General Gareev Makhmut. General Makhmut Gareev: "It's a lie that we fought ineptly┘"
Born July 23, 1923 in the city of Chelyabinsk, in a working class family. Father, Akhmet Gareev (born in 1881), is a worker. Mother, Rakhima Gareeva (born in 1892), is a housewife. Son, Timur Makhmutovich Gareev (born in 1961), graduated combined arms school, Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze. Now colonel Russian Army. Daughter, Galiya Makhmutovna Krainova (born in 1952), graduated from the Tashkent State University, works as a teacher of English language.
A week before the Great Patriotic War, Makhmut Gareev became a cadet at the Tashkent Infantry School named after V.I. Lenin. Eighteen-year-old boy rushed to the front. It did not take long to study - five months, and already in November 1941 he was the commander of a rifle platoon, acting as a company commander of the 99th separate Tajik rifle brigade of the Central Asian military district.
Two months later, the young officer is enrolled as a student of the "Shot" courses. And four months later, Makhmut Gareev, as part of the 120th separate rifle brigade, as a company commander, was sent to the Western Front. And immediately falls into the inferno.
Being on the defensive, the brigade repelled the fierce attacks of the enemy. Lieutenant Gareev, who had just arrived at the command post of the brigade, had to reach the location of the third battalion almost through open areas, under continuous bombardment and artillery fire. Soon, machine-gun and rifle fire pressed him tightly to the ground. He crawled forward, taking advantage of natural shelters. After about an hour and a half, Mahmut managed to reach the observation post of the battalion. It turned out that all the officers were out of order. The arrived lieutenant was met by senior sergeant Shcherbina, who was acting as a battalion commander. Without hesitation, Gareev takes command of the battalion. And the enemy continues to push. Losses are growing. Already twice german tanks penetrated deep into the defense, but they managed to be destroyed or damaged by anti-tank mines or anti-tank rifles. By order of Gareev, the fighters took the most convenient positions. Of the remaining three machine guns, a battalion reserve was created, and the machine gunners were transferred to where there was a danger of a breakthrough by the enemy infantry. The battalion fought for two days, led by an officer who had just arrived at the front. The Germans, having lost a lot of equipment and manpower, were forced to retreat to their original positions. By this time, Captain Gubkin arrived in the battalion, and Gareev took over the first company.
In August 1942, Gareev, as acting battalion commander, took part in an offensive battle for the first time. Two platoons broke into the first enemy trench on the outskirts of the village of Varganovo. The rest of the units lay under enemy fire. The situation was very complicated. The personal example of officer Gareev decided the outcome of the battle. As a result of the rapid advance of the attackers and heavy mortar fire, the stronghold of Varganovo was taken. Mahmut was wounded, but continued to lead the battle. This was followed by a short stay in the hospital. And again the front. Soon a new wound and concussion.
Gareev met the victorious 45th year as an assistant to the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 45th rifle corps 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front.
The experience gained in the battles on the Western and 3rd Belorussian fronts was useful to Gareev when he, as a senior assistant to the head of the department for using the experience of the war of the operational department of the headquarters of the 5th Army, arrived in the 1st Far Eastern Front. There, soon Gareev and his comrades celebrated the victory over militaristic Japan. With a sense of triumph, they recalled the battles, both in the west during the Great Patriotic War, and in the east, where the last point of the Second World War was set.
After a relatively short service in the operational department of the headquarters of the 5th Army of the Primorsky Military District, M.A. Gareev was sent to study at the M.V. Frunze Military Academy. For him, these were years of hard work, deep reflection on the experience gained in the war. At the end of 1950, Gareev completed his studies at the academy with a gold medal. By this time he had a "taste" for scientific activity. He wrote the first works summarizing the experience of the past war.
Soon Gareev receives a new assignment and leaves for the Belarusian Military District as chief of staff of the 152nd Guards rifle regiment 50th Guards rifle division. Five months later, an experienced officer is transferred to the operational management department of the headquarters of the Belarusian military district to the position of senior officer. After another four and a half years, Colonel Gareev becomes the chief of staff of the 120th Guards Rifle Division.
Since the end of 1957, Makhmut Akhmetovich has been a student of the Military Academy named after K. E. Voroshilov (since 1958 - Military Academy General Staff Armed Forces of the USSR), which at the end of 1959 also graduated with a gold medal.
And again - goodbye Moscow! Hello, Belarus, where you have already had the opportunity to fight and serve. From November 1959 to September 1970, the colonel, and later General Gareev, successively held the following positions: deputy commander of the guards motorized rifle division, commander of the guards training motorized rifle regiment, deputy commander of a guards training tank division, commander of the same tank division, and finally, chief of staff - first deputy commander of a combined arms army.
Further, General Gareev is appointed chief of staff of the Chief Military Adviser in the armed forces of the United Arab Republic. In 1989 - 1991 Mahmut Akhmetovich - Advisor to the President Democratic Republic Afghanistan on military issues.
Returning from the DRA, General Gareev became chief of staff - first deputy commander, a member of the Military Council of the Ural Military District.
From Sverdlovsk, M. A. Gareev returned to Moscow, headed the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Then he becomes the head of the 7th Directorate - Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and finally, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
Since 1993, Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev has been the president of the Academy of Military Sciences. He is a doctor of military sciences and a doctor historical sciences, author of many books. Among them are such publications as Combined Arms Exercises, Frunze as a Military Theorist, Military Science, Ambiguous Pages of War, Outlines of the Armed Struggle of the Future. Special place in his work is the book "Marshal Zhukov. The greatness and uniqueness of military leadership." She was awarded the G.K. Zhukov State Prize. M. A. Gareev is the author of more than 250 scientific works. A number of his works have been published abroad.
Army General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev was awarded 19 orders and 30 medals.
The main hobbies of the general of the army are sports, reading and music.
Army General Makhmut Gareev by right is considered the elder of the officer corps of Russia. His first war was the Great Patriotic War. The second is the Soviet-Japanese. The third is the War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel, where he served as a military adviser. The fourth is the war in Afghanistan. On the eve of his 95th birthday, the illustrious military leader took the time to give an interview to AiF.
Sergey Osipov, AiF: - Makhmut Akhmetovich, your military biography started in Uzbekistan. But how did you, a Tatar from the Urals, get there?
Mahmut Gareev: - I was really born in Chelyabinsk in a large Tatar family. There were 8 of us kids. Then we moved to Omsk. But in the early 1930s, there was terrible unemployment in the country. In search of a better life, the father decided to move the family to Central Asia where, according to rumors, it was more satisfying to live. But first, my older brother was sent to Tashkent for reconnaissance. He wrote from there: come here, no matter what stick you stick in the ground, everything will grow. The family packed up and left. Then, by the way, the decision of the Council of People's Commissars was issued that the Tatar and Bashkir migrants were purposefully sent to Central Asia. Common Turkic languages and all that. So there were many Tatars in almost all Soviet institutions of Uzbekistan and other republics. One of my sisters, for example, worked as a teacher in an Uzbek village for 40 years.
Before leaving for the front in 1941 with his father. Photo: From the personal archive / Makhmut Gareev
The family settled in ancient city Karshi. I studied first in an Uzbek school, then in a Russian one. And the family spoke Tatar, so from childhood I was a polyglot. And I wanted to serve in the army. I read a lot about the great Russian commanders - Suvorov, Kutuzov wanted to be like them. Yes, and life in Uzbekistan was military. The city where we lived was regularly attacked by the Basmachi. They came from Afghanistan, where the British were in charge, who through them sought to destabilize the situation in the USSR. Basmachi killed communists, Soviet employees, slaughtered families in which children studied in Russian schools. Looking ahead, I will say that the Basmachism ended once and for all after June 22, 1941. The USSR and England became allies - and how cut off!
So, in the city of Karshi, where my family lived, the 82nd cavalry regiment stood to protect against the Basmachi. I got into the habit of going there, playing in a brass band. First on the viola, then on the baritone - such a big copper pipe. The Red Army soldiers fed me for this, and this is some kind of help to the family. Well, he became a pupil of the regiment along with several boys like me.
A little later, 10 of us wrote a statement to the military registration and enlistment office. At the beginning of 1941, we were sent to the Tashkent Infantry School. They were then commanded General Petrov, who later became famous during the defense of Odessa and Sevastopol. It didn't take long to learn. On June 22, we come back from field exercises, some carry a machine gun, some have a machine gun, and instead of lunch they build us on the parade ground. We listen to Molotov's speech through the loudspeaker. The war has begun...
In November, we were released from the school as platoon commanders and sent straight to the front near Moscow. Many of our graduates ended up in the 316th division, which later became the Panfilov division, and I was sent to the 120th separate rifle brigade. How did you get to the front-line Moscow - separate story. 50-60 kilometers either on foot or on a ride. Further - crawling on the belly, since the 3rd battalion destined for me fought in the environment. Got it. Towards - a foreman with a bandaged hand. Not a single officer remained in the ranks, and there were 40 fighters with headcount 400 people. This foreman commanded the battalion, was wounded, handed over his cases to me and left for the medical battalion. So my first position in the war was a battalion commander. I was him, however, not for long, until a more experienced officer arrived, Captain Gubkin. I received the 1st company. And he never commanded a platoon.
With comrades-in-arms, May 1, 1945. Photo: From the personal archive / Makhmut Gareev
What is the worst thing about war?
- The worst thing is not when they shoot. The worst is spring and autumn. During the day the sun will warm, the earth will thaw, become wet. If we need to go on the attack and the Germans will press us to the ground with fire - that's the trouble! You will plop down in a puddle or a funnel filled with water. And do not raise your head for hours. You lie on the muddy ground and slowly freeze.
And how were they saved?
- They saved themselves with vodka. True, it was issued only in winter and late autumn. Only vodka from the cold and escaped. In case the foreman did not have time to give out 100 grams, when there was an opportunity before the battle, they stocked up in the military trade with triple cologne. It also helped...
Do you remember the first time you got hurt?
— But how! It was in August 1942. He went on the attack near the village of Varganovo, Kaluga region. Now it is no longer on the map. A grenade in the right hand, a pistol in the left. Here in the left hand between the big and index finger the German bullet hit. Passed through the palm, the bone is not affected. I thought it would be fine, but after 2 days the palm began to swell. Went at night to an army hospital nearby. The surgeons there are angry, they didn’t sleep for three days, and they immediately say: they fought back! Now we will cut off the brush so that there is no gangrene. In their hospitals, a large flow of wounded was considered a good indicator. If they cut off my hand right away, I would have been treated for 15 days - and goodbye. But I refused amputation and ruined the hospital's indicators!
Okay, just kidding, I didn't spoil it. An old woman rescued me - a surgical nurse. He says, in the morning an ambulance train to Ryazan, go to the station, I'll write you down. He was treated for a month and a half, but he kept his hand. After, in 1943, there was a shrapnel in the head, then there was a bullet in the left leg, typhus in Manchuria during the war with Japan, a shell shock in Afghanistan in 1990 ...
Afghan, 1989 Photo: From the personal archive / Makhmut Gareev
- So, it seems that the Limited contingent was withdrawn in 1989.
- The contingent was withdrawn, and I remained - the chief military adviser at president Najibullah. And I was shell-shocked under such circumstances. We left the Soviet embassy in an armored UAZ. Apparently, the Taliban caught this case. On the outskirts of Kabul, a shell exploded next to the car. Concussion, I didn't need any courage this time. But then such times came that courage had to be shown in civilian life. And in their side, and not in Afghanistan.
- In terms of?
- in the sense that Soviet Union save from decay. Under certain conditions, this could be done. I am telling you this as a former deputy chief of the General Staff!
Mahmut Gareev. Photo: / Sergey Osipov
Position: retired Army General, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan Date and place of birth: July 23, 1923 / Chelyabinsk, USSR Education: Tashkent Red Banner Infantry School named after V. I. Lenin (1941), Military Academy named after Frunze (1950) , Military Academy of the General Staff (1959)
Years of life: 1923-2019
Fought on the Western and 3rd Belorussian fronts. He was deputy commander of a rifle battalion, assistant, deputy chief and chief of the operational unit of the headquarters of the rifle brigade, from June 1944 - officer of the headquarters of the 45th rifle corps. In 1942, in the battles near Rzhev, he was wounded, in 1944 he was again wounded in the head. In February 1945, after leaving the hospital, he was sent to the Far East as a senior officer in the operational department of the 5th Army headquarters. In its composition, he fought on the 1st Far Eastern Front during the Soviet-Japanese War in August 1945.
Career stages:
Before 1947- continued to serve at the headquarters of the 5th Army in the Far Eastern Military District;
1950 — 1957 - Chief of Staff of the Regiment, Senior Officer of the Operational Directorate of the Headquarters of the Belarusian Military District, Commander of the 307th Guards Training Motorized Rifle Regiment in the 45th Training Tank Division of the Belarusian Military District, Chief of Staff of the 120th Guards Motorized Rifle Division.
since 1959- Deputy division commander, commander of a motorized rifle and tank divisions, Chief of Staff of the 28th Combined Arms Army in the Belarusian Military District.
1970 — 1971 - Chief Military Adviser in the United Arab Republic;
With1971- Chief of Staff of the Ural Military District;
from February1974- Head of the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff;
With1984- Deputy Chief of the General Staff Armed Forces USSR;
since 1989- chief military adviser in Afghanistan after the withdrawal from there limited contingent Soviet troops, played a large role in planning the military operations of the government troops of President Najibullah;
With1990- Military Advisor - Inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense;
With1992- retired.
Scientific and social activity:
Since the establishment in February 1995 of the Academy of Military Sciences, a non-governmental research organization was elected its president.
Served as Inspector General of the Office of Inspectors General of the Department of Defense Russian Federation, Deputy Chairman of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Deputy Chairman of the Public Council under the Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation.
honorary titles and awards:
He was awarded the Order of Lenin, four Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Alexander Nevsky, Orders of the Patriotic War I and II degrees, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, three Orders of the Red Star, orders "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" II and III degrees, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.
In 2013 he was awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland III degree, in 2018 - the Order of Alexander Nevsky.
In 1998 he became the first laureate of the State Prize of the Russian Federation named after Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov for the book “Marshal Zhukov. The greatness and uniqueness of military leadership” (1996).
Major Gareev in 1945.
Photo from Mahmut Gareev's book "Battles on the military-historical front".
The Second World War ended not in May 1945 and not in Berlin, but in September and in the Far East. After the defeat of militarist Japan, in which, in addition to the US troops, the Red Army also took part. The Manchurian operation, carried out by the troops of the Trans-Baikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army in cooperation with the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla of the Soviet Union, entered the history of military art forever.
General of the Army Makhmut GAREEV, President of the Academy of Military Sciences of Russia, who was directly involved in the events, told the editor-in-chief of NVO about the unknown and little-known details of this operation.
- Our conversation, Makhmut Akhmetovich, I would like to start with such a rather acute issue today. Did the Soviet Union, endlessly exhausted by the war with Nazi Germany, also join the war against Japan? The Japanese did not threaten us much. Throughout the war, they maintained sufficient neutrality, and the Americans, whom we promised to help, in those years in every possible way delayed the opening of the Second Front, cynically observed who would gain the upper hand in that struggle - Germany or the USSR.
Why did we have to help them in the fight against Japan? After all, they could do without us.
- I think to say that the Americans could do without us in the East is the same as to say that we could do without them in the West. We must not forget that this was a world war. On one side were the aggressors - the "powers of the axis Berlin-Rome-Tokyo", on the other - the anti-Hitler coalition represented by its main participants - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. And neither we nor the Americans could end the war without solving problems both in the West and in the East.
As for the position of Moscow, no matter how our allies behave - England, the USA, despite also many shortcomings in Stalin's activities, especially within the country, it must be said frankly that in international cooperation, according to agreements with the allies, the head of our state was extremely consistent. In this regard, even foreign ill-wishers cannot reproach him for anything.
But the point here, of course, is not only the desire or unwillingness of individual leaders. For us, the war from the very beginning developed in such a way that there was a threat in the West and in the East. In all the strategic plans of the USSR, starting from the second half of the 1930s, there is one task - to be ready to fight on two fronts. In the West, which was emphasized with all certainty, against Germany, in the East - against Japan. And the most important goal of politics, diplomacy and military action was that we would not be forced into a simultaneous war, but in turn. First with one enemy, then with another.
In this regard, the task of defeating militarist Japan by the Soviet leadership has never been removed from the agenda. Why? Let's remember the shame Russo-Japanese War. The defeat of 1905 remains in the memory of the peoples of Russia with deep pain and sorrow. People of the older generation have been waiting for decades for this shame to be washed away. It is impossible to remove the feeling of just revenge from the psychology of Russian people. Let us also recall that in that war Japan inflicted great damage on Russia. It took away Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and other lands, which, in essence, were illegally transferred to Japan. During civil war the Japanese captured most Far East and tormented him. Thousands of people were shot. In fact, they committed undisguised aggression against us. All this required an appropriate response.
And, perhaps most importantly, Stalin considered it obligatory for himself to keep his word. The idea that the Soviet Union should enter the war with Japan was discussed in all our negotiations with the allies. They insisted and convincingly asked that the USSR enter this war. Before the Tehran Conference, Stalin always gave an evasive answer. But there he nevertheless promised to enter the war with Japan. This question arose especially sharply at the Crimean Conference. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin had already firmly stated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan two or three months after the end of the war with Germany. And exactly three months later, to the day, he fulfilled his promise - on May 9 the war in Europe ended, and on August 9 we began fighting against Japan.
- You, Makhmut Akhmetovich, were a young captain at that time?
No, I was already a major.
- But nevertheless, they fought in the West, then they had to fight in the East. What are your personal impressions - people who have gone through the same military path as you are not tired of fighting? With what mood did they take the news that after they were lucky to stay alive in one war, they were being driven to another, where, not even an hour, they could also be killed?
- I will answer this question, but first I want to finish the thought that I did not have time to express earlier.
We settled on the fact that exactly three months after the victory over Germany, Stalin declared war on Japan. What should be kept in mind here? Today, many of the events of that time are covered incorrectly, even perversely. Many argue that the Soviet Union should not have entered that war. They say that we seem to have violated the non-aggression pact. But the USSR announced the invalidity of this pact a month and a half before the start of the war. There was no breach of the pact. We acted according to international law.
In addition, it was clear (and these are studies by American scientists themselves and practical studies that were carried out at the headquarters of the US armed forces during the war years) that if Japan resisted, and the Japanese argued that even if the US captured their islands, they would come under guardianship The Kwantung Army will fight there for decades to come. Tokyo planned to keep Manchuria as a springboard to continue the war. Such sentiments were at that time very strong in Japan.
The Soviet Union, of course, was interested in the fact that there was no such bridgehead, because it would threaten not only America, but above all us, our Far East. And this bridgehead had to be liquidated at all costs, and the Japanese army had to be defeated.
American experts calculated and reported to Roosevelt that if the USSR did not enter the war, it could last a year or a year and a half, and it would cost a million lives for American soldiers. That's how the question was. Even after the US dropped atomic bombs On August 6 and 9 on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan did not capitulate, did not stop resistance, it was going to continue to fight.
And when we analyze all these circumstances, we will understand: the Soviet Union had to enter this war. It was in his interests, and in the interests of all mankind - it was necessary to complete the Second world war. Put a dot on it. The defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in a short time removed all the fears that I mentioned. The victory was won quickly. We practically saved tens and hundreds of thousands of lives of American and British soldiers who were going to fight there to the bitter end. Unfortunately, this is often forgotten. Especially across the ocean.
Now about the mood of the veterans. After the capture of Koenigsberg, in which I participated, on April 11, 1945...
– More than sixty-five years ago┘
- Yes. I was then at the headquarters of the 5th Army, in the operations department. Our troops have become from the territory East Prussia to transfer the 28th army, which stormed Koenigsberg, was sent to the Berlin direction. Others went to the Hungarian direction┘
- Not certainly in that way. This is a very interesting point. The fact is that they began to transfer troops to the East immediately after Finland left the war. It was in the autumn of 1944, somewhere in September or October. What is the "highlight" of the Manchurian operation? There, in the East, it was possible to quickly end the war, defeat the Kwantung Army and not suffer heavy losses on one condition - if the Red Army ensured the surprise of this operation. And how to ensure it, if we denounced the treaty, and it was possible to understand that the Soviet Union was going to enter the war? How to transfer such a mass of troops from West to East without the Japanese noticing? It is almost impossible to do this.
The Japanese were waiting for our attack. But when it will happen, they did not guess.
Today you can often hear from some "analysts" that we fought mediocre. It's a lie. Our commanders had a lot of amazing insights. The Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Alexei Antonov, and Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky also participated in this work (by the way, after the death of Chernyakhovsky, he was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, so that, firstly, he would quickly defeat the Nazis in East Prussia and freed troops for the transfer to the East, and secondly, to get the practice of managing the front), and he planned this operation so skillfully that the Japanese practically did not notice anything.
They began to transfer divisions to the East as early as 1944. But defiantly those that were on the Karelian front, some from the Hungarian direction ... It was those divisions that had previously been transferred from East to West. Both the Japanese and our civilian population knew for sure that these troops were now returning in triumph to their places of permanent deployment. These connections were met with flowers, with music at the stations - there are no questions. And under their cover, a large number of other troops, especially tank and aviation, were transferred already covertly. They weren't shown anywhere. They stopped at dead ends, people were not allowed to go anywhere.
Sometimes you hear: how can there be surprise at such distances and with such a mass of troops? But she was. If you use disinformation, an ordinary military trick, then you can do a lot.
What else should be kept in mind? About a month before August 9, the Japanese government approached us with a request to mediate peace talks between Tokyo and Washington. The Japanese promised that for this they would return South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. We could solve our territorial problems politically without losing a single person. Then only the Americans would bear losses in manpower. But Stalin was so consistent in these matters that he considered it a matter of honor to keep his word. He did not accept such a lucrative offer from Tokyo, but entered the war.
- You did not answer the question about the mood of the soldiers.
- Yes, we will return to Koenigsberg. Some of our formations and units began to be loaded onto the train. Nobody knew where we were going. There were intense fights, we were all very tired. Despite this, we were all forced to glue maps of the Berlin and Prague directions - everyone thought that we were going there. But it turned out that we went to Moscow. The echelon of the headquarters of the 5th Army arrived in the capital on May 2. We were at an impasse. But that evening, for the first time in my life, I saw fireworks in honor of the capture of Berlin. And there was a rumor in the echelon that we were going to fight against Turkey. Only when we crossed the Volga did it become clear where we were going after all. We drove very secretly.
– At night?
- No, we drove around the clock, and made stops only at night. No train stations, only far from them, in some dead ends. Not even all the unit and formation commanders knew where we were going. In general, this transfer of such a mass of troops was exceptionally well planned and clearly carried out. By that time, Stalin already unconditionally trusted his generals, did not constrain their initiative.
On the border of Manchuria with the Soviet Union, the Japanese created a very powerful fortified area. In order to destroy it, the front headquarters planned three days of continuous artillery preparation. A day and a half only to open the system of the fortified area - with artillery fire it was necessary to remove the thickets that masked the pillboxes. But the commander of our 5th Army, Colonel General Nikolai Krylov, decided to go on the offensive without artillery preparation. Covertly, advanced battalions.
On August 9, at one in the morning Khabarovsk time, when it was pouring rain, we, under the cover of this downpour, accompanied by border guards (and in training before the offensive, all the forward detachments worked out border crossing routes with border guards many times) crossed the border and captured pillboxes. In peacetime, no one lives in pillboxes. The Japanese lived in wooden houses five hundred or six hundred meters from these pillboxes. And while they jumped out to meet us, the pillboxes were already captured. Without a single shot.
To the north of Gradekovo, where we were standing, there is Mount Camel, Mount Garrison. There, in the area of Gradekovo itself, our UR (fortified area) was located, it was commanded by General Shurshin. And he, in order to cheer up the troops, decided to hold an artillery raid for ten minutes. And when the raid was made, the Japanese jumped out and occupied the pillboxes. The war had already ended, I was driving across the border with a report to the headquarters of the front - the Japanese were still sitting in pillboxes and firing. What does this fact say? If we had not chosen such tactics, as suggested by General Krylov, we would have begun to attack, as during the Finnish war, to break through the defenses, only the fight against the URs would have continued for six to seven months. That's what a reasonable commander's decision means.
Look, there was a million-strong Kwantung Army. Of it, only 690 thousand people were captured. And in total we lost 12 thousand soldiers and officers during this operation. This is for those accusations when we are told that we fought mediocrely, filled up the enemy with corpses ... That is why some people in the West do not like to remember our Manchurian operation.
– There is another side of the issue. I will definitely ask him. For now, I still want to hear from you: what were the moods of the soldiers who took Berlin, Koenigsberg, and they were sent to fight also in the East?
“A lot depended on age. To us, young officers... A small digression. On June 22, when the war began, I studied at the Tashkent Military School. We were lined up on the parade ground, and we listened to Molotov's speech. A cadet Garkavtsev was standing next to me. He says: here again, as in Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, while we are studying here, the war will end. We won't be able to fight again.
Garkavtsev died at the end of forty-second, near Stalingrad. I remembered him so that you could understand what kind of mood we, young officers, had at that time. In forty-five I was twenty-two. I'm already a major. And even with some enthusiasm he accepted the news of the war against Japan. And among us were people of an older age, let's call it average. They also agreed: yes, the Japanese need to take revenge. But there were those who spent four years in the war, and before the war, many who had already served their time were not transferred to the reserve. Some of them pulled the soldier's strap for seven or eight years. They had families. They hoped: the war will end, they will return home, and then...
I was not burdened by anything. So the mood was different.
I remember when we arrived at the place, we began to conduct training, we had the battalion commander Georgy Gubkin, he later received the Star of the Hero, began to teach soldiers: grenades on the hills of Manchuria must be thrown differently than you did near Koenigsberg. There the place is flat, here it is mountainous. Throw it up until it explodes, roll under your feet. Therefore, after pulling out the pin, twist it with your hand twice and only then throw it. We had to teach and front-line soldiers.
But I remembered this in order to pay attention to such a detail: Gubkin told how to use grenades, then he asked: do you have any questions? One fighter was out of action, he was forty-five years old, he asks: when will the demobilization be? Some of my colleagues were very worried about this issue.
- Let's go back to the numbers that you mentioned: almost 700 thousand were taken prisoner, and only 12 died. In the West, they say that the Red Army had such relatively small losses not because its commanders gained the necessary combat experience, pitied and protected people, skillfully used their martial arts, but because after the nuclear bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the Kwantung Army was already demoralized and did not represent such a formidable force as it was before August 6. Surrendered in captivity by regiments and divisions. The Russians did not perform any special feats. What can you say about this?
- When someone wants to justify and prove some kind of stupidity, you can come up with anything. All historical facts these claims are refuted. I have already given you some of them. If we acted according to a template, and not as we did the Manchurian operation, we would have to fight, in spite of any Hiroshima, for a very, very long time.
But when we arrived in the Far East, we had the experience of four years of war behind us. Our military art was at the highest level. Even today, when you visit military exercises for three or four days, you already feel that you have learned something, but here if for four years “KSHU (command and staff exercises. - V.L.) goes in conditions that are too close to reality ”, then, of course, you can learn a lot. And what we represented in the forty-first - forty-second, and what we represented in the forty-fifth - it was heaven and earth.
And if these skillful actions had not been, then we would have received a “second Gradekovo”. From Mount Camel, the Japanese, who had settled in pillboxes, fired for another six months: they had everything there - ammunition supplies, water, and food ... Everything was there. The war was over and they were shooting.
Everything suggests that it was only thanks to skillful actions that we avoided great losses. And the Japanese were determined to resist. They really resisted. So I had to save the 84th Cavalry Division of General Dedeugly.
– Mongolian division? The surname of the commander is similar.
– No, the commander was an Armenian by nationality. I recently read the book “Armenians in the Great Patriotic War”. There is a photograph of him, a story about him. So, on August 15-18, the division was surrounded - it was to the northeast of Nenani, there is such a Chinese city. The Japanese fought desperately there. It was the same in other places. But the skillful actions of our troops, the landing of a large number of troops in their rear - not by parachute, but by landing, all this had a deafening effect on them. You can judge this at least by such an episode.
In the zone of the Trans-Baikal Front there was a fortress Zhekhe. This, as far as I remember, is a half-million city, a powerful stone fortress. And if it had to be stormed, as they say, in the forehead, it would take a lot of time and, of course, there would be big losses ... But what does the corps commander, General Issa Pliev, do? In the forty-first year, this was even unimaginable.
He takes security guards of seven or eight people, one Dodge car, two Jeep cars. He sits in them and at great speed bursts right into the gates of this fortress, enters the headquarters and says: I called the planes, they are ready to bomb you. If you don't want to be killed all of you, give up. We bargained for an hour and a half, the entire garrison - 25 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered to one general with a guard detachment. That's what commander's audacity and pressure mean.
- But on August 14, there was an appeal by the Japanese emperor that the army should stop resisting.
- It was. But not all garrisons and units of the Kwantung Army received it. Not everyone was going to follow this order. After all, there was another order: the Americans to surrender, the Chinese to surrender, and continue to fight with the Russians. In order for us to occupy as little territory as possible in Korea, Manchuria and other regions of China. Despite this, we have solved all our problems.
There everything went to the fact that there would be great resistance, we would have to bear heavy losses, if it were not for such skillful actions of our command. And all the talk that the Japanese were in a panic and were going to surrender in orderly rows is not confirmed by any facts.
- In the war against Japan, there were two armies - ours and the American. It is clear that at the strategic level, the plans for interaction were somehow coordinated. But was it at the tactical and operational-tactical level? At the grassroots - in the regimental, divisional units?
– I was not then initiated into such interaction. But while working at the headquarters of the 5th Army, of course, I had to see and know something. For example, we were told that the Americans should not enter Port Arthur, the port of Dalniy, that by agreement we should be there. That there will be Americans in Korea south of the 38th parallel. By the way, our battalions of the 25th Army, Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov, approached the northern outskirts of Seoul and stood there for two days until the Americans approached. And when the allies approached, we withdrew our troops beyond the 38th parallel. That is, some details of the coordinated actions were known to us at that time. But when our troops, units of the 39th Army reached Port Arthur, two American detachments tried to land there in high-speed landing craft. And our fire, however, upwards, not on them, were forced to drive away the Yankees, did not allow them to land on the shore.
Americans, of course, have never suffered from a lack of arrogance. It was believed that they could capture Port Arthur and then not leave from there. Still, the agreements were largely respected. Although Washington did not do much. There was, for example, an agreement that we would participate in the occupation of Japan, that one or two of our brigades would be stationed in Tokyo following the example of Berlin.
Our 35th Army, commanded by Colonel-General Nikolai Zakhvataev, was already training to serve there, and was about to land on the island of Hokkaido. But General Douglas MacArthur, who had a very determined character and great influence in the White House, rejected this US commitment. President Harry Truman, apparently, did not feel very confident, and MacArthur actually personally dictated many questions on the Far East, took all measures to prevent the landing of the Soviet Union on the territory of Japan.
The Americans insisted on establishing their own bases on the territory of the Soviet Union for the war with Japan. For example, in the Kuriles. But it was clear that if they took these places, then at least they would not leave soon. And such proposals were also rejected.
I must say that at the diplomatic level we are not the best way worked after the war. We shouldn't have slammed the door and left the San Francisco Conference. It was necessary to conclude an agreement or postpone its conclusion jointly with other countries. And since we left, they signed it without us. Now it comes back to us.
- Last question. How did the Chinese population meet you, soldiers of the Red Army? What impression did you get from talking with him, with the Chinese communists? I don't know, wittingly or unwittingly, but you helped the Chinese Communists defeat the Kuomintang and carry out the socialist revolution in the country.
– This issue requires a separate conversation, although in short, this is not a researched topic at all. Not illuminated anywhere. There were a lot of such insidious questions, which neither journalists nor historians have yet got to the bottom of and which are still waiting for their researcher. But what can be said in advance. Probably, nowhere did our troops meet so well, except, perhaps, in Belarus, as in Korea and China.
By the way, one can talk endlessly about the Manchurian operation, how well everything was thought out. But there is a document. The intelligence chief of the 5th Kwantung Army (there was also the 5th Army) reports to Commander Yamada that the concentration of Soviet troops is going on, the depth of this concentration, the length along the front - they worked undercover intelligence. On the report, the resolution of the Japanese commander: "Only a madman can advance in the rainy season." And in August it started to rain. But we chose the beginning of the offensive at a time when everyone thought it was crazy.
This created enormous difficulties for the troops. Supply immediately disrupted
– You can’t drag artillery, tanks…
Everything got stuck in the mud. I later saw in North Korea, especially in Nenan, Girin, Donghua - in these areas. All the villages converged and helped to drag our guns, helped to pull out the tanks, which got stuck, just got stuck in the mud, cars ... From one village to another, the tanks were actually dragged by hand. No one forced them to do this - they hated the Japanese so much that they were ready for anything, just to drive them away from native land. The Japanese really treated them very cruelly. After all, only once a month was it allowed in China and Korea to eat rice ...
This is a separate issue. But we are often reproached: why didn't you immediately release the captured Japanese, why did you take them to the Soviet Union? I was the head of the operational group in the northern part of Manchuria to control these prisoner-of-war camps, and when our troops were about to leave in the forty-fifth, then they stayed for a few more months, we handed over the first few camps to the Chinese. What did they do? All products were taken away from the Japanese. A Chinese walks past the camp and definitely thinks that it is necessary to shoot at him.
- Japanese?
- Yes, the Japanese were on their knees: do not leave us. There is demagoguery, unfortunately, among journalists who say: illegally exported, violated international law┘ But what to do with 650 thousand people? There is no transport to take them all to Japan, and the situation is such that everything around is mined. You can’t leave them here, the Chinese will kill them all - they themselves ask to take them away. When people do not know all the circumstances, they try to make categorical judgments... But in life everything is much more complicated.
Many difficult questions arose. Before the start of the war with Japan, the Soviet Union entered into an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. On Port Arthur, on the Chinese Eastern Railway, on other issues. The communists were terribly offended. I kept running into the chairman of the Northeast China Military Council with Comrade Gao Gann, smartest person, revolutionary. He expressed extreme indignation about this. But, apparently, the leadership of our country did not really believe that the communists would win in China and considered it necessary to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek. In general, in the long term, even taking into account the realities of today, it was more profitable for our country if Chiang Kai-shek won there. Weak, fragmented China played into our hands then.
And if the Communists came to power, the Kremlin understood, China would become a powerful centralized power. There will be a lot of joy, but also worries.
– Why then did we help Mao Zedong and not Chiang Kai-shek?
- All the first agreements before the war were concluded with Chiang Kai-shek. And there was such a condition: where our troops are stationed, neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang should go there. How did it happen? Under an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, in October-November 1945, we were to withdraw our troops from Manchuria. Suddenly, Chiang Kai-shek sees: if we leave, all the cities will immediately be occupied by the communists. It is unprofitable for him, and he does not have enough strength to take our place. He's stuck in the Special District, other places. They also accepted the surrender of Japanese troops. In short, he appeals to Stalin with a request to leave the Red Army where it is. And immediately there is a contradiction with Mao...
There are many papers on the subject that have never been published. Perhaps the time has not yet come. We leave them for future researchers.
THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
MILITARY ART OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV
Interview with the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army Makhmut GAREEV
Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev was born on July 23, 1923 in Chelyabinsk. Served in Soviet army over 50 years. Member of the Great Patriotic War - on the Western, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Far Eastern fronts. Several times he was wounded, shell-shocked. AT post-war years was in various command and staff positions in the Far Eastern, Belarusian, Ural military districts, chief of staff of the Chief Military Adviser in Egypt and adviser to the President - Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan. The last position was Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Author of books: "Tactical exercises and maneuvers", "Combined arms exercises", "M.V. Frunze - a military theorist", "Military science", " national interests and military security Russia”, “If there is war tomorrow”, “Ambiguous pages of the war”, “My last war” and more than 200 other scientific papers on methodological issues military science, the theory of military art, the methodology of military training and education, military history published in the USSR, in Russia and abroad. Laureate of the M.V. Frunze Prize. Doctor of Military and Doctor of Historical Sciences. |
Dear Makhmut Akhmetovich, This May we are celebrating the 54th anniversary of the Victory. For many of our contemporaries, the Great Patriotic War is something very distant, and they sometimes judge the war only by films and publications in the media. mass media. Unfortunately, reliability here often gives way to completely different criteria. One of the hottest topics is the scale of the military leadership talent of our military leaders. And the most striking figure among them is, of course, Marshal Zhukov.
Not so long ago, the American newspaper "News" published a list of one hundred outstanding commanders world history. There are only four Russians, including Soviets. While Americans - 17, 19 British, 12 French, 9 Germans. Although, unlike the United States that has existed for just over 200 years, Russia has been at war for more than a thousand years, having many outstanding, striking victories to its credit.
It seems even more strange that in the mentioned list, Hitler is in 14th place, followed by his beaten generals, and Zhukov occupies a modest 70th place. Domestic media do not lag behind, constantly exaggerating the topic of Zhukov's "cruelty", or even accusing him of "mediocrity".
Meanwhile, after more than half a century, it becomes more and more obvious that Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov will forever go down in military history as a great commander. In Russia, after Suvorov, he had no equal. As a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I command fronts, he was a participant in the most important, key events and battles of the Great Patriotic War.
The modern reader demands an indispensable explanation from us, not content with the mere statement of fact. By what criteria can one evaluate the talent of a commander?
Military history knows thousands of different commanders, but, apparently, no more than ten of them fell into the category of great ones. To get into this elite, it was necessary not only to win victories, but also to find brilliant solutions and methods of action, to show one's brilliant military style and, in general, a high level of military art.
If you look at encyclopedias or textbooks on military history, then in the case of the generals of the past, everything comes down to one form or another of building battle formations and new methods of warfare.
But often, especially in the First and Second World Wars, the belligerents acted in approximately the same battle formation. At the same time, some won, while others suffered defeat.
What then is the main reason, if you like, the secret, what, finally, is the basic law of military art that determines victory or defeat? What makes a commander truly great?
To explain this phenomenon of military history, various factors are given: the economic power of the state, numerical and military-technical superiority. The aims of war were often spoken of, meaning that armies waging a "just" war should usually win. Of course, all of this mattered. But often the opposite happened. So, for example, the army of T. Kosciuszko numbering 100 thousand people, which led a fair liberation war, was defeated by the 25,000th army of Suvorov, who, as was said later, waged a not very fair war.
The study of the experience of the Great Patriotic War, Zhukov's military art, in particular, brings us closest to understanding this problem. The conclusion suggests itself that the main thing here is the correspondence of strategic goals, decisions of the command and actions of the troops to the specific conditions of the situation, which ensures the successful fulfillment of military tasks. Moreover, this is not about formally taking into account the spontaneously developing situation, but about actively influencing it in order to extract benefits for oneself and impose one's will on the enemy.
Take, for example, the defense of Leningrad or Moscow, where the art of generalship manifested itself not in a catchy form of operational maneuver, but in an iron will, unshakable determination, which were transferred to the troops, in a rigid organization and firmness of control. Here Zhukovsky's character manifested itself with particular force.
If in the September defensive operation the Western Front practically collapsed, then under the command of Zhukov, the same front, newly restored during heavy battles, in October-November 1941, for the first time during the war, conducted successful defensive operations and was able not only to repel the German offensive, but also to push them back from Moscow.
Another example. After the war, some military historians asked Zhukov what principle of an offensive operation he adhered to: “fading” or “undamped”? Why, during the Vistula-Oder operation with reaching the line of Bydgoszcz and achieving the specific goal of the operation, he stubbornly sought Stalin's consent to a further non-stop offensive to the Oder River, and after that, contrary to the requirement of the Supreme Commander to continue the offensive against Berlin, he insisted on an operational pause, for which he war criticized (in particular, V.I. Chuikov and others)? Zhukov was also reproached for the fact that after the delay at the Seelow Heights, he brought tank armies into battle even before breaking through the entire tactical defense zone.
To these questions and reproaches, Georgy Konstantinovich reasonably answered that he did not adhere to any abstract theoretical principles and statutory provisions, but each time proceeded only from the specific situation and operational-strategic expediency. In the first case, the position and actions of the enemy, the capabilities of our troops made it possible to make a throw to the Oder, and in February-March the conditions were already different. It was necessary to relocate aviation, pull up the rear, replenish the troops, secure the right flank of the front from a possible enemy counterattack. Tank armies had to be brought in during the Berlin operation because there was almost complete defense from the Seelow Heights to Berlin and no operational space was foreseen. Otherwise, one would have to break through a deep defense with the forces of infantry alone and slowly, with huge losses to move towards Berlin, and to introduce tank armies with an approach to a huge city, as they did in Grozny in 1995.
Thus, for Zhukov, the main thing was a specific analysis of the current situation and specific decisions arising from this situation. Zhukov believed that each battle, operation, is unique and unrepeatable. Decisions and methods of action should be just as unique and unrepeatable. Main essence Zhukovsky military art - in creativity, innovation, originality, and therefore, in the surprise of decisions and actions for the enemy.
So we can define first An important feature of Zhukov's talent as a commander is inexhaustible creativity and innovation.
Second an important feature is a deep, flexible mind and insight. In the words of Machiavelli, "nothing makes a commander great more than the ability to penetrate the enemy's plan." And Zhukov perfectly mastered this art. The ability to mentally read the most complex and confusing situation, like an open book, not only to penetrate the enemy’s plan, but also to anticipate the possible course of events, gave him the opportunity to take the necessary measures in advance. This ability played a special role in the defense of Leningrad and Moscow, when, with extremely limited forces, only due to good reconnaissance, foreseeing possible directions of enemy attacks, Zhukov managed to gather ahead of time in these areas not the main ones, as it should be according to science, but almost all available means.
Particularly striking is the foresight shown by Zhukov in July 1941, when Hitler was just hatching the idea of turning two armies to the south to strike at the flank of our South Western Front. Moreover, his most experienced generals objected when the corresponding directive was delivered to Borisov. Halder and Guderian went to headquarters to persuade the Fuhrer to cancel the decision. In general, it seemed incredible that the German command could stop the successfully developing offensive against Moscow. And so, when this command itself did not yet know how to act, Zhukov reported to Stalin with all certainty that the enemy would turn part of the forces from Moscow to Kiev direction, and proposed measures to strengthen the Central Front and withdraw troops Southwestern Front for the Dnieper.
Stalin did not agree with this and, moreover, for excessive persistence and harshness, he removed Zhukov from the post of chief of the General Staff. But this Zhukovsky insight will forever adorn the history of military art.
Or another example - the final combat operations of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky to seize and expand bridgeheads on the Narew River. When Zhukov arrived here from the 3rd Ukrainian, where he organized the entry of Soviet troops into Bulgaria, Rokossovsky's troops fought hard and fruitless battles on the bridgeheads and suffered heavy losses. Marshal Rokossovsky many times appealed to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command with a request to gain a foothold on the achieved lines, justifying this with a lack of funds, fatigue of the troops and irreparable losses. But got rejected. Stalin demanded to complete offensive operation the capture of larger bridgeheads, as was always done in the second half of the war. At the same time, he promised to send additional troops and aircraft.
Zhukov, having been in the troops of the 1st Belorussian, also became convinced of the futility of continuing the offensive and supported Rokossovsky at the Stavka meeting. But in favor of such a decision, he brought a different, but such an argument, which immediately disarmed everyone, including Stalin. The marshal explained that bridgeheads on the Narew River would not be required for the subsequent major offensive operation (they would only be needed to misinform the enemy) and that in order to capture Warsaw, the main blows would have to be delivered in other directions.
This is an example of how one commander looks at military operations through the prism of the ending operation, and the other - Zhukov - sees the same situation with completely different eyes, correlating it with the plan and interests of the subsequent operation.
Third An important feature of Zhukov's military art and the lesson that follows from it is careful planning and comprehensive preparation of each operation.
And one more quality should be noted. This is Zhukov's ability to firmly and persistently implement the decisions made, the will and courage in defending his proposals and decisions.
As Clausewitz wrote, “the higher we climb the steps of the service hierarchy, the more predominance in activity gets thought, reason and understanding; the more courage, which is a property of temperament, is relegated to the background; therefore, we so rarely find her in high positions, but then she is all the more worthy of admiration. We know from history how difficult it is. Even the great Kutuzov could not resist the waywardness of the two emperors near Austerlitz. Sometimes it is easier to show courage in battle than civil courage.
Zhukov's courage manifested itself even at Khalkhin Gol. If during the events on Lake Khasan Mekhlis and others simply crushed Blucher under them, then Zhukov at Khalkhin Gol immediately stopped the intervention of Marshal Kulik and Stern. Before being sent to Leningrad during World War II, he set a condition for Stalin - to prohibit Zhdanov from interfering in operational affairs. And then, during the war, Zhukov, together with A.M. Vasilevsky, defended the most expedient decisions before Stalin, and in the second half of the war this was often successful, which saved our troops from many disasters and losses.
In a short interview it is impossible to fully cover all aspects of military art in the Great Patriotic War. And yet, could you, Makhmut Akhmetovich, give examples of successful operations, where the talent of our commanders was clearly manifested? After all, it is no secret that until now, individual historians, researchers of the war, and the example of the rating of an American newspaper you cited testifies to this, consider our Victory to be largely accidental or achieved by unprecedented victims in spite of, and not thanks to, military art.
Speaking about the art of war in the Great Patriotic War, about the military art of Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev, Govorov and our other outstanding military leaders, we must not forget that our army resisted and defeated the actually strongest army in the world, an enemy that possessed (it’s not a sin to recall) resources almost all of Europe, which no one had been able to resist before.
Zhukov, back in the war game in 1940, and then throughout the war, actually opposed German strategic thought. And if he and Keitel, one of the leading German strategists, met in 1945 in Berlin during the signing of the German Surrender Act - one as a winner, the other as a loser, then normal person it is not clear who fought how, who was a really outstanding strategist!
I have already spoken above about the military talent and courage shown by Zhukov during the defense of Moscow and Leningrad. During the Stalingrad epic, it was Zhukov and Vasilevsky who caught the moment when it was necessary to abandon the waste of forces on the continuation of numerous counterattacks, but to accumulate strength and prepare a more thorough offensive operation. As you know, it ended with the encirclement and destruction of the 300,000-strong enemy grouping.
The Battle of Kursk, in addition to a huge victory and the achievement of a radical turning point in the course of the war, from the point of view of military art, meant a new understanding of the essence of strategic defense, when the military went on the defensive not forcedly, but in advance, which was not possible either in the 41st or in the 42nd m. It was not possible because defense was regarded only as a temporary, forced type of military action, designed to repulse the offensive of superior enemy forces in a short time and with limited forces. It was not taken into account that defense on a strategic scale with the aim of disrupting the offensive and defeating the enemy, holding the occupied lines without a large retreat also requires large forces, conducting a number of additional fierce battles. This was one of the great discoveries in the art of war, which is still not properly understood.
In the battles of 1944 - 1945, Zhukov led the largest strategic operations of front groups, which became the prototype new form strategic operations in the theater of operations (Theater of War), reaching the highest level military leadership in the Belarusian, Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations. Berlin, for example, was taken in 7 days, while the Nazi troops failed to take either Leningrad or Moscow.
It is impossible to ignore one more constantly exaggerated in recent times question: about combat losses and Zhukov's "cruelty".
In general, the issue of losses during hostilities is very sensitive. Now they write a lot about the fact that because of our heavy losses during the Great Patriotic War, even a victory cannot be considered a victory, and instead of Victory Day, a day of mourning should be established. I will not go into detail here overall figures characterizing the losses of the USSR and Germany in this war, but I will refer to the first two issues of your journal, where Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev spoke about this in detail. I will only note that in reality our irretrievable military losses during the Great Patriotic War make up 8.6 million people, and the fascist army and its allies - 7.2 million people. The difference (about 1.5 million people) was formed due to the extermination of Soviet prisoners of war (about 4.5 million people were captured by the Nazis, and they returned only 2 million after the war). The circumstance that at the end of the war the entire German and Japanese Kwantung Army capitulated to our Armed Forces is also discounted.
But back to Zhukov. The most common thesis in the accusations against him is unsubstantiated speculation about his cruelty, inattention to his subordinates, the desire to achieve the goal "at any cost", about prohibitively large losses in personnel (compared to other commanders) in all the operations that he conducted . Georgy Vladimov in the novel "The General and His Army" holds the idea that Guderian treated people with care, and Zhukov proceeded from the principle of "losses not to be considered." In reality, however, Zhukov did not simply unfoundedly proclaim the demand for saving people. He achieved this by a demanding attitude towards himself personally and by the combat training of troops, by carefully preparing commanders, staffs and troops for each operation.
At a time when it became fashionable to peck Zhukov with might and main, not only lightweight historians and journalists talked about losses, but, unfortunately, some honored military leaders. But how did they do it? They said, for example, that during the counteroffensive near Moscow, the Western Front suffered more losses than the Kalinin Front (ZF - 100 thousand people, KF - 27 thousand people). But at the same time, they kept silent that the Western Front included more than 700 thousand people, and the Kalinin Front - 190 thousand.
If we take losses as a percentage of the total number of troops (which is more correct), then the picture is completely different. The irretrievable losses of the Western Front under the command of G.K. Zhukov are 13.5% of the total number of troops, and Kalininsky I.S. Konev - 14.2%. In the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation, Zhukov had 20.9%, and Konev had 35.6%; in the Vistula-Oder - the 1st Belorussian Front - 1.7%, and the 1st Ukrainian - 2.4%; in the Berlin operation, where the largest and most powerful enemy grouping opposed the 1st Belorussian front, the loss of the latter is 4.1%, and the loss of the 1st Ukrainian front- 5 %. The losses of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (R.Ya.Malinovsky) in the Budapest one are 1.5 - 2 times higher than the losses in the Berlin operation. See for yourself what the facts say!
Military art has attracted attention at all times. By examples feats of arms their compatriots brought up generations. Our magazine plans to continue to devote its pages to this topic. In particular, we plan to publish the results of our ongoing survey of leading specialists in the history of World War II in order to identify its leading commanders. We remind readers that this year marks the 60th anniversary of the beginning of this very bloody war. This autumn we will try to celebrate one more date - the 60th anniversary of the Winter War. We hope for your help in this and we invite scientists of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation, which you head, to visit our pages.
I am sure that the scientists of our Academy will gladly take advantage of your invitation. And I would like to wish the readers of The World of History to treat the past of their country with respect and care. At one time, I.S. Turgenev said about one of the literary heroes that when such people disappear, it will be possible to close the book of history - there will be nothing to read in it. Life has its own heroes, so I'm sure it's too early to close the book of history.