At the beginning of the war, a conspiracy was being prepared against Stalin. At the beginning of the war there was a great betrayal of officers and generals of the Red Army
Through the fault of Stalin and Voroshilov, not only was an entire galaxy of highly talented generals devoted to the revolution destroyed, but along with their killing, their strategy and tactics developed by them for the upcoming war were discarded as wrecking.
“Everyone who writes on this subject emphasizes,” wrote the military historian General Grigorenko, “that our military theory has significantly outstripped the military thought of the capitalist countries, having developed in the late twenties and early thirties many provisions that were confirmed during the Second World War: the principles of applying large tank masses, the massive use of aviation, the landing and operations in the deep enemy rear of large armed landings, etc. Before 1933, Germany did not yet have the principles with which she started the war. In 1932-1933, the Germans only began to adopt them from our army.
... We in 1941 did not base our military theory on the principles that we developed in the late 1920s and 1930s. These new military ideas were discarded by our army in order to eliminate the consequences of the sabotage of Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Yakir and others.
Stalin, this “great commander of all times and peoples”, “a brilliant strategist”, thanks to his criminal policy and ambition, not only allowed Hitler to power in Germany, not only beheaded the Red Army on the eve of the war with Nazi Germany, not only disarmed the country by signing a pact with Nazi Germany, not only did not give the military the opportunity to prepare for the outbreak of war, he, in addition, weakened the power of the Red Army, canceling the theory and organizational structure Red Army, developed by its leading commanders.
He abandoned the brilliant military theory that the German General Staff adopted from our army, which then victoriously applied it on the battlefields with the Polish, French, English and other armies, and also successfully applied it against the Red Army, especially in the initial period of the war, when The Red Army has not yet had time to return to the old principles of building its troops.
This correct idea of General Grigorenko was confirmed by many leading military leaders of our country.
“Perhaps the reader remembers,” wrote G.K. Zhukov, “that our army was a pioneer in the creation of large mechanized formations of brigades and corps. However, the experience of using such formations in the specific conditions of Spain was assessed incorrectly, and the mechanized corps in our army were eliminated.
It was necessary to urgently return to the creation of large armored formations.
From the above excerpt, which fully confirms the thought of General Grigorenko, one can see “what a swamp we have flown into” (Lenin) thanks to the mistakes and crimes of Stalin and Voroshilov.
At the end of the war, the Red Army began to form mechanized armored formations.
“In 1940, the formation of new mechanized corps, tank and motorized divisions began,” wrote Marshal Zhukov. - …AND. V. Stalin, apparently, did not have a definite opinion on this issue and hesitated. Time passed, and only in March 1941 a decision was made to form the 20 mechanized corps we asked for ... By the beginning of the war, we managed to equip less than half of the formed corps. It was these corps that played a big role in repelling the first blows of the enemy.
G.K. Zhukov did not tell how the formation of mechanized corps took place. General Grigorenko wrote about this in his article:
“The reorganization was begun at the most alarming time, on the eve of the Hitlerite attack on us, and was carried out in an obviously absurd manner. Tank battalions rifle divisions were disbanded and turned to the formation of mechanized corps, which, after disbanding in 1937-1938, were restored again.
Disbandment (tank battalions) happened very quickly. Those of the corps, which received both people and materiel, did not have time to master the new organization and did not manage to fight in new organizational forms. But it's still half the trouble. The whole trouble was that some of the corps from among those listed on paper were a bunch of unarmed people ... These are, in fact, organized prisoners of war. (Grigorenko, ibid.).
Instead of the formation of mechanized corps and their training to be carried out in the rear and, for this, to withdraw the tank battalions of rifle divisions to the rear, the formation of armored corps was carried out in the border zone. Those of the mechanized corps, which were completed, but due to the shortness of time were not trained, entered the war unprepared in new organizational forms. Those corps that provided people, but did not have time to provide equipment, became really organized cadres of prisoners of war.
How to explain that the formation of mechanized units took place so slowly and absurdly?
The whole point was that Stalin was reluctant to form mechanized formations, as G.K. Zhukov wrote about this. Therefore, having begun in 1940, it was not completed by the beginning of the war. Only in March 1941, Stalin decided to form 20 mechanized corps.
If, as Zhukov writes, the mechanized formations formed on the eve of the war “played a big role in repelling the first enemy strikes,” despite the fact that the troops had not yet had time to get used to the new organizational forms, then one can imagine what role they could play at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, if they had not been disbanded in 1937-1938.
G.K. Zhukov published his book in 1969, when the leadership of the CPSU was doing everything to rehabilitate Stalin. Therefore, he writes very politely and carefully about Stalin's mistakes.
What does Zhukov's words mean that "Stalin had no definite opinion on this issue and hesitated", on an issue that, as the experience of the war showed, had crucial for the success of our troops?
This means that Stalin, for reasons of prestige, did not want to admit his mistake regarding the disbandment of mechanized formations in 1937-1938 and therefore reluctantly went to the creation of tank corps.
Because of this, the creation of such formations was delayed until the eve of the war, the army did not have time to get used to the new organization, and some of these formations, which did not have time to complete their formation, became "organized trained cadres of prisoners of war."
As you know, Stalin was in no hurry to prepare troops for war with Nazi Germany. Contrary to all reports, he believed that there was no danger of war in the next one or two years. He was convinced of the reliability of the non-aggression pact signed with Hitler.
“It was clear,” wrote Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, “that the General Staff did not expect the war to begin in 1941. This point of view came from Stalin, who believed too much in the non-aggression pact concluded with fascist Germany, wholly trusted him and did not want to see the impending menacing danger. (N. N. Voronov "In the service of the military", 1963, pp. 170-175).
To characterize the peaceful moods of Stalin and Molotov on the eve of the war, I will cite one excerpt from Zhukov's book. After his appointment as Chief of the General Staff, in February 1941, he raised the question before Stalin that
“It is necessary to take urgent measures and timely eliminate the existing shortcomings in the defense of the western borders and in the armed forces. V. M. Molotov interrupted me: “Do you think that we will have to fight the Germans?” Molotov and Stalin were so carried away by their friendship with Hitler that they did not even imagine that a war was possible between the USSR and Germany.
G.K. Zhukov recalled that only three months remained from the moment he was appointed chief of staff to the start of the war with Germany. After reviewing the state of the army, he came to the conclusion that the Soviet armed forces were completely unprepared for such a serious war as was coming in the near future. He lamented that there was little time left for "everything to be put in its place." In his opinion, omissions in preparation for repelling the first blows of the enemy were connected with this.
And if history gave the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov more time than 3–3.5 months, would he be able to catch up?
Would Stalin have allowed him to carry out all the measures that he had planned to repel the first blow of the enemy?
Reflecting on the answers to these questions, G.K. Zhukov wrote:
“During the period of the brewing of a dangerous military situation, we, the military, probably did not do everything to convince I.V. Stalin of the inevitability of war with Germany in the very near future and to prove to him the need to carry out the urgent measures provided for by operational mobilization plans.”
Zhukov blames Stalin for miscalculating the timing of a possible German attack on the Soviet Union. He carried the idea in the book that Stalin, in accordance with his personal forecast, did not force all military districts, the fleet, aviation and the Ministry of Defense to train troops and build defensive structures.
As a result, the country and the army were unprepared to repel the first enemy attacks.
Stalin was most afraid of the first blow of the Nazi war machine. All the military leaders who were in close contact with him wrote about this. Therefore, he entered into an agreement with Hitler, was careful not to provoke Germany in every possible way, and forbade the activation of the operational mobilization plan.
But in fact it turned out that he conducted his entire practical policy of preparing the Red Army for war in such a way that he made this first blow of the Nazi military machine the most destructive for the USSR and the most effective for Germany.
The military experts who surrounded Stalin saw and understood the looming danger of an attack on the USSR by Nazi Germany. They proposed a whole system of measures to protect our country from the first blow of the enemy, but Stalin invariably rejected their proposals.
It was impossible without Stalin to train the armed forces to repel an enemy attack, since this, first of all, was connected with the danger of taking harsh measures against them for military leaders of all ranks.
What, then, was the fault of the military leaders, which historians and G.K. Zhukov himself speak and write about in his memoirs?
Was it their fault that they failed to convince Stalin "of the inevitability of war with Germany in the very near future"? Everyone who wrote about this understood perfectly well that it was impossible to convince Stalin of the need to put into action the operational mobilization plans of the Red Army, that persistent demands, no matter who they came from, about the implementation of these plans could not lead to anything good. G. K. Zhukov, apparently, wanted to make readers understand that Stalin, as the political leader of the country, had to understand the international situation better than the military. And if, despite this, the military had to convince Stalin of the imminent danger, then the blame for the fact that they could not do this cannot fall on the military.
The fact that G.K. Zhukov thought exactly this way and not otherwise, that he did not shield Stalin, is evidenced by the following passage from his book:
“I have already spoken about what measures were taken to prevent Germany from starting a military conflict. The People's Commissar for Defense, the General Staff and the commanders of the military border districts were warned of personal responsibility for the consequences that may arise due to the careless actions of our troops. We were categorically forbidden to make any advancement of troops to the front lines according to the cover plan without the personal permission of I.V. Stalin. (pp. 242–243).
Most journalists, military men, diplomats, including Chakovsky, both during Stalin's lifetime and now, in hindsight, are trying to prove that Stalin's government did everything to prepare for war. At the same time, it lists how many people were mobilized into the army, how industry was restructured, how Stalin held meetings on the production of new types of weapons, etc.
Even if you take all this on faith, was it really just that? The main thing was to bring the troops into a state of full combat readiness to respond to the first strike, so that it would not be unexpected for the people and the army.
“... The defense of the country depends not only, sometimes not even so much, on the number of people, tanks and aircraft in service,” wrote b. Narkomvoenmor N. G. Kuznetsov, - but, above all, from the readiness to immediately put them into action, to use them effectively when the need arises ... Preparation for war is not just the accumulation of equipment.
... Did Stalin think about this? Much, much has been done. Yet something very important was missing. There was a lack of constant, daily readiness for war. And only in this case, the divisions could play the role that was intended for them.
Stalin and Voroshilov boasted of the preparedness of the troops for war. In fact, everything was done the other way around. This readiness of divisions to immediately take action was paralyzed by Stalin's policy, and therefore, despite the fact that 170 Soviet divisions were located on the western borders, from the first hours of the war they were disorganized, thrown back from the borders or taken prisoner, and along with them a huge part of the equipment fell into the hands of the enemy.
All attempts by Zhukov, Timoshenko and other military leaders to put them into action ran into Stalin's categorical ban. Even on the night of June 22, when the defector announced that the German troops would begin the offensive on June 22, and Timoshenko and Zhukov suggested that Stalin give a directive to put the cover plan into action, J. V. Stalin remarked:
“It is premature to give such a directive now, maybe (?) the issue will still be settled peacefully. It is necessary to give a short directive in which it is indicated that the attack can begin with provocative actions of the German units. The troops of the border districts should not succumb to any provocations, so as not to cause complications. (G.K. Zhukov “Memories and Reflections”, pp. 242–243).
G.K. Zhukov reveals to the readers the line of Stalin, who, after signing the pact with Hitler, consistently, right up to the attack on the USSR, believed that war with the Germans could be avoided if one did not succumb to the provocations of revanchist circles in Germany. According to him, Hitler was resolutely against the war with the USSR. The generals of the Wehrmacht and the monopoly circles behind them were allegedly in favor of the war with Russia. In fact, as evidenced by the memoirs of the Wehrmacht generals, the German generals were resolutely against the war with the USSR. The decision to attack the Soviet Union came personally from Hitler. This fact is another evidence of Stalin's "far-sightedness".
G.K. Zhukov acquaints us with Stalin's directives to all military organizations from top to bottom, about their full responsibility for any actions of the troops that could provoke retaliatory actions of the German army. It was impossible to disobey these instructions of Stalin, since the slightest deviation from the directives was considered by Stalin as provocative, with all the ensuing consequences.
How, under such conditions, Zhukov hoped to convince Stalin of the inevitability of an imminent war with Germany?
If the military considered themselves guilty before the country for not being able to convince Stalin of the inevitability of war, then what should be the fault of Stalin himself, who claims to be the leader of the Soviet people, who needed to be convinced and who not only did not understand what abyss he was pulling into the entire Soviet people, but also did not give the people around him the opportunity to explain the situation to him.
In fact, neither Zhukov, nor anyone else among the military and political figures who surrounded Stalin, dared to tell him directly to his face that he was leading the country along a dangerous path. Everyone knew that Stalin would not take into account the opinions of others, even those closest to him.
“Stalin still believed,” wrote Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov, “that a war between fascist Germany and the Soviet Union could only arise as a result of a provocation by fascist military revenge-seekers and was most afraid of these provocations. As you know, Stalin liked to decide everything himself. He had little regard for the opinions of others."
Reading the memoirs of marshals, generals and other participants in the war, one wonders how all of them, in fact ordinary people, saw the growing danger of an attack. Nazi Germany on the USSR and how the “genius leader” and “great commander Generalissimo Stalin” did not see and understand this.
All attempts by Timoshenko and Zhukov, Kuznetsov and the commanders of the military districts to influence Stalin in order to speed up the commissioning of "measures provided for by operational and mobilization plans" proved futile.
“The implementation of the measures provided for by the operational and mobilization plans,” wrote G.K. Zhukov, “could be carried out only by a special decision of the government. This special decision followed only on the night of June 22, 1941.
In the coming months before the war, the orders of the leadership did not provide for all the necessary measures that needed to be carried out in a particularly threatened war period in the shortest possible time.
Not only were counties not allowed to put operational plans into action. Military border districts were ordered to conduct various exercises in the camps, which diverted troops from the front lines and set them up in a peaceful way.
“The requests of some commanders of the troops of the districts,” wrote Marshal R. Malinovsky, “to allow them to put the troops on combat readiness and push them closer to the border, JV Stalin single-handedly rejected. The troops continued to study in a peaceful way: the artillery of the rifle divisions was in artillery camps and at the training grounds, the sapper units in the engineering camps, and the "naked" rifle divisions were separate from their camps. With the impending threat of war, these gross mistakes bordered on crime. Could this have been avoided? It can and should." (“Military History Journal”, No. 6, 1961, p. 7).
But Stalin's line was especially harmful in the very pre-war days. Marshal R. Malinovsky wrote in the already cited article:
“To the clarifying question whether it is possible to open fire if the enemy invades our territory, the answer was: do not succumb to provocations and do not open fire.”
Even after the war began, the counties were not allowed to fully enact the cover plan. In negotiations with the Deputy Commander of the Western District, General Boldin, Marshal Timoshenko warned:
"Tov. Boldin, please note that no action against the Germans is to be taken without our knowledge. I inform you and ask you to warn Pavlov that comrade. Stalin does not allow artillery fire on the Germans.
How so? After all, our troops are forced to retreat? Cities are burning. People are dying, Boldin said.
Do not take any other measures, except for reconnaissance deep into enemy territory for 60 km. (Boldin "Pages of Life", 1961, p. 81).
The war began, and Stalin still continued to believe that this was a provocation on the part of revanchist circles, and not an order from Hitler.
Such a policy, which now seems at least strange, then aroused surprise even among Stalin's unconditional favorites.
“It is completely incomprehensible,” wrote aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev in his memoirs, “why our troops,“ until further notice ”were forbidden to cross the border? Why was aviation allowed to strike only to a depth of 100–150 km on German territory? The war was already on, and the command did not know that this was an accidental invasion? German error? Provocation?"
When the war began, and it became clear to everyone, including Stalin himself, that our leadership made an irreparable mistake, when, as a result of this, the enemy troops quickly advanced deep into our country, destroying the vast majority of equipment and capturing hundreds of thousands of prisoners Soviet soldiers, Stalin, in order to justify his mistakes and crimes, put forward the “theory” of a “surprise attack”, which was supposed to explain to the mass of the Soviet people the reasons for the rapid advance of the fascist army across our territory and the unstoppable retreat of our armed forces deep into Soviet territory. The press was instructed to explain to the people that the enemy turned out to be treacherous and violated the non-aggression pact signed with the USSR.
As evidenced by the irrefutable facts cited above, this attack was sudden only for Stalin. The claim of surprise attack was at odds with all the propaganda carried out by Stalin and Voroshilov in the late 1930s. For example:
“In a report at the fourth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Comrade Voroshilov pointed out that “the Red Army and Navy proud to know that together with the armed forces Soviet Union always and invariably all our wonderful people and government, the party of Lenin-Stalin and our wise leader Stalin are calmly and strenuously working to be in full combat readiness every moment. The Soviet Union will not be taken by surprise by international events, no matter how sudden and formidable they may be.
Here is another testimony of a person who was in close contact with Stalin's kitchen, Chief Marshal of Artillery N. N. Voronov:
“Meanwhile, there was a lot of alarming data, and our people who visited Germany confirmed that German troops were moving towards the Soviet borders. Moreover, even Winston Churchill found it necessary back in April to warn Stalin about the danger threatening the Soviet Union from fascist Germany.
So, two months before the start of the war, Stalin knew about the preparations for an attack on our country. But he ignored all the warning signs.”
Despite overwhelming evidence, our historical research continues to assert that Nazi Germany's attack was sudden and unexpected. What is the reason, after all, that Stalin, despite the continuous reports that came to him from the intelligence service - which did not just refer to some rumors, but operated on completely reliable and convincing materials and documents coming from intelligence officers directly located in Germany; from intelligence officers working in other countries, including from such an outstanding intelligence officer who was in Japan as R. Sorge; from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill; from US Secretary of State Wallace, who transmitted these data, through the USSR Ambassador to the United States Umansky, and from many other sources, he acted as if he had materials that were much more weighty and convincing than the materials that came to his desk officially, although more in a secret way that allowed him to make decisions against the insistence of the military to set operational and cover plans in motion. Why did Stalin, after Molotov went to Berlin for negotiations with Hitler, not understand everything that the diplomat Berezhkov, General Vasilevsky, the USSR ambassador to Germany, Dekanozov and others, who were there with Molotov, understood during the negotiations? how did Molotov "pin Hitler to the wall" when he demanded from the latter an answer to the question about the reasons for the redeployment of German troops to Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, which Hitler could not answer? All of them bore the absolutely firm impression from their stay in Germany that the fascist leadership was preparing to attack the Soviet Union.
Why didn't Stalin endure this impression, to whom they reported everything in detail and in detail? It is absolutely indisputable that, in addition to all these data, Stalin had at his disposal some other materials that were known only to him and which allowed him to believe, despite all the evidence, that everything would still be settled peacefully.
What are these materials?
This secret is partly revealed by G.K. Zhukov, who wrote:
“Naturally, the question arises: why did the leadership, headed by I.V. Stalin, not implement the measures he himself approved of the operational plan?
I. V. Stalin is most often blamed for these mistakes and miscalculations. Of course, Stalin certainly made mistakes, but their causes cannot be considered in isolation from objective historical processes and phenomena, from the whole complex of economic and political factors ... Now we have in our field of vision, especially in wide public publications, mainly the facts of warnings about the impending attack on the USSR and the concentration of our troops on our borders, etc.
But at that time, as the documents discovered after the defeat of fascist Germany show, many reports of a completely different order fell on the table to I.V. Stalin. (Ibid. pp. 232–233).
Obviously, Zhukov knows what materials in question what documents that fell on the table to Stalin, he trusted, not trusting the data of his own intelligence. He knows, but he can't name them. We can only guess about it. Disinformation supplied to Stalin by various Nazi intelligence services? Very possible. Hitler's personal letters to Stalin? Very likely. The veil over this mysterious question was slightly opened at the discussion in the IMI of Nekrich's book “1941 - June 22”, where D. Melnikov from the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and E. Gnedin, former head. The press department of the USSR Foreign Ministry spoke not only about the non-aggression pact and the friendship pact with Nazi Germany, but also about Stalin's readiness to join the tripartite pact, that is, in fact, about an agreement with Hitler on the division of the world.
Zhukov, in fact, hinted that Stalin's behavior in the pre-war period should not be regarded as a mistake, that it should be regarded as an integral part of a certain policy. That is why Zhukov wrote that only by considering the issue as a whole, one can understand and correctly assess Stalin's behavior on the eve of the war.
This is, of course, true. Naive, if not false, is the attempt by some Soviet historians to claim that Stalin was cunning, trying to deceive Hitler. From my point of view, this was by no means a trick, but an attempt to seriously establish a coalition with Hitler, which was supposed to decide the future of mankind. This is indirectly confirmed by the words of Stalin, which he said after the victory and reported by Svetlana Alliluyeva: "Oh, with the Germans we would be invincible."
Hitler impressed Stalin. And not so much the personality of Hitler as the totalitarian system he created. It was more difficult to agree on the division of spheres of influence with the United States and England: there are different parliaments, the press, various political parties, in general, “rotten democracy”. With Hitler, it seemed to Stalin, it was easier: the two dictators would understand each other and agree - for a long time, anyway. That is why, until the last minute, he trusted his "personal contacts" and the information that came to him from the Nazis, more than the data of Soviet intelligence and messages that came to him from other countries, especially from England.
Does this justify Stalin? On the contrary, it aggravates his guilt. In seeking power over mankind, he was ready to negotiate with the most vicious enemy of mankind, and in the name of friendship with him turned a blind eye to the most obvious facts. This was the betrayal of his own people.
In the pre-war period, there were facts that could not be interpreted otherwise than unambiguously. These included, first of all, the entry of German troops into all states bordering the USSR and the concentration of large masses of German troops along the entire border of the USSR. It was impossible to interpret such a redeployment of troops otherwise than as indisputable evidence of the aggressive intentions of Germany. But Stalin, fascinated by the power of Nazi Germany and unable to abandon his idea of an alliance with this power, showed, as Zhukov writes, "caution in carrying out the main measures of the operational and mobilization plan." It turned out that this “brilliant strategist” and “great political leader” does not know how to separate information from disinformation in the documents that come to his desk, that he, being super-cautious and super-distrustful with his own people, completely trusts the enemy. He was "cautious" in the interests of the enemy, instead of being cautious in the interests of his country.
As far as we can judge now, Stalin kept his far-reaching plans for a long and lasting alliance with Nazi Germany and its war machine a secret even from his closest military and political circle. This is understandable: he could not yet state directly that fascism should become the closest military-political ally of the USSR. Otherwise, he could not explain his “tactics” in a critical situation on the eve of the war either. This explains why, in this critical situation, Stalin, as Marshal N. N. Voronov notes, without even making an attempt to consult with military leaders, categorically forbade putting the operational plan into action and withdrawing troops to defensive lines. Fascinated by the power of fascist Germany and ready to make any concessions to Hitler, Stalin took the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in order to negotiate with Hitler face to face, and not through intermediaries.
The readiness of Stalin to make any concessions to Hitler in order to maintain an alliance with him is repeatedly mentioned in the world press and in memoirs. Here is one of the interesting testimonials. In the summer of 1941, according to the then adviser to the German embassy in Moscow, Hilger:
“Everything indicated that he (Stalin) believed that Hitler was about to play a game of extortion in which threatening troop movements would be followed by unexpected demands for economic or even territorial concessions. He apparently believed that he would be able to negotiate with Hitler when these demands were made.
As the course of historical events has shown, this blind faith of Stalin in Hitler was not justified. Probably, this is for the best both for our people and for humanity as a whole: it is terrible to think what would await people if the union of these two monsters was fixed for a long time. But even so, the policy of appeasing and appeasing fascism, which lasted two years, cost the Soviet people dearly. The collapse of Stalin's "strategy", for which the "great commander" himself paid with only a ten-day depression, cost our country millions of casualties and colossal losses in equipment (in the first days of the war, the Germans captured and destroyed about 60% of Soviet aircraft, tanks and artillery pieces, located in the front line).
No wonder Stalin fell into a panic and, as they say, expected the resignation of the leadership. However, the members of the Politburo turned out to be incapable of such a step: they arrived in Kuntsevo and habitually humbly asked the "leader" to take the reins of government into their own hands. Stalin calmed down and entered his usual role of dictator.
The official figure of Soviet losses in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 is known. - 20 million people. But nowhere does Soviet propaganda (press, radio, television, cinema) analyze the causes of these gigantic losses, does not show what they were made of. Even 20 serial documentary“On the Great Patriotic War”, created by director R. Karmen, is entirely built on the same false concept of the “surprise” attack of Nazi Germany, which indirectly justifies the gigantic number of victims suffered by the Soviet people in this war. But if you look closely at the numbers that add up to these twenty million, it becomes clear that the main reason for such huge losses is not the surprise attack of the enemy, but the same criminal policy of Stalin.
In fact, R. Carmen's third film says: “2 million people were killed in the occupied territory in Belarus, and 4 million in Ukraine. This is out of 20 million people in the war of 1941-1945.”
But there were still victims in the occupied territories of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova and, above all, Russia. About a million people died in Leningrad alone. In total, at least 10-11 million people died in the occupied territories. If we add to this the 2 million soldiers and officers who died and were captured in the very first days of the war, then total figure losses in the occupied territories will amount to 13 million people, or 65% of all losses suffered by the Soviet Union in the war of 1941-1945. Such gigantic losses, of course, would not have occurred if it were not for Stalin's "strategy", which actually disarmed our troops in the face of Hitler's aggression. As Marshal N. N. Voronov rightly writes:
“If the German fascist invaders who treacherously attacked us at dawn on June 22, 1941, met an organized rebuff of our troops on prepared lines, if our aviation, relocated in advance, dispersed at field airfields, had struck at the enemy, if the entire command and control system had been brought into line with the situation, we would not have suffered such great losses in people and military equipment in the first months of the war. Then the course of the war would have turned out completely differently, vast territories of Soviet land would not have been given to the enemy, the people would not have had to endure so much suffering.
To remain silent about who is the true culprit of this suffering is a crime. No less a crime is an attempt to mitigate this guilt.
Among such attempts is the assertion of a number of Soviet historians that thanks to the "wise" policy of Stalin, who concluded the Soviet-German pact, the war was supposedly postponed for two years.
Such a statement would make sense if its authors could prove that Stalin used these two years to strengthen the country's defenses. But the facts prove otherwise.
General Grigorenko figuratively formulates the results of this two-year respite as follows:
"During this time, everything was done that weakened our defense, and did not have time to do what strengthened it."
Most revealing in this regard is the monstrous story of how the line of fortifications on the western border of the Soviet Union was destroyed.
Here is what General Grigorenko writes about this:
"Due to the fact that the western border was pushed back by 200-250 km, the old fortified areas were gradually destroyed - the entire huge expensive defensive line from sea to sea."
And almost word for word - the statement of Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky:
“In order to speed up the creation of defensive structures on the new frontiers, we decided to disarm and dismantle most of the fortifications that had been built with such difficulty and at a huge cost of funds over a number of years along our former state border.”
The military believed that the old line of defensive structures should be preserved. The Soviet General Staff proposed to keep the main forces of the Red Army on a well-fortified and well-studied old border, and to push only parts of the cover into new areas.
Stalin did not approve this plan, and at his request it was revised by the General Staff. Moreover, despite the objections of the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal Timoshenko and the Chief of the General Staff, General Zhukov, he ordered that weapons be removed from the old fortified areas and transferred to new fortified areas.
As a result, by the beginning of the war, the fortified areas along the old border were destroyed, and the new defensive line was not completed.
Neither the old nor the new defensive systems (on which gigantic funds were spent) were thus able to play their role and delay the enemy for any length of time. Where, then, is the military gain received by the country in two years as a result of the partition of Poland? Indeed, already on June 27, 1941, the 2nd Panzer Army of the Germans reached the outskirts of Minsk and began to encircle the Soviet troops stationed in this area, and by July 9 it was all over. It took only 5-10 days to deprive our army of the advantage it received by pushing the borders of the USSR by 200-250 kilometers.
There is nothing to talk about political gain. During the two years of governing the forcibly annexed territory - Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia - our administration not only did not attract the sympathy of the population of these territories to the Soviet regime, but also aroused the hatred of the inhabitants of these conquered countries by the cruelties and violence it perpetrated.
“By June 25,” wrote Marshal Vasilevsky, “the enemy units had deepened to 120-130 kilometers. By mid-July, the Red Army had left Latvia, Lithuania, part of Estonia, almost all of Belarus, Moldova and part of Ukraine (eastern).
So, in the two years that the outbreak of the war was delayed, the main thing was not done - the defense of our border was not prepared.
During the same two years, “they managed to remove the 45-mm anti-tank gun and anti-tank rifle from service” and “did not manage to replace them” (Grigorenko). As the experience of the war showed, the 45-mm gun was withdrawn from service without any reason: all enemy tanks that operated before the advent of the "tigers" and "panthers", and this gun, and the anti-tank gun perfectly pierced and were effective even in firing against the "tigers" ” and “panthers” (as you know, during the war, the production of both an anti-tank gun and an anti-tank rifle had to be resumed).
However, before the war, it was decided to withdraw them from service. Neither Zhdanov, who insisted on this, nor Stalin, who approved this decision on the basis of the report of Marshal Kulik, reckoned with the objections former minister armaments of Vannikov, who declared to Zhdanov: "You allow the disarmament of the army before the war." Perhaps it was precisely this statement of his that led to the arrest of Vannikov, who, after the outbreak of the war, had to be urgently returned from prison?
So what did Stalin "manage" and what "did not have time" to do in two years - from 1939 to 1941?
General Grigorenko speaks about this most colorfully, and the next page of my work is a simple retelling of the corresponding passage in his article.
They managed to disband the tank battalions of rifle divisions, but did not have time to form and train mechanized corps in a new strategy.
They managed to double the size of the armed forces, but did not manage to put the troops on alert.
They managed to concentrate mobilization reserves in threatening proximity to the state borders, but did not have time to ensure their safety, and in the very first days of the war they all fell into the hands of the enemy.
They managed to hide in prison a number of leading designers of weapons and military equipment(some were even shot, including the author of the later famous Katyusha), but did not manage to organize the mass production of new weapons, completed in 1939 (for example, new fighters, dive bombers and attack aircraft, excellent tanks were not put into production "T-34" and "KV"; as for the "Katyusha", they did not even have time to create a prototype).
They managed, as mentioned above, to destroy the fortified areas on the old border, but did not manage to create new ones.
They also did not have time to restructure industry on a war footing, because the mobilization plan was adopted only in June 1941.
The list of measures that the Soviet government managed and did not manage to carry out in preparation for the war could be continued. But even what has been said is enough to convincingly show how Stalin used the two years that he allegedly "won" by signing friendly pacts with Nazi Germany. Colossal human losses, the surrender of vast territories to the enemy, the seizure by the Nazis of our weapons, industrial enterprises, agricultural land, the enslavement of the population of the occupied territories - this is the result of Stalin's "preparation for the defense of the country." Is it possible to give a more damning assessment of Stalin's political and military activities than a simple description of his activities in the pre-war period gives?
Even in the "History of the CPSU" during the short period of the "thaw" it was written (albeit with characteristic restraint):
"More than a year and a half since the conclusion of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR was not used to the proper extent to strengthen the country's defense capability."
Now, it seems, they try not to remember even this restrained characteristic.
Arsen Martirosyan: The military conspiracy of 1937-1938 was not uprooted to the end
Hitler, indeed, did not transfer German industry and the industry of the European states occupied by the Third Reich to a military footing. They did it easier - they robbed the occupied countries. For example, 5 thousand steam locomotives, more than 5 million tons of crude oil, hundreds of thousands of tons of fuel and lubricants were taken out of France alone, great amount tanks, motor vehicles, various others having military purpose, materials. The supply of weapons, equipment and ammunition from occupied Czechoslovakia also played a colossal role. In fact, the West handed it over to Hitler, so that he could quickly and better prepare for an attack on the USSR. At that time, the Czechoslovak military-industrial complex was one of the largest arms manufacturers, providing more than 40% of the world market with its supplies.
According to the calculations of Hitler and his generals, the loot should have been enough for the blitzkrieg. After all, as Soviet intelligence managed to document, on the fifth day of the aggression, the Nazis planned to capture Minsk! It was planned to defeat the border grouping of the Red Army within a week, and in a couple of months - the "victory parade" of the Third Reich in Moscow. Alas, many of these plans came to fruition.
“But according to official history, they learned about Directive No. 21 almost on the day it was signed ...
Yes, they did, but not right away. The first information that Hitler had adopted a certain plan of aggression, indeed, came at the very end of December 1940. Further, intelligence has made tremendous efforts to detail this information. The main directions of strikes, numbers, combat composition, strategy and tactics of the Wehrmacht, and much more were established. And in the interval from June 11 to June 21, 1941, the Soviet intelligence services were able to 47 times either relatively accurately or absolutely reliably name the date and even the hour of the beginning of the aggression. Why only in this interval? Because the date of June 22 appeared on paper only on June 10 in the form of a directive from the boss General Staff Franz Halder.
-According to the version of "liberal" historians, Stalin did not believe this information ... He even wrote an obscene "resolution" on the intelligence report.
—Stalin believed intelligence information, but only verified and repeatedly rechecked. And the obscene resolution is nothing more than a clumsily made fake. In fact, this has long been documented.
Questions of war and peace do not imply sudden movements and hasty decisions. Too much is at stake. Relying precisely on verified intelligence information, Stalin gave the order to bring the troops of the First Strategic Echelon to combat readiness as early as June 18, 1941. And before that, for more than a month, the military had been repeatedly warned about the imminent start of German aggression. Moscow sent relevant directives, the movement of troops from the internal districts was authorized, and much more. In general, they did everything to arrange a "decent meeting" for the aggressor.
But the local command did not carry out all the orders, or did it extremely negligently, which means a crime for the military. But there were also facts of direct betrayal, for example, in the form of a direct cancellation of combat readiness, in particular, in the Air Force - immediately the day before the attack. Although they already knew for sure that it would be.
Even worse. When the war had already been going on for several hours, the Germans bombed our cities, killed Soviet people, fired at the positions of the Red Army, the commander of the Kyiv Special Military District, General Mikhail Kirponos, forbade bringing troops into combat readiness until the middle of the day on June 22. And then he did his best to make a disaster Southwestern Front in the form of the tragedy of the "Kyiv cauldron".
- General Kirponos then died heroically ...
“More like he was just 'heroically slapped'. There is a record of identification of his body, drawn up in November 1943, it was published back in Soviet times. According to the official “heroic” version, the corpse of a general who fell in an unequal battle with the Nazis, from whom they removed insignia, orders, medals and took away all the documents, was thrown somewhere in the forest, showered with branches and leaves. And after a couple of years, the “responsible comrades” for some reason instantly identified the remains that had completely decomposed in two years ...
But it seems that the “military conspiracy” was liquidated back in 1937? ..
In 1937-1938, only the visible top was liquidated, and they did not get to the bottom of the second and third echelon of the conspirators. For reasons of state security, Stalin was forced to put a harsh end to the orgy of repression unleashed by Yezhov, including against the military.
The idea of a coup d'etat in the USSR against the backdrop of a military defeat has been developed in the highest army circles of the Soviet Union since 1926. In 1935, a GRU report landed on Stalin's desk, in which this scenario was clearly outlined. Then the NKVD presented the relevant evidence. That is why 1937 followed.
In June 1941, the scenario that had been conceived five years earlier was realized. “The plan for the defeat of the USSR in the war with Germany”, compiled by Tukhachevsky and his accomplices - his arrested marshal in 1937 outlined already on the Lubyanka on 143 pages in an even handwriting. However, earlier, in September 1936, Jerome Uborevich took this plan to Germany. Having received it, the Germans late autumn of the same year, they held a command-staff game on maps, where Minsk was captured on the fifth day of the still “virtual” aggression.
Did our people know about this game?
- Yes. On February 10, 1937, its results were reported to Stalin. And in 1939, one of the participants in that game fell into the hands of Soviet intelligence - a Russian émigré, staff captain tsarist army Count Alexander Nelidov. An outstanding Soviet intelligence officer Zoya Voskresenskaya worked with him. And he also confirmed that during the game the Nazis captured Minsk on the fifth day. And in May 1941, the agent of Soviet intelligence, a member of the Red Chapel, Jon Sieg, who was one of the leaders of the Berlin railway junction, provided Soviet intelligence with a sealed written order from the Wehrmacht high command - on the fifth day from the start of hostilities against the USSR, to head the Minsk railway node.
Was Stalin informed about this?
Why did military leaders surrender their country to the enemy? After all, the Soviet generals then already enjoyed all the benefits of life.
They wanted more - to receive for personal use the “specific principality” cut off from the dismembered Russia-USSR. Fools, they did not understand that no one would give them anything. Nobody likes traitors, their fate is always sealed.
- Can you briefly talk about the “Tukhachevsky plan” and how it was implemented in June 1941?
- Tukhachevsky proposed deploying the main groupings of covering armies, taking into account the location of the border fortified areas, so that they occupy a flank position in relation to those directions where enemy strikes are most likely. According to his concept, the border battle should take on a protracted character and last for several weeks. However, the slightest sudden blow, especially inflicted by forces concentrated on a narrow section of the breakthrough front, automatically led to a bloody tragedy. This is exactly what happened on June 22, 1941.
Even worse. Like Tukhachevsky, the high command of the Red Army, represented by the "Kyiv mafia" that had formed there, stubbornly pushed through the idea that for the German General Staff the most likely direction of the main attack was the Ukrainian one. That is, the historically established main route of all aggressors from the West, the Belarusian one, was completely denied. Timoshenko and Zhukov completely ignored Belarus as the direction of the main attack. Just like Tukhachevsky, who, in his affidavit at the Lubyanka, indicated that the Belarusian direction is generally fantastic.
Simply put, knowing exactly where and with what forces the Germans will attack, and even hoping that the Germans will not change their minds to inflict their main blow in Belorussia and the Baltic states, Timoshenko and Zhukov diligently misled Stalin on this issue. Both stubbornly proved to Stalin that the main forces of the Germans would oppose Ukraine, and therefore the Red Army should keep its main forces there. Even after the war, they stubbornly talked about it.
On June 22, the tragedy happened exactly according to the treacherous scenario. Divisions, corps and armies were forced to occupy lines of defense that were tens, hundreds and thousands of times greater than their capabilities. The division had from 30 to 50-60 km of the defense line, although according to the Charter it was supposed to be no more than 8-10 km. It reached microscopic 0.1 soldiers (and more) per 1 meter of the front line, although it was known in advance that the Nazis would trample down with a density of up to 4.42 infantrymen per meter of the breakthrough line. Simply put, one of our divisions was supposed to withstand at least five, or even more, enemy divisions. As a result, the Nazis in the literal sense of the word "out of thin air" were granted unprecedented strategic superiority. And this is not to mention the fact that frank holes were generally organized in our defense system. The largest - 105 km - in the Western District.
Anti-tank defense was planned in the same way. Only 3-5 barrels per 1 km, although it was well known that even according to the charter of the Panzerwaffe, they would go into a breakthrough with a density of 20-25 vehicles per kilometer. But in fact, at the time the aggression began, there were 30-50 tanks per 1 km, depending on the sector of the breakthrough front, and the General Staff of the Red Army had this data.
What Tymoshenko did (by the way, a nominee of Tukhachevsky) and Zhukov (he enjoyed the special favor of Uborevich), the former later called "an illiterate scenario for entering the war." In fact, it was an illegal, uncoordinated, criminal plan supposedly to repel aggression.
What kind of defense plan did our country have before the development of Tukhachevsky was launched? And did he exist?
- Of course it existed, it was just "replaced". Officially approved by the Soviet government on October 14, 1940, the plan to repel Germany's aggression prescribed to contain and repel the first blow of the aggressor with active defense and active actions to fetter the enemy's actions. Moreover, the central attention was paid to the Pskov-Minsk direction. Those. the main forces of the Germans were expected to the north of Polesye, in Belorussia and the Baltic states, and our main forces were to be there as well.
Under the cover of active defense, the main forces were to be mobilized and concentrated. And then, and only in the presence of favorable conditions (!), a transition to a decisive counteroffensive against the enemy could be carried out. Moreover, depending on the deployment option - there were two of them, southern and northern - the transition to this very counteroffensive was possible no earlier than on the 15th or 30th day from the start of mobilization. But not an immediate counter-frontal counteroffensive by our main forces in Ukraine against the non-main forces of the enemy - against the allies of Germany, which was staged by Zhukov and Timoshenko, ruining almost the entire border grouping of the Red Army. Especially tank troops, primarily on the Southwestern Front.
As a result of their actions, especially taking into account the advancement of mobile depots to the border, in the very first days of the war, the Red Army lost 6 million rifles out of 8 million available at the beginning, millions of shells of all calibers, tens of thousands of tons of food, fuel, ...
Therefore, there was a shortage of weapons, ammunition and everything else?
— Exactly, but they still prefer to keep quiet about it. Remember, in Konstantin Simonov’s The Living and the Dead, the old worker Popkov, regretting that the Red Army does not have everything, says: “Yes, in the most extreme case, I would give this apartment, I lived in one room, I would live on an eighth of bread , on the gruel, as in Civil, he lived, if only the Red Army had everything ... ". The worker, as well as Simonov himself, did not know what actually happened, why such an incredible shortage of everything and everything had formed. And today, few people know this. Hide.
Even worse. Right on the eve of the war, when the advance of troops to the border had already begun, they started exercises for artillery. Anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery was taken far to the rear, and heavy, on the contrary, to training grounds close to the border. The defending group was left without air cover and completely defenseless against tanks, and heavy artillery, in fact, had to be recreated - it was instantly captured by the Germans. Little of. Right on the eve of the war, the artillery was blinded in the truest sense of the word, that is, they removed all the optical devices in separate howitzer regiments in the Baltic States and Belarus, without which it cannot work, and sent them "for repairs." And at the same time they immobilized under the pretext of replacing horse-drawn transport with a mechanical one - they took the horses away, but did not give tractors.
In units of the Air Force, especially in the Western District, on the eve of the war, combat readiness was canceled and the pilots were allowed to rest. Even holidays are allowed! Forward-based aviation stood as if on parade, or rather, as an excellent target. In many parts of the Air Force on the evening of June 21, they ordered to remove weapons and drain fuel. Have you ever wondered why our pilots started counting heroic deeds with rams? Yes, because there were no weapons on their planes, guns and machine guns were dismantled before the start of the war. Supposedly for verification. And ordinary Russian men went to ram to stop the enemy...
Didn't people see it?
“We saw, talked, wrote, protesting the decisions of the higher command as extremely dangerous. And after the tragedy happened, they openly accused the command of betrayal. This thought took possession of the whole army. With colossal difficulty, this epidemic of distrust was quelled, because it was necessary to fight. For this, Stalin had to promptly put some people against the wall. For example, there is still the “lament of Yaroslavna” of democrats and anti-Stalinists about the fact that innocent Air Force generals were shot en masse. And what, they were not supposed to answer for their betrayal, expressed in the abolition of combat readiness right on the eve of the war, when officially, with the sanction of Stalin, combat readiness was already declared by the high command? After all, the ground troops were left without air cover, and how many of them died only because of this - no one counted ...
The General Staff was headed by Georgy Zhukov. What, and he too? ... After all, the future "Marshal of Victory" in the same December 1940, in the course of operational-strategic games on cards, playing for the Germans, defeated the defending commander of the Western Special Military District Dmitry Pavlov.
- There was no such thing, this is another lie that was thrown into the masses, including through cinema, in the famous film by Yuri Ozerov. But in reality, defending Pavlov, acting within the framework of the "official" defensive strategy developed by Boris Shaposhnikov, won against Zhukov. That is, repulsed the attack of the "Germans".
The documents describing the course of that game were declassified more than 20 years ago and now they are available, and everyone can see what really happened then.
We survived, we won. What happens, the traitors "re-educated" and became the defenders of the Motherland?
- Survived and won, first of all, His Majesty the Soviet RUSSIAN SOLDIER, together with his adequately thinking and acting officers, who fought under the command of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin - an outstanding statesman, geopolitician, strategist and diplomat, a brilliant organizer and business executive.
And he did not forget what the generals had done, this is evidenced by the special investigation he launched into the causes of the disaster on June 22 (general Pokrovsky's commission).
Here are the famous five questions that Colonel General Alexander Pokrovsky asked his "wards":
Was the plan for the defense of the state border brought to the attention of the troops in the part that concerns them; when and what was done by the command and staffs to ensure the implementation of this plan?
From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to reach the state border, and how many of them were deployed before the start of hostilities?
When was the order received to put the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by fascist Germany on the morning of June 22?
Why most of artillery was in training centers?
To what extent were the headquarters prepared for command and control, and to what extent did this affect the conduct of operations in the first days of the war?
Isn't it interesting questions? Especially in light of what we've been talking about. Unfortunately, the investigation was not completed at that time. Someone did everything to make the case "released on the brakes."
Three quarters of a century have passed since those events. Is it worth it to stir up the past, to expose the traitors who died long ago?
Martirosyan: Worth it. And it's not even about specific names. It's about historical justice, honesty. Stalin made Zhukov a symbol of victory. Because he deeply respected the Russian people and understood what he had to endure during this war. Although he himself knew very well that the true Suvorov of the Red Army, truly the Great Marshal of the Great Victory, the most brilliant commander, was the most intelligent and noble Konstantin Rokossovsky. But the state-forming people in the USSR - the Great Russian People - needed their own symbol. So Zhukov became him, because Rokossovsky was "let down" by the fifth count - he was a Pole.
But how did the "Marshal of Victory" thank Stalin? In a letter addressed to Khrushchev dated May 19, 1956, in which he so slandered and slandered his Supreme Commander-in-Chief that even the notorious Trotskyite maize could not stand it and soon expelled Zhukov from the post of Minister of Defense.
Stalin was not betrayed only by two marshals - Rokossovsky and the creator of Soviet long-range aviation, Marshal Alexander Golovanov. The rest blamed all the blame for June 22 on the leader. It's like they have nothing to do with it. It is somehow not customary to remember that Zhukov even offered to surrender Moscow to adversaries ...
The current generation should know EVERYTHING about that war. After all, he is being told that our fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers were useless defenders of the Motherland, that they surrendered by the millions and voluntarily, and the "evil communists" did not give them weapons. Many already sincerely believe that it was Stalin who was guilty of the tragedy of June 22 - he did not heed the warnings of the wise Zhukov. A great many myths have spread, including those planted by foreign intelligence services.
On the altar of the Great Victory, the Soviet people placed 27 million lives full of strength and bright thoughts of our compatriots. And this should not be forgotten. Therefore, we must know everything, no matter how bitter this truth may be. Otherwise, we won't learn anything. We must clearly understand with whom our glorious ancestors had to fight.
But most difficult question in the study of the causes of the defeats of the Red Army in the summer of 1941, the question remains - was there or was there an organized betrayal in the Red Army?
And if it was - wasn't it, this betrayal, and was the cause of those defeats? And to what extent the same G.K. Zhukov and S.K. Timoshenko?
Some minds in Russia are dominated by the conviction that there was no conspiracy of the military in “1937”, that in general in the USSR in those years there was neither a military, nor an economic, nor a general political conspiracy. Stalin invented all this in order to “illegally” destroy the “brilliant” generals, the “brilliant” lyric physicists and other creative intelligentsia.
Also, at the same time, Stalin killed a bunch of working people in the person of, first of all, the “most hardworking” peasants ( probably wanted everyone to die quickly in Russia ).
In the USSR, there was no "opposition" at all to Stalin's course aimed at the development of the country. There were disputes between the Bukharins on petty and insignificant issues in the economy ( and Bukharin himself generally wrote"Constitution of 1936"!), and it was timid the disagreement of the Tukhachevskys against the "dominance" of Budyonovshchina and Voroshilovshchina in the Red Army. And in the West, no one wanted to attack the USSR-Russia.
They called on Stalin to be “more democratic”, but they did not even think of attacking the USSR. But the Tyrant himself only thought of killing more people and attacking someone. That in fact, everyone without exception dreamed of the prosperity of Russia and everyone supported Stalin. But Stalin, due to his tyranny (and possibly insanity), was always looking for "dissenters". It's that simple.
Why are all these military, political, economic sabotage being denied? Yes, because recognizing the fact that there was an anti-Stalinist opposition in the USSR-Russia during all the years of his reign (on one scale or another), one will have to explain not only on the basis of what laws this “opposition” was persecuted and for what they were “planted”, but also what she really did and in whose interests, what the “opposition” wanted to achieve and achieved in its struggle against the “hated regime”.
The denial of the existence of an anti-Stalinist opposition in general, as well as any conspiracy of the military before the war, and even more so at the beginning of the war, plays into the hands of all "historians". And officialdom, and haters of Stalin, and some "objective" historians of the new generation. There is an immutable dogma - Stalin is a villain (or simply not a very good person), he shot all the "oppositionists" back in the "37th", therefore there were no opponents of Soviet power in the country, which means that he alone is to blame for everything (in different variants) - and this is the primitivization of the historical model to the 1st order of consideration of activity only in the pair "crowd - leader".
For historians, of course, it is easier to describe such a primitive model than to try to understand all the sub-processes in the global historical process. But just all the facts of those years, all the logic political life in the USSR says that this very “opposition” to the Stalinist course did not disappear anywhere even with the arrival of Beria in the NKVD in 1938.
This opposition, which had been active throughout the years of Stalin's rule, subsided somewhat during the war. But not because the conscience woke up, but because in the conditions of "wartime" they could be put up against the wall much faster. And most importantly, none of this brethren was capable of fighting Hitler on equal terms, especially after they realized that the Germans in the occupied territories of 1941 were somewhat different from the Germans of 1914 and were not going to deal with the "opposition ”, as with the future “ruling elite” after the destruction of the USSR-Russia. But after the war, and even more so in last years Stalin's life, the "opposition" revived again.
And after his death, all his reforms began to curtail just openly ( about this series of articles"The coup d'état of 1953" http://inance.ru/2015/02/iuda/).
What did Stalin and his team proclaim back in 1925, at the XIV Congress of the CPSU(b)?
“We must make every effort to make our country an independent, independent country based on the domestic market”, “turn our country from an agrarian into an industrial one, capable of producing the necessary equipment on its own for their own economy and industry, not to depend on supplies and “help” from the West.
And what did the “opposition” propose?
According to the opposition's plans, "our country must remain agrarian for a long time, it must export agricultural products and bring in equipment" purchased in the West for these products. What was the result of such economic activity of the "opposition"?
This would lead to the fact that "our country could never, or almost never, industrialize, our country from an economically independent unit based on the domestic market, would have to objectively turn into an appendage of the general capitalist system", the world system of the West, into raw material appendage (http://liewar.ru/kto-vyigral-vojnu/).
Does it remind you of anything these days?
To the question of whether there was or was not a conspiracy of the generals in the summer of 1941, in order to organize a “defeat in the war with Germany”, you can try to look for answers in the only available “Case” of Army General Pavlov, which is more or less published today in various research books about this period.
In the book by Yu.I. Mukhin “If it weren’t for the generals”, pieces of such testimony are given from the commander of the ZapOVO Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army D.G. Pavlova. Pavlov was arrested in the first days of July 1941, and in his very first testimony he began to declare that he was in a military conspiracy to defeat the USSR.
At this point, the “whistleblowers of Stalinism” immediately declare the standard - he “was tortured precisely in order to knock out a confession in a conspiracy traditional for Stalin against Soviet power". I just don’t want to waste time refuting this - well, well, they “tortured” and the military general “confessed”! And why were they convicted and shot under the article on “criminal negligence”? After all, Stalin was a half-mad maniac, who did not take into account any "legality", they sewed cases and more abruptly, composing anything for those under investigation.
Pavlov
And here's what's interesting. On the basis of Pavlov's testimony, about a week later, the Hero of the Soviet Union, the hero of the Finnish Company, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (who oversees the construction of fortified areas, it seems), General of the Army K.A., is arrested. Meretskov. He is arrested only on Pavlov’s statement that Meretskov, in the company, “under the closet”, blurted out, they say:
... in the event of their attack on the Soviet Union and victory German army we won't get any worse
Pavlov also stated that
... General Staff order plan for war time for tanks, cars and tractors was overestimated 10 times.
General Meretskov was chief of the General Staff for only 5 months, from August 1940 to January 1941. Since February 1941, the Chief of the General Staff was G.K. Zhukov. And it would be more logical to arrest and interrogate Zhukov, and not Meretskov, and especially not for drunken conversations. But the “Case” against General Meretskov, who was released two weeks after his arrest and who in the end was not charged with anything, is not available.
And here I already want to ask the modern "keepers of secrets" - What's the problem? The man was released from the "Stalin-Beria dungeons" as innocent! And his “Case” is still not subject to publication and study? I wonder what questions the "executioners-investigators" asked General Meretskov, and what answers the general gave, if they have not yet been declassified? It seems that the "answer" in this strange "Case" must be sought in what position Meretskov held before, when he was chief of the General Staff.
The decision to start hostilities against another state, to start a war, the head of the country takes only if there is some intelligence and analytical data. At the same time, the head of state must be sure that his decision is absolutely correct and will not lead to defeat in the event of an attack on another country, especially such as the USSR then, which occupied Second place in the World in economic (and hence military!) Power.
Hitler signs the "Plan Barbarossa" just in December 1940. And it means that at the time of signing this "plan", which provides for specific directions of the main attacks, Hitler knew about the USSR something like that which allowed him to take this step.
Also known from textbooks school history that Hitler and all his entourage ( as well as England and the USA), gave the USSR a period of a couple of weeks, a maximum of a couple of months, for “resistance”, that a “revolution” would occur in the USSR immediately after its attack, that uprisings would occur on the national outskirts and the “prison of peoples” would fall apart by itself.
Today, it is still fashionable to consider Hitler an "adventurer", "paranoid" and a sufferer of many different nervous (and not only) diseases. But it is customary to consider him as such from great cunning, that our and, most importantly, Western historians who do not want to focus readers' attention on foreign sponsors of the "Fuhrer". Hitler signs a plan of attack on the USSR, also having some information in his hands, which, according to his calculations, will allow him to win the war with the USSR. And this is not only “astrological forecasts”.
Hitler already knows something in December. Approves the "Plan" Barbarossa "and begins to rush to implement it, although in reality Hitler was not completely ready to fight by June 41. But he was also assiduously pushed by the British! Could Hitler get some information through England, or still "directly" from Moscow?
After all, the British, well, very diligently pushed Hitler against the USSR. And Stalin knew it. In 1914, were there stories with the transfer of mobilization plans to Russia by Germany by tsarist generals? Like they were. When the district-front of Pavlov collapsed and Pavlov himself began to chat during the investigation about the “betrayal” of Meretskov (and not the same Zhukov), then Stalin, who studied the history of the First World War well, and the reasons for its defeat in which the tsarist generals were involved, could admit, that, under Meretskov, there could have been some kind of leak from the General Staff that “prompted” Hitler to make a “decision”? Could. It remains for our historians-diggers to look for the reason why why Hitler signed"Barbarossa" and why was he so sure that the USSR would not last even a couple of months.
And the “Case” against General K. A. Meretskov, closed in July 1941, can help with this.
We like to admire the fact that the essence of the Barbarossa plan lay on Stalin's desk almost a couple of days after it was approved by Hitler - however, the despot tyrant "could not use" the information received. Or maybe "on the table" Hitler had some "plans" in the USSR?
Today, after all, it is already known that in the apparatus of A.I. Mikoyan was an agent before the war, working for Germany. After the war, did Voznesensky's department lose especially secret documents related to state planning? So there is nothing “unusual” in the fact that officers who were not very “loyal to the Motherland” could serve in the Soviet General Staff, no. How did Soviet commanders differ from the same tsarist ones in their essence? Also people who do not believe in the possibility of victory over Germany, because. know about the impending betrayal, about its scale.
Meretskov, according to Pavlov’s testimony, talks about this in principle, saying that if the Germans attack, then the USSR will definitely lose, and “... if they attack the Soviet Union and the German army wins, it will not be worse for us.” Maybe the Meretskovs, in the event of Hitler's inevitable attack on the USSR "and the victory of the German army", have already somehow fussed so that their new owners would not forget them? This assumption already put forward in their books and Yu.I. Mukhin, and A.B. Martirosyan and many other researchers.
Another thing is that it is almost impossible to find documentary evidence of such facts. If something like this happened, then the confirmation of such a betrayal would be carefully hidden. How is the fact of bringing the units to "high" and "full combat readiness" still hidden today? western districts June 18, 1941 - 4 days before the German attack on the USSR.
Lost Order of June 18, 1941
Even during the life of Stalin and on his orders in the late 40s - early 50s. under the leadership of the head of the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff, Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky, careful work was carried out to generalize the experience of concentrating and deploying troops in the western border districts according to the plan for covering the state border in 1941 on the eve of World War II.
Under this cover, a thorough investigation into the causes of the incredible tragedy of June 22, which Stalin had initiated in deep secrecy at the beginning of the war, continued. To this end, the participants in those events, who in the initial period of the war held various command positions in the troops of the western border districts, were asked five questions:
- Was the state border defense plan brought to the attention of the troops in the part that concerns them; when and what was done by the command and staffs to ensure the implementation of this plan?
- From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to reach the state border, and how many of them were deployed before the start of hostilities?
- When an order was received to put the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22; what and when instructions were given to carry out this order, and what was done by the troops?
- Why was most of the artillery in training centers?
- To what extent were the headquarters prepared for command and control, and to what extent did this affect the conduct of operations in the first days of the war?
You just think about the essence of the questions posed! After all, they unequivocally testify that Stalin seriously and not without reason suspected the betrayal of part of the generals, including in the matter of putting the troops on alert, which led to an unprecedented tragedy, the price of which was the death of 27 million citizens of the Soviet Union!
After all, Stalin knew about the true scale of the total demographic losses of the Soviet Union in the war. After the war, he himself bitterly regretted that the war knocked out about 30 million Soviet citizens. The only pity is that he himself did not publicly announce this figure, so that there would be no speculation in the future. True, for political reasons immediately after the war, this, obviously, was not worth doing. We are not even talking about material damage, because even its astronomical figures are nothing compared to human lives!
In those years, the survey was a secret event. Time has passed, it would seem that the time of glasnost has come. Honest historians in uniform decided to turn to the materials of this survey. And so the famous and most authoritative "Military History Journal", starting with No. 3 in 1989, began to print answers Soviet generals to the above questions, devoting in turn one article in the issue to the answer to one question.
It was possible to publish the answers of the generals only to the first two questions, because as soon as the turn came to the answers to the question “When was the order received to put the troops on alert?”, Without any explanation, the publication was stopped. And the editor-in-chief of the VIZH was so given a hat and a hand that God forbid...
However, what they managed to publish turned out to be quite enough to drive a good, very good aspen stake into the utterly false tales of Khrushchev, Zhukov and others like them liars that on the eve of the war, Stalin did not allow the troops to be put on alert. Because all those whose answers were given in the first publications operated with dates in the range from 13-14 to 24.00 on June 21.
Cipher telegram with order N962/sh of the Commander of the Air Force ZapOVO: DECRYPTED TELEGRAM N217 from Lida Filed 4:08 21.6.41 Accepted 8:00 21.6.41 Received at OShSS 8:05 21.6.41 Deciphered 8:15 21.6.41 Address: Commanders of AD, chiefs of aviation-based areas, to-frames of individual APs.
The commander of the Air Force ordered all units to be put on alert, bring the required amount of ammunition to take the necessary measures to mask the airfields, materiel and transport. Report on execution on 21.6.41. I repeat 21.6.41. by 18:00. N962/sh Taranenko Paragraph to the Chiefs of the ShShS Immediately acquaint the chiefs of the air-based areas with this encryption. (TsAMO RF, fund 14 Guards BAP, op. 178446, d. 2, l. 310.) http://svoim.info/201410/10-6-1.jpg
Here are a couple of answers from military leaders.
Colonel General tank troops P.P. Poluboyarov (former head of the PribOVO armored forces):
On June 16 (!) at 23:00, the command of the 12th mechanized corps received a directive to put the formation on alert. The corps commander, Major General N. M. Shestopalov, was informed of this at 11 p.m. on June 17 upon his arrival from the 202nd motorized division, where he conducted a check of mobilization readiness.
On June 18, the corps commander raised formations and units on combat alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. During June 19 and 20 this was done.
On June 16, by order of the district headquarters, the 3rd mechanized corps (commander Major General of the Tank Forces A.V. Kurkin) was also put on alert, which concentrated in the indicated area at the same time.
Major General P.I. Abramidze (former commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 26th Army):
On June 20, 1941, I received the following code from the General Staff: “All units and units of your formation located on the very border should be taken back a few kilometers, that is, to the lines of prepared positions. Do not respond to any provocations from the German units until they violate the state border. All parts of the division must be put on alert. Execution to be reported by 24 hours on June 21, 1941. Exactly at the appointed time, I reported by telegraph on the fulfillment of the order. The report was attended by the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General F. Ya. Kostenko, who was entrusted with checking the execution.
What is curious. Any mention, even a hint of the existence of the directive of June 18, 1941, has disappeared. They disappeared almost half a century ago. Therefore, it is hardly possible to establish its number, as well as the coordinates of storage in archives. But it should be remembered that it was Zhukov who became the Minister of Defense and received access to all the archives. But "God is not in power - but in Truth"!
Traces of this telegram remained, and not only in writing, but, above all, where Marshal Zhukov would least want to see them. They remained in the protocols of the investigation and trial in the case of those arrested together with D.G. Pavlov. commanders of the Western Special Military District, whose sanction for arrest and bringing to trial was personally approved by Zhukov. On the 70th page of the 4th volume of the investigative file on their charge, the following words are recorded by the head of communications of the ZapOVO, General Andrei Terentyevich Grigoriev:
And after the telegram from the Chief of the General Staff dated June 18, the troops of the district were not put on alert.
The telegram, therefore, was - in this sense, the former position of Grigoriev is of particular importance. He was the head of communications of the ZapOVO, that is, the telegram passed through his hands! And at the trial, Grigoriev confirmed this with the following words: “All this is true” (Fedyuninsky I.I. Raised by alarm. M., 1960, p. 11 - 12. Unknown Russia, XX century. Book II. M., 1992, 106. History of the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1965, vol. 6, p. 135.
But it would be fine, but the obvious sabotage of bringing the troops to full combat readiness was carried out by Zhukov and Timoshenko even in relation to the famous "Directive No. 1" of June 21, 1941 (CA MO. F. 48A. Op. 1554. D. 3. L 257 - 259.), written after the meeting of Budyonny, Timoshenko, Zhukov and Stalin in Moscow that began at 12:00 on June 21.
Judging by the documents, as well as the words of N.G. Kuznetsov, who arrived at Timoshenko by midnight on a call, Zhukov and Timoshenko for some reason failed with this directive until the night - she went to the troops only at 00.30 on June 22! For some reason, two senior military leaders for at least 7 (seven!) Hours could not “give birth” to directive No. 1, only half a page in volume! And if we proceed from the contents of the diary of S. M. Budyonny, then it turns out that from 12.00 on June 21 to 00.30 on June 22!
As a result, the only troops that were really put on full alert were the border and internal troops. There it was announced already at 21.30 on June 21, that is, 6 hours before the start of the aggression! At the same time, full combat readiness was declared in all organs of the NKVD and the NKGB.
After the adoption of a fundamental decision, the General Staff with the People's Commissariat of Defense only at 00.30 min. On June 22, Directive No. 1 was sent to the districts. It is quite clear that its decoding in the districts was already carried out under the barbaric bombing of the Nazis ... The “battle formations” of those sleeping peacefully, including after cultural events, four days before the aggression, on the personal instructions of Stalin, the warned troops of the first operational echelon of the First strategic echelon in the blink of an eye were crushed, crushed and destroyed. What happened under these conditions was supposed to happen! ..
And after the assassination of Stalin, Zhukov, together with Khrushchev, gave birth to the myth that Joseph Vissarionovich did not allow the troops to be put on alert?! Only now he forgot one detail. In the "Directive No. 1" that came out from under his pen - in fact, its authorship belongs to Budyonny with Stalin's approval - it was indicated:
At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kyiv and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness to meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies.
Nobody paid attention to this nuance for decades. Unfortunately, so does the author. Oleg Yurievich Kozinkin, a former officer of the Russian army and a thoughtful reader from Penza, drew attention to the meaning of this tiny, but, as it turned out, of tremendous importance detail. According to his purely professional explanation, which he also checked with the help of his friend, the head of the department of tactics at one of the military schools, “to be on full combat readiness” in such a directive means that the order to bring the troops to full combat readiness was given earlier! But it's true! This is also why, at 13:00 Moscow time on June 22, Stalin “hit” Timoshenko and Zhukov with the following words:
You hide behind surprise. Keep in mind - the Germans expect to cause panic in parts of our army by surprise.
To utter such accusatory words “You are hiding behind surprise!” Stalin could only in one case - if indeed the troops were ordered in advance to be in full combat readiness. And he knew that he personally gave such an order! So the "strategists" got "nuts" quite rightly ...
This is how Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov flogged himself mercilessly for his own lie! And at the same time Khrushchev and others like him! It’s a pity that not with salty rods ...
Conclusion
The conspiracy of the marshals, at least Zhukov and Timoshenko, at least to hide, if not outright sabotage, then their sloppiness, was. Most likely, the conspiracy was multi-layered, since the impudence of the marshals with their desire for “counter-blitzkrieg” and “war on enemy territory” was skillfully used, at least by the West (or, more precisely, by England and the “hawkish” circles of the USA) in order to join the Nazi coalition in the war with the USSR.
The West, in turn, was used by global forces who wanted to curtail the project of building socialism in a single country, into which Stalin turned Trotsky's project of the country - "brushwood for the world revolution" (about this http://inance.ru/2015/06/oni/) . But these plans of theirs were not allowed to come true, Hitler fell, and besides, a course was set for rapprochement between the USA and the USSR, which a prime example serves as a Hollywood film "Mission to Moscow" about the trials of Trotskyists:
Unfortunately, the price for such achievements was huge - it was not only 30 million lives of Soviet people, but also the further collapse of the USSR after the coup d'état was carried out in 1953. one of key roles in these events of this coup, Zhukov also played, who could be attracted to their side, threatening to publish the results of the Pokrovsky commission, which by that time had already completed its main work to clarify the causes of the tragedy on June 22, 1941.
Conclusion
As a conclusion, let's cite an excerpt from the book by Sergei Maltsev "The Invisible Battle" (http://www.n-bitva.narod.ru/chitat.htm), which reflects the 7th order of consideration of historical processes:
The Hierarchy of Mind and Light is the pinnacle and foundation of the world created by Mind and Light. The hierarchy of darkness, no matter what planet it appears on, is a dead-end, temporary phenomenon, these are the real garbage, which for some time retain their abilities that they once achieved, until the moment of separation from spiritual evolution.
But in the Battle with the hierarchy of darkness, the Hierarchy of Light has to reckon with the choice of a person who very often takes the side of Evil and gives Evil his spiritual and physical strength. It has to reckon with the free choice of man, because free choice is something without which a man will not be a man, but will be only a trained animal. It is the other side that deprives a person of freedom of choice - the dark hierarchy. By the method of suggestion, deceit or intimidation.
We see in everyday life how easily a person lends himself to reification. One has only to create an appropriate scientific myth, some "-isms", rationally substantiate them, and then we are ready to consider ourselves simply as biological material. Are we then able to respect ourselves and others? No, we will be prostrate before some more powerful mechanism, before a force, before some "deity", the Fuhrer or the "Galactic Council" and for his sake we will go over the heads of others. Will we be able to make decisions and take responsibility for them? No, we will hand over the responsibility for ourselves to the system or "deity" and allow us to make decisions for us. Will we be able to fight for the realization of our unique, only meaning, that destiny with which each of us comes to this world? No, we will carry out other people's meanings, serve other people's interests.
It turns out then that science can be in the service of Evil, degradation and slavery?
No, true science cannot lead to slavery. So, you need to carefully look at what is true science, and what is just someone's subconscious or conscious desire to materialize the entire living, feeling and thinking world.
A living being cannot be just a mechanism, just a set of biological conditions closed in on themselves. The whole world, which evolves, and therefore continuously outgrows itself as a quality, in the inner dimension, cannot be such a dead conditionality, mechanism. Mechanism alone does not constitute the essence of the world. Mechanism is not the essence of man.
Because at every moment of his life a person makes his decisions, makes his conscious, his free choice. Choice between Good and Evil. And we saw, looking into the living soul of history and looking beyond the material line, biological life that Good and Evil are real, that they exist, that they exist. They are not somewhere on a distant star or in romantic dreams, but they are present every moment next to us and in ourselves. And in any conditions, even in the very core of Evil, a person always has a choice and an opportunity to be and remain a person. In the Battle with Evil, a person always has a choice, a choice to become a winner.
Let's give the last word in our research to Viktor Frankl (Austrian psychiatrist, psychologist and neurologist, former prisoner of the Nazi concentration camp):
The past few years have perhaps sobered us up. At the same time, they showed us that the human in a person cannot be ignored, they taught us that everything depends on the person. A man has been preserved in the memory of the concentration camp. I want to mention only one of the leaders of the camp into which I ended up at the end and from which I was released. He was an SS.
When the camp was liberated, something became known that only the camp doctor, himself one of the prisoners, knew before: this man from the camp authorities laid out a lot of money from his pocket in order to get medicines for prisoners from a pharmacy in the nearest settlement! The headman of the same camp, himself also a prisoner, was stricter than all the SS guards put together; he beat the prisoners when, where and as much as he could, while, for example, the chief I was talking about, as far as I know, never once raised a hand against any of “his” prisoners.
This showed up as a person. The man survived. In the fire of suffering, in which he melted, his essence was exposed.
If we ask ourselves about the most important experience we have had concentration camps, this life in the abyss, then from everything we have experienced, we can single out the following quintessence: we have come to know a person, as, perhaps, none of the previous generations knew him. What is a person? It is a being constantly deciding what it is. This is the being who invented the gas chambers, but it is also the being who went into these gas chambers with his head held high and with a prayer on his lips...
Youth Analytical Group
The lessons of the Great Patriotic War have two aspects: information-military and historical-practical. The latter, in turn, has two sides. One is actually historical: truthful knowledge of the facts of our history, of the war. The other is practical: history does not repeat itself in general, but many details repeat. For example, betrayal as a factor that sometimes plays a decisive role. Already before our eyes, betrayal played a big role in the fate of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and not the betrayal of the "man from the street", but the representatives of the ruling elites - individuals and entire groups. Is it not the betrayal of the generals that lies at the basis of the February coup of 1917? That it was, of course, not the cause, but the trigger of destruction Russian Empire. "The Scot broke his oath, he ruined the king for a penny" - this is how the Scottish guard surrendered Charles I during the English revolution. There was a betrayal during the Great Patriotic War, and, in fact, high level- it is enough to recall General Vlasov, and not only him.
In this regard, we can say that the analysis of the mechanism of betrayal during crises and wars - we live in a growing global crisis and in a war era - is a very practical and archaic matter. Especially when you consider how many Russian leaders keep money in the banks of the West, have real estate there and teach their children there. And as President Nixon's aide Chuck Colson used to say, if you grab someone's genitals, the rest of the body will come along.
One of the directions of the information war directed against the role and significance of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War is anti-Stalinist hysteria in its various forms, where two myths occupy a central place: about "Stalin's repressions" and about Stalin's guilt for the disaster of June 22, for the defeat of the summer 1941. Simply put, for the fact that, allegedly because of his "trust in Hitler", "distrust of his own intelligence", "bloodthirstiness", "the ban on returning fire to the German invasion in the first hours of the war", etc. we almost lost the war.
The first to launch this myth was not our sworn friends in the West, although they pretty much overdid it on this topic, but Khrushchev, about whom Churchill said that he did much more to destroy communism than the English prime minister himself. He could say the same about many of Stalin's marshals and generals. Once they trembled before the leader, but after the 20th Congress, these saturnalia of the nomenklatura, they were ready to throw mud at him at the first nod of the new owner. To my credit Soviet army, not everyone went to lie and humiliation. For example, marshals K.K. Rokossovsky and E.A. Golovanov did not say a bad word about Stalin, although they tried to squeeze this word out of them.
However, not only servility moved the generals. After all, by blaming Stalin for the defeats of the initial period of the war, one could remove the blame from oneself personally and from the military establishment as a whole. After the death of Stalin, one could not be afraid of investigating the causes of the tragedy of June 22 - it began during the war and stopped only with the death of the leader. Now myths could be forged. The myths in question were first picked up by the "sixties" who sought to warm themselves at the feet of the new government, then these myths migrated to the West, and during the Gorbachev era they returned like a boomerang, playing a significant role in the bacchanalia that perestroika punks staged under the waving of a conductor's baton the main ideologist-shifter of perestroika.
The myths of the Khrushchevites and perestroika were surprisingly organically intertwined with the Nazi-British interpretations of the causes of the war and the mechanisms of its beginning. Until now, many of these myths are alive: both because there is an order, and because there is a fear of historical retribution, and because there is little information - most of the materials related to the history of the immediate eve and the first days of the Great Patriotic War, before still not disassembled. Plus deliberate distortions, falsifications. Nevertheless, a lot has been done in recent years in terms of restoring the real historical picture and debunking anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist myths.
One of the most successful scientists working in this direction is Arsen Benikovich Martirosyan - the author of more than two dozen books on the history of the 1930s-50s, including the struggle between Soviet and British intelligence in the 1930s, the Great Patriotic war, Stalin, Beria. main topic his new two-volume study - the causes of the disaster on June 22. According to the author, the reason is the betrayal of a part of the Soviet generals and officer corps. Martirosyan reasonably lays the main blame on the "Kyiv mafia" - a group of generals who came from the Kyiv Military District (KOVO), headed by People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov.
Thematically, the two-volume book is divided into three unequal parts: two small ones (one is devoted to how the British prepared world wars, the second - to the direct preparation of Hitler's attack on the USSR during the 10 years preceding the war) and a huge third, dedicated to a detailed analysis of the last 10 days of June 1941 G.
One of the lines of falsification of the history of the Second World War (and the First too) is an attempt to present it as accidental. Martirosyan's work, like big number other serious studies, does not leave a stone unturned from this wretched scheme, because of which the ears of interested persons, or rather, states and supranational groups, stick out. Second World War logically followed from the First World War and had to solve those problems that the First World War did not solve. Astute contemporaries already in 1919 said that the Treaty of Versailles had made the Second World War practically inevitable. I will add that the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Russian Empire back in 1916, believing that the Entente countries would defeat German Empire and its allies, considered inevitable the emergence new war in 20 years.
The world with logical inevitability went to a new war because of a whole tangle of contradictions, primarily British-American: overseas "cousins" set the task of destroying the British Empire, but not with their own hands, but with the hands of the Germans, and therefore invested in Hitler. The British dreamed of the destruction of Russia, now Soviet, also by proxy, and therefore also invested in Hitler. International capital as a whole was interested in achieving two goals. First, in the destruction of nation-states in Europe. This is precisely what J. Schacht, the "financial genius of the Third Reich," promised bankers back in 1931 if Hitler came to power, which is well shown by a number of works, in particular "Tragedy and a Dream" by K. Quigley and "Hitler, Inc." How Britain and the USA created the Third Reich" G. Preparations. Secondly, in establishing control over the two new world industrial centers: Donetsk-Dnepropetrovsk (after Soviet modernization) and Ural-Kuzbass, located on the territory of the USSR. There were only five such centers in the world at that time, and two of them were in the Soviet Union (in the West - Pennsylvania, Birmingham, Ruhr). Finally, the ethno-demographic (“racial”, as they would say in the Reich) aspect was of particular importance, and not only for the Germans, but also for the creators of racism as a doctrine - the British: in 1939, 46% of the population of Europe were Slavs , which, according to forecasts, by the middle of the twentieth century should have made up more than half of the population of Europe.
In this situation, it was Great Britain that did everything to set Hitler against the USSR. Actually, for this, the Munich Agreement was started. The venerable American journalist W. Lippmann, who did not at all sympathize with the USSR, remarked about Munich: Great Britain and France surrendered Czechoslovakia to Hitler in the hope that Germany and the USSR would start fighting each other and exhaust themselves. In addition to receiving weapons and uniforms from Czechoslovakia for 50 divisions, the military-industrial complex and gold reserves, Hitler was brought to the attack bridgehead closest to the borders of the USSR. However, as G. Preparata notes, here is Hitler, who realized that he was being driven into a trap and tried to jump off the British hook. He turned the Czech Republic into the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and proclaimed Slovakia a sovereign state, whose independence he personally guaranteed. Thus, Hitler made it clear to the British puppeteers that he was not going to fight the USSR in the near future. And at that moment Germany did not have the potential for a world war. This was proved by American economists who specifically studied this issue in the 1950s. Germany would have been ready for a world war in 1944-1946, but this, of course, did not suit the British. And at their instigation, the Reich began to provoke Poland, whose leadership in the pre-war period, Churchill described as "the most vile of the vile." Poland demanded an ultimatum for itself a protectorate over Slovakia, which Hitler could not do, he understood: in order to avoid a world war now, but to prepare for it in the future, it is necessary to solve the Polish problem. And for this it is necessary to negotiate with the Soviet Union, which was done.
Thanks to the German-Soviet treaty, the USSR emerged from the isolation into which Munich tried to drive it, and received almost two years of respite. And the Soviet leadership had no illusions that war could not be avoided in principle. Martirosyan cites an illustrative episode: during the August negotiations in 1939, Stalin, answering one of Ribbentrop's questions, said: "We do not forget that your ultimate goal is to attack us." And when Ribbentrop tried to start his speech with a phrase about the "spirit of brotherhood" between the German and Russian peoples, Molotov cut him off: "There can be no brotherhood between us. Let's talk about business if you like." This is about the question of whether they believed Soviet leaders and Stalin, in particular, to Hitler.
Of particular interest in Martirosyan's work is the analysis of the May-June events of 1941, which became the prelude to the war. On May 4, speaking in the Reichstag with a speech on domestic and foreign policy, Hitler never named the USSR - as if it did not exist. The next day, May 5, the response move: speaking at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of graduates of military academies, Stalin spoke rather sharply about Germany. And on May 6, he was appointed to the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars - Stalin officially became head of government. On May 10 (according to another version, earlier) Hess flew to Great Britain (the Soviet Union responded with exercises of the Airborne Forces and the call for service of 800 thousand reservists, and then another 300 thousand) and began secret negotiations Nazi No. 2 with representatives of the British elite.
This is now, taking advantage of the fact that the documents on Hess were classified until 2017, and he himself was sent to the other world as soon as the USSR expressed its readiness to release him from Spandau (having learned about this, Hess told his son by phone that now the British would definitely kill him - a few days later he was found hanged), the British pretend that from the very beginning they treated Hess as a criminal. In fact, they conducted intensive negotiations, about the course and content of which Stalin, by the way, received reports from our intelligence almost from the negotiating table.
A decisive shift in the secret negotiations took place on 9 June. On that day, on behalf of Churchill, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain John Simon joined the negotiations with Hess - in 1935 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, who gave the "green light" to Germany in its expansion to the east during the March British-German negotiations.
Upon learning of this the next day, Stalin understood perfectly well that the British had given the Germans certain guarantees, and it was not by chance that already on June 10, Hitler finally set June 22 as the date of the attack on the USSR and ordered the transfer of additional contingents of troops from France to the German-Soviet border, leaving only 14-15 divisions. Martirosyan is right - without British guarantees, Hitler would never have dared to do this.
Fearing that, by agreement, the Germans and the British would arrange a provocation, accuse the USSR of aggression and, using this as a pretext for reconciliation, strike a joint blow at the USSR, Stalin, based on intelligence data, initiated the famous TASS statement of June 13 (published in the press on 14 June), sustained in a peaceful tone.
This statement is used by Stalin's detractors as evidence of the leader's "stupidity", "his desire to curry favor with Hitler", thus trying to delay the war. For some reason, these people believe that Hitler was the addressee of the statement. In fact, Stalin was well aware of the inevitability of war. But the state was ready for it, and here the most important thing was to deprive anyone in the West and, above all, the pro-German circles of the United States (which at that time were very powerful) from attributing aggressive intentions to the USSR. That was the impression Hitler was trying to create in the Western powers - and not by chance.
The fact is that back in 1937, Roosevelt said that in the event of a German attack on the USSR, the United States would take the side of the USSR, otherwise they would take the side of Germany. And on April 17, 1941, the US Congress decided that in the event of Soviet aggression against Germany, the United States would act in alliance with Hitler. This would automatically mean the end of the British-German war and the formation of an international bloc against the USSR consisting of the United States, the British Empire, the Third Reich, Turkey, Japan and some other small geopolitical jackals. Only an idiot or a traitor like Rezun-Suvorov can hang noodles on his ears that Stalin was preparing an invasion of Europe. In this case, Stalin would have had the entire West against him, plus Japan, Finland and Turkey. The relative military potential of the USSR in 1937 is estimated by experts (for example, Paul Kennedy in his famous work "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers") at 14%, Germany - 14.4%, Great Britain - 10.2%, France - 4.2 %, Italy - 2.5%, USA - 41.7%, Japan - 2.5%; in the sum it turns out 14% against 86%. And even the military power of the USSR, which had increased by June 22, 1941, was still much inferior to the total power of the indicated potential bloc, whose members were also building up their military power.
Naturally, Stalin could not allow such a situation, and therefore he emphasized the peacefulness of the USSR in every possible way, but at the same time he turned not to Hitler, but to Roosevelt. In the current situation, the United States could be the only real ally of the USSR. In addition, they could (and did) contain the anti-Soviet encroachments of Great Britain (of course, not out of love for us, but because of the desire to destroy the British Empire). And the Americans heard Stalin. Therefore, it was not the USSR that turned out to be alone against the entire West, as happened with Russia in the Crimean War, but Hitler - against the union of Russians and Anglo-Saxons. And it all ended with the ruins of the Reichstag, not the Kremlin. And there was a Victory Parade on Red Square, when the flags of Nazi Germany, their allies and henchmen (the same Vlasovites) were thrown at the foot of the mausoleum, the transformation of the USSR into one of the two superpowers, the collapse of the British Empire (you really remember Hamlet's "Go, poisoned steel , by appointment"). And all this - despite the catastrophe on June 22, which is savored by corned beef-falcons and other public of a similar sort and smell. Despite the summer defeats of 1941, it was precisely the fact that the heroic resistance of the Red Army - with all the defeats - thwarted the blitzkrieg and already in September 1941 deprived Hitler of a chance to win. With the resource base that the Reich had, victory over the USSR could only be achieved in one case - in the event of the defeat of the USSR in 2-3 months. And the disaster of June 22 seemed to promise just such an option. But the Hitlers and the traitors assumed, while the Russian people and the Soviet system headed by Stalin disposed. Let us return, however, to the pre-war days.
After a TASS statement on June 13, Hitler suspended the advance of strike force troops to their initial attack positions. Martirosyan believes that, taking advantage of the situation, he began to seek additional guarantees. It is possible that Hitler, understanding to whom the TASS statement was addressed, decided to once again weigh the pros and cons, and, most likely, this in itself became a means of pressure on the British - for them, the German attack on the USSR was the only way out of the current situation. situation, and they did everything to make it happen by providing certain guarantees. Moreover, these guarantees are easy to calculate based on the further actions of our British "allies". This is a promise that the Reich will not be stabbed in the back, i.e. they will not open a second front, which will drastically reduce the bombing of Germany. And I must say, the British kept these promises.
As early as September 4, 1941, in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador I. Maisky, Martirosyan specifically points to this interesting fact- Churchill let it slip when he said that the opening of a second front should not be expected until 1944, i.e. the British gave Hitler three years to wear down both his Reich and the USSR. They resumed intensive bombing of Germany only in 1943 under serious pressure from the United States, and the second front was opened only in 1944, only after the victory of the Soviet Union in the battle on Kursk Bulge when the Anglo-Saxons finally realized that the USSR was quite capable of defeating the Third Reich alone and being on the shores of the Atlantic.
It is quite possible that the British also made some vague promises about the conclusion of peace with Germany and possible joint actions against the USSR for the joint division of the "Russian pie". The history of their behavior in crisis situations makes it possible to assume such a possibility - it is enough to recall the words and deeds of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward Gray and George V in relation to German diplomats on the eve of the First World War: the British confidently spoke of their neutrality as a settled matter, and then declared war on Germany.
Having apparently received additional guarantees, on June 18, Hitler orders the resumption of the advance of troops to their original positions for the attack. On the same day, based on the results of aerial reconnaissance, in addition to the available intelligence information, Stalin authorized the sending to the western districts of a directive to bring the troops of the first echelon to combat readiness. FOUR DAYS BEFORE THE AGGRESSION! But the British remained true to themselves here too: after giving Hitler guarantees and pushing him against the USSR, they, firstly, hurried to secure an alibi for themselves - on June 16, Cripps (well, right best friend the USSR, whose "heart hurts about all of us"; how can one not recall the words of the wonderful Russian geopolitician E.A. Edrikhin-Vandama that there can be only one thing worse than hostility with the Anglo-Saxon - friendship with him) reports to the Soviet ambassador about the imminent, from day to day, German attack on the USSR. Secondly, already knowing about the German attack, on June 12, the British (who, if not they, knew that everything had already been decided and the deadlines had been set) miraculously refrained from the already almost completely sanctioned bombing of the Soviet Transcaucasus. Obviously, in order not to be in the same company with the aggressor, or, moreover, God forbid (the god of Insidious Albion), not to frighten him away.
This is not the place to go into detail about one important aspect of the British-German feud, so in short. In the 1870s, the Germans, using the help of the British continental Masonic lodges (German lodges were under the leadership of these latter for more than a century) to defeat France, after this victory, in fact, broke off their former relations with them. Having united their lodges into a single all-German union, the Germans began to create an alternative to not only the British continental, but, most importantly, the island Masonic lodges, a complex of closed structures of world governance. The British could forgive such things only to the Americans, but not to the Germans, and there could be only one punishment - the destruction of the Reich by proxy, which was done the second time, although today the rise of Germany outwardly looks like revenge.
So, Hitler's attack on the USSR - I agree with Martirosyan - could only be carried out as a result of a British-German conspiracy, with which the British drove Hitler into a trap. The Fuhrer had no chance not to fall into this trap, and the only chance to jump out of it was the defeat of the USSR within two or three months, or even better - several weeks. Hitler believed that, having acquired Soviet resources, it would be possible to start talking with the British in a different language, crushing British possessions in India together with the Japanese. But first it was necessary to defeat the USSR - with lightning speed. And it seemed that it would be so: firstly, the agent of strategic influence of Great Britain, the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris (Lombard roots), convinced Hitler that the Russians had only one defensive echelon (in fact there were three) and that the entire Red Army was concentrated near the border, and therefore all of it can be destroyed with one blow. Secondly, the British-German conspiracy was to be helped by what Martirosyan called the anti-Stalinist conspiracy of the generals, or the second edition, the second tier of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy.
On May 28, 1941, the GRU resident in Romania reported to the Center that, according to the information he obtained from the Germans, "the Russian army will expose itself to the German offensive in the western part of the USSR and will be defeated there in the shortest possible time." And so it happened. In addition, the resident reported that the Germans expected that after their attack some changes would take place in the Kremlin. And it was serious...
At one time, many of the sixties, and then perestroika and post-perestroika hacks, tried and are trying to impose on the public opinion that Stalin and only Stalin were to blame for the catastrophic events of June 22 and the following weeks. Allegedly trusting Hitler and not trusting his own intelligence, he not only did not prepare the country for war, but also forbade retaliatory actions and the opening of return fire on the Germans on June 21–22, 1941.
But Khrushchev and a number of Soviet marshals and generals. Can they be trusted? By no means, says A.B. Martirosyan, they are lying - on the example of a careful comparison of the texts of 10 editions of Zhukov's memoirs, as a result of which Martirosyan calls him "four times a liar of the Soviet Union", as well as an analysis of a number of other "memoirs", he convincingly proves this. “Why can’t you trust the marshals recklessly?” - Martirosyan devoted a whole paragraph with this title to the answer to this question in his book.
A lie is not only a distortion, but also a concealment of the truth, a secret. What secret did the marshals hide with their memories? And was there anything to hide? Apparently, there was something, and so serious that it cast a shadow on a significant part of the country's high command, its actions at the very beginning of the war. This is something, according to Martirosyan, partly criminally negligent, partly criminally conspiratorial activity of the generals on the eve of the war and immediately after it began, which led to the tragedy of June 22. “The fact of betrayal by a part of the Soviet generals and officer corps is the real reason for the tragedy of June 22, 1941,” writes Martirosyan. And more detailed: “The basis ... of the tragedy of June 22, 1941 was, alas, precisely TREASON. It was expressed in the illegal, tacit substitution of the official plan to repel the impending German aggression, and the malicious setting up of the Soviet troops concentrated in the border zone under inevitable defeat, defeat and destruction, not agreed with anyone and in no way agreed with the top political leadership of the USSR. The local command also made its criminal contribution to the weakening of the mobilization and combat readiness of the troops entrusted to it. Furthermore. Although it is still difficult to categorically state that the delay in sending Directive No. 1 was for criminal purposes, nevertheless, there is every reason to state categorically that this was done deliberately. And against the background of the defeat, an anti-state coup was to be carried out by the military, pursuing the goals of overthrowing the Soviet government, the physical destruction of the top leadership of the USSR (including the assassination of Stalin) and separate reconciliation with Nazi Germany on conditions that were humiliating for a great power. A thousand pages of the text of the study are devoted to proving this thesis. In the center of the evidence base are the actions of People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, or, as the author calls them, a "duet".
Already in February 1941, the people's commissar and the chief of staff, without formally canceling the country's defense plan, actually changed it. As Martirosyan writes, they stepped over it: the principle of active defense, the implementation of which by the Red Army was very afraid of the German command, was replaced by the "duet" with the principle of "hard defense" (in their terminology - "stubborn defense") on the line of the state border. In addition, the generals assumed an immediate counterattack on the invading enemy, as M.N. had once planned. Tukhachevsky, which would quickly lead the Red Army to a crushing defeat, especially considering the monstrous density of the Wehrmacht offensive at the beginning of the aggression. K.K. Rokossovsky writes in his memoirs that on the eve of the war he could not figure out what the essence of our plan was: “if there was any plan, it clearly did not correspond to the situation that had developed by the beginning of the war, which led to a heavy defeat of our troops in the initial period of the war. In fact, this is an accusation against the “duet”, and if Zhukov did not admit his guilt, then the cautious Timoshenko, who did not leave his memoirs, writes Martirosyan, was forced to characterize the chosen war strategy as an “illiterate scenario”.
95 years ago, at the end of December 1917, representatives of France and Great Britain, Georges Clemenceau and Robert Cecil, signed a secret convention on the division of the south of Russia into spheres of interest and areas of future operations for British and French troops.
The "Plan of the Entente" was adopted at a meeting in Paris on December 23, 1917 and promulgated by US President Woodrow Wilson on the eve of 1918. The plan provided for the division of Russia into spheres of influence and was called the "Terms of the convention."
The English "sphere of action" included the Caucasus, the Cossack regions of the Don and Kuban, middle Asia, and in French - Ukraine, Bessarabia and Crimea.
London and Paris agreed that from now on they would consider Russia not as an ally in the Entente, but as a territory for the implementation of their interventionist plans.
The conclusion of the Anglo-French convention is on a par with such a “glorious” deed of Western democracies as the signing of the Munich Agreement of 1938, according to which they handed over democratic Czechoslovakia to be torn to pieces by Germany, Poland and Hungary, which became the prologue of World War II.
During the conclusion of the Brest Peace. March 1918
It is not surprising that people in the West try not to remember these pages of their own - they too contradict the tired statements about the high moral principles that Western politicians supposedly guide.
Alas, the 95th anniversary of the beginning of the intervention in Russia remains out of sight of Russian politicians, scientists and the media.
They may object to me, reminding me that since Soviet times, it is customary to date the beginning of the intervention in the spring of 1918. However, this periodization is contradicted both by the fact of the conclusion of the Anglo-French convention, and the invasion of Bessarabia by the troops of Romania - another "faithful ally" in the Entente. Both events took place in December 1917.
This clarification is of fundamental importance.
The West justifies intervention in the internal affairs of Russia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the need to fight against Germany. But the sequence of events was different.
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded in March 1918, and the signing of the Anglo-French Convention and the Romanians' invasion of Bessarabia took place two and a half months earlier.
In December 1917, when Paris and London signed a convention, negotiations between the Bolsheviks and the countries of the Quadruple Alliance were just beginning.
You can treat Lenin and his party as you like, but it is impossible to deny that, having come to power, the leader of the Bolsheviks immediately turned to the peoples and governments of the warring states with a proposal to immediately conclude a democratic peace - without annexations and indemnities.
Moreover, he addressed his appeal "in particular to the class-conscious workers of the three most advanced nations of mankind and the largest states participating in the present war: England, France and Germany."
On November 8 (21), the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs turned to the ambassadors of the allied powers with a proposal to conclude "an immediate truce on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations." There was no talk of any separate peace between Russia and Germany.
The Entente allies decided not to react at all to the peace initiatives of the Bolsheviks. The local "experts in Russia" were sure that the days of Soviet power were numbered.
On November 14 (27), Germany announced its agreement to start negotiations on a truce. Having received a response from Berlin, the Bolsheviks made another attempt to conclude a general peace.
Having offered Germany to postpone the start of negotiations for five days, on November 15 (28) they proposed to join the peace talks with the governments of other states. It remained unanswered.
Starting negotiations with Germany, the Soviet delegation immediately announced that they intended to talk about ending the war in general, and not about a separate agreement.
Military occupation of Moldova by Romania. March 1918
Disagreements in positions were quickly clarified, and the Bolsheviks, having achieved a ten-day truce (from December 7 to 17), returned to Petrograd, from where they again turned to the Entente states with a proposal to start general peace negotiations.
In December, the Soviet government repeated the proposal several times. In vain: the Entente was categorically against Russia's withdrawal from the war.
On November 10, the heads of the military missions of the Entente states at the headquarters of the supreme commander, referring to the agreement of August 23 (September 5), 1914, concluded between Russia, England and France, demanded the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by the tsarist and Provisional governments.
Since the people did not want to fight, and the Entente allies did not want to negotiate for peace, the Soviet government found itself between a rock and a hard place. Under the circumstances, he had no alternative to a separate peace with the states of the Quadruple Alliance.
This was also understood by the English ambassador to Russia, D. Buchanan, who was far from sympathetic to the Bolsheviks. In November 1917, at the Paris Conference of the Entente, he warned the leaders of the coalition against striving to force Russia to fight by brute pressure: “My only desire and goal has always been to keep Russia in the war, but it is impossible to force an exhausted nation to fight against its own will.”
However, the approach of the French Marshal F. Foch prevailed, who saw in the Romanian army the backbone around which the anti-Bolshevik forces of southern Russia (the Don Cossacks, Ukrainian and Caucasian nationalists) could be united, capable of continuing the fight against Germany. And so that they could receive ammunition, it was proposed to seize the Trans-Siberian Railway.
Is it not here that the origins of the Czechoslovak rebellion, which contributed to the unleashing of a full-scale Civil War, lie?
In March 1918, Russia signed a peace treaty with the states of the Quadruple Alliance. This caused an outburst of rage among British and French politicians, who were accustomed to looking at the Russian soldier as "cannon fodder".
If the Bolsheviks to the last clung to the illusory hope of avoiding the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, then the states of the West were not so scrupulous.
Already on 5-6 (18-19) December, secret negotiations were held in Geneva between England and Austria-Hungary on the terms of a separate peace between Austria-Hungary and the Western powers.
At the initiative of the British General Smuts, questions of possible concessions from Austria-Hungary, Italy, Serbia and Romania were discussed. The talk of concessions in favor of Russia, which caused Austria-Hungary the greatest damage in the war, never came up ...
The Brest peace finally untied the hands of the former allies in the Entente. Justifying interference in the internal affairs of Russia, they competed in hypocrisy.
On November 11, 1918, at 11 a.m., the first of 101 salutes was fired, announcing the end of the First World War.
On November 13, the predatory Treaty of Brest was annulled by the RSFSR. “The main arguments of the allies to justify the presence of their troops in Russia collapsed,” the American historians D. Davis and Y. Trani rightly noted.
However, the Entente states did not even think about leaving Russia, continuing to violate its sovereignty. The former allies were not embarrassed by the fact that during the revolutions in France, Russian troops did not invade it, and during the Civil War they did not land in the United States.
The French forgot about the words of Marshal Foch that "if France was not wiped off the face of the earth in 1914, then first of all she owes it to Russia."
Didn't remember it and former ambassador France in Russia M. Paleolog, who on August 4, 1914 tearfully asked Nicholas II: “I beg Your Majesty to order your troops to go on an immediate offensive, otherwise the French army risks being crushed ...”
The tsar ordered the troops that had not completed their mobilization to advance. For the Russian army, the haste turned into a disaster, but France was saved.
Characteristically, Palaiologos took this for granted: “According to cultural development French and Russian are not on the same level. Russia is one of the most backward countries in the world. Compare our army with this ignorant unconscious mass: all our soldiers are educated; in the forefront fight young forces who have shown themselves in art, in science, talented and refined people; this is the cream of humanity ... From this point of view, our losses will be more sensitive than Russian losses.
Own shirt closer to the body - these are the most soft words, which can comment on the cynical statement of a diplomat.
Romania also turned out to be ungrateful. At the beginning of the First World War, she took a wait-and-see attitude, conducting diplomatic bargaining with both coalitions. True, already in September 1914, Romania signed an agreement with Russia, promising to observe benevolent neutrality.
Neutrality was not fair: Romania allowed the passage of Austro-Hungarian and German cargo through its territory to Turkey. Only in August 1916 did Romania enter the war on the side of the Entente, declaring war on Austria-Hungary.
The troops of the Central Powers inflicted a crushing defeat on the Romanians, capturing two-thirds of the country. Bucharest was surrendered in December 1916. The royal family fled to Russia.
To save the ally, the Russian command hastily transferred 35 infantry and 13 cavalry divisions. For Russia, the entry of Romania into the war worsened the situation, lengthening the front by almost 500 km.
A year later, Romania "thanked" the saviors by invading Bessarabia.
According to historian Natalia Narochnitskaya, the meaning of the intervention was "not to crush Bolshevism and communist ideology ... The main motives were always geopolitical and military-strategic."
Having unleashed the intervention, the former allies in the Entente pursued the goal of dismembering the territory historical Russia, creating on its outskirts a garland of "independent" states controlled by the West.
This conclusion is also confirmed in the guidelines shared with President W. Wilson by the main developer of the US foreign policy, Colonel E. House: “The first question arises: is Russian territory synonymous with the concept of territory belonging to the former Russian Empire? It is clear that this is not so ... It is necessary to provide conditions for the withdrawal of all German troops from Russia, and then before the peace conference there will be a blank sheet of paper on which it will be possible to draw a policy for all the peoples of the former Russian Empire.
To be interested in the opinion of the peoples of Russia, whether they consider their history and territory to be a “blank sheet of paper”, Western geopoliticians considered it superfluous…