ., these and other materials collected by the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry were published in a separate brochure "Documents on German atrocities in 1914-1918." .
The nature of these publications can be judged from the following fragment, which cites the testimony of a prisoner of war lieutenant of an Austrian infantry regiment, who claimed that the mockery of Russian prisoners in the German and Austro-Hungarian armies was built into a system. "At the end of April and in May [ 1915 - E.S.], when the Russians retreated to the San River, my soldiers - Czechs, Poles and Rusyns - repeatedly resorted to me and reported with horror that somewhere nearby German and often Austrian German soldiers were torturing Russian prisoners, torturing them to death, - he told. - How many times have I turned in the indicated direction and seen a really terrible picture. In different places, the abandoned, disfigured and mutilated corpses of Russian soldiers were lying around. The German soldiers who were nearby each time announced to me that they were only following the orders of their superiors. When I asked the German officers if this was true, they answered me: “This is how every Russian prisoner should be treated, and until you Austrians do the same, you will not have any success. Only brutalized soldiers fight well, but for this our soldiers must practice cruelty against Russian prisoners, who, as traitors to their homeland and voluntarily surrendered, deserve nothing but torture.
Summarizing the information received from a variety of sources, the newspapers angrily wrote: “The brutally cruel attitude towards the prisoners and wounded taken by the Germans is fully manifested from the first moment they are taken prisoner, on the battlefields. Those who surrender are brutally tortured, often to death, the wounded are finished off with rifle butts and bayonets. Many eyewitness officers testify that in their presence a group of captured Cossacks was shot from machine guns.
Of course, such publications, as well as the facts of the cruelty of the enemy, which the servicemen had to face personally or learn "first hand" from witnesses and eyewitnesses, caused a reasonable fear of the possibility of being captured and subjected to torment and abuse. It is no coincidence that in German letters, diaries and notebooks, along with references to the capture of Russian soldiers (“... this cowardly people (Russian infantry), with stronger pressure from our side, threw down their weapons and immediately surrendered”) there are also examples of a different kind : "One Russian officer shot himself so as not to be taken prisoner".
On August 21, 1914, the commander of the 33rd ersatz battalion, Captain von Besser, writes about the battles in East Prussia: “My people were so embittered that they did not give mercy, because the Russians often show that they are surrendering, they raise their hands up, and if you approach to them, they again raise their guns and shoot, and as a result there are heavy losses. In his wife's reply dated September 11, 1914, we find the following response, reflecting the mood in the rear of Germany towards the prisoners: “You are absolutely right that you do not allow any indulgence, why? War is war, and what a huge amount of money it takes to keep people capable of military service in captivity! And this gang also wants to eat! No, this is too generous, and if the Russians committed such terrible vile things as you saw, then these cattle should be made harmless! Inspire this also to your subordinates.
Nevertheless, the mass character of captivity became a reality of the world war, and the specific experience of staying and surviving “behind barbed wire” became the fate of over 3.4 million Russian prisoners.
The fugitives, whose testimonies were recorded in questionnaires collected, in particular, by intelligence units at the headquarters of the front commanders, spoke in detail about the conditions of being in captivity - both at the stage of transfer and in points of temporary and permanent detention.
So, in a survey of Grigory Kuznetsov, a private of the 324th Klyazma Infantry Regiment, who escaped from captivity, dated July 6, 1915, it was reported: “They fed us poorly and little on the road, they gave 1 pot of coffee for two and 1/2 pounds of bread, buckwheat and corn flour... The Austrian escorts treated us well. German soldiers confiscated clothing, especially boots; They took away my watch… The Rusyn escorts sold us bread for 50 kopecks. pound..."
Ensign of the 12th company of the Siberian Regiment A. Denisov and junior non-commissioned officer Ivan Banifatiev told how they were driven as part of a column of prisoners of war to the border, and then taken by rail to Germany: “We were led from Brezin almost naked, without boots and overcoats to the border. Many of us were wounded and sick. We went 6 days. We were not fed. They will lead you to a pit with potatoes or beets and shout: "Eat, Russian pigs."
The wounded, bleeding, walked two versts. Although we supported each other all the way, but, exhausted, lagged behind and fell. The backward Germans killed everyone. Not even half of us made it to the border. Here they put us in dirty wagons. 80-90 people were stuffed into each car. They took us with the doors locked. There were no windows. The stuffiness is unbearable. Some died from exhaustion and overcrowding. We put them against the wall of the car. The groan, the cries of the wounded and sick terrified everyone. At the sight of all this suffering, some of us were close to insanity. I, says Denisov, cried several times. In Berlin, our carriages were opened. We carried the dead out of the wagons. We were given soup and a small piece of bread; the bread was with straw, but we were ready to eat stones too…”
On July 4, 1915, privates of the 231st Drogichinsky Regiment Ivan Verbilo and Roman Cherepakha, who escaped from captivity, testified that they were used in the construction of military fortifications: he said that he was sick, the German doctor examined him and, if he found him healthy, they gave him 15 sticks each ... The position that we dug stretches from Yaroslav through Radymno to Przemysl. We began to think about how to escape from captivity, since we considered it a shame to dig fortifications against our own, and in general it was difficult in captivity in all respects. ... The lodging place was surrounded by a high wire fence ... The German and Austrian escorts treated us badly: they beat and scolded us. The food was very bad. Barley soup without meat and fat, one pound of very bad bread with chaff, and two glasses of tea a day. At the expense of food, the escort Germans are better, the German will soon give our hungry prisoner a piece of bread for nothing; an Austrian, whatever nation he may be, strives to sell and take a ruble for half a pound.
Private of the 6th company of the L.gv. Vasily Kuznetsov of the Semenov Regiment said: “... In Suwalki, the prisoners were doing work. I personally worked on the housework and on loading on the railway, but I know that our prisoners in the Suwalki region dug trenches even under the fire of Russian artillery, and three were killed ... The Germans treat Russian prisoners very badly. They beat them with sticks, almost do not feed them. For Jewish soldiers, an exception is made and seniors are appointed to work ... "
The lower ranks of the sergeant major of the 206th Salyan Infantry Regiment Ivan Lavrentyev Anoshenko and the senior non-commissioned officer of the 74th Stavropol Regiment Zakhary Ivanov Zhuchenok, who escaped from captivity together, reported: “... In captivity they are fed very poorly, so there are many thefts by our prisoners. When loading provisions, two of our lower rank prisoners were shot in Rava-Russkaya for taking one bottle of wine and several breads. The treatment is cruel in general ... "I. Anashenok added:" ... We worked in Belzec to unload various things - food and fodder, but I, as a sergeant major, did not work. Z. Zhuchenok also confirmed this: “... I, as a senior non-commissioned officer, did not work and stayed in the tent and met Sergeant Major Anoshenok, and we decided to escape from heavy captivity.”
Some of these testimonies were included in proclamations distributed among the troops, warning against surrender, and published in newspapers. So, on July 2, 1915, the newspaper Nash Vestnik wrote on the first page: “Every day our prisoners come from Germany who managed to get through the border after long days of wandering and hunger strikes.
Their stories are full of horrors. There are no boundaries to the torment and humiliation that befalls the unfortunate, whom fate forced into captivity.
Continuous hunger strike, shameful work on the removal of sewage, beatings, severe brutal punishments for unsuccessful work due to emaciation; lack of care for the wounded and sick - this is what the stories of those fellows who managed to get through at the cost of terrible hardship and risk are filled with,
And the immeasurable malice of the tormentors, who, like animals, enjoy the suffering of our unarmed and defenseless soldiers.
With these words, one of those who fled through Switzerland ends his story: “God forbid, brothers, no one should fall into such hellish torment. If you get sick from hunger at work, then you will receive several pushes with the butt for treatment: several of our soldiers cried from such torment. And not a few buried in the damp earth. Many could not endure such torment of the enemy. And may God punish me if I'm telling a lie ... "
... Such an attitude towards prisoners of war is the best characteristic of our enemy, who, in impotent rage, seeing his inevitable shame, vents it on defenseless prisoners.
In another issue, July 9, 1915, Our Vestnik gives the story of three fugitives who fled from German captivity to Holland, reprinted from the Petrograd Courier, whose Rotterdam correspondent met with them at the Russian Consulate General. Corporal of the 141st Mozhaisk regiment Iosif Filobokov and senior fireworker of the 5th battery of the 36th artillery brigade Ivan Matovov were captured at the very beginning of the war, in mid-August 1914 in Prussia, and spent 9 months in captivity. Their fellow volunteer of the 163rd Lankaran-Kotenburg Regiment Vladimir Timchenko was captured on December 2, 1915 and spent 5.5 months in captivity. From their testimony, one can get a fairly complete picture of the daily diet of Russian prisoners of war of the lower ranks: “They all unanimously describe their stay in this captivity in the most gloomy colors. Food was given to them in extremely insufficient quantities. Recently, for example, the bread ration has been reduced to 100 grams or 1/4 pound per person per day. In the morning, two cups of coffee were dispensed. The same in the evening. Sometimes evening coffee was replaced by salted water with some kind of seasoning. Dinner invariably consisted of one dish all the time: unpeeled potato mash, lately (after complaints!) laced with cornmeal. And it's all!"
The story contains a description of the camp itself and the conditions of detention in it, the attitude towards prisoners on the part of the camp administration and guards, and their use in forced labor:
“The treatment of prisoners is outrageous. They scold, beat and mutilate them in passing, for all sorts of trifles. All guard camps are guilty of this, but especially the fugitives we met complained about non-commissioned officers and sergeant majors: “Dogs are chained, not people!” …
The camps, according to the description of the fugitives, are below any criticism. Made of boards, they leak, they do not keep heat in winter. They have no furniture. Instead of a bed - straw on the floor. Therefore, the barracks are dirty, stuffy and "lousy".
Due to the lack of food and the unhygienic barracks, as well as the absence of baths, all kinds of diseases can be said to be rampant among the prisoners. The mortality rate there is unusually high. Medical assistance is not always given, because the administration suspects all those who fall ill in a simulation.
All of the above information is not news. We have heard similar complaints more than once from fugitives from another camp. Lack of food, mistreatment, filth, disease - all these charms are also characteristic of other German camps. But the last fugitives complained about the exhaustion of their hard work, this was news to us. According to them, the Germans use prisoners exclusively for the most difficult work. When building, for example, railways, they are forced to carry logs, sleepers, and other weights, dig ditches, etc.
Everyone is required to work. When, for example, non-commissioned officers stated that, according to the Russian military regulations, they should not be used for work, they were told that they were not in Russia, but in Germany, and that everyone was equal here, and privates, and non-commissioned officers, and sergeants , and ensigns, and everyone should work.
The Germans oblige the prisoners to work even on major Orthodox holidays. So, the work was carried out by prisoners on Palm Sunday. At Easter, only one day was given for rest.
The prisoners themselves, in fact, would have nothing against the work. They even prefer to work. But the trouble is that the food given to them does not correspond to the work asked of them. Then they are outraged that they are used for work related to the defense of Germany: the construction of strategic roads, the construction of factories for the manufacture of military supplies, etc. .
On July 11, 1915, Our Bulletin publishes the story of two more fugitives - the junior medical assistant of the 314th mobile field hospital Ivan Yelensky and the shooter of the 39th Siberian regiment Nil Semenov, who described in detail their stay in the prisoner of war camp and the peculiarities of the routine in it: “... The prisoners were placed in the stable of the cavalry regiment that had lodged there before the war. 6 people were placed in each stall, which created incredible crowding. Soon, various diseases appeared. At first, the prisoners were given three pounds of bread for two days, but this did not last more than two months, after which the same three pounds were given for five days, and sometimes they were not given out for several days. For breakfast and dinner, the prisoners were given black coffee, bitter, no more than one glass for each, and lunch consisted of thin stew in a very insufficient amount. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Germans did not allow anyone to have money and from the very first day they took away not only all the money and valuables, such as watches, rings, etc., but even removed their overcoats and boots from everyone, giving them wooden shoes in return. , which were incredibly heavy and rubbed their legs.
Landsturmists were assigned to them as guards, almost all of them elderly people. These soldiers were terribly rude and cruel.
When sick people appeared among the prisoners, they were not provided with any medical assistance; the Germans did not believe in their illnesses, suspected pretense and sent them to the doctor only when the patient collapsed exhausted at work or was already close to death in the stinking stable. Apart from these proofs of illness, the Germans believed in nothing. When a prisoner declared that he was unwell, he was usually beaten with cleavers and rifle butts, after which they were driven to work. Many of these patients died on the job.
The prisoners were not allowed to smoke under pain of cruel punishment. During the first few weeks of captivity, they were forbidden to say anything among themselves, which was an unbearable burden for the unfortunate, deprived of even this consolation.
... Despite the tightness and dirt in the room and the uncleanliness of the prisoners associated with this, the Germans in no case allowed them to wash, arguing that the Russians are pigs and do not need it ... " .
Describing the working conditions of prisoners of war in forced labor, the fugitives said that on November 24, 1914, they were sent to build canals for an electric station in the town of Bransberg. In total, about 500 people were sent, and they were promised pay and improved food, but they were deceived: the conditions were terrible, the prisoners were not given any clothes, they did not even return their overcoats, people “worked knee-deep in ice water, and after work they could not even dry their clothes ". Moreover, "they worked 12 hours a day, without exception, without distinction of rank."
In such unbearable conditions, which put people on the brink of survival, many prisoners thought about escaping, and some made real attempts to escape: “On the first day of Easter, 10 prisoners escaped from work, using a hole cut with knives in the wall of the barracks. Immediately, in the dead of night, all the prisoners were gathered for verification: the Germans raged and shouted, tried to vent their furious anger on those who remained; a whole platoon of German soldiers rushed along the river in pursuit of the fugitives, but the search for them was unsuccessful. The prisoners were already secretly glad that at least some of their comrades managed to get out of this hell, but it turned out differently. At dawn, the fugitives were overtaken, eight people were caught, and the remaining two disappeared ... Those who were caught were subjected to preliminary torture, after which two fell dangerously ill and, it seems, died the next day, and the rest were sent under heavy escort to Danzig. The prisoners did not learn anything about the fate that befell them ... Immediately after this incident, the regime deteriorated even more. The prisoners were forbidden to have even penknives, they made a general search and threatened with immediate execution if someone found a knife or other sharp object ... After this incident, the prisoners were literally starved ... " .
Based on the testimonies of prisoners who fled from various camps in Germany and Austria-Hungary, as well as other sources, including reports from representatives of the Red Cross, conclusions and generalizations were drawn about the widespread violation by the enemy of the norms of international law in relation to prisoners of war and the monstrous conditions of their detention: Recently, completely reliable information about the situation in Germany of our prisoners of war officers and lower ranks gives the following gloomy picture of those exceptionally extremely difficult living conditions that the Germans have created for Russian prisoners who have fallen into power with them ... ".
Particularly noted was the violation of international conventions in relation to captured officers, deprived of not only the usual, but at least minimal comfort: “Transportation of prisoners of war officers, including up to senior commanders, is usually carried out in unlit wagons, often filthy with cattle - 40 people in one wagon. At the same time, they have to sit right on the dirty floor, where the officers are forced to sleep when moving, lasting several days.
For some reason, they feed the prisoners on the road mostly at night, giving a disgusting greasy mess, without bread, from which many people vomit. Water is released in an extremely limited amount and then raw, but they do not give boiling water at all. Buying anything on the way is completely prohibited.
The treatment of prisoners of all ranks and ranks by the escorts and their superiors is invariably barbarously rude and cruel. So, the escorts once tore off a cross from a regimental priest and trampled it underfoot, a wounded officer was beaten on a mutilated leg.
At the points of permanent quartering of Russian prisoners of war, officers are placed in dirty barracks, 15-18 people in a small room equipped with two tiers of bunks. Often officers are placed even in stables and sheds. Two captured generals were placed in a cramped non-commissioned officer's closet.
Consolidated companies composed of officer ranks, which also include generals, are commanded by the German lower ranks, showing in everything the most rude attitude towards their unfortunate subordinates. Twice a day, officers and lower ranks of the prisoners of war are called over, each time in the yard, even in rainy and cold weather, despite the fact that the vast majority of prisoners are dressed only in light protective shirts.
Officers and generals are constantly subjected to searches that are insulting in form and, in general, the most impossible conditions of everyday regime are created for them in concentration camps.
The nutrition of the officers, extremely unsatisfactory in quality, is more than meager. Terrible anemia develops among the prisoners, and placing a significant part of them in dark, damp and fetid underground casemates causes serious rheumatic diseases. .
At the same time, the document emphasized the extremely harsh conditions of detention of Russian soldiers and gave examples of “disciplinary action” on them by the German authorities: “Our captured lower ranks have a particularly hard time in Germany. For food, they are given half a pound of the worst bread a day, twice a week they are given a small piece of meat, and on other days only one podbolka. Captured soldiers are dressed up for all sorts of hard work, subjecting them to terribly harsh punishments. So, for example, for the smallest misdemeanors, they are tied to a tree for several hours or forced to run to exhaustion with a bag full of sand behind their back, which painfully beats on the back while running. The lower ranks are beaten with sticks, whips, butts - for the slightest oversight.
One lower rank, who wrote in a letter home that he received half a pound of bread a day for food and meat twice a week - as it is, in fact, was sentenced to two years in prison for libel.
On the basis of malnutrition, with increased hard work and the absence of any medical care, a large mortality develops among the lower ranks. Cases of suicide are also very frequent; so, recently, the lower rank was stabbed to death with a box of sardines.
The intercourse of prisoners of different camps among themselves is completely prohibited. .
It should be noted that none of the warring parties "was ready to accommodate such a number of captured enemy soldiers and officers and to provide them in a protracted confrontation." At the same time, “during the war, the desire to strengthen the morale of their own population and influence the opinion of neutral countries that measured the civilization of a belligerent state by the level of mortality in prisoner of war camps led to the desire of all parties to underestimate or hide the number of their own soldiers who surrendered, as well as sick and dead prisoners of war enemy."
Inconsistency of the conditions of detention with sanitary standards, famine and epidemics, as well as numerous violations of the provisions of international law, caused a high death rate in the camps. According to domestic researchers, the mortality rate among Russian prisoners of war was 7.3%, and in general, 190 thousand people died in the camps of the Central Powers, of which about 100 thousand were in Germany. At the same time, the mortality rate among immigrants from the Russian Empire was twice as high as the corresponding indicators of captured Western European nationalities. According to incomplete German statistics, 91.2% of deaths were caused by diseases (of which 39.8% of deaths were due to tuberculosis, 19% to pneumonia and 5.5% to typhus, 31% to "other diseases" in which , obviously, included such "typical camp diseases" as dysentery, cholera and starvation), 8.2% - injuries and 0.6% - suicides.
At the end of August 1916, the Central Committee of the Russian Red Cross Society reported: “The Committee received information that our prisoners of war in Germany and Austria-Hungary are dying of tuberculosis in a significantly large number and that in general the infection with this disease, taking there on the basis of malnutrition threatening sizes, can serve as a hotbed for the spread of this disease in Russia when our prisoners return. In view of this, in addition to strengthening the food supply of our prisoners of war with food parcels, an agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary on the evacuation of tuberculosis patients to neutral countries is necessary.
The question was raised about the exchange of disabled prisoners of war (about their mutual return to their homeland), about the transfer of sick and wounded prisoners of war to neutral countries and their internment until the end of the war. Relevant agreements were signed between several belligerent powers, the exchange was carried out through the mediation of the Red Cross and the Vatican. However, in Russia, the solution of this issue was hampered at the level of interdepartmental agreements, which, in particular, is evidenced by the secret correspondence between the director of the Second Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry A.K. Bentkovsky and the leadership of the General Staff in February 1915. “If, on the one hand,” Bentkovsky wrote, “the removal of our prisoners of war from Germany can have a favorable effect on their living conditions, then on the other hand, the release of the German government from the obligation to provide food is quite large in number its number of prisoners of war can to some extent, at least for a while, improve its situation with regard to providing the population of Germany with nutrients, which from our military point of view, undoubtedly, seems extremely undesirable. The Main Directorate of the General Staff, represented by Major General Leontiev, expressed full agreement with this opinion, although, of course, he understood that hunger and exhausting labor for the wounded and seriously ill people was tantamount to a death sentence. But “political and military expediency” turned out to be more important for high officials than humanitarian considerations and alleviating the plight of their compatriots who were captured.
Obstacles were placed even to public charitable initiatives to organize assistance to prisoners, collect money and send food. So, M.A. Alekseev called for a ban on the publication of collection announcements in newspapers, arguing that "prisoners are in more tolerable living conditions than the defenders of the Motherland at the front, who are every minute in mortal danger," and if information about starvation and ill-treatment of prisoners in the camps is up to until now stopped the mass transition to the enemy, then reports of the collection of money and the organization of assistance could set the "cowardly, who have not mastered the concept of duty, to surrender", and, in addition, the funds collected would reduce the "expenses of the Germans for the maintenance of our prisoners" and allowed to send freed up resources for war.
As a result of this approach, assistance to prisoners of war from Russia was organized late and turned out to be ineffective, and the German authorities widely used the tragic situation of Russian prisoners for their own purposes, spreading propaganda among them that they were left to their fate, thereby undermining their morale. and the authority of the tsarist government.
As early as April 1915, the Russian ambassador in Paris reported that in a number of camps "soldiers are dying of hunger, sending money is inexpedient, since it is forbidden for soldiers to buy food." But to the request of the Chief of the General Staff about the need to send food to the prisoners, Emperor Nicholas II refused, citing "the impossibility of verifying that the bread would really be delivered to its destination, and would not be used for food by the German troops." On July 29, 1915, the Chief of the General Staff sent a secret letter No. 1067 to the Chief of the Main Directorate of Posts and Telegraphs about a ban on sending crackers in parcels for prisoners of war. However, after some time this ban was lifted.
Rumors spread among the Russian population that parcels sent to Russian prisoners of war were stolen in Germany and Austria-Hungary or confiscated by decision of the governments of these countries. The metropolitan and provincial press wrote very emotionally about the loss of parcels. As a result, many relatives and close acquaintances of prisoners of war, as well as some public organizations, refrained from sending them food supplies. Meanwhile, many parcels were lost on the way, never reaching the borders of Germany and Austria-Hungary. On November 10, 1915, Major General Ivanchenko wrote to the Moscow Committee of the Red Cross: our prisoners of war, this camp must be recognized as exceptional. From the most reliable sources, I know that their commandant is a fine, honest old man, who is very concerned about the possible improvement of their lot, the treatment is correct, the care for the sick is excellent, but they are starving because there is a lack of food everywhere, and all hope for our help, and from This is what comes out of her: the son writes: “Mmm V ... (From Moscow) sent 14 parcels to my husband (directly by mail) and 4 to me. None received. Parcels come to us with Russian seals, are opened with German accuracy in our presence and, for the most part, are robbed. "Look for the villains at home" ... "
Non-commissioned officer I.I. Chernetsov was taken prisoner in 1915. The last letter from the front received from him by his relatives was dated January 15, the first postcard from captivity - June 15, 1915. He was held in a prisoner of war camp in Germany, in the city of Worms. Letters from captivity, or rather postcards on the standard form of the Red Cross, were allowed to be sent 6 times a month. The content of most of these postcards in 10 lines by I.I. Chernetsov's standard: "I'm alive, well, thanks for the parcel ..." And then a listing of its contents usually follows, probably in order to make sure that nothing was lost along the way. And only on February 19, according to the old style (March 4, according to the new style), 1917, in an Easter greeting to his relatives, his restraint and pragmatism give way to feelings: “Christ is Risen! Dear and dear Lisa, Alexei Ivanovich and Bobochka! I congratulate you on the great holiday and sincerely wish you to meet and spend it in full health and peace of mind. Being mentally with all of you, I am constantly connected by invisible spiritual threads that connect us, and at least this consciousness will be a consolation to you and me on this great day. Parcels 10 and 11 received on February 15 and 17. Thank you very much for everything. Congratulations on the holiday to all relatives. Kisses, loving brother Vanya. All postcards from captivity have a return address: “For a prisoner of war. Unter. Of. Chernetsov Ivan. Bat. III, company 15, N 1007. Germany, city of Worms. It should be noted that sister I.I. Chernetsova E.I. Ogneva corresponded not only with her brother, but also with other prisoners of war from this camp, his fellow soldiers, sent them parcels and received news about her brother through them, in turn, passing news from her correspondents to their families.
The opportunity to keep in touch with the house, with relatives, give them news, inform about oneself, reassure loved ones who are in constant anxiety about their fate, was the most urgent need for prisoners. The main theme of the letters was the economic and family affairs of loved ones who remained at home, and the main incentive that supported the will of people to live was the desire to return to their homeland. Meanwhile, strict censorship and careful checking of letters and parcels led to significant delays in postal items from Russia to prisoners of war, for whom they were matters of physical and moral survival, and the repression of the German authorities in the form of cancellation of correspondence led to a loss of interest in reality: “people lost heart , walked like clouds and did not want to hear about anything. The resumption of contacts with the Motherland instantly improved the morale of the prisoners, brought them out of depression.
The process of adaptation of soldiers and officers to the situation of captivity was manifested in a wide range of behavioral patterns - from passive acceptance of imposed realities and escape from reality, various forms of cooperation with the German authorities and the camp administration, to covert and open resistance, including spontaneous and organized actions. The prisoners of the camps zealously followed the development of the situation on the fronts, vigorously discussed political events in Russia. In order to justify themselves (as opposed to the suspicions of treachery widespread in their homeland), they tried to present their stay in captivity in the light of a martyr's halo, and even introduce an element of heroization, including in self-presentation a refusal to work for the enemy or an unsuccessful attempt to escape. One of the young officers characterized his experiences behind the barbed wire as a process of social maturation: “From a weak boy, I turned into a man with a beard, I experienced a lot of grief and hardship, but hard trials strengthened me, now it’s not scary to look ahead.”
In general, it should be noted that the experience of captivity was as individual for everyone as the front-line experience itself. Someone was lucky more, someone less. The officers had more chances of survival than the lower ranks, the healthy - more than the wounded and sick, those who owned any craft - more than those who did not know it, the educated - more than the illiterate , etc. The conditions in which the prisoners of war were kept depended not only on the general state policy, economic reasons, the constant forcing in society of the “image of the enemy”, which caused an increase in hatred for the prisoners among different segments of the population, but simply on the “human factor”: abuse of power, uncontrolled arbitrariness in the camps and work teams came, most often, from the local authorities. “In a separate camp, the level of violence depended, first of all, on the commandant, who had not only the right to determine the disciplinary regime, but also to make final decisions on the implementation of punishments in specific cases”